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OPERATION CASTLE

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HISTORY OF TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL

For the Month of March, 1954

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Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force SEVEN

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CHAPTER I

COMMAND

March 1954

The Air Task Group history for the month of March started off with BRAVO Shot which was fired in the Bikini area with complete air success. All Air Force aircraft scheduled to participate in the mission completed their mission with no aborts. The details of the Air Force participation in the BRAVO mission are contained in the Operations portion of this history. Immediately after the shot, it was indicated from the CIC aboard the USS ESTES that the OBOE airstrip at Bikini was closed indefinitely. It actually opened up again for limited operation on the 10th of March. The contamination of the OBOE strip prevented moving personnel back into the control shack at that time, however, a control team including fire fighters were brought ashore prior to each aircraft landing. The control building and the hangar were severely damaged.

Due to extensive fall-out which unfortunately fell a few miles south of the contemplated area, it was necessary, on the second of March, to evacuate the twenty-eight (28) Air Force personnel, in charge of the Rongerik Weather Station, to Kwajalein. The move was actually made between 1400 and 1700 hours on the second of March. Since complete data on this contamination and subsequent corollary actions were not available during the month of March, separate documentation on this subject will be forthcoming in a later history.

In order to apprise the SAC, AFSWC, and ARDC of the time contemplated for the next shot, a TWX was sent to General LeMay and General Mills on the

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second of March. This message further defined BRAVO Shot in terms of initial data gained and presented a new revised schedule for remaining shots.[1]

Following up from the previous month's activities, Operations Order 3-54 was published on the third of March completely covering radioactive fall-out evacuation plans. This Operations Order was specifically designed to cover possible evacuation of Eniwetok in case of major fall-out from any one of the remaining shots.

In order to coordinate the Operations Order 3-54 and follow up on a trip to Kwajalein made by in the month of February, the Commander, Task Group 7.4 and several staff members visited the Commander at Kwajalein on the fifth of March to coordinate the evacuation plan, and discuss possible aircraft staging, contaminated aircraft parking, necessary maintenance and allied work load.[2]

Contamination of TARE/OBOE airstrip at Bikini, which precluded aircraft from using the strip, seemed to delay preparation for the second shot considerably. Although two PBM aircraft were furnished by Task Group 7.3 for operational control of Task Group 7.4, these two aircraft were considered inadequate to furnish the airlift required for timely pursuit of the ROMEO mission. Anticipating a need for additional amphibious aircraft, General Estes forwarded a TWX to of AFSWC explaining the situation and requesting that he informally check on the availability of SA-16 aircraft which may be loaned to Joint Task Force SEVEN for the remainder of the mission in the forward area.[3] in a returning

1. TG 7.4 Msg: 3-2817SRD.
2. Trip Rept on Kwajalein Visit, dtd 9 Mar 54, TG 3-3016S.
3. TG 7.4 Msg: 3-2863SRD.

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TWX indicated that SA-16 aircraft could be made available, upon request, by Headquarters USAF. This information was passed on to Joint Task Force SEVEN who officially requested the SA-16 aircraft be furnished by Headquarters USAF for the duration of the mission. The PBM aircraft which were originally scheduled to supplant C-47 airlift to Bikini were used during the early period of March in checking the atolls southeast of Bikini for fall-out and for helping in evacuating Air Force personnel and natives from these atolls.

With the contamination of the OBOE strip at Bikini denying its use and considering a request from the Commander at Kwajalein to aid in a search for a British Canberra which was lost in that area, a C-47 aircraft from Task Group 7.4 was sent to Kwajalein on TDY to aid in the search. This aircraft was returned to Eniwetok on the 12th of March after the Bikini C-47 airlift was re-established.

On previous operations the sampling effort had grown continuously up to a point which indicated that cloud samples were being procured within the capabilities of present-day Air Force aircraft. In order to assure that the Air Task Group was doing all it could with equipment available in supporting Task Group 7.1 in cloud sample collection, on the third of March wrote a letter to of Task Group 7.1 requesting his opinion as to the quality of the cloud sampling effort being provided. He asked specific questions concerning adequacies of aircraft, quality of the crew training, positioning, etc.[4] s reply to this letter indicated that, with the equipment available, the sampling effort had been most satisfactory.[5] In reply he further indicated

4. TG #3-2862S.
5. TG #3-3114SRD.

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cations which could be taken to better the effort for the remaining CASTLE shots. Instructions were forwarded to the Test Aircraft Unit to take the action which outlined.[6]

The first accident of the Air Task Group, involving aircraft, occurred on the third of March. It was a minor accident which damaged a rotor blade of an H-19 and the left elevator of an SA-16. It was a taxi accident, a full account of which was handled as a separate matter in accordance with Air Force regulations.

During the month of February it became apparent in the scheduling of Project Participants that full coordination with Joint Task Force SEVEN had not been accomplished. Some of the Project Participants who had a "need to know", concerning information available in briefings given by Joint Task Force SEVEN, were not allowed to participate in such briefings even though they had a QUEBEC clearance. This was due to a misunderstanding on initial coordination. To completely clarify responsibilities concerning Project Participant scheduling, the Deputy Commander of Task Group 7.4 visited Joint Task Force SEVEN and discussed the matter with and It was agreed that, in the future, the Project Participants who had a "need to know" and who had a QUEBEC clearance would be permitted to attend Joint Task Force SEVEN briefings provided DMA had no objections. The complete plan for Project Participant scheduling was drawn up into a Programming Plan, subject: "Information for Project Participants".[7]

On the fifth of March an information copy of a TWX to the 76th Air Rescue Squadron at Hickam AFB indicated that action had been taken on Joint

6. TG #3-3185SRD.
7. TG 7.4 Programming Plan 2-54, dtd 6 Mar 54.

[redacted]

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Task Force SEVEN's request for SA-16 support in the forward area. Air Rescue Service directed the 76th Air Rescue Squadron to furnish three (3) SA-16 aircraft and crews to be under the operational control of Joint Task Force SEVEN for the duration of the CASTLE operation. A TWX was forwarded from Task Group 7.4 to the Commander, PACDIVMATS, information copy to ARS in Washington, D.C., telling them that the aircraft would be assigned under the operational control of the 4930th Test Support Group and it was required that maintenance personnel be furnished with the aircraft and that spare parts be provided.[8]

With the additional SA-16 crews to be stationed at Eniwetok it was necessary to provide billeting space for them. On the eighth of March a letter was forwarded to Task Group 7.5 requesting construction of six (6) additional personnel tents in the Air Force area for these crews.[9]

The first delay of the CASTLE series began on the seventh of March when it was apparent that the upper winds were unsuitable for shooting the ROMEO shot. Fall-out, as experienced on BRAVO, was felt to be too severe to permit shooting when upper winds would indicate possible contamination of any civilized areas. To preclude visitation of Project Participants when no shot was actually imminent, a TWX was forwarded on the seventh of March to SAC and AFSWC informing them of the shot delays.[10] Also, on the thirteenth of March, further information concerning the delays was forwarded.[11] During this period of relative inactivity, or shot delay, meetings were being held on the roll-up plan, final report, etc. The initial meeting on the roll-up plan was held on the ninth of March and the airlift requirements for

8. TWX to PACDIVMATS, TGDC 3-42.
9. Ltr fr TG 7.4 to TG 7.5, subj: "Construction of Additional Tent Frames", dtd 8 Mar 54, TG 4698.
10. TG 7.4 Msg: TGG 3-73.
11. TG 7.4 Msg: TGG 3-164.

