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JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

AG FILE

No. 903

RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT, RADIOACTIVE SAMPLES, RADIATION AND
CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY

12

DECLASSIFIED BY ACTING CHIEF 15C4
SIGNATURE John R. Bickley Jr.

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85D

JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

903

RADIOACTIVE FALL-OUT, RADIOACTIVE SAMPLES, RADIATION,
AND CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY.

*For Related Mat see
700 series
(Files 700 + 729.3)*

AG FILE

1958

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to TIT!*

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COPIES SERIES

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
APO 437
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

27 June 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LUEDECKE:

FROM: STAFF SURGEON

SUBJECT: Doseage Increases (as per letter request CTG 7.5)

1. Recommend approval.
2. Consideration of this request and records as submitted on individuals involved indicates that my recent memo on same subject applies in this instance, also.
3. Proposed indorsement attached.



RALPH M. LECHAUSSE
Colonel USAF
Staff Surgeon

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Proposed 1st Ind

TO: Commander Task Group 7.5

Approval is granted for request as in paragraph one of basic communication and for individuals listed in paragraph three of same communication.

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**ENGINEERING SECTION
RADIATION EXPOSURE AS OF 27 JUNE 1998**

RANK	NAME	SERIAL NO.	AFSC	JOB	EXPOSURE IN
MSOT		43171D		Line Chief	1868
MSOT		43171D		Flight Chief	2670
TSOT		43171D		Crew Chief	3783
TSOT		43171D		Hanger Chief	3322
TSOT		43171D		Crew Chief	6792
TSOT		43171D		Flight Chief	3154
TSOT		43171D		Engine Build-Up	2307
TSOT		43171D		Crew Chief	4141
TSOT		43171D		Crew Chief	4638
SSOT		43171D		Crew Chief	3502
SSOT		43171D		Crew Chief	2203
SSOT		42350		Electrician	2820
SSOT		43151D		Crew Chief	7190
SSOT		43171D		Inspection	2271
SSOT		43171D		Crew Chief	2419
SSOT		43151D		Crew Chief	3378
SSOT		43171D		Crew Chief	1890
SSOT		43171D		Deck Chief	2798
SSOT		43151D		Crew Member	2499
SSOT		43151D		Crew Member	1621
A/1C		43151D		Crew Member	3608
A/1C		43151D		Crew Member	1921
A/1C		53450		Sheet Metal	2278
A/1C		43151D		Crew Member	4238
A/1C		43151D		Crew Member	2765
A/1C		43151D		Crew Member	1940
A/1C		43151D		Dock Member	3541
A/1C		43151D		Crew Member	2386
A/1C		42152		Hydraulic	1489
A/1C		43151D		Crew Member	4309
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	1921
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	3721
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	1968
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	3808
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	2207
A/2C		43151D		Dock Member	3084
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	1880
A/2C		43151D		Dock Member	3736
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	2243
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	1718
A/2C		43151D		Dock Member	2694
A/2C		43151D		Dock Member	2890

ENGINEERING SECTION (CONT'D)

RANK	NAME	SERIAL NO.	AFSC	JOB	EXPOSURE NO.
A/2C		43250		Engine Build-Up	2115
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	3317
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	1744
A/2C		42350		Electrician	2321
A/2C		43151D		Inspection	7947
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	2184
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	4160
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	1951
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	2518
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	2998
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	0854
A/2C		43250		Engine Build-Up	1950
A/2C		43151D		Crew Member	3208

Headquarters
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
United States Air Force
APO 187, San Francisco, California

1 JUL 1956

SAC

SUBJECT: Radiation Exposures for Certain Task Group 7.4 Men

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 437, San Francisco, California

1. Paragraph 6a of Appendix 1 to Annex K to JTF-SEVEN Operation Order No. 1-58 establishes a maximum permissible exposure (MPE) of 5.0r for personnel participating in HARDTACK. We find that adherence to this limitation throughout the lengthened HARDTACK series, among two small groups of our Task Group 7.4 men, would jeopardize the successful performance of our nuclear cloud sampling mission. These two groups of men are the fifteen (15) MCO's and airmen of the Nuclear Applications Section of our Cloud Sampling Element, and the fifty-five (55) B-57B ground crewmen in the same element (ground crewmen of the B-57D's are being rotated by SAC). Inclosure #1 is a listing of the members of the former group together with the exposure of each of the individuals as of 27 June 1956. Inclosure #2 is a similar listing of the second group.

2. It is requested that MPE's of 10.0r and 8.0r be established for the men listed in Inclosure 1 and 2 respectively.

3. We in Task Group 7.4 are conscious of our responsibility to limit the radiation exposure of our men to an absolute minimum consistent with the need to get our job done.

2 Incls

1. Roster/MCO's & Airmen
(Nuclear Applications)
2. Roster/B-57B Grnd Crew.

WM B. KIEFFER
Colonel, USAF
Commander

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**NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS SEC
RADIATION EXPOSURE AS OF 27 J**

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Inclosure # 2

CGO/903

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Radiation Exposures for Certain Task Group 7.4 Men

HEADQUARTERS JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN, APO 437, San Francisco, Calif. 9 JUL 1958

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, San Francisco, California

Approval is granted as requested in paragraph 2 of basis of communication for the individuals listed in Inclosures 1 and 2.

2 Inclos
m/s

A. R. LUEDECKE
Major General, USAF
Commander

General Luedecke	P
General Griffith	
General Dick	
Admiral Tyree	
Doctor Ogle	
DC/S	
Protocol	
J-1	
J-2	
J-3	MAJ RICHIE
J-4	
J-5	
Compt	
AG	
AGM/R	John

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Handwritten: I U N P

COMP **903**
(12 Jul 58)

2d Ind

Headquarters Joint Task Force SEVEN, APO 437, San Francisco, Calif. **15 JUL 1958**
TO: Headquarters, Task Group 7.1, APO 437, Box No. 1, San Francisco, Calif.

Approval is granted for additional dosage to a total limit of seven (7) roentgens.

A. R. LUEDECKE
Major General, USAF
Commander

M/R: Hq TG 7.1 originated ltr stating accumulated over five roentgens radiation exposure and requested approval to retain up to a limit of seven roentgens. 1st Ind from Hq TG 7.1 recommended approval.

General Luedecke
General Griffith
General Dick
Admiral Tyree
Doctor Ogle
DC/S
Protocol
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
Compt
AG <i>[Signature]</i>
AGM <i>[Signature]</i>

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Major General A. F. Lamberton

- 2 -

JUN 23 1958

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
RECEIVED

FOR THE COMMANDER

JUN 23 1958
Deputy Commander

Copies furnished:
WALSH, HEN, Wash., D. C.
G. H. Weaver, Wash.-D.C., ALO
Chicago
Central

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General Luedcke
General Griffith
General Dick
Admiral Daspit
Doctor Ogle
DC/S
SJS
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
General Richie
Mr JACKS
MR-KLEMENT
DBA


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MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDER:

Staff Surgeon

24 June 1958

- c. No violation of existing NCRP or AEC recommendations or directives will occur.
- d. Paragraph 3 of basic communication is pertinent.
- 3. Finally, it is pointed out that Mr. Sanders and all concerned are fully aware that compliance with the documents mentioned in 3 c above is ultimately and solely the responsibility of the employer.


RALPH M. LECHAUSSE
Colonel USAF
Staff Surgeon

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COMM/ 403

1st Ind

28 June 1958

SUBJECT: Dosage Increase (27 June 1958)

Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, APO 437 San Francisco, California

To: Commander, Task Group 7.5, APO 435, San Francisco, California

Approval is granted for request as in paragraph one of basic communication and for individuals listed in paragraph three of same communication.

A. R. LUEDECKE
Major General, USAF
Commander

Copies furnished:
USAFEC, DBM, Wash., D. C.
C. Weaver, ALO
Chrono
Central

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1010

AGMR FILE COPY

General
Luedecke
General
Griffith
General
Black
Admiral
Whee
Doctor
Ogle
DC/S
SJS
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
Compt
AG

Major Samuel A. R. Rindfleisch

- 2 -

JUN 27 1958

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FOR THE COMMANDER

JOB D. RINDFLEISCH
Deputy Commander

Copies Forwarded:
SAC, WFO, Wash., D. C.
S. Weaver, ALO
Chicago
Central

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903
1.3

Headquarters
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
United States Air Force
APO 187, San Francisco, California

BTVO

19 JUN 1958

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO: Comdr, VP-38 Squadron

GJTF-SEVEN


ATTN: Rad-Safe Office

Forwarded for your information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

Memo for Record,
Subj: Contaminated PZV,
dated 9 June 1958


JOSEPH K. MYRMEL
Lt Colonel, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations

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Headquarters
TACK GROUP 7.1, PROVISIONAL
United States Air Force
APO 157, San Francisco, California

13 JUN 1958

SNVO

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO: Comdr, WF-28 Squadron

GJTF-SEVEN
ATTN: Rad-Safe Officer

Forwarded for your information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
None for Record,
Subj: Contaminated PTV,
dated 9 June 1958

JOSEPH K. MYRNE
Lt Colonel USAF
Deputy Director of Operations

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**Headquarters
TASK GROUP 7.3, PROVINCIAL
United States Air Force
APO 287, San Francisco, California**

2400

JUN 9 - 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: Contaminated F4V

1. The following information concerns Navy F4V aircraft no. 1446 whose mission was Red-Safe Reconnaissance and Barrier Patrol at Makinab on 27 May 1958. This aircraft was being vectored by F4V-7 Red-Safe in order to obtain the exact path of a radio active cloud. The aircraft commander's instructions included a requirement to turn out of any radiation field exceeding 3 roentgens per hour. Prior to flying the mission the air vents on the aircraft had been closed. Instructions were being passed by the SAOC by radio from F4V-7 Red-Safe to the F4V, and radiation intensities were being relayed in the same way from the aircraft to F4V-7 Red-Safe. **BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

2. Because a portion of the cloud, believed to be 15 miles distant, was actually 7 miles distant the F4V began observing an early rise on its radios equipment. The pilot turned out but in doing so penetrated a very small cloud. On emerging it was noted that the aircraft had become contaminated in that the radiation level held constant. A reading of 8,000 mr/hr was noted in the nose of the aircraft. The aircraft commander requested permission to return to "FRAN" Island and permission was granted.

