

restricted data. Access to classified military information would be a decision of the Department of Defense.

(d) Any press allowed to observe a test could not be given access to classified information. Subject to this limitation, the press could observe the actual shot and be given briefings before and after the shot on effects, safety, arrangements, and the like.

2. Availability of Facilities. -- The present plan for U.S. media representatives and Federal Civil Defense Administration observers calls for one ship heavily supplied with communications facilities to accommodate 30 to 40 U.S. media representatives and 30 to 40 U.S. Civil Defense observers

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plus necessary staff to service this group. There is no provision at present for accommodating foreign media or foreign observers either afloat or ashore (5 UK and 5 Canadian official representatives are the exception to this statement).

B. COURSES OF ACTION

3. The following courses of action have been developed with the view to minimizing unfavorable impact on foreign climate of opinion:

(a) No press be invited and a coordinated information program be developed by AEC and the Department of Defense to replace press coverage, (Only UK and Canadian official observers would be present).

Comment:

- (1) This solution causes the least problems in terms of logistics and pressures from other nations. State believes that this will create the least public criticism and comment. Defense has no objection to this solution.
- (2) In the absence of accommodations for personnel and full facilities for transmission of information and because of security restrictions limiting and complicating coverage on the spot, the U.S. Information Agency feels that more problems of a public information character would be raised by restricting coverage to certain public information media than would be solved. Accordingly the U.S. Information Agency favors this solution.

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will also present added security problems. In addition, communications facilities available on the press ship are considered barely adequate for U.S. press needs and would be insufficient for a combined U.S. and foreign press group.

- (3) Department of Defense views this solution as unacceptable on the basis that additional foreign official observers cannot be accommodated without overtaking existing logistic facilities.

(c) Invitation to U.S. press on one trip and approximately 40-50 foreign official observers on the second trip. (U.K. and Canadian observers to be accommodated separately.)

Comment:

- (1) This solution might satisfy the requirement of cementing good relations with our allies, and would be supported by State and CIA.
- (2) Department of Defense would object to this solution on the same basis as (b) above. In addition, Department of Defense feels that even if the logistics problem were to be solved, the results would not justify the expense.

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(d) Invitation to the U.S. press only, plus U.K. and Canadian official observers.

Comment:

- (1) This is the solution recommended by the AEC. Department of Defense has no objection.
- (2) In the opinion of the Department of State and CIA, this solution would cause unsatisfactory relations with our allies and from the standpoint of foreign climate of opinion might jeopardize the future conduct of weapons tests in the Pacific.

B. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FINANCING

4. Foreign official observers could be requested to defray the costs of travel to the point of embarkation, probably Hawaii. Representatives of foreign media, if accepted on the presently planned press ship, could be requested to pay on the same basis as the U.S. media representatives. It would not be feasible for members of the foreign press or foreign official observers to pay for charter of a separate vessel. The vessel presently planned for U.S. news media might make a second trip for the benefit of foreign official observers. Cost of the vessel in this case would have to be assumed by the U.S. Government. The AEC has indicated that it does not have funds for such a second trip.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that:

(a) The Operations Coordinating Board select one of the foregoing courses of action as the basis of guidance to the appropriate agencies with respect to participation of foreign observers in Operation REDWING.

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(b) If the board approves a course of action involving attendance by foreign official representatives, that the Departments of State and Defense be requested to develop an acceptable method of selection.

(c) If the Board approves a course of action involving attendance by foreign press representatives that the Department of State and U. S. Information Agency be requested to develop a method of selecting a minimum number of foreign media representatives (press, TV and radio).

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