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Task Group 7.4 roll-up was hand-carried to Joint Task Force SEVEN on the tenth.

Immediately subsequent to the KING shot, TG 7.1 desired to effect recovery of the firing party on NAN Island and of samples at various other sites. Due to the high levels of contamination at those points, it was impossible to accomplish these missions through landings on normally designated helicopter landing points. Success demanded landings in close proximity to the bunkers and measurement stations. No one aboard the command ship knew whether or not these areas were sufficiently safe to permit landings. For Eniwetok shots, TG 7.4 would be responsible for helicopter lift. Hence, in order to ascertain the degree of safety which might be expected in making landings near bunkers and measurement stations at Eniwetok, Commander, TG 7.4 had conference with J-3, 7.1 to obtain information on all such landings which might be necessary after proposed Eniwetok shots.

On the 9th March,

and made a survey of all these proposed Eniwetok helicopter landing sites.

Task Group 7.1 was informed of construction or clearing work which was to be accomplished at each of certain of these sites in order to make them safe. The remainder were approved for use. All helicopter pilots at Eniwetok were then briefed on each of these sites.

On the third of March, one (1) of the airlift PBM's when taking off at Bikini, damaged a wing float. This take-off was not considered a good one by Task Group 7.3, therefore, on ten March Task Group 7.3 requested that the two (2) PBM aircraft and crews be removed from operational control

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of the 4930th Test Support Group and attached to Task Group 7.3 for a short period of time for additional training in water landings.[12] This request was complied with and the PBY aircraft were dispatched to Bikini to be under the operational control of Task Group 7.3 as requested. They were returned to the 4930th Test Support Group control after a period of approximately ten (10) days.

Water landings in the Bikini area, although not considered critical for the most part, were considered a little tricky because of the ground swells within the lagoon. On the eleventh of March, Deputy Commander, Task Group 7.4, flew to Bikini in an SA-16 to survey the lagoon area for designation of safe landing area or areas. On the seventeenth of March a letter was submitted to Joint Task Force SEVEN outlining the Task Group 7.4 choice for water landing areas. It was requested that this one area submitted be designated the only area for water landings at Bikini and further requested that an aircraft buoy be provided. The same letter outlined a proposal for overall aircraft control in the Bikini area. These proposals were concurred in by first indorsement, thereto, on the twenty-first of March by Joint Task Force SEVEN.[13]

The SA-16 aircraft assigned to the 78th Air Rescue Squadron at Kwajalein, which were being used on the CASTLE operation at Eniwetok, did not seem to be getting proper maintenance. It was determined that the SAR Detachment Commander, under the Test Services Unit, was in an undesirable position in that he was required to keep two (2) Operational SA-16's at Eniwetok during non-operational period and three (3) SA-16's at Eniwetok during operational periods. In addition, he was the Squadron

12. TG #3-3108C.
13. Ltr to JTF SEVEN, subj: "Airlift Opr", TG #3-3174C.

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Commander of the 78th Air Rescue Squadron at Kwajalein and had not been relieved of the SAR responsibility in that area. This workload appeared to be too much responsibility. To further aggravate this situation, the two (2) SA-16's attached to the 4930th Test Support Group from the 76th Air Rescue Squadron at Hickam AFB arrived at Eniwetok without maintenance personnel, thereby increasing the maintenance burden on the 78th Air Rescue Squadron at Kwajalein. This situation was outlined in a TWX, on the twentieth of March, from to .[14]

immediately complied by sending a TWX to the 76th Air Rescue Squadron at Hickam AFB directing the assignment of a new Detachment Commander for the Rescue Element at Eniwetok, relieving Major Haggerty of this duty and further directing that maintenance personnel and supply be provided the two (2) SA-16 airlift aircraft from the 76th Air Rescue Squadron at Eniwetok.[15]

With the delay of three (3) weeks and more between BRAVO and ROMEO shots, it became evident that the corrosive salt air at this station was causing increased maintenance and abort rates. Only by frequent aerial flights could we hope to keep the abort rate at an acceptable minimum. The problem which ensued on these frequent flights was that, with such flying, periodic inspections had to be performed which could deny use of the aircraft for the operation. Since we could never be assured as to when a shot would be fired, we were in the position of assuming a calculated risk by withdrawing aircraft from operation for these inspections.

14. TG 7.4 Msg: TGG 3-250.
15. TWX fr DTG's 23/0235Z & 23/1135Z.

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To acquaint n with this problem area, as it pertained to our capability, G s forwarded a letter to Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN on the twenty-third of March explaining the fact that we had critical aircraft such as the RB-36 that required special maintenance and proposed a priority for maintenance for their concurrence. First priority was given to the RB-36 Sampler Controller and the two (2) B-36 Samplers. Second priority was proposed as: F-84 Samplers, WB-29 Weather aircraft, Rescue aircraft, one (1) C-54 Photographic aircraft, and the Inter-Atoll airlift aircraft. All other aircraft would be considered in third priority for maintenance.[16]

Also, during the extended period after ENIVO and before ROMEO, thought was being given to preparing the shots at minimum time interval between shots to permit a possible make-up in schedule. A thorough study was prepared by this Task Group to determine the minimum length of time required to decontaminate key aircraft and prepare them for another operation. The information from this study was forwarded to , 23 March, indicating actions which could be taken by Joint Task Force SEVEN which would improve Task Group 7.4 capability on turn-around. Such things were suggested as: (1) Eliminate requirement of CASSIDY taking crater photos to reduce possibility of contamination, (2) Increase allowable radiation dosage limits on B-36 maintenance personnel, upon request, (3) Eliminate, when feasible, the B-36 Effect aircraft to free those maintenance personnel for other B-36 work, (4) Authorize use of one (1) B-36 Sampler instead of two (2), and (5) Provide additional decontamination units to Task Group 7 [illegible].