3. On landing, the aircraft was monitored and found to be contaminated as follows:

<u>Interior</u>	<u>27/2900H</u>
a. Nose area	5,000 mr/hr (Down)
b. Cockpit area	600 mr/hr (Down)
c. Left Recip Engine	8,000 mr/hr (Down)
d. Right Recip Engine	5,000 mr/hr (Down)
e. Left wheel well	180 mr/hr (Down)
f. Right wheel well	380 mr/hr (Down)
g. Left jet engine	600 mr/hr (Down)
h. Right jet engine	700 mr/hr (Down)
i. Tail area	180 mr/hr (Down)

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SWO, Rq 35 7.1, Subj: Contaminated FV

The aircraft was isolated and allowed to decay. Because of the high exterior intensities, interior monitoring was postponed. The crew was processed through the personnel decontamination center and monitoring revealed that their clothing and exposed skin were contaminated to levels of 7 mr/hr or less. Normal personnel decontamination reduced all contamination to background level and the crew was released. Film-badges were taken immediately to Test Unit 6 of SW 7.1 for processing to determine exposure. A second monitoring of the aircraft six and a half hours later revealed the following.

<u>Exterior</u>	27/1530H
a. Nose	800 mr/hr (Gamma)
b. Fuselage	240 mr/hr (Gamma)
c. Left Recip Engine	2,800 mr/hr (Gamma)
d. Right Recip Engine	2,400 mr/hr (Gamma)
e. Left wheel well	60 mr/hr (Gamma)
f. Right wheel well	60 mr/hr (Gamma)
g. Left jet engine	180 mr/hr (Gamma)
h. Right jet engine	185 mr/hr (Gamma)
i. Tail	16 mr/hr (Gamma)
j. Radar dome forward	2,400 mr/hr (Gamma)

<u>Interior</u>	
a. Radar wall	220 mr/hr (Gamma)
b. Forward cockpit	200 mr/hr (Gamma)
c. Flight deck	60 mr/hr (Gamma)
d. Radio compartment	20 mr/hr (Gamma)
e. After station	12 mr/hr (Gamma)
f. Rear observers station	500 mr/hr (Gamma)
g. Fuselage	60 mr/hr (Gamma)

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EWB, E4 W 7.4, Subj: Contaminated F27

At 1800 hours the aircraft was moved to the decontamination area and cleaned with 5,000 gallons of high pressure water at 115°F. A final monitoring of the aircraft indicated the following:

<u>Exterior</u>	<u>MR/HR</u>
a. Nose	9 mr/hr (Gamma)
b. Fuselage	21 mr/hr (Gamma)
c. Left body engine	180 mr/hr (Gamma)
d. Right body engine	150 mr/hr (Gamma)
e. Left wheel well	12 mr/hr (Gamma)
f. Right wheel well	14 mr/hr (Gamma)
g. Left jet engine	22 mr/hr (Gamma)
h. Right jet engine	23 mr/hr (Gamma)
i. Tail	20 mr/hr (Gamma)
j. Radar dome forward	100 mr/hr (Gamma)

<u>Interior</u>	<u>MR/HR</u>
a. Fuselage	14 mr/hr (Gamma)
b. Radar well	20 mr/hr (Gamma)
c. Forward cockpit	20 mr/hr (Gamma)
d. Flight deck	12 mr/hr (Gamma)
e. Radio compartment	4 mr/hr (Gamma)
f. After station	6 mr/hr (Gamma)
g. New observers station	60 mr/hr (Gamma)

The aircraft was released to Commander Hart with the advice that although the radiation levels were greatly reduced they still exceeded in some cases the recommended levels established by Appendix 1 to Annex E to JTF-7 Operation Plan Number 1-58, dated 8 February 1958 (i.e., 7mr/hr /Beta and Gamma/ on the interior and 7 mr/hr /Gamma/ on the exterior, measured at 6 inches from the surface). Radioactive decay would, in a matter of 48 to 72 hours appreciably reduce the interior contamination. Use of the aircraft would depend entirely on operational requirement.

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0000, HQ 90 700, Subj: Continued FTV

Film badge analysis indicated the following exposures:

Film Badge No. 28784	873 mR
Film Badge No. 28793	873 mR
Film Badge No. 28905	900 mR
Film Badge No. 28763	246 mR
Film Badge No. 28871	399 mR
Film Badge No. 28769	221 mR
Film Badge No. 28969	187 mR
Film Badge No. 28906	75 mR
Film Badge No. 28870	439 mR
Film Badge No. 28872	158 mR

LeDwly E. Allen Jr.
LEDEWY E. ALLEN JR.
Captain, USAF
Nuclear Research Officer

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000/903 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Damage Increases (Jan 23, 58)

24 June 1958

COMMANDEE, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN, APO 637, San Francisco, California.

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.3, APO 635, San Francisco, California

Approval is granted for request as stated in paragraph 1 of basic
consideration and for the individuals listed in paragraph 3 of

A. E. LINDECKE
Major General, USAF
Commander

Copies furnished:
USAF, DM, Wash., D.C.
G. H. Weaver, Maj, USAF, APO

General Griffith
General Dick
Admiral Tyree
Doctor Ogle
DC/S
Protocol
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
Compt
AG
AG

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[REDACTED]

Headquarters
Task Unit 7.1.3, Task Group 7.1
APO 437, P. O. Box 3
San Francisco, California

TU 3 58 0253

APR 12 1958

SUBJECT: Radiation Dose Limits for Operation HARDTACK (U)

THRU: Commander
Task Group 7.1
APO 437
San Francisco, California

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 437
San Francisco, California

1. It is requested that personnel of Projects 1.9 and 3.6 be authorized the increase in radiation exposure limit to 5.0 r per 13 - week period. These two projects will participate on the CACTUS and KOA events, and the increase in radiation exposure limits is considered necessary in this case to permit effective recovery of project data.

2. Inclosure (1) includes the approval by the U.S.A.F., Air Research and Development Command of such an increase in radiation Dosage for Projects 1.9 and 3.6 personnel to 5.0 r per 13 - week period.

*Doesn't mean
a thing
mechanics*

1 Incl:
Ltr SWRS HQ, AFSWC, dtd 23 Jan
58, same subj. with 1st Ind

K. D. Coleman
K. D. COLEMAN
Colonel, USAF
Commander

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

903

ROSTER OF PERSONNEL EXPOSED TO WHOLE BODY THERAPY
(1 January 1958 through 31 March 1958)

HEADQUARTERS JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

NAME	Exposure mr Gamma	NAME	Exposure mr Gamma
	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
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	20		
	20		
	20		
	20		
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903
2-3

28 April 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander Task Group 7.4

SUBJECT: Radar Tracking of Sampling Aircraft for Pinon

1. This will confirm conversations held between Colonel Wignall, Dr. R. Batsel and myself on the tracking plan. The purpose of providing for a tracking system is fundamentally to add plausibility that the sampling mission was conducted in a straight-forward manner. It will not be the intent, however, to try to indicate to the U.N. Observers or to the press, that the tracking system is a Proof that the sampling mission was in fact carried out as shown.

2. To appropriately accomplish the radar tracking scheme, it is requested that TG 7.4 provide a briefing on the radar system to the observers on D-1 or D-2 to familiarize them with the system and equipment. As part of the briefing it would be desirable to have one of the B-57 B sampling aircraft make a take-off, fly a short pattern, and land so the observers can see how the system operates.

3. On shot day, if the U.N. observers desire it, they will be permitted to track the sampling aircraft as they carry out their mission. Selected members of the press should be allowed to be in the AOC in the gallery during this period. The radars should be set for a range, probably 150 miles, such that the planes in flight will not pass off the scope. All radars should be set up the same way. It also would be desirable to plot on the large plotting board a continuous track of the courses followed by the aircraft from take-off to landing.

4. We would appreciate your comments on the above proposal.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY.

G. W. JOHNSON
Technical Director,
Pinon

cc: CJTF 7 ✓
CTG 7.1
CTU-2
R. Batsel
P. Bankhart
R. Southwick
G. Johnson

1217-JFL

(12 Apr 58)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Radiation Dose Limits for Operation HARDTACK (U)

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.1, JTF SEVEN, APO 437, San Francisco, California
3 May 1958.

TO: Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, APO 437, San Francisco, California

1. Recommend approval.

2. This matter has been thoroughly discussed with the program directors and the project personnel. Considering the location of the recovery stations and the limited time available for recovery prior to the next shots in the same areas, plus the probable contamination that will result from detonation of the two devices, it is felt that the increase in the 13 week exposure limit is justified in order to guarantee recovery of the scientific data by the personnel involved. There is a strong possibility that the value of the programs will be seriously impaired if the dosage limitation is not raised.

3. Every effort will be made to keep the exposures well under the limit requested. Radiological safety personnel of this organization will maintain a close contact with personnel concerned and follow cumulative dosage totals in detail to assure the safety of the individuals participating.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GORDON L. JACKS
Major Cmlt
Commander, TU-6

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 & 2 - Addressee ←
- 3 - CTG 7.1
- 4 - CTU-6
- 5 & 6 - M&R

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
P. O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

11 March 1958

SUBJECT: Task Group 7.1 Radiological Safety Regulations for Operation HARDTACK


TO: Distribution

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the radiological safety regulations that will apply to all Task Group 7.1 personnel during Operation HARDTACK.

2. Your attention is invited to that portion of the regulations concerning film badges. Each individual in the Task Group will be issued a film badge that is to be worn at all times. Dog-tag chains will be provided for a convenient means of wearing the badges. If preferred, individuals may attach the film badge to the security badge rather than using the dog-tag chain. Film badges will be exchanged periodically by all personnel. In addition, upon return from any mission in a contaminated area, badges should be exchanged at the Rad-Safe Center.

3. It is realized that these regulations will not cover all cases that may arise, personnel assigned to Task Unit 6 will be available to advise and assist in handling the problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GORDON L. JACKS
Commander
Task Unit 6

1 Incl
Rad-Safe Regulations

GLJ/py
DISTRIBUTION:
Total

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RAD-SAFE REGULATIONS

I. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. The Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, is responsible for all radiological safety during Operation HARDTACK. The responsibility for general on-site (Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls) radiological safety operations has been delegated to the Commander, Task Group 7.1.

B. The Commander, Task Unit 6, Task Group 7.1, will exercise overall supervision and control for CTG 7.1 on all radiological safety matters.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for the radiological safety of members of their task units. In addition, during operations in contaminated areas, project and party leaders are responsible for radiological safety of the parties and for compliance with these regulations.

II. RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY OPERATIONS.

A. TU-6 rad-safe support services will include:

1. Continuing surveys of the radiological situation at EPO, to include plotting and briefing facilities capable of portraying past and current radiological situations. Reports and maps will be prepared for distribution.
2. Monitoring assistance, training, and advice as requested.
3. Maintenance and issue of monitoring instruments and protective clothing as required.
4. Personnel dosimetry and records service (to include all of JTF SEVEN).
5. Decontamination facilities for personnel, vehicles, and equipment.