16. Ltr fr G dtd 23 Mar 54, TG #3-3214S.
17. Ltr fr C dtd 23 Mar 54, TG #3-3215S/RD.

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On the twenty-ninth of March, replied to both of the aforementioned letters concurring with the relative priorities for maintenance, elimination of RB-36 for crater photography, increasing dosage limits on B-36 maintenance personnel, and eliminating B-36 Effects aircraft on all shots, if required, except on YANKEE and NECTAR. He indicated that, wherever possible, two (2) B-36 Samplers shoud participate, although, if time interval between shots was less than seven (7) days, one (1) would be acceptable.[18]

On the twenty-fourth of March, a letter was forwarded to the Commander of AFSWC bringing him up-to-date on the status and functions of the Air Task Group in the forward area, giving him a complete resume of the operation to that date.[19]

ROMEO shot was fired in the Bikini area on the twenty-seventh of March. There were several minor aircraft aborts, all considered primarily due to the length of time the aircraft had set on the ground in preparation for the operation. The aborts did not prevent successful air operation since back-up aicraft were avialable. It was determined that the aircraft must, necessarily, be flown at frequent and regular intervals while in the moist atmosphere of Eniwetok to keep them operational. Although there was minor damage to the aircraft strip at Bikini and considerable debris had to be removed, the Bikini airstrip was opened at 1700M on shot day. A more detailed account of the ROMEO mission is contained in the Operations section of this history.

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18. Ltr fr C dtd 29 Mar 54, TG #3-3283S.
19. TG #3-3225SRD.

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On the thirtieth of March a TWX was sent to AFSWC and SAC giving a brief account of ROMEO shot and suggested a new schedule for the Project Participant program. The information furnished was essentially that contained in the JTF SEVEN informational TWX issued on the twenty-ninth of March.[20]

AFSWC had forwarded to Task Group 7.4 a request that [redacted] be returned to the Zone of Interior to pursue a project in AFSWC which was pending at the time. On the thirtieth of March the Commander of Task Group 7.4 requested of AFSWC that [redacted] be allowed to remain until the thirtieth of April so he could complete definitive studies of considerable importance to the Air Force.[21] AFSWC concurred.

On the ninth of March a letter from JTF SEVEN, subject: "AEC Information Team" was received which requested the cooperation of all Task Group Commanders in furnishing information to this Team. It was indicated that this information, regardless of its immediate classification, might be released at a later date to the civilian public.[22]

On the thirtieth of March, Mr. [redacted], a member of this AEC Information Team, interviewed G[redacted] C[redacted] furnished the information requested b[redacted] and tempered the information toward later publication of same.[23]

In order to prepare for the KOON shot which was next in the series, a positioning meeting was held at Joint Task Force SEVEN Headquarters with G[redacted] attending from this Headquarters. [redacted]

20. TG Msg: TGG 3-331.
21. TG Msg: TGDC 3-334.
22. TG #3-3013C.
23. Interview with

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[redacted] WILDTIME (D-50 IBDA) aircraft were positioned at 12, 20, and 27 nautical miles using the same pattern as for ROMEO shot. Actual positions for the Effects aircraft were not available for this meeting. The documentary photography C-54 aircraft were tentatively position at 210° (two aircraft) and 310° from Ground ZERO. This tentative decision was based on whether or not control could be maintained from the Control Ship.[24]

On 31 March, a test run was made to affirm C-54 positions. It was found that control could be maintained on an HF circuit although positions were changed somewhat from the tentative positions of the day before. On this date, the positioning criteria for the Effects aircraft were received.

24. Memo for the Record: Positioning of Acft for KOON Shot, dtd 31 Mar 54.

CHAPTER II

SECURITY

A study of the number of pending "Q" clearances was made at the beginning of this reporting period. It was believed that some "Q" clearance investigations could be discontinued, since the Project was well into the operational phase and the duty of personnel who had "Q" clearances pending was not being hampered. It was also felt that a lot of effort and expense could be saved by eliminating these investigations. On 12 March a TWX was sent to JTF SEVEN requesting the discontinuance of 17 "Q" investigations.[25] On 19 March another TWX was sent to JTF cancelling four more "Q" investigations.[26] This left 26 "Q's" still pending at the end of March. Although these personnel were already performing their duty, these clearances were needed for them to work freely and to eliminate the minor snags, clearance-wise, that developed in completing their mission.

The breakdown, by units, of "Q" clearances still pending:

1.	Headquarters, Task Group 7.4	2
2.	Test Aircraft Unit (Sampling)	4
3.	Test Aircraft Unit (Effects)	4
4.	Test Support Unit (4930th)	1
5.	Test Support Squadrons	12
6.	Test Services Unit	3
	TOTAL	26

25. TWX to JTF SEVEN, cite TGS 3-136, Uncl.
26. TWX to JTF SEVEN, cite TGS 3-231, Uncl.

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The eight pending "Q's" in the Sampling and Effects organizations were very much needed. These eight men, without "Q's", were hampered by not being able to attend certain briefings which were given by scientific personnel prior to each mission. The reason that the Test Support Squadron had such a large number of clearances pending was due to not receiving the requirements and assignments of helicopter pilots in sufficient time to enable the procurement of required "Q" clearances. Also, "Q" clearances were being detained because some personnel had failed to give complete information in their original Personnel Security Questionnaires. In most cases the information omitted was of a minor nature and it was believed that the information was not withheld intentionally. Sworn statements were obtained from each individual and forwarded to JTF SEVEN. There was a total of seven sworn statements forwarded during this reporting period, which would enable the investigations on these individuals to be completed and final clearance to be granted.

A letter addressed to all personnel was published on 5 March, quoting the first official AEC announcement regarding the detonation of the first atomic device in Operation Castle.[27] A second letter to all personnel was published on 18 March regarding an announcement by the AEC stating that personnel and natives had been removed from certain areas in the Pacific Proving Grounds.[28] Both of these letters were disseminated to all personnel with the instructions that anything other than the official statements could not be written in personal letters.

27. Ltr fr CTG 7.4 to all pers, "Security Letter," 5 March 1954.
28. Ltr fr CTG 7.4 to all pers, "AEC Announcement," 18 March 1954.

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As indicated in the Security protion of the February history, the need for coordinated arrangements on a firm policy and procedure to be followed for inclusion (on a need-to-know basis) of certain Task Group 7.4 Project Participants in the Official Observer briefing and tour program, was accomplished on 8 March by and The above named officers contacted , Deputy for Air, JTF SEVEN, Dr. , Deputy for Scientific Matters, JTF SEVEN, and , Task Group 7.4, who concurred in an established procedure to be followed on subsequent shots for specific Project Participants to be included in the briefing and tour of JTF SEVEN Official Observers.[29]

In answer to an earlier JTF SEVEN request,[30] a TWX was sent to that Headquarters on 15 March stating that Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, did not anticipate submitting any "Q" clearance requests between 1 April and 30 September 1954.[31]

A Report of Investigation was received from AFSWC on 16 March which had not been transmitted in accordance with AFR 205-6, paragraph 16, in that it was available for perusal by personnel not authorized in the cited regulation. AFSWC was notified of this violation and asked to take action to avoid recurrence of this incident.[32]

As a member of the Task Group 7.4 administrative inspection team, attended a meeting in the Conference Room on 13 March, to review the points to be checked on forthcoming inspection of the Test Services Unit. On the following day, the administrative security

29. Memo for the Record fr 17 Mar 54, "Proj Part."
30. TWX fr JTF SEVEN, DTG 121655Z, Uncl.
31. TWX to JTF SEVEN, cite TGS 3-179, Uncl.
32. Ltr to AFSWC, 18 Mar 54, "Violation of AFR's 205-1 & 205-6, TG 4966.