B. Exposure Guides and Dosage Control.

1. The total permissible exposures to participating personnel are as follows:

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- a. Gamma: 3.75 roentgens per consecutive 13-week period, with a maximum of 5.0 roentgens for the Operation. Personnel whose previous radiation dose history indicates that their total accumulated dose to 1 January 1958 is in excess of or equal to $5(N-18)$ roentgens, where N is the age on 1 January 1958, will under no circumstances be allowed to exceed the 5.0 R maximum for the Operation.
- b. Alpha: 10,000 exposure units for any consecutive 13-week period computed by multiplying the average air concentration in the area of exposure in d/m^3 by the hours of exposure. This is to be used in all cases where personnel are not using respiratory protection in an alpha-contaminated area. Natural alpha background is not included in the 10,000 units.

2. The tolerance level for vehicle contamination will be as follows:

- a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta inside and 7 mr/hr gamma only outside.

- b. 500 c/m/55cm² fixed alpha. By "fixed" alpha is meant that no change in the alpha contamination level can be observed by wiping a 100cm² area. (55cm² is the area of the normal "Pee Wee" probe.)
 - c. 200 c/m/55cm² removable alpha.
3. The tolerance level for personnel contamination will be as follows:
 - a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta for outer clothing and shoes, 1 mr/hr gamma on skin or personal clothing. Personnel decontamination will be performed when these levels are exceeded.
4. The tolerance level for equipment removed from contaminated areas will be as follows:
 - a. 7 mr/hr gamma only.
 - b. 500 c/m/55cm² fixed alpha. Decontamination will be performed in the field with portable decontamination equipment prior to return to the main decontamination station if the level exceeds 5,000 c/m/55cm².
5. In the event that reasonable decontamination procedures cannot reduce contamination levels below those levels listed above, CTU-6 will issue appropriate instructions.
6. All personnel will be issued film badges and charge-a-plates on arrival at EPG. The film badge will be worn at all times. In addition, badges will be exchanged after each entry into a contaminated area (exceptions to this will be made in the case of continuing access permits. See below). Lost badges should be reported immediately to TU-6. On return to home station badges will be turned in as part of the ETC check out procedures.
7. TU-6 will process film badges and submit dosage records to Task Unit Commanders on a daily basis. In addition, special reports will be issued on all personnel reaching or exceeding the 20 roentgen cumulative dose total. Dosage information may be obtained informally at any time by calling the photo-dosimetry section at the TU-6 Rad-Safe Center.

C. Entry into Contaminated Areas.

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1. Radex (radiological exclusion) areas are defined as follows:
 - a. Full Radex Area: Contamination level of 100 mr/hr or higher.
 - b. Limited Radex Area: Contamination level of 10 mr/hr but less than 100 mr/hr.
 - c. Non Radex Area: Contamination level less than 10 mr/hr.
2. Entry into a full radex area will require full protective clothing. In addition, a qualified monitor must accompany any party entering a full radex area. Entry into a limited radex area will require such protective clothing and monitoring support as is deemed necessary by the plotting and briefing section, TU-6.

3. Entry of personnel into contaminated areas (full and limited radex) will require access permits. The access permit will signify that all rad-safe procedures have been complied with. These access permits will be issued to party monitors or party leaders by the plotting and briefing section TU-6 at Rad-Safe Center.
4. Recovery and construction parties will be allowed to enter contaminated areas as desired dependent upon the current radiological situation. Actual control of early entry on D-Day will be exercised by the J-1 Section, Task Group 701.
5. Check points for control of entry into contaminated areas will be established by TU-6 as required. Normally, check points will be maintained at the Air Dispatcher's Office and the marine landing. Personnel departing for contaminated areas should have access permits prior to passing the check points. Upon return from a contaminated area, personnel and equipment will be monitored at the check points. Personnel or equipment found to be contaminated above the tolerance levels will be directed to the appropriate decontamination station. All personnel should proceed to the Rad-Safe Center to exchange film badges upon return from a contaminated area.
6. Task Unit Commanders may arrange for continuing access permits into contaminated areas for personnel in their Task Units. These continuing access permits are designed to allow frequent entry to and exit from a contaminated area without following all radiological safety regulations on each and every entry and exit. All requests for continuing access permits will be approved by CTU-6. These permits may be withdrawn at any time, depending on the radiological situation. In general, continuing access permits will be good only until another device is fired or certain individual cumulative dosage totals are reached.
7. Projects will provide their own monitors for entry into contaminated areas. In the event monitors cannot be provided by the project, arrangements will be made with TU-6 for supply of the required monitors. Monitors assigned to individuals or groups working in contaminated areas or with contaminated equipment during recovery operations will act in an advisory capacity to keep the recovery party leader informed of radiation intensities at all times. Since the party leader is responsible for the radiological safety of all members of his party he is expected to accept the monitor's advice and act accordingly. It is the responsibility of both the leader and the monitors of the recovery party to adhere to the limits established in these regulations.
8. Party monitors, and any others deemed necessary, shall be briefed by the TU-6 plotting and briefing section prior to receipt of an access permit.
9. TU-6 will train monitors for the various projects as required.
10. When eating or smoking in any contaminated area, sensible sanitary precautions should be taken.

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

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All radioactive material brought into the Eniwetok Proving Ground, with the exception of Source and Special Nuclear Material, will be registered by project leaders with CTU-6. Information concerning the nature of any radioactive material,

source strength, and location (by building) is required. This information is desired primarily for the protection of the fire department in the event of fire.

B. No contaminated material will be removed from the EPG without the prior approval of CTO 7.1. All such materials or equipment which are to be removed will be monitored, packaged, labeled and loaded so as to satisfy pertinent regulations concerning shipment of radioactive materials. Such material that will travel by commercial means or unescorted shipment on HATS must be packaged in accordance with Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. T-5 personnel will assist project and J-4 personnel in determining the packaging requirements.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for providing CTO-5 with lists of qualified monitors within their Task Units. CTO-5 will assist the Task Unit Commanders in qualifying personnel if so desired.

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
P. O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

11 March 1958

SUBJECT: Task Group 7.1 Radiological Safety Regulations for Operation HARDTACK


TO: Distribution

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the radiological safety regulations that will apply to all Task Group 7.1 personnel during Operation HARDTACK.

2. Your attention is invited to that portion of the regulations concerning film badges. Each individual in the Task Group will be issued a film badge that is to be worn at all times. Dog-tag chains will be provided for a convenient means of wearing the badges. If preferred, individuals may attach the film badge to the security badge rather than using the dog-tag chain. Film badges will be exchanged periodically by all personnel. In addition, upon return from any mission in a contaminated area, badges should be exchanged at the Rad-Safe Center.

3. It is realized that these regulations will not cover all cases that may arise, personnel assigned to Task Unit 6 will be available to advise and assist in handling the problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GORDON L. JACKS
Commander
Task Unit 6

1 Incl
Rad-Safe Regulations

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RAD-SAFE REGULATIONS

I. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. The Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, is responsible for all radiological safety during Operation HARDTACK. The responsibility for general on-site (Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls) radiological safety operations has been delegated to the Commander, Task Group 7.1.

B. The Commander, Task Unit 6, Task Group 7.1, will exercise overall supervision and control for CTG 7.1 on all radiological safety matters.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for the radiological safety of members of their task units. In addition, during operations in contaminated areas, project and party leaders are responsible for radiological safety of the parties and for compliance with these regulations.

II. RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY OPERATIONS.

A. TU-6 rad-safe support services will include:

1. Continuing surveys of the radiological situation at EPO, to include plotting and briefing facilities capable of portraying past and current radiological situations. Reports and maps will be prepared for distribution.
2. Monitoring assistance, training, and advice as requested.
3. Maintenance and issue of monitoring instruments and protective clothing as required.
4. Personnel dosimetry and records service (to include all of JTF SEVEN).
5. Decontamination facilities for personnel, vehicles, and equipment.

B. Exposure Guides and Dosage Control.

1. The total permissible exposures to participating personnel are as follows:

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- a. Gamma: 3.75 roentgens per consecutive 13-week period, with a maximum of 5.0 roentgens for the Operation. Personnel whose previous radiation dose history indicates that their total accumulated dose to 1 January 1958 is in excess of or equal to $5(N-18)$ roentgens, where N is the age on 1 January 1958, will under no circumstances be allowed to exceed the 5.0 R maximum for the Operation.
- b. Alpha: 10,000 exposure units for any consecutive 13-week period computed by multiplying the average air concentration in the area of exposure in d/m³ by the hours of exposure. This is to be used in all cases where personnel are not using respiratory protection in an alpha-contaminated area. Natural alpha background is not included in the 10,000 units.

2. The tolerance level for vehicle contamination will be as follows:

- a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta inside and 7 mr/hr gamma only outside

- b. 500 c/m/55cm² fixed alpha. By "fixed" alpha is meant that no change in the alpha contamination level can be observed by wiping a 100cm² area. (55cm² is the area of the normal "Pee Wee" probe.)
 - c. 200 c/m/55cm² removable alpha.
3. The tolerance level for personnel contamination will be as follows:
 - a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta for outer clothing and shoes, 1 mr/hr gamma on skin or personal clothing. Personnel decontamination will be performed when these levels are exceeded.
 4. The tolerance level for equipment removed from contaminated areas will be as follows:
 - a. 7 mr/hr gamma only.
 - b. 500 c/m/55cm² fixed alpha. Decontamination will be performed in the field with portable decontamination equipment prior to return to the main decontamination station if the level exceeds 5,000 c/m/55cm².
 5. In the event that reasonable decontamination procedures cannot reduce contamination levels below those levels listed above, CTU-6 will issue appropriate instructions.
 6. All personnel will be issued film badges and charge-a-plates on arrival at EPG. The film badge will be worn at all times. In addition, badges will be exchanged after each entry into a contaminated area (exceptions to this will be made in the case of continuing access permits. See below). Lost badges should be reported immediately to TU-6. On return to base station badges will be turned in as part of the EPG check out procedures.
 7. TU-6 will process film badges and submit dosage records to Task Unit Commanders on a daily basis. In addition, special reports will be issued on all personnel reaching or exceeding the 20 roentgen cumulative dose total. Dosage information may be obtained informally at any time by calling the photo-dosimetry section at the TU-6 Rad-Safe Center.

C. Entry into Contaminated Areas.

1. Radex (radiological exclusion) areas are defined as follows:
 - a. Full Radex Area: Contamination level of 100 mr/hr or higher.
 - b. Limited Radex Area: Contamination level of 10 mr/hr but less than 100 mr/hr.
 - c. Non Radex Area: Contamination level less than 10 mr/hr.
2. Entry into a full radex area will require full protective clothing. In addition, a qualified monitor must accompany any party entering a full radex area. Entry into a limited radex area will require such protective clothing and monitoring support as is deemed necessary by the plotting and briefing section, TU-6.

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3. Entry of personnel into contaminated areas (full and limited radex) will require access permits. The access permit will signify that all rad-safe procedures have been complied with. Those access permits will be issued to party monitors or party leaders by the plotting and briefing section TU-6 at Rad-Safe Center.
4. Recovery and construction parties will be allowed to enter contaminated areas as desired dependant upon the current radiological situation. Actual control of entry on D-Day will be exercised by the J-3 Section, Task Group 7.1.
5. Check points for control of entry into contaminated areas will be established by TU-6 as required. Normally, check points will be maintained at the Air Dispatcher's Office and the marine landing. Personnel departing for contaminated areas should have access permits prior to passing the check points. Upon return from a contaminated area, personnel and equipment will be monitored at the check points. Personnel or equipment found to be contaminated above the tolerance levels will be directed to the appropriate decontamination station. All personnel should proceed to the Rad-Safe Center to exchange film badges upon return from a contaminated area.
6. Task Unit Commanders may arrange for continuing access permits into contaminated areas for personnel in their Task Units. These continuing access permits are designed to allow frequent entry to and exit from a contaminated area without following all radiological safety regulations on each and every entry and exit. All requests for continuing access permits will be approved by CTU-6. These permits may be withdrawn at any time, depending on the radiological situation. In general continuing access permits will be good only until another device is fired or certain individual cumulative dosage totals are reached.
7. Projects will provide their own monitors for entry into contaminated areas. In the event monitors cannot be provided by the project, arrangements will be made with TU-6 for supply of the required monitors. Monitors assigned to individuals or groups working in contaminated areas or with contaminated equipment during recovery operations will act in an advisory capacity to keep the recovery party leader informed of radiation intensities at all times. Since the party leader is responsible for the radiological safety of all members of his party he is expected to accept the monitor's advice and act accordingly. It is the responsibility of both the leader and the members of the recovery party to adhere to the limits established in these regulations.
8. Party monitors, and any others deemed necessary, shall be briefed by the TU-6 plotting and briefing section prior to receipt of an access permit.
9. TU-6 will train monitors for the various projects as required.
10. When eating or smoking in any contaminated area, sensible sanitary precautions should be taken.

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

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A. All radioactive material brought into the Eniwetok Proving Ground, with the exception of Source and Special Nuclear Material, will be registered by project leaders with CTU-6. Information concerning the nature of the radioactive material,

source strength, and location (by building) is required. This information is desired primarily for the protection of the fire department in the event of fire.

B. No contaminated material will be removed from the EFG without the prior approval of CTC 721. All such materials or equipment which are to be removed will be monitored, packaged, labeled and loaded so as to satisfy pertinent regulations concerning shipment of radioactive materials. Such material that will travel by commercial means or unescorted shipment on NARS must be packaged in accordance with Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. TUSO personnel will assist project and J-4 personnel in determining the packaging requirements.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for providing CTC 721 with lists of qualified monitors within their Task Units. CTC 721 will assist the Task Unit Commanders in qualifying personnel if so desired.

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
P. O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico


11 March 1958

SUBJECT: Task Group 7.1 Radiological Safety Regulations for Operation HARDTACK

TO: Distribution

1. Transmitted herewith is a copy of the radiological safety regulations that will apply to all Task Group 7.1 personnel.
2. Your attention is invited to the portion of the regulations concerning film badges. Each individual in the Task Group will be issued a film badge that is to be worn at all times. Dog-tag chains will be provided for a convenient means of wearing the badges. If preferred, individuals may attach the film badge to the security badge rather than using the dog-tag chain. Film badges will be exchanged periodically by all personnel. In addition, upon return from any mission in a contaminated area, badges should be exchanged at the Rad-Safe Center.
3. It is realized that these regulations will not cover all cases that may arise, personnel assigned to Task Unit 6 will be available to advise and assist in handling the problem.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GORDON L. JACKS
Commander
Task Unit 6

1 Incl
Rad-Safe Regulations

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RAD-SAFE REGULATIONS

I. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. The Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, is responsible for all radiological safety during Operation HARDTACK. The responsibility for general on-site (Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls) radiological safety operations has been delegated to the Commander, Task Group 7.1.

B. The Commander, Task Unit 6, Task Group 7.1, will exercise overall supervision and control for CTG 7.1 on all radiological safety matters.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for the radiological safety of members of their task units. In addition, during operations in contaminated areas, project and party leaders are responsible for radiological safety of the parties and for compliance with these regulations.

II. RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY OPERATIONS.

A. TU-6 rad-safe support services will include:

1. Continuing surveys of the radiological situation at EPO, to include plotting and briefing facilities capable of portraying past and current radiological situations. Reports and maps will be prepared for distribution.
2. Monitoring assistance, training, and advice as requested.
3. Maintenance and issue of monitoring instruments and protective clothing as required.
4. Personnel dosimetry and records service (to include all of JTF SEVEN).
5. Decontamination facilities for personnel, vehicles, and equipment.

B. Exposure Guides and Dosage Control.

1. The total permissible exposures to participating personnel are as follows:

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a. Gamma: 3.75 roentgens per consecutive 13-week period, with a maximum of 5.0 roentgens for the Operation. Personnel whose previous radiation dose history indicates that their total accumulated dose to 1 January 1958 is in excess of or equal to $5(N-18)$ roentgens, where N is the age on 1 January 1958, will under no circumstances be allowed to exceed the 5.0 R maximum for the Operation.

b. Alpha: 10,000 exposure units for any consecutive 13-week period computed by multiplying the average air concentration in the area of exposure in d/m³ by the hours of exposure. This is to be used in all cases where personnel are not using respiratory protection in an alpha-contaminated area. Natural alpha background is not included in the 10,000 units.

2. The tolerance level for vehicle contamination will be as follows:

a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta inside and 7 mr/hr gamma only outside.

- b. 500 c/m/55cm² fixed alpha. By "fixed" alpha is meant that no change in the alpha contamination level can be observed by wiping a 100cm² area. (55cm² is the area of the normal "Pee Wee" probe.)
 - c. 200 c/m/55cm² removable alpha
 3. The tolerance level for personnel contamination will be as follows:
 - a. 7 mr/hr gamma plus beta for outer clothing and shoes, 1 mr/hr gamma on skin or personal clothing. Personnel decontamination will be performed when these levels are exceeded.
 4. The tolerance level for equipment removed from contaminated areas will be as follows:
 - a. 7 mr/hr gamma only.
 - b. 500 c/m/55cm² fixed alpha. Decontamination will be performed in the field with portable decontamination equipment prior to return to the main decontamination station if the level exceeds 5,000 c/m/55cm².
 5. In the event that reasonable decontamination procedures cannot reduce contamination levels below those levels listed above, CTU-6 will issue appropriate instructions.
 6. All personnel will be issued film badges and charge-a-plates on arrival at EPG. The film badge will be worn at all times. In addition, badges will be exchanged after each entry into a contaminated area (exceptions to this will be made in the case of continuing access permits. See below). Lost badges should be reported immediately to TU-6. On return to home station badges will be turned in as part of the EPG check out procedures.
 7. TU-6 will process film badges and submit dosage records to Task Unit Commanders on a daily basis. In addition, special reports will be issued on all personnel reaching or exceeding the 2.0 roentgen cumulative dose total. Dosage information may be obtained informally at any time by calling the photo-dosimetry section at the TU-6 Rad-Safe Center.
- C. Entry into Contaminated Areas.
1. Radex (radiological exclusion) areas are defined as follows:
 - a. Full Radex Area: Contamination level of 100 mr/hr or higher.
 - b. Limited Radex Area: Contamination level of 10 mr/hr but less than 100 mr/hr. **BEST AVAILABLE COPY**
 - c. Non Radex Area: Contamination level less than 10 mr/hr.
 2. Entry into a full radex area will require full protective clothing. In addition, a qualified monitor must accompany any party entering a full radex area. Entry into a limited radex area will require such protective clothing and monitoring support as is deemed necessary by the plotting and briefing section, TU-6.

3. Entry of personnel into contaminated areas (full and limited radex) will require access permits. The access permit will signify that all rad-safe procedures have been complied with. These access permits will be issued to party monitors or party leaders by the plotting and briefing section TU-6 at Rad-Safe Center.
4. Recovery and construction parties will be allowed to enter contaminated areas as desired dependent upon the current radiological situation. Actual control of entry on D-Day will be exercised by the J-3 Section, Task Group 701.
5. Check points for control of entry into contaminated areas will be established by TU-6 as required. Normally, check points will be maintained at the Air Dispatcher's Office and the marine landing. Personnel departing for contaminated areas should have access permits prior to passing the check points. Upon return from a contaminated area, personnel and equipment will be monitored at the check points. Personnel or equipment found to be contaminated above the tolerance levels will be directed to the appropriate decontamination station. All personnel should proceed to the Rad-Safe Center to exchange film badges upon return from a contaminated area.
6. Task Unit Commanders may arrange for continuing access permits into contaminated areas for personnel in their Task Units. These continuing access permits are designed to allow frequent entry to and exit from a contaminated area without following all radiological safety regulations on each and every entry and exit. All requests for continuing access permits will be approved by CTR-6. These permits may be withdrawn at any time, depending on the radiological situation. In general, continuing access permits will be good only until another device is fired or certain individual cumulative dosage totals are reached.
7. Projects will provide their own monitors for entry into contaminated areas. In the event monitors cannot be provided by the project, arrangements will be made with TU-6 for supply of the required monitors. Monitors assigned to individuals or groups working in contaminated areas or with contaminated equipment during recovery operations will act in an advisory capacity to keep the recovery party leader informed of radiation intensities at all times. Since the party leader is responsible for the radiological safety of all members of his party he is expected to accept the monitor's advice and act accordingly. It is the responsibility of both the leader and the members of the recovery party to adhere to the limits established in these regulations.
8. Party monitors, and any others deemed necessary, shall be briefed by the TU-6 plotting and briefing section prior to receipt of an access permit.
9. TU-6 will train monitors for the various projects as required.
10. When eating or sleeping in any contaminated area, sensible sanitary precautions should be taken.

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

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A. All radioactive material brought into the Eniwetok Proving Ground, with the exception of Source and Special Nuclear Material, will be registered by project leaders with CTR-6. Information concerning the nature of the radioactive material,

source strength, and location (by building) is required. This information is desired primarily for the protection of the fire department in the event of fire.

B. No contaminated material will be removed from the HEC without the prior approval of CTC 7A. All such materials or equipment which are to be removed will be monitored, packaged, labeled and loaded so as to satisfy pertinent regulations concerning shipment of radioactive materials. Such material that will travel by commercial means or unescorted shipment on HARS must be packaged in accordance with Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. TU-5 personnel will assist project and J-4 personnel in determining the packaging requirements.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for providing CTU-5 with lists of qualified monitors within their Task Units. CTU-6 will assist the Task Unit Commanders in qualifying personnel if so desired.