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inspection was conducted and the Test Services Unit was graded excellent with regard to their handling of classified matter and their compliance with the security responsibilities as directed by this and higher headquarters' regulations. The following day a meeting of the inspection team was held in the Task Group Headquarters to review each section's inspection report. The completed inspection report was submitted to the Task Group Chief of Staff on 22 March.

Group Security Regulation 205-5, "Departure Security Procedures," was completed in draft form on 20 March. This regulation was approved, published and distributed on 24 March.[33]

On 22 March, a 40-minute security lecture was given in the MATS Terminal to MATS personnel, by the Task Group Security Officer.

At the end of March, the clearance status of Task Group personnel was:

1. 89 percent of required "Q" clearances had been granted;
2. 100 percent of required TOP SECRET Clearances had been granted;
3. 99 percent of required SECRET clearances had been granted.

33. Group Regulation 205-5, "Departure Security Regulation," 2[illegible] Mar 54.

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During the period 20 February through 31 March 1954, interviews were conducted by a Special Agent of the 26th District OSI, Hickam AFB, on the following cases:

1. Personnel Security Investigations (Clearance)

   a. Three AEC "Q" investigations.

   b. Three Air Force Military Personnel Investigations.

2. Criminal Investigations:

   a. Three sex offenses (homosexuality).

   b. One larceny.

   c. The following investigations were conducted regarding minor accidents, for which no written reports were submitted, nor actual cases assigned:

      (1) One vandalism.

      (2) One larceny.

      (3) One jeep accident.

3. Counter-Intelligence Investigations.

   a. One subversive activities investigation.

   b. One Communist Matters Investigation.

4. In addition to the above, one criminal investigation and one Personnel Security Investigation (OSI Personnel) were conducted at Eniwetok, which originated as a result of other lead information within the 26th District OSI, Hickam AFB, TH.

5. One Security Violation investigation was conducted at Eniwetok. It was established that no violation of security had, in fact, occurred in this instance. Verbal report was made to [redacted], from the OSI Special Agent, with a formal report not being required.

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CHAPTER III

PERSONNEL

The Barber Shop for Task Group 7.4 personnel opened on 1 March in Building 93 with one airman assigned as barber. He was to cut hair only, and strictly on an appointment basis. His tools were obtained from the Eniwetok Post Exchange. On the same date, this section compiled a roster of all personnel in Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, for use in evacuation in case of radioactive fall-out.

On 5 March the Director of Personnel received a TWX from AFSWC stating that L[redacted] Task Group 7.4 Provisional (Rear) Commander, would be assigned to NATO, USAFE, on 25 April 1954. AFSWC was to designate another officer at Kirtland as commander of the rear echelon in the near future. On 23 March AFSWC notified the Air Task Group that M[redacted] would assume command of the Rear Headquarters, as an additional duty, upon the departure of L[redacted].

Instructions were received on 5 March from AFSWC to reassign Captain [redacted] Test Support Unit, to the 4901st Support Wing (A), Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. C[redacted] was in the ZI on emergency leave at that time.

A new section was added to the proposed interim T/D of the 4930th on 8 March, at the request of the Director of Materiel and the concurrence of the Deputy Commander. Five airman spaces were to be added in the Roads and Grounds Section of the 4932nd Test Support Squadron. This new section was established due to the heavy equipment on hand, contemplated usage, and required maintenance during the interim period. A TWX was sent to AFSWC

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asking them to correct their copies of the interim T/D accordingly.

On 12 March Personnel approved a request from the Test Services Unit to release , Deputy Commander of the Test Services Unit, from TDY and return him to his parent unit, Headquarters, MATS. He had been made available to the Test Services Unit with the understanding that he would be returned after the second CASTLE shot. No replacement was required.

The return of 1st L to the ZI from a PCS assignment with the 4930th Test Support Group was approved on 15 March. New accounting procedures no longer required his presence at Eniwetok after 1 April. In answer to our request, instructions were received on 18 March to reassign to Headquarters, AFSWC.

The Airman Promotion Board convened on 16 March for the purpose of reviewing 16 promotion recommendations for Headquarters personnel. After approval by , the board proceedings were sent to Headquarters Squadron Section, AFSWC, for consideration when the April promotion quotas were received.

On 18 March necessary orders were initiated to return of the Comptroller Division to Kirtland, where he was to perform duty as Task Group 7.4 Accounting Technician under supervision of the AFSWC Comptroller. A TWX was dispatched to AFSWC on 22 March, informing them of his scheduled departure for the ZI. On the same date, began an administrative inspection of the Test Services Unit. A TWX from AFSWC on 18 March stated that had been assigned from the AMC as a Sikorsky technical representative,

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replacing Mr currently at Eniwetok. Mr. carried only an INTERIM SECRET clearance. However, AFSWC had requested a TOP SECRET clearance from the Air Materiel Command and was awaiting our comment and instructions. Upon receipt of our instructions, AFSWC sent to Eniwetok.[34] Upon his arrival on 28 March, Mr. replaced who was assigned to Bridgeport, Connecticut.

On 23 March we received a Department of the Air Force Letter outlining the Air Force Officers' responsibility to the public. Effective 1 April, a mandatory statement to indicate the manner in which an officer carried out his civic responsibilities and represented the Air Force in his dealings with the public, was to be made in Section IV of AF Form 77, Officer Effectiveness Report.[35] The Director of Personnel drafted and forwarded special letters to all three units, calling attention to the required comment in the OER's.[36] A letter from AFSWC on the same date outlined several forthcoming changes to AFR 35-39, Foreign Service. Items concerned were length of tours, TDY during tours, voluntary statements, and duration of tours. This letter was routed to all staff sections and units of Task Group 7.4. It was learned on the same day that Captain had taken over the supply account and would have Building T-502 ready for occupancy when this Headquarters returned to Kirtland following the overseas phase of CASTLE.

On 24 March, we prepared a question and answer list, relative to personnel, for use in interview with representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission. This material was for possible use in press

34. Message fr AFSWC, SWOTR 3-25.
35. Ltr fr USAF, 2 Mar 54.
36. Ltr fr AFSWC, 16 Mar 54.

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releases. Task Group 7.5 and JTF SEVEN were notified that had been appointed Evacuation Officer for Task Group 7.4 in the Bikini Area. was notified of his appointment and responsibilities. All units and sections of Task Group 7.4 were informed of his appointment and requested to submit to Captain Ozier a report, by name and location, of any of their personnel in the Bikini area. Whenever any of their personnel were sent to or from the Bikini Area, Captain was to be notified immediately of the transfer.[37 & 38] On the same date, Personnel approved and forwarded to AFSWC a request from the 4930th to upgrade two airmen in AFSC's in which there were Group-wide overages. These were special cases and, after a thorough study, Colonel Forrest recommended approval. There appeared to be no intent to violate the spirit of AFM 35-1.