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J3-H-674

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SUBJECT: Request of HARDTACK Project 3.4 for Change in Radiation Dosage Limit (U)

HEADQUARTERS TASK GROUP 7.1 Joint Task Force SEVEN, P. O. Box 1663, Los Alamos, New Mexico, 17 February 1958

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington 12, Virginia

Concur in paragraph 4 of basic letter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EAL/rjd

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - CJTF SEVEN
- 1 - FC/AFSWP (Pickett)
w/o basic
- 1 - CTG 7.1 (Shuster)
w/o basic
- 1 - Project 3.4 Long Beach
Naval Shipyard (Murray)
c/o Code 242 w/o basic
- 1 - COM, Norfolk Naval Shipyard,
Portsmouth, Va., ATTN: UERD
for Code 270 w/o basic
- 2 - M&R, LASL w/o basic
- 1 - J-3 (files)

E. A. LUCKE

J-3

Plans & Operations

*Copy our 24 Jan 58 reply to
COM Norfolk Naval Shipyard
for work FC 21 Feb 58
Schauwe*

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I-0752-58

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
P. O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

11 March 1958

SUBJECT: Task Group 7.1 Radiological Safety Regulations for Operation HARDTACK


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FOR THE COMMANDER:


GORDON L. JACKS
Commander
Task Unit 6

1 Incl
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RAD-SAFE REGULATIONS

I. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. The Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, is responsible for all radiological safety during Operation HARDTACK. The responsibility for general on-site (Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls) radiological safety operations has been delegated to the Commander, Task Group 7.1.

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 - b. Alpha: 10,000 exposure units for any consecutive 13-week period computed by multiplying the average air concentration in the area of exposure in d/m/M3 by the hours of exposure. This is to be used in all cases where personnel are not using respiratory protection in an alpha-contaminated area. Natural alpha background is not included in the 10,000 units.
2. The tolerance level for vehicle contamination will be as follows:
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- b. 500 c/m/55cm² fixed alpha. By "fixed" alpha is meant that no change in the alpha contamination level can be observed by wiping a 100cm² area (55cm² is the area of the normal "Pee Wee" probe.)
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4. The tolerance level for equipment removed from contaminated areas will be as follows:
 - a. 7 mr/hr gamma only.
 - b. 500 c/m/55cm² fixed alpha. Decontamination will be performed in the field with portable decontamination equipment prior to return to the main decontamination station if the level exceeds 5,000 c/m/55cm².
5. In the event that reasonable decontamination procedures cannot reduce contamination levels below those levels listed above, CTU-4 will issue appropriate instructions.
6. All personnel will be issued film badges and charge-a-plates on arrival at EPS. The film badge will be worn at all times. In addition, badges will be exchanged after each entry into a contaminated area (exceptions to this will be made in the case of continuing access permits. See below). Lost badges should be reported immediately to TU-6. On return to home station badges will be turned in as part of the EAC check out procedures.
7. TU-6 will process film badges and submit dosage records to Task Unit Commanders on a daily basis. In addition, special reports will be issued on all personnel reaching or exceeding the 2.0 roentgen cumulative dose total. Dosage information may be obtained informally at any time by calling the photo-dosimetry section at the TU-6 Rad-Safe Center.

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1. Radex (radiological exclusion) areas are defined as follows:
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2. Entry into a full radex area will require full protective clothing. In addition, a qualified monitor must accompany any party entering a full radex area. Entry into a limited radex area will require such protective clothing and monitoring support as is deemed necessary by the plotting and briefing section, TU-6.

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3. Entry of personnel into contaminated areas (full and limited radex) will require access permits. The access permit will signify that all rad-safe procedures have been complied with. These access permits will be issued to party monitors or party leaders by the plotting and briefing section TU-6 at Rad-Safe Center.
 4. Recovery and construction parties will be allowed to enter contaminated areas as desired dependent upon the current radiological situation. Actual control of early entry on D-Day will be exercised by the J-1 Section, Task Group 701.
 5. Check points for control of entry into contaminated areas will be established by TU-6 as required. Normally, check points will be maintained at the Air Dispatcher's Office and the marine landing. Personnel departing for contaminated areas should have access permits prior to passing the check points. Upon return from a contaminated area, personnel and equipment will be monitored at the check points. Personnel or equipment found to be contaminated above the tolerance levels will be directed to the appropriate decontamination station. All personnel should proceed to the Rad-Safe Center to be charged with badges upon return from a contaminated area.
- Task Unit Commanders may arrange for continuing access permits into contaminated areas for personnel in their Task Unit. These continuing access permits are assigned to allow frequent entry to and exit from a contaminated area without following all radiological safety regulations on each and every entry and exit. All requests for continuing access permits will be approved by CTR-6. These permits may be withdrawn at any time depending on the radiological situation. In general, continuing access permits will be good only until another device is fired or certain individual cumulative dosage totals are reached.
7. Projects will provide their own monitors for entry into contaminated areas. In the event monitors cannot be provided by the project, arrangements will be made with TU-6 for supply of the required monitors. Monitors assigned to individuals or groups working in contaminated areas or with contamination equipment during recovery operations will act in an advisory capacity to keep the recovery party leader informed of radiation intensities at all times. Since the party leader is responsible for the radiological safety of all members of his party he is expected to accept the monitor's advice and act accordingly. It is the responsibility of both the leader and the members of the recovery party to adhere to the limits established in these regulations.
 8. Party monitors, and any others deemed necessary, shall be briefed by the TU-6 plotting and briefing section prior to receipt of an access permit.
 9. TU-6 will train monitors for the various projects as required.
 10. When eating or smoking in any contaminated area, sensible sanitary precautions should be taken.

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

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1. All radioactive material brought in to the Inland Proving Ground with the exception of Source and Special Nuclear Material will be registered by project leaders with CTR-6. Information concerning the nature of all radioactive material,

source strength, and location (by building) is required. This information is desired primarily for the protection of the fire department in the event of fire.

B. No contaminated material will be removed from the EDC without the prior approval of CPG 742. All such materials or equipment which are to be removed will be monitored, packaged, labeled and loaded so as to satisfy pertinent regulations concerning shipment of radioactive materials. This material that will travel by commercial means or unescorted shipment on NIA must be packaged in accordance with Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. EDC personnel will assist project and J-4 personnel in determining proper packaging requirements.

C. Task Unit Commanders are responsible for providing CPGs with lists of qualified monitors in each task unit. CPGs will assist the Task Unit Commanders in qualifying personnel if so desired.

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FORM 948, 1-64

SUBJECT: Request of HARBOR Project 1-4 for Change in Radiation
Damage Limit

Copies furnished (Cont'd):

Dr. Murray, Project Officer, Project
1-4, Long Beach Naval Shipyard,
a/c Code 242

COM, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth,
Va., ATTN: UNKD for Code 270

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RN 197538
903
0-3

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS FIELD COMMAND
ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT
SANDIA BASE, ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

FORM 960, 1 AG

11 FEB 1958

SUBJECT: Request of HARDTACK Project 3.4 for Change in Radiation
Damage Limit (U)

THRU: Commander
Task Group 7.1
P.O. Box 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to Commander, Norfolk Naval Shipyard Confidential letter FC/8570 (271) (HARDTACK) dated 17 January 1958.

2. At the suggestion of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, reference (a), which requests that the radiation damage limit for Project 3.4 personnel be raised to 4 r, was forwarded direct to Commander, JTF 7 instead of through established channels via (1) Commander, Field Command, AFSPM and (2) Commander, Task Group 7.1.

3. As a result of subsequent action by Commander, FC, AFSPM, Project 3.4 has initiated action to have CNO (Op 36) preliminarily approve the raising of the radiation damage limit for Project 3.4 personnel from 3.0 r to 5.0 r for any 13 week period during Operation HARDTACK. After that approval is obtained, it is anticipated that Commander, FC, AFSPM will subsequently forward an appropriate request, through established channels, pertinent to raising the radiation damage limits for the specific personnel concerned of Project 3.4.

4. In view of the above, it is considered that no action on reference (a) is required.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

HARRY D. PICKETT
Captain, USN
Asst Deputy Chief of Staff
Weapons Effects Tests

Copies furnished:
COM JTF 7 (Advance copy)

[REDACTED]


COPY

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

BUMED-742:GCB:ces
Serial: 01116
13 DEC 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
To: Commander, Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, Virginia

Subj: Operation HARDTACK - radiation dosage limits for personnel;
comment concerning

Ref: (a) Norfolk NavShipYd ltr FS/S11(274A)(HARDTACK) Ser 0635
of 5 Dec 1957

1. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has no objection to the increase in radiation dose for personnel in Project 3.4, Operation HARDTACK, from 3r/13-week period to 4r/13-week period. This proposed increase is in accordance with a revision of National Bureau of Standards Handbook 59, entitled "Permissible Dose for External Sources of Ionizing Radiation." However, it must be emphasized that the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery desires that personnel exposure be kept as low as possible, even at the expense of an early entry into the target area.

2. It is requested that the Commander, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, direct this request to the Commander, TF-7, as a policy matter coming under that Commander's cognizance.

/s/ P. F. Dickens, Jr.
By direction

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Enclosure (1)




NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD
PORTSMOUTH, VA. bgy

R N 1922 6
90 1 2 . 3

In reply refer to

PS/8570(271)
(HARDTACK)

[REDACTED]

029

JAN 17 1958

From: Commander
To: Commander, Task Force 7

Subj: Operation HARDTACK; request for change in radiation dosage limit

Ref: (a) NavShipIdNorVa conf ltr PS/S11(274A) HARDTACK of 5 Dec 1957
to Chief, BuMed, info copy to Hdqtrs FC AFSWP
(b) BuMed conf ltr BUMED-742:CCB:ces Ser 01116 of 13 Dec 1957
to NavShipIdNorVa

Encl: (1) Copy of reference (b)

1. It is understood that the radiation dosage limit for personnel while stationed at EPG during Operation HARDTACK will be established as 3r.
2. Underwater Explosions Research Division Project 3.4 plans for personnel to go aboard the target ships as soon as possible after WAHOO in order to effect repairs, recalibrate equipment and make preparations for UMBRELLA.
3. In anticipation of the relatively early re-entry needed by Project 3.4 after WAHOO and the extended work required aboard the target ships between WAHOO and UMBRELLA, it is most desirable that the radiation dosage limit for Project 3.4 personnel be raised to 4r.
4. It should be noted that no personnel involved in Project 3.4 has ever participated in an atomic test before and that the earliest possible participation after WAHOO and UMBRELLA tests will be in 1960. It should further be noted that every effort will be made to keep personnel exposure as low as possible.
5. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery was approached by reference (a) with respect to this change in the radiation dosage limit and has no objection to this increase (reference (b)).
6. It is therefore requested that the radiation dosage limit for Project 3.4 personnel be raised to 4r.