On 26 March a stencil was prepared for dissemination to all 7.4 units and elements, outlining procedures to be followed when Granite messages (emergency messages received from Headquarters, USAF) were received.[39] The names of all personnel in the Test Support Unit who would remain in the interim force, and a list of personnel who would be returned to the ZI upon completion of the rollup, were submitted to AFSWC so that they could forward reassignment instructions prior to completion of CASTLE.

A letter was received from AFSWC on 27 March concerning possible waivers which might be granted by ARDC and USAF to permit attendance of the Field Officers' Course of Air Command and Staff School by certain

37. D/F, Appointment of Evacuation Officer, 24 Mar 54.
38. Ltr, Appointment of Evacuation Officer, 24 Mar 54.
39. Ltr, TGP 311, 25 Mar 54.

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officers in grades of Lt Colonel and Major who were desirous of attending, but were frozen in their particular assignments, or could not be released at that time. A copy of this letter was routed to all staff sections and posted on the bulletin Board. M _ was returned to Kirtland on 28 March for reassignment due to medical reasons and his being surplus to Task Group needs. On the same date, we received Air Force special orders announcing the promotion of the following first lieutenants to Captain: Gc , Headquarters, Task Group 7.4; W and , Test Support Unit.

On 30 March AFSWC wrote the Air Task Group concerning the forthcoming meeting of the Air Force Selection Board to consider regular Air Force officers for permanent promotion to colonel. This information was given wide dissemination. Personnel requested special orders be published by the Adjutant placing M of the Operations Directorate on further TDY to Tripler Army Hospital.

Our ideas on a tentative Table of Distribution for a permanent Test Wing and Group were drafted and submitted to Operations on 31 March.

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CHAPTER IV

COMPTROLLER

Expense Accounting:

The 4930th Test Support Group received a letter from AFSWC (Expense Accounting, 18 Feb 54) on 24 February, directing that expense accounting, as required by AFL 177-4, would be discontinued by the 4930th and assumed by the Accounting Division, DCS/Comptroller, AFSWC, effective 1 April 1954. The only requirement for the 4930th subsequent to 1 April 1954 would be to forward copies of Issue and Turn-In Forms to AFSWC. Based on the above referenced letter, a first indorsement was appended by this Headquarters to a letter (cost Accounting, 22 March 1954, written by the 4930th) notifying AFSWC that the JTF SEVEN Cost Report for the month of March would be prepared at this Headquarters. It was also requested that a procedure be established by AFSWC to record capital costs, effective 1 April 1954. The April JTF SEVEN Cost Report was to be prepared by Task Group 7.4 personnel after return to Kirtland.

Funding Problems:

Funding problems were discussed by the Comptroller with Deputy Comptroller for JTF SEVEN, on 24 February.[40] Two major recommendations resulted from this conference:

1. A decision had to be made whether or not the Base Supply Officer was to completely stop stocking "housekeeping supplies and equipment" and "special purpose vehicle spare parts common to both Army and Air Force" and let Task Group 7.2 furnish all requirements for these items. If such a decision were made, the Base Supply Officer should make an estimate of

40. Staff Visit Report by [redacted] on 24 Feb 54.

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the requirements for these items and the question of funding should be forwarded to JTF SEVEN for final solution.

2. Funds for the use of the 4930th during the interim should be allotted to AFSWC since there would also be fund requirements by AFSWC for the planning phase of future tests.

Pacific Area Map:

At the request of - - a map of the Pacific area (91" X 162") was mounted on a panel of plywood and placed on the wall of the Conference Room by a member of the JTF SEVEN Comptroller Division. This project was completed on 22 March.

Rated Officers' Flying Pay:

', J-3 Division of Task Group 7.1, telephoned Major and requested information on procedures to be following in allowing rated officers of TG 7.1 to receive flying pay without meeting the minimum flying requirements, due to the fact that it was impracticable for them to participate in flights due to their mission. A research of regulations was made and a change contained in a TWX from AFSWC to the 4930th held the necessary information. Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, had not received a copy of this teletype, however. Following the above conversation, a letter was forwarded to 7.4 from 7.1 (Minimum Flight Requirements, 9 March 1954) making the verbal request official.[41] The letter was given to the Director of Operations for necessary action. On 26 March 1954 a letter to TG 7.1 was forwarded in answer to their request, stating that AF personnel would not be excused from meeting AF Regulation 60-2 requirements. It was ascertained that sufficient aircraft time was available to support the AFR 60-2 requirements if properly utilized.[42]

Standard Form 1080:

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41. Ltr fr Hq TG 7.1, File 4894, dtd 9 Mar 54.
42. Ltr to Hq TG 7.1, file 210.49, dtd 26 Mar 54.

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A letter was received from AFSWC (Review of Standard Form 1080, 4 March 1954) requesting that all documents for supplies issued to Task Group 7.2, or similar units, be checked for propriety of reimbursement action. In addition, all billings from TG 7.2 were to be verified prior to submission to AFSWC. A letter was transmitted to TG 7.2 requesting all billings for supplies issued to Air Force units be submitted to TG 7.4 so the required verification could be accomplished. The Test Support Unit was directed by letter to accumulate all issue forms and forward them to TG 7.4, monthly.[43]

Transfer of Personnel:

On 17 March it was decided to return S/ _ t, Fiscal Clerk, to AFSWC with the Task Group files and records. These records would then be maintained at Kirtland. This move helped relieve critical office and living quarters space.

Overtime:

Unit commanders and staff directors were contacted for an estimate of the number of man-hours expended by their personnel in completing the workload during January and February. The regular work-week for Air Force personnel was 50 hours, except for the augmentation personnel to Task Group 7.2, who were working 41 hours per week. Overtime during this period totalled 68,500 man-hours, which brought the overall Air Force average to 60 hours per man, per week. Personnel in the Graphics Division were the only ones within the Comptroller Division required to work overtime. The balance of the Comptroller personnel had only a token amount of work to handle.

Fund Requirements FY 1955 and 1956:

The Comptroller received a letter from AFSWC directing compliance

43. Ltr to TSU, 27 Feb 54.

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With a letter from Headquarters, USAF (Budgeting and Funding for Air Force Subsistence in Continental United States, 17 December 1953). The information needed was an estimate of the fund requirements for subsistence of airmen on Eniwetok for Fiscal Years 1955 and 1956. This information was submitted by first indorsement to the basic communication.[44]

AFM 67-7:

T, -s- ---- , Cost Accounting, was assisting the 4930th Base Supply Officer to establish accounting records to be maintained under the provisions of proposed AFM 67-7, "Monetary Inventory Accounting Procedures." A letter, "Monetary Inventory Accounting System," dated 29 March,[45] was sent to the AFSWC Comptroller in answer to Messages SWC 3-77,[46] SWP 3-159,[47] and TGGR 3-116,[48] which outlined our conception of the Comptroller functions for the 4930th.