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Copies to:
HQ, FC, AFSWP (with copy of enclosure)
Dr. W. W. Murray, Project Officer, Project 3.4

T. J. Sullivan, Jr.
T. J. SULLIVAN, Jr.
By direction

[REDACTED]

24 JAN 1958

SUMMARY: Radiation Storage Limit

**TO: Commander
Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth, Virginia**

1. Reference NavShipMort's conf ltr FM/all(274A) HANDTACK of Dec 1957 to Chief, Bldg, info copy to Hdqtrs NE AFMSP, Bldg conf ltr EMB-742:OCB:res Ser 0116 of 13 Dec 1957 to NavShipMort's, Mort's conf ltr FM/6770(271) HANDTACK of 17 Jan 1958 to CJTF-7.

2. Subsequent to initiation of correspondence referenced above as the result of conference of all concerned DOD, AEC and other at a recent conference (16 Jan 1958), the NE criteria for Operation HANDTACK have been established, in part, as follows:

a. 3.75 roentgens (gamma only) per 13 week period or 5 roentgens if the operation extends beyond 13 weeks.

b. In the event authorization for individual exposures of the established NE is indicated by the nature of the project, authorization will be granted only by the Commander JTF-7 and only specific cases for which operational requirements provide justification.

c. The operational period for radiation control purposes defined as the event minus fifteen (15) days through the event plus fifteen (15) days.

3. In view of the above, it would appear that Project 3.1 will be able to operate within the criteria as established without violation of results to be obtained from the Project. Should this not be the case, request for exception should be processed as under 2.b. above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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PERRY B. GRIFFITH
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Staff

U. S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE LABORATORY
SAN FRANCISCO 24, CALIFORNIA

906B
CEM:mle

NOV 24 1958

[REDACTED]

From: Commanding Officer and Director
To: Distribution List contained in Report USNRDL-TR-260

Subj: U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory CONFIDENTIAL Report
USNRDL-TR-260; forwarding of

Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT OPNAV RPT 5600-3 (Conf) Ser 34/0906 of 22 May 58
to CNO

Encl: (1) Confidential Report USNRDL-TR-260 entitled "A Proposed
Doctrine for Fleet Radiological Defense" by S. Baum, W.E.
Strope and R.L. Harvey

1. Enclosure (1) presents, as a proposed replacement for Chapter 11 of NMIP-50-1, a revised doctrine for fleet atomic warfare defense and provides a documented basis for its major elements. This doctrine reflects the results of technical and operational evaluations of nuclear weapons effects, hazards, and countermeasures with respect to their implications on fleet operations.


2. The present Chapter 11 of NMIP 50-1, entitled "ABC Defense and Damage Control," treats the defense against atomic, biological and chemical warfare as a single system. Enclosure (1) points out that the apparent similarities between atomic warfare defense, on the one hand, and biological and chemical warfare defense, on the other, are not nearly as significant as their fundamental differences.

3. This report was reviewed in draft form by the Commanders in Chief, U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and was jointly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations by reference (a). It is currently under review by CNO and thus at present represents a Laboratory recommendation rather than an approved doctrine.

J. H. McQuilkin
J. H. McQUILKIN

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Final in
February 1959
2-6-59
[Signature]



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN
Chief of Naval Operations
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

QCT 1958

Dear Admiral Burke:

You will recall that as a result of the March 1 detonation of the CASTLE test series conducted by JTF-7 in the Pacific in 1954, the natives of Rongelap and Ujae Atolls in the Marshall Islands were exposed to radioactive fallout. The Atomic Energy Commission, on behalf of the U. S. Government, has accepted responsibility for periodic medical examinations of these Marshallese. Since that time there have been five follow-up medical examinations conducted by the AEC in collaboration with the Naval Medical Research Institute, the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory and the Brookhaven National Laboratory. These examinations were greatly facilitated by the assistance afforded the medical teams by CINCPACFLT and the Commanding Officer ENVSTA-5J.

The fifth follow-up examinations during February-April, 1958 for the first time employed the whole body counter, an electronic device for the measurement and identification of the total body burden of contaminating radioisotopes. It proved an unqualified success in that it provided direct data on the type and degree of internal contamination of a number of the islanders. It was also useful in establishing that there was residual radioactivity present in certain foods and other materials. Since it is likely that the current series of tests has added to the contamination level of these islands, it is more than ever imperative to continue these medical follow-up studies and to extend the survey to a detailed examination of the ecological aspects of these islands; special attention must be given to the locally obtained items of diet.

In order to accomplish this mission it is proposed that a team of medical and ecological specialists be sent to these islands with their required equipment, supplies and technical assistance. The experience of last year's expedition, for which you graciously provided the LST "Times County", prompts us to request that an LST again be assigned for transportation and basing beginning some time between the middle of February and the first of March, 1959, and requiring about one month overall for completion of mission. An LST proved to have many advantages over other craft, not the least of which was its ability to accept and secure the 21-ton shielded steelroom of the whole body counter on its tank deck.

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OCT 31 1958

An LST also has sufficient power supplies of the correct type to operate the whole body counter and the x-ray equipment.

The shielded steelroom presently is stored at Eniwetok. It can be on-loaded and secured within three to four days. The present operational plans would require that an LST be on Station at Eniwetok about a week before the planned departure to Rongelap. It would return to Eniwetok approximately 21 days later and off-load the steelroom.

If operational considerations warrant, the communication team could board the LST at any other designated point in this island system and similarly could disembark. At least two technicians, however, should assist in the on-loading of the steelroom and its associated delicate electronics and accompany this equipment while it is on board.

Assistance from the U. S. Navy in the accomplishment of the above mission would be of immeasurable value. Accordingly, your approval of the use of an LST together with the following incidental items is respectfully requested.

1. Participation in the operation by certain naval personnel, both service and civilian. Approximately five such naval personnel should accompany the team, but as yet these men are undesignated. At least some of the five will come from those listed in Schedule A dependent on duties and commitments as of that time. Your general approval of such detached duties is respectfully requested.
2. Transportation via MSTS for all other personnel (Schedule A) of the team and cargo from Hawaii to Rongelap or other designated point of embarkation and return. In addition to the five members of the team listed in paragraph 1 above there are contemplated some five scientists and six technicians from the Brookhaven National Laboratory, and one scientist each from the National Institutes of Health, the Walter Reed Medical Center, and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Five to seven civilian ecologist-scientists from the University of Washington complete the team. The total weight of all medical equipment and gear is estimated at four tons and the volume at 150 cubic feet.
3. Transportation and berthing of the above medical and ecological investigators on the trip to and from Rongelap and during the period of the communications and collecting.
4. Assignment of a Class 2 priority for all MSTS transportation required.

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Admiral Arleigh A. Burke

- 3 -

1958

5. Air transportation between Rongerik or other designated embarkation point and Majuro, and return, to transfer three Marshallese (one medical practitioner and two interpreters) and to transfer several members of the medical team to Majuro for the purpose of examining children which serve as controls for the Rongerik children.
6. Authorization to all Naval Commands enroute to provide assistance and support to this team of scientists as needed.
7. Authorization of the Commander of the IRT to on-load the stockroom and other stored material at Rongerik and subsequently return there if that island is not designated as the principal station of the vessel.

Your cooperation in bringing about this biomedical mission will be deeply appreciated. Moreover, in addition to satisfying the Government's responsibility for the health of the Marshallese, you will be assisting in studies which have proven to be of value to the Department of the Navy and to the AEC in advancing our understanding of the nature of radiation injury and the delayed effects of irradiation.

Sincerely yours,

General Manger

Enclosure
Schedule A
Ltr to A.T. Lund

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14-00000

SCHEDULE "A"

Tentative listing of personnel. Additional personnel are being contacted. Those listed below have received informal approval of their respective Commanding Officers or Directors.

U. S. Navy

Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland
Lt. Cdr. I.V. King (MC) USN, Naval Liaison Officer (not to accompany team)
Lt. Earl J. Roth (MC) USN, Surgeon
Mr. Maynard Kieber, Electrician Scientist

Naval Medical Research Unit, Cairo, Egypt
William G. Clutter, ECI, USN. Serv. No. 653-39-71, Technician

Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida
W. Jefferson Hasty, ECI, USN. Serv. No. 605-94-99, Technician

Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, San Francisco, California
Mr. Hyman Nechter, Statistician
Mr. William Murray, Photographer

14th Naval District, Preventive Medicine Unit, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Lt. James P. Nolan (MC) USN, Liaison Officer for COMNAVREAFRON
(not to accompany team)

U. S. Army

Walter Reed Medical Center
Colonel Austin Lowery, MC, USA, Ophthalmologist

Civilians

Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, L.I., New York
Dr. Robert A. Conard, Medical Department, Team Leader and internist
Dr. James S. Robertson, Medical Dept., Biophysicist
Dr. William Wolins, Medical Department, Internist
Mr. James J. Gremough, Medical Department, Technician

Others

Dr. Leo Meyer, South Nassau Communities Hospital, Rockville Center, L.I., New York, Hematologist
Dr. J. Edward Hall or Dr. Baruch S. Klumberg, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Md., Internist
Undesignated Officer, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Mr. Clyde Sipe, Camden, Missouri, Chief technician
Mr. Irving Jones, South Nassau Communities Hospital, Rockville Center, L.I., New York, Technician

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SCHEDULE "A" Contd.

Marshall Islands, Majuro

One medical practitioner

Two interpreters

University of Washington, Seattle, Washington

Dr. Edward E. Reid, Laboratory of Radiation Biology

Dr. Allyn H. Seymour, Laboratory of Radiation Biology

**Approximately four to six additional scientists and/or technicians
from this laboratory**

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4 FEB 1958

1-2/803

3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Recontamination of Army Specialized Barges (U)

Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington
12, Virginia

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.3, Washington 25, D. C.

The request in basic letter is considered appropriate and has been
submitted through proper channels with the request for its inclusion in
your operational planning. In event fulfilling this requirement is
beyond your capability, request this headquarters be advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copy furnished:
FC AFMFP
OTG 7.1
NOL

THOMAS B. GRIFFIN
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Staff

M/R: Self-explanatory.

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COL JEFFREY/tallmadge/3-3/2212/29 Jan 58

General	
Lueders	
General	
Griffith	
General	
Dick	
Admiral	
Doyle	
Doctor	
Oglo	
DC/S	
SJS	
J-1	
J-2	
J-3	
J-4	
J-5	
Compt	

JTF-7 903
Bdy 221 JF3

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 437 Box #1
San Francisco, California

2937-JFE

15 July 1958

SUBJECT: Request for Support for Program 40 (Radiation Biology)

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4
APO 187
San Francisco, California

1. Program 40 (Radiation Biology) has as its objective the radiological-ecological study of RONGELAP Atoll, to evaluate the extent of radiation contamination of an off site atoll from the present testing program and to further the available knowledge of the cycling of the "long lived" radioisotopes produced by the 1954 tests.

2. The support needed is transportation and living accommodations for twelve scientists from ENIWETOK to RONGELAP, movement about RONGELAP as requested by the party leader, Doctor Edward Held, and return to ENIWETOK, with the men and material at the end of the operation. Support is needed during the period 12 August to 24 August inclusive. The use of the MV ALOTO has been requested of CTG 7.5 for this purpose.

3. In addition, CTG 7.4 is requested to provide communication support by the Weather Station at RONGELAP, and normal SA-16 support for mail and supplies.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


J. H. WENDELL
J-3
Plans & Operations

JHW/jfm

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - CTG 7.4
- 1 - CTG 7.1
- 1 - D/A
- 1 - J-3
- 1 - J-6
- 1 - Program 40 (Donaldson)
- 1 - CJTF 7 (Info)
- 2 - TG 7.5 (Info)
- 2 - I&R

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

R/N 3968004

9-3
963

"JULY 1954"
OFFICE
FOR REPORTS

MAY 24 1956

AIR MAIL

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Japanese Foreign Office request for survey vessel SHINKO MARU
to receive certain assistance in Central Pacific; forwarding of
information concerning

Ref: (a) CNO Comd msg 232247Z May 1956

Encl: (1) Copy of American Embassy Tokyo msg No. 2732 of 22 May 1956
(2) Copy of American Embassy Tokyo msg No. 2740 of 23 May 1956
(3) Copy of CNO ltr ser 0247721 of 23 May 1956 to ASTSECDEF (NSA)

1. Enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are forwarded as amplifying information to
reference (a).

J.N. McDonald
By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVSTA LHAS
COMNAVFE
COMNAVSEAFTON
CJTF 7

(with encl (1), (2) and (3))
(with encl (1), (2) and (3))
(with encl (1), (2) and (3))
(with encl (1), (2) and (3))

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URGENT TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM: TOKYO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2732, May 22, 5 P.M.

PROPERTY

FORNEY HAS DELIVERED NOTE VERBALE OFFICIALLY INFORMING US RE DISPATCH SHINKOKU MARIU TO SURVEY EFFECTS NUCLEAR TESTS. SHIP TO INVESTIGATE FISH, BIOLOGICAL, ATMOSPHERIC, METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS IN VICINITY TESTING GROUNDS. SHIP DEPARTING TOKYO MAY 26 AND RETURNING JUNE 30; NOTE INCLUDES FULL ITINERARY, DETAILS CREW AND OTHER PERTINENT DATA (TEXT BEING POUNDED).

NOTE REQUESTS FOLLOWING ASSISTANCE TO SURVEY SHIP: 1) NAME APPROPRIATE US SIGNAL STATION, CALL SIGN, FREQUENCY OF CALL AND REPLY SIGNAL AND TIME EXCHANGE SIGNALS IN ORDER SURVEY SHIP COMMUNICATE DAILY NOON POSITION TO US AUTHORITIES AT NUCLEAR TEST AREA; 2) INFORMATION ON PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES I.E. COORDINATION OF TIME AND DATE DETECTION AND POSITION FOR SURVEY SHIP TAKE REFUEL; 3) PERMISSION STOP AT PONAPE AND SAIPAN ONCE EACH FOR SUPPLY 100 TONS FRESH WATER AND FUEL/OILABLE FOODS AT COST NOT MORE \$1.50 AT BOTH PLACES; 4) INFORMATION ON PORTS OF CALL—A. METHODS OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATION; B. AVAILABILITY OF PILOTAGE AND PORT CHARTS; C. AVAILABILITY OF SAMPARS; AND D. AVAILABILITY OF PIERAGE; 5) SERVICES US MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR TRANSPORTATION OF INVESTIGATION DATA, INSTRUMENTS ETC. BETWEEN PORTS OF CALL AND TOKYO.

IN VIEW URGENT DEPARTURE SHINKOKU MARIU REQUEST EARLY REPLY MESSAGE REQUESTING FULLEST COOPERATION POSSIBLE WITH SURVEY SHIP. AT REQUEST INQUIRY FOR INFO ON SHINKOKU MARIU, THIS MESSAGE AND COPY DISPATCH BEING SENT HIM DIRECTLY.

ALLEN

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COPY

Enclosure (1)

URGENT TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM: TOKYO

TO: Secretary of State

RE: 2710, May 23, noon

PRIORITY

REFERENCE NPTL 2963.

1. ITINERARY SHINKOSEN'S MAINLY WEST BANGOR AREA: FROM TOKYO SOUTHEAST TO POINT 20 DEGREES NORTH LONGITUDE, 157 DEGREES EAST LATITUDE; THEN SOUTH TO POINT 9 DEGREES LONGITUDE; THEN EAST TO POINT 161 DEGREES LATITUDE; TO PONAPE ARRIVING JUNE 18; NORTHWEST TO SAIPAN ARRIVING JUNE 22; AND NORTH TO TOKYO ARRIVING JUNE 30. OBSERVATIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AT 37 POINTS ON ITINERARY.
2. RE PERISHABLE FOODS, JAPANESE DESIRE PURCHASE MAINLY VEGETABLES AND OTHER FRESH FOODS IN RELATIVELY LIMITED QUANTITIES AT COST ESTIMATED AT NO MORE THAN \$1.50 AT BOTH SAIPAN AND PONAPE. JAPANESE UNCERTAIN EXACT QUANTITIES DESIRED.
3. RE SERVICES RE MILITARY AIRCRAFT, JAPANESE DESIRE TRANSPORT FROM TOKYO TO SAIPAN AND PONAPE INVESTIGATION INSTRUMENTS, BRICS AND OTHER INCIDENTALS FOUND NECESSARY AFTER SHINKOSEN'S MAIN DEPARTURE TOKYO IN ADDITION, DESIRE SEND BACK FROM BOTH PLACES TO TOKYO UNDEVELOPED FILMS FOR INVESTIGATION AND RESEARCH, TAPE RECORDINGS, INVESTIGATION REPORTS AND LETTERS FROM RESEARCH STAFF AND CREW. PONAPE BELIEVES SHIPMENTS WILL BE SMALL AND NOTES THEY CAN BE CARRIED BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT MAKING REGULAR RUNS TO SAIPAN AND PONAPE ON NON-RECOGNIZABLE BASIS.

ALLISON

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Enclosure (2)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
OP-107
Per 016121

23 MAY 1956

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Subj: Japanese Foreign Office request for survey vessel SHINKO MARU
to receive certain assistance in Central Pacific
Ref: (a) American Embassy Tokyo msg No. 2732 of 22 May 1956

1. Reference (a), which outlines the desire of the Japanese Foreign Office to have the survey ship, SHINKO MARU, depart Tokyo 26 May to investigate fish and oceanographic conditions in the vicinity of the nuclear test area, has been referred to the Chief of Naval Operations for reply.

2. In answer to the specific requests contained in reference (a), the Chief of Naval Operations recommends the following action be taken:

a. Have appropriate U.S. signal station, call sign, frequency of call and reply signal and time exchange signals in order survey ship communicate daily noon position to U.S. authorities at nuclear test area.

Daily position reports may be addressed to Commander, Joint Task Force 7. The call sign for this command, at the proving grounds, is JTF. The message may be transmitted to the Naval Communications Station, Guam, M.I., for relay to JTF 7. The call sign for Naval Communications Station, Guam, is NTS. The frequency to use in the initial call up to Naval Communications Station, Guam, is 900 MC. The frequencies to be employed for exchange of traffic after initial contact are:

SHINKO MARU transmits on 468 MC

SHINKO MARU receives on 470 MC

Daily noon position should be transmitted about one-half hour after local apparent noon.

b. Information on precautionary measures, i.e., communication of time and date of detonation and position for survey ship take refuge.

A danger area has been described in accordance with the recommendations of both Commander Joint Task Force 7 and the Atomic Energy Commission.

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Enclosure (3)

Should be relayed to
CTG 7.3 & 7.3 Rep.

0-215/mt
Sec 01, 1951

23 MAY 1956

This area warning has been disseminated through diplomatic channels as well as by Notices to Mariners, Notices to Airmen, and International Notices to Airmen. Grave hazards will at times exist in this area and all mariners and airmen are warned to remain clear. It is not anticipated that there will be any such hazards outside the danger area. In the unlikely event that test activities create a hazard, appropriate warnings will be given via existing systems. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, has established with Commander Naval Forces Far East and United States Naval Attache Tokyo additional precautions relative to the positioning of any Japanese vessel. Communication of times and dates of detentions to Japan is not considered to be necessary. The ship should not be authorized to enter the prescribed danger area.

c. Permission to stop at Pampopo and Saipan once each for supply 100 tons fresh water and perishable foods at cost of not more than \$150.00 at both places.

If the Japanese Government is determined to send a ship on such an expedition it does not appear unreasonable to point out to the Japanese that with the resources available to that government it should be possible to select one with sufficient sea-keeping characteristics to permit a thirty day cruise without logistic support in this area. The Chief of Naval Operations recommends that this be done. If no such ship is available the Chief of Naval Operations will grant entry clearance for the SHINKOBU MARU to enter the Naval Defensive Sea Area of Guam for a period of one day, en route to and from the vicinity of the testing area. One hundred fifty dollars worth of perishable foods and 100 tons of fresh water can be furnished the ship during both visits on a reimbursable basis. Necessary arrangements for this support can be made by the ship's master with Commander Naval Forces Marianas. The reason Guam has been selected in lieu of Pampopo and Saipan is because it is the only port in the area where required logistic support can be made available to the ship and for other reasons outlined below. No authority should be given to enter any port other than Guam.

d. Information on ports of call. (1) Methods of wireless communication. Guam has adequate communication facilities. (2) Availability of pilotage and port charts. Commander Naval Forces Marianas will arrange to pilot the SHINKOBU MARU in and out of Apra Harbor. (3) Availability of bunkers. None available at Guam. If required, the boats should be brought from Japan. (4) Availability of pierage. Adequate in Apra Harbor.

e. Services U.S. military aircraft for transportation of investigation data, instruments, etc., between ports of call and Tokyo.