Transfer of Reports:

Messages were sent to Headquarters, AMC, Sacramento Air Material Area, and the 1500th Air Base Wing, Hickam, requesting that their future reports on the status of sub-allotments be transmitted to Kirtland as the fiscal accounts for Task Group 7.4 were moved to that location.

Final Report Funds:

A query was sent to TF SEVEN, on the availability of funds for commercial printing of the Final Report. A letter was received from JTF SEVEN a few days later requesting we submit our estimate of [illegible]

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44. Ltr and 1st Ind, "Funding for AF Subsistence."
45. Ltr to AFSWC, "Monetary Inventory Accounting," 29 Mar 54.
46. Msg SWC 3-77.
47. Msg SWP 3-159.
48. Msg TGGR 3-116.

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for the printing. A suspense of 10 April was established for submission of the request in order that the format and content of the report might be determined.

Subsistence Aboard Naval Vessels:

A letter was transmitted to the units of Task Group 7.4 requesting that all of their personnel performing TDY aboard Navy vessels comply with the provisions of paragraph 3b of TG 7.3 Instructions 4063.1, dated 3 February 1954. This provided that each officer or officer grade civilian would pay cash for each meal and that the Ship's General Mess would take ration credit for all meals furnished enlisted personnel. Previously, personnel of the Air Force Bikini Detachment were subsisted at the Holmes and Narver Mess and H & N then collected from them for the meals furnished aboard ships. The TG 7.5 camp at Bikini had been deactivated and the Air Force personnel were now stationed at Eniwetok and subsisted by Task Group 7.2.

Administrative Inspection:

A check list of comptroller activities was prepared for the administrative inspection of the Test Support Unit which was to be held on 6 April.

Perparation of Charts:

The Graphics Division spent many man-hours during March preparing briefing charts for the Commander and the Director of Operations. Statistical charts were completed and placed in the Conference Room. A suggested cover for the Final Report was prepared in four colors and approved. Numerous other minor and routine jobs were handled during the period.

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CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS

PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

Extensive planning and resolute preparations were accomplished within the Operations Directorate prior to the first shot of Operation CASTLE. The first shot was assigned the code name BRAVO and its detonation was anxiously anticipated by all Operations personnel. The general feeling within the Directorate was that much tension on the part of everyone would be relieved upon the successful execution of the BRAVO event. A return to relative normalcy did follow the highly successful mission, and after the detonation on 1 March everyone returned to the task of preparing for the second shot - ROMEO.

A wide variety of operational problems had to be conquered in carrying out the mission of Task Group 7.4 for this first shot. The two rehearsals had come and gone and the analysis of their weaknesses contributed greatly toward a solution of problems which were found to exist. One typical problem was the operations order for BRAVO shot. Task Group 7.4 Operations Order 1-54 was published to govern the execution of both rehearsals, but the order for BRAVO had to be completely new. Fundamental differences between a rehearsal and an actual mission necessitated the requirement for the new operations order. Certain information could not be obtained until B minus four, requiring the entire Directorate to work into the wee hours of B minus three in order to publish this directive. The order, consisting of 110 pages, was distributed on B minus three in 130 copies, as Operations Order 2-54. Although a new operations order would have to be prepared for each shot, plans were made to refer to

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2-54 as much as possible so as to reduce the size of these new orders.

BRAVO minus one was briefing day and at 0800 hours all aircrews reported to building #79, the new Task Group 7.4 Briefing Room. This was to be the first briefing conducted in this room and the Operations personnel quite naturally were eager to see how it would be accepted. Much time and effort had been spent in planning and constructing the 250 seat briefing room. Many extremely favorable comments were heard as the crew members entered and proceeded to their assigned seats. Project Participants were also present.

As Lt [redacted], Director of Operations, opened the briefing, all lights were turned off except the black lights which were focussed on the first briefing chart. All briefing charts had been prepared with luminous paint and as this transition from brilliance to that of darkness took place, and the chart assumed a bright glow, there was a murmur of great satisfaction from the entire audience. The general briefing was conducted first, then the specialized briefings followed, covering all phases of the first mission.

Immediately after BRAVO shot (on 1 March), the airstrip at Bikini was contaminated to such a degree that its immediate use was hazardous to personnel. Radiation prohibited the landing of aircraft. This condition imposed a serious problem because airlift between Eniwetok and Bikini was a necessity. The two PBM aircraft, operationally controlled by Task Group 7.4 at that time, were not considered sufficient to accommodate all the anticipated passengers and cargo. [redacted] after carefully surveying the existing problem, took prompt action through appropriate channels and Headquarters, USAF, was requested to furnish three

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SA-16 aircraft. Headquarters, USAF, directed the Air Rescue Service to dispatch three SA-16's from Hawaii to Eniwetok for our operational control. Only two SA-16's could be made available due to lack of aircrews. These two aircraft arrived on 9 March and were immediately placed in service in our Inter-Atoll Airlift system.

On the 3rd of March, I scheduled a conference at 2000 hours in building 90 for the officer personnel of the Operations Directorate. This meeting was primarily called to re-organize and to re-assign tasks and responsibilities to persons working in the Directorate.

was assigned as Chief of Plans and Requirements, vice L , who was transferred to the 4930th Test Support Group. Because of the shortage of personnel in the Plans and Requirements Division, and because the Communications Division requirements were such that two officers could carry the load, Captain was reassigned to Plans and Requirements. His assigned primary duties were those of preparing the schedules for Project Participants arriving at Eniwetok and assembling the history for the Operations Directorate. At the same time, Ma s, originally assigned as Senior Controller in AOC under the Operations and Training Division, was reassigned as Executive Officer to the Director of Operations. Because duties were such that his presence, on many occasions, was required at places other than his office, coordinated matters between the Director of Operations during his absence from the office and in the AOC on shot days.

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As a result of radiological contamination precipitated by BRAVO event, Rongerik Island, one of four outlying islands used primarily for weather reporting purposes in the forward area, had become unsafe for prolonged inhabitation. Current estimates indicated that its reoccupation was not likely to take placd prior to 1 May 1954. Because of this development, certain objectives had to be accomplished and the existing problems resolved. The objectives presented were as follows: to provide for the interim re-entry of Rongerik and for the ultimate re-establishment of the island's weather reporting and support facilities; to insure that re-entry personnel received maximum available protection from the effects of radiological contamination on each re-entry mission; to obtain samples of contaminated materials and to insure that, for radiological safety reasons the movement of each person evacuated was reported from the time he left Rongerik until he departed permanently from the forward area.

On 6 March, held a conference with members of the Headquarters staff and representatives of the Test Services Unit and Weather Control Element for the purpose of analyzing the problem developing a suitable plan and determining the necessary implementation for care of the Rongerik personnel. The conference was composed of General Harmond, Commander of the Test Services Unit; and Lt. , Commander of the Weather Control Element. The facilities that were installed on Rongerik Island were contaminated and were primarily to augment and extend the meteorological capabilities of Joint Task Force SEVEN. However, the existing radiological hazard would not preclude visits to

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Rongerik, provided the period of occupation did not exceed Rad-Safety limits. It was decided that, during the interim between evacuation and re-establishment of Rongerik to normal operational status, small groups of personnel, as re-entry teams or parties, would be periodically transported from Eniwetok to service, maintain and operate, on a very limited scale, the equipment and facilities which were located on the outlying weather islands. Certain coordination with all agencies of interest was necessary for the complete and successful accomplishment of this Task Group objective.

During the second week of March, a team provided by the Test Services Unit conducted the first in a series of re-entry missions into Rongerik, to inspect, service, maintain and operate the equipment that was installed.[49,50,51] The initial re-entry team entered Rongerik via surface vessel. It was contemplated, however, that amphibious aircraft would be used for subsequent trips. Five to seven personnel comprised each team. A fully qualified Radiological Safety Monitor, provided by the Test Aircraft Unit, accompanied each team engaged in the re-entry mission to Rongerik. On each re-entry mission, radiation intensities indicated by detection instruments were to be recorded and forwarded to the Director of Operations upon the return of the team to Eniwetok. In addition, samples of coral and other contaminated debris, found in the vicinity of working areas at Rongerik, would be obtained under the supervision of the Rad Safety Monitor for the team and conveyed to a representative of Task

49. 2d Ind to B/C, "Radiation Monitoring and Operational Readiness Plan for Rongerik Atoll," 6 March 54.
50. Ltr to T Spt Unit, "Rqmts for Spt of the Rongerik Re-entry Opr Under PP No. 1-54.
51. Ltr to T Acft Unit, same as above.

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Group 7.1. The Rad Safety member of the team also recorded on a sketch the approximate physical location at which each sample was collected.[52]

Provided that the radiological contamination had dissipated to the safe point, the Commander of the Test Services Unit, was to re-establish the weather reporting facilities to normal operations subsequent to 1 May 1954. Only personnel who previously had not been exposed to radiation intensities considered excessive would be assigned to man the weather reporting installation on Rongerik Island.

A meeting was held on 6 March in the Task Group 7.4 Conference Room for the purpose of discussing the format and content of the Final Report.

Chief of Plans and Requirements, and also coordinator for the preparation of the Final Report, attended as the representative of the Director of Operations. A tentative agreement was reached on the format that was to be used for the Final Report.

Colonel , Chief of Staff of Task Group 7.4, concluded the meeting by requesting that each member have his directorate prepare an outline of subjects or topics which would be proposed for inclusion in the Final Report. These topics would cover the main areas of staff activity for which the directorate was responsible. Under these topics specific problems and their solutions would be delineated in the discussion portion of the Final Report. At a later meeting all subjects or topics could be compared to determine whether they could be used to highlight common problems. Thus, the coordinator of the Final Report, could show continuity in the effect of the problem as it applied throughout all staff sections. In essence, the meaning of this requirement seemed to be that the Director of Operations would consolidate the viewpoints of all staff sections

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52. Map of Rongerik(sketch is not to scale).

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concerning a particular problem so as to be able to point out its evolution, development, ramificiations, ultimate solution and such recommendations thereon as might appear appropriate.

On 8 March, [redacted] made firm arrangements with personnel concerned at Parry Island, whereby the Project Participants could join the Official Observers in their briefing tour. The following procedure was established and was to be used on subsequents shot: [redacted] would determine which of the Project Participants should participate with the official observers and refer the names of these persons to [redacted], who would concur fo [redacted]. He would then notify Lt Colonel Hanna of these names. L [redacted] would handcarry the list to Joint Task Force SEVEN, where a TWX would be prepared to DMA stating that such personnel had a need-to-know and would be allowed to join the Official Observers unless information to the contrary was received. [redacted] would then assure that the list reached [redacted] for arrangement of passage into the "exclusion area." [redacted], after being informed of this transaction, would pursue completion of coordination of the schedule with [redacted], Deputy for Air Force, Joint Task Force SEVEN, and Programming Plan 2-54 would be followed.

On 28 March, M [redacted] completed the first phase of an overall study of the problem involved in safeguarding Task Group 7.4 personnel and equipment in the event the area was used for test detonations. [redacted] had advised that consideration was being given to firing certain barge devices from MIKE crater.[53]

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53. Msg TX-309, 26 Mar 54, "Shot Scheduling," TG 7.4 CASTLE File 311.

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This first phase investigated the problems associated with the assumption that a partial or complete evacuation of TG 7.4 might be necessary from Eniwetok. The details of this study are available in the CASTLE Files.[54]

Dr. , SAC Operations Analyst, performing duties with Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, was preparing a study of the possible effects which such planned tests might have on Eniwetok Island. Dr. paper will be discussed in a later chapter. Meanwhile, the problems associated with the assumption that Eniwetok might not have to be evacuated for a test conducted at MIKE Crater were being investigated in a separate study by the Plans and Requirements Division. Consideration was given to those precautions which had to be taken to safeguard personnel and equipment from the direct and indirect hazards which were likely to ensue from tests conducted in the Eniwetok Area.

At 1400 hours on 29 March, the ROMEO critique was held in building 79. The meeting was opened by L . He introduced Lt , Commander of Weather Central Element, who reviewed the weather prior to ROMEO shot. had prepared a chart of predicted winds prior to ROMEO shot versus actual observed winds on shot day. Throughout 75 percent of the period discussed, winds were in the direction and at the speeds indicated.

continued the critique by reviewing the incidents and difficulties experienced by Task Group 7.4 on ROMEO Day. The incident of an F-94 landing with the runway partially blocked by a Coleman

54. Staff Study. [redacted]

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tractor and B-36 was reviewed and the tower was to be advised against a recurrence of such an incident. On two occasions landing instructions were given to H-19's which would have interferred with mission aircraft operations. An H-19 was attempting a landing at the same time ELAINE was landing from its mission. On another occasion an H-19 landed after two F-84's were on the runway ready for take-off with JATO armed. The tower was informed that closer supervision of landing and take-off must be maintained.

It was requested that pilots who had last minute passenger or crew changes call the Test Aircraft Unit representative in the control jeep to obtain these changes. This procedure would cut down the long transmission on "B" channel.

The Test Aircraft Unit was commended for completing their mission in the face of their aborts. FLOYD 2, FB-36, had gear trouble, was turned around in less than two hours for another take-off and completed the mission. There also were two partial air aborts of F-84's. Other F-84's were substituted in minimum time and the replacement aircraft were airborne and the mission completed in an excellent manner.