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Op-215/mt
Sec 024901

23 MAY 1956

Scheduled military flights from Guam to Japan. Necessary arrangements for the handling of investigation data and a limited amount of air freight can be made at Guam with Commander Naval Forces Marianas. No other services of this type can be made available.

/s/ G. L. MESSLI
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Administration)




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Division of Biology and Botany
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Mr. George H. Bunting

Forwarded herewith are graphs of radiation intensity readings at Sengulay Atoll. These data supplement previous communications to you from this command.

SECRET

100-443887-100

JOHN M. LEONARD
Captain 100
Asst Adj Gen ✓

Copy Forwarded via

J-3/Dr Clement/Ky1404/9 July 1958

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1063

[illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
WEATHER BUREAU

Pacific Supervisory Office
P. O. Box 3650
Honolulu 11, Hawaii

April 21, 1958

Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 437
San Francisco, Calif.
(Attn: Major Frank Ritchie, RADSAFE)

Dear Sir:

In response to a telephone request from a Captain Matt of your organization, may we inform you that the Weather Bureau has no monitoring capabilities for radioactive fallout in the Hawaiian Islands.

We have at three stations in Hawaii; namely, Honolulu, Hilo and Lihue, the "fly paper" type of collection which the Weather Bureau performs for the AEC. The Weather Bureau, in this instance, merely exposes the paper. All analyses and measurements are made by AEC and, therefore, any data which you require from these "fly paper" exposures would have to be obtained from the AEC, not the Weather Bureau.

Very truly yours,


H. Dean Parry
Meteorologist Acting in Charge

HDP:smc

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Keith Beyer, P-15 Group Leader

March 13, 1950

Mr. Ogle, Deputy Commander for Scientific Matters-777 7

YOUR PROPOSED VISIT TO KPO

J-50

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Rainwater Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

Therefore, I would like to invite you to assist me in the above considerations preferably during the period April 21 to May 15. If you find it possible to stay slightly longer this would be most satisfactory. If the suggested period is not satisfactory to you, I would appreciate further advice from you on this subject.

Original Signed by
WM. OGLE

Mr. Ogle

WO:el

CC: Gen. A. R. Luedecke ← ~~OK~~
J. M. S. Kellogg

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
(CONTRACT W-7405-ENG-36)
P. O. Box 1663
LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

IN REPLY
REFER TO **J-20**

March 19, 1950

Dr. Roger Betsel
University of California Radiation Laboratory
P. O. Box 808
Livermore, California

Dear Roger:

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Bikini Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

I would therefore like to invite you and Ken Street to assist me during Hardtack on the above considerations. It would be most helpful to me if between you you could cover the period of June 7 to July 15 assuming the operation extends that late. I am sending a similar letter to Ken and would like to request that you discuss this with him and let me know what period of time you could come out if you find it possible at all.

I would greatly appreciate any assistance you can give me on this subject.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
WML OGLE

Wm. Ogle
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
SCIENTIFIC MATTERS-JET 7

WML:al

CC: R. F. York
R. Small
A. R. Lindholm ← CH
H + B (2)
File

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
(CONTRACT W-7405-ENG-36)
P. O. Box 1663
LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

IN REPLY
REFER TO 2-50

March 19, 1958

Dr. K. I. Street
University of California Radiation Laboratory
P. O. Box 808
Livermore, California

Dear Ken:

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Bikini Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

I would therefore like to invite you and Roger Bernal to assist me during Hardtack on the above considerations. It would be most helpful to me if between you you could cover the period of June 7 to July 15 assuming the operation extends that late. I am sending a similar letter to Roger and would like to request that you discuss this with him and let me know what period of time you could come out if you find it possible at all.

I would greatly appreciate any assistance you can give me on this subject.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
WYM. OGLE
Wm. Ogle
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
SCIENTIFIC MATTERS-JTF 7

Wotol

CC: H. F. York
D. Sewall
A. R. Lindstrom ← CK
H + R (2)
File

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
(CONTRACT W-7405-ENG-36)
P. O. Box 1663
LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

IN REPLY

REFER TO: J-80

March 13, 1958

Dr. Lester Machta
U. S. Weather Bureau
Department of Commerce
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Les:

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Rainwater Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

During our phone conversation the other day you stated you would be interested in assisting in the above considerations but were not sure what period of time would be most convenient. I have arranged a possible schedule for the people I am asking out and would like to ask you to consider the period of May 21 to June 15. If this does not meet your convenience please let me know.

I would greatly appreciate your assistance during Hardtack if you find you can accept this invitation.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
WM. OGLE

Wm. Ogle
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
SCIENTIFIC MATTERS-JTF 7

W0:el

CC: Gen. A. R. Luadoche ~~cc~~ — GK
H + R (2)
File

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY
(CONTRACT W-7405-ENG-36)
P. O. Box 1663
LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO

IN REPLY
REFER TO 5-80

March 13, 1958

Dr. Gordon Dunning
Division of Biology and Medicine
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Gordon:

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Eniwetok Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

Therefore, I would greatly appreciate your coming to the Eniwetok Proving Ground to assist in the above considerations if you can find it possible. Since I do not want to ask anyone to stay very long, I have arranged a tentative schedule which involves your being overseas from April 15 to May 7. If this time is not convenient for you please advise me of any preferable period of time. If you would care to stay longer than the above mentioned period of time that would be quite satisfactory.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by
JWM. OGLE

Wm. Ogle
DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR
SCIENTIFIC MATTERS-JTF 7

WJ:el

CC: Dr. G. Dunning
Gen. A. E. Inceste ← CK
H + R (2)
File

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G. A. Cowan, Associate J Division Leader

March 13, 1958

Mr. Ogle, Deputy Commander for Scientific Matters - JTF 7

YOUR PROPOSED VISIT TO KPO

J-80

During the forthcoming Hardtack Operation at the Bikini Proving Ground, I would appreciate discussion with a few informed and dependable people in deciding whether the conditions with respect to radioactive fallout are such as to allow the safe firing of nuclear devices.

I would therefore like to invite you to assist in the above considerations preferably during the period May 7 to June 1. If you find this period inconvenient with your own schedule, I would appreciate an alternate suggestion.

Original signed by
WMA. OGLE

Mr. Ogle

WO: Gen. A. R. Lucadack ←
Mr. A. G. Graves
File

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903
2-3 2-3

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

FF-1

MI

Supp W/ 913

4 MAR 1958

From: Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet
To: Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier

Subj: Radiation Monitoring Program

Encl: (1) Copy of Hqtrs JTF 7 ltr J-3/903 of 24 Feb 1958

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith for your compliance. The subject program is placed under the cognizance of your command.

2. You are authorized to deal directly with Headquarters Joint Task Force SEVEN in connection with this monitoring program. Send information copies of your communications to CINCPACFLT.

GEORGE F. MOSCO,
Fleet Aerologist

Copy to:

Hqtrs JTF 7 (Arlington Hall Station, Arlington 12, Va.)

CO NAS KWAJALEIN (with encl (1))

CO NAS MIDWAY (with encl (1))

CO FLEETCOM PEARL (with encl (1))

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2. Joint Task Force 1000 is planning to operate a radiation monitoring program in the Central Pacific during Operation HARBOR. In connection with this program the task force desires to place radiation monitoring equipment in the area of the Hawaiian Islands. The equipment to be used is of the type which can be carried by small aircraft and can be operated by a single person. The equipment is of the type which can be used to detect and measure radiation levels in the area of the Hawaiian Islands. Should this request be approved, the equipment will be directly to surveillance of the area of the Hawaiian Islands.

128
The Joint Task Force
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Joint Task Force SEVEN is planning to operate a radiation monitoring program in the Central Pacific during Operation HARBOR. In connection with this program, the Task Force desires to place radiation monitoring equipment at the U. S. Weather Bureau operated stations at TIKI, PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU.

Assistance from the weather station personnel, as well as to install equipment described below is requested.

The equipment for each station consists of a Radiation Surveyor, a 10-cathode Automatic Counter, which requires 115-volts, 60 cycles power supply, and a Station Log book. Should this request be approved, this equipment will be transported from Hawaii directly to the stations about 1 April 1958.

The assistance requested of the station personnel, consisting mostly of recording instrument readings twice daily, will be supplied by the personnel who will accompany the equipment. No equipment will be furnished. Replacement units will be furnished when the existing equipment, at which time the previously used equipment will be returned to Hawaii.

Sincerely yours,

Very faithfully,
The Hon. Earl Warren
US Supreme Court Building
P.O. Box 100
Washington, D.C.

PERRY R. GRIFFITH
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff, 2d AF

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44/203
14 FEB 1954
Monitoring Installations

Commander
Air Weather Service
Andrew Air Force Base
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Joint Task Force SEVEN is planning to operate a radiation monitoring program in the Central Pacific during Operation HARBOR. In connection with this program the task force desires to place radiation monitoring equipment at the Air Weather Service Station on Guam.

2. Assistance from the weather detachment personnel as well as permission to install equipment consisting of a radiation survey meter, an automatic monitor and a station log book is requested.

3. Should this request be approved, this equipment will be transported from Eniwetok direct to the detachment about 1 April 1954. The requested assistance, consisting primarily of recording instructions, reading twice daily, will be spelled out in instructions which will accompany the equipment. No maintenance support will be required of detachment personnel. Replacement units will be delivered to the station immediately at which time the previously used equipment will be returned to Eniwetok.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

PERRY B. GRIFFITH
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Staff

MAJOR FRANK G. RICHIE/Rev/J-3/19 Feb 54

2211

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2-3/903

21 FEB 1958

SUBJECT: Radiation Damage Limit

TO: Commander
Field Command
Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Sandia Base
Albuquerque, New Mexico

1. Reference is made to:

a. Letter from Commander, Norfolk Naval Ship Yard, PN/07/0011
HANDTACK, 17 January 1958.

b. Letter from CJTF SEVEN to Commander, Norfolk Naval Ship Yard,
2-3/903, subject: Radiation Damage Limit, 24 January 1958.

c. Letter from COMFLECOM AFMSP, FOMT 960.4 AG, subject:
of HANDTACK Project 3.4 for Change in Radiation Damage Limit (U),
February 1958.

2. Reference 1b is attached for your information, which is a
to reference 1a.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Encl
CJTF-7 ltr dated 24 Jan 58

JOHN M. LEONARD
Captain AGO
Asst Adj Gen

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COL LEONARD/tallmadge/J-3/2216/26Feb58

General Innes
General Griffith
General Dick
Asst Asst
Doctor Ogle
Asst
Asst
J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
J-6
Compt

Report of Action on 1/1/50

Report of Action on 1/1/50

Report of Action on 1/1/50

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Report of Action on 1/1/50

Report of Action on 1/1/50

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Since Argentine Gas is
authorizing airlift
to provide such auth

OSAF 88 00-85-13

is being requested