The voice time tape, as available for ROMEO, was totally unusable. It was recommended that new tape be cut using a "count-down" system. The new tape was cut and flight checks were made on 31 March and 1 April.

concluded the critique by commenting on the fine job everyone did in making the ROMEO event a success.

During March, a considerable amount of pressure was felt, personnel

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wise, in the Operations Directorate. This situation had its beginning in January in the hospitalization of [redacted] at Tripler Army Hospital, Honolulu. Then, in the early part of February, [redacted] departed Eniwetok for the Zone of the Interior to be with his wife while she underwent a serious operation.

[redacted] tasks included the preparation of the schedule of events, working closely with Base Operations and formulating procedures for flight emergencies. His departure left a serious gap in the Operations and Training Division of this Directorate. This situation was alleviated somewhat with the arrival of [redacted] on 16 February. However, since [redacted] was unfamiliar with the activities of this organization, time was needed to train him for the duties he had to perform. During the above-mentioned period, [redacted] of the Plans and Requirements Division was confined for approximately a week in the base hospital because of a skin disorder. His duties were writing and assembling operations orders and attending to the Briefing Room, both of which were full time tasks. Subsequent to [redacted] hospitalization, it was necessary for him to make daily visits to the base hospital for treatment of this malady. Because of its severity, [redacted] received orders on 30 March transferring him to Tripler General Hospital in Hawaii, for approximately 30 days. Much overtime was necessary for both officers and airmen in the Directorate because of these unforeseeable and unfortunate circumstances.

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SHOT DELAYS

By mid-March, JTF SEVEN was gravely concerned over the adverse wind conditions which were causing incessant shot delays. In order to avoid fall-out over inhabited atolls, proper wind conditions required a southerly component. Since these proper conditions were normally developed by a large out-draft to the southeast of the shot area and seldom lasted more than two to three days, the Air Task Group was faced with the possibility of a two-day interval between shots. A careful study and analysis of our maintenance capability indicated a two-day turn-around period could be met with a reasonable degree of certainty by all aircraft except the samplers, which required decontamination time.

From BRAVO experience, it was known that a B-36 could be decontaminated in six hours and F-84's in one hour, following a 24-hour decontamination decay period. Twenty-four hours would then be required for the B-36's to perform post-flight inspection, clear maintenance write-ups, etc. Even on this compressed schedule, it was proposed that the number of sampling aircraft be reduced by 50 percent. This plan was approved by Task Group 7.1 and JTF SEVEN.

Decontamination would start on the B-36 sampler (FLOYD 1) at 0600 hours on D plus 1 and be completed at noon on the same day, at which time double maintenance crews would start post-flight inspection of the aircraft. At noon, decontamination would start on the seven F-84's which had sampled the day prior. Although eight F-84's would be available for the next shot, it was decided that decontamination should start on the coolest to provide backup for the next shot.

Further, it was determined that by carefully controlling the decontamination times and maintenance effort, a complete turn-around of all

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mission aircraft, including samplers, could be effected with a four-day period between shots. This accelerated maintenance plan was to be placed in effect after ROMEO was fired on 27 March, so that KOON could be fired in the shortest possible time. However, adverse winds delayed KOON beyond the four-day interval and a true test of the system could not be made.

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OPERATION AND TRAINING

During March, the Operations and Training Division was almost totally committed to the preparation for and the execution of BRAVO and ROMEO Shots. Other significant events were establishing new airlift procedures in the Bikini area (to include water operation when TARE Airfield was destroyed by KOON Shot), and increased search and rescue intercept activity. These events are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs:

The CIC (Command Ship) was extremely successful in performing its mission for BRAVO Shot. Positive control over all aircraft was continually maintained except for two brief periods when radar failed as a result of salt water being sprayed on the antenna during ship decontamination operations. During these same periods, VHF and HF communications difficulties were experienced for the same reason. The CIC was not notified that decontamination of the ship was to take place. was assured that this situation would not recur.

Radioactive fallout resulted in the fast movement of the Command Ship from the shot area without the CIC being notified. This situation did not prove serious as positioning of aircraft, in relation to the ground or water surface, was not important after H-hour. Again was assured that the CIC would be notified in advance of future ship movement.

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The most significant observation of the CIC during the BRAVO Shot was that the explosion did not seriously affect either radar or radio transmissions. This observation was in direct contrast to that made during MIKE Shot in Operation IVY, when both radar and radio seemed to be seriously affected by the explosion. Weather seemed to be the deciding factor. During MIKE Shot, the air was heavily saturated with visible moisture prior to the shot. During BRAVO Shot it was not. MIKE Shot itself generated numerous Cumulo-Nimbus type clouds reaching to extremely high altitudes. BRAVO Shot did not. Radar scopes were cluttered for several hours with wide spread cloud returns during MIKE, making sampling aircraft control extremely difficult. The scope was clear 30 minutes after BRAVO Shot. IFF returns and radar blips did disappear for brief intervals during BRAVO, although no clouds were visible on the scope. This allowed for good control of all aircraft.

BRAVO proved that extensive training of CIC personnel prior to the shot was a sound investment. The CIC Air Force and Navy team functioned smoothly and expertly throughout the operations. The check list monitor proved exceptionally valuable, in that he relieved the Senior Controller of many check list details so that his primary duty of supervising CIC operations coordinating with the JOC could be done in an orderly and efficient manner.

The Air Operations Center was successful in performing its mission during BRAVO Shot. Detailed written procedures were made available

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to all operating positions and the AOC was fully manned one hour prior to take-off of the first aircraft, which was H-6 hours. Only minor discrepancies existed which affected the operations of the AOC. One such incident was the arrival at Eniwetok of three VIKING aircraft. Their IFF was not air or ground checked prior to BRAVO Shot. The AOC dispatched these aircraft on the same heading climb-out with five minutes separation anticipating of using IFF for separation. Two of the three aircraft IFF's were inoperative. Also, the radio telephone procedure of point-to-point radio operators was not up to expected standards. This caused many repeats when communications reception was weak resulting in the slow flow of important traffic. An on-the-job training program was reemphasized to correct this deficiency.

The Control DDE (DOLLHOUSE) departed Eniwetok Lagoon at 1300 hours, 28 February, for an assigned station 100 nautical miles east of the AOC, and arrived on station at 2130 hours. Constant watch was maintained on J-407 (an HF curcuit) from time of departure from Eniwetok. Upon arriving on station, a constant listening watch was put on J-408 and the DOLLHOUSE homer on 232 kcs was turned on at 0130 hours on 1 March.

DOLLHOUSE received orders to move from its present position at 0530 on 1 March to a point 75 nautical miles west of point "Baker." At B-Hour, DOLLHOUSE was 72 nautical miles and 265° from ground zero.

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The control DDE was called upon, at intervals during BRAVO Shot, to act as relay between BOUNDARY TARE and the AOC on Circuit J-407. This operation was accomplished with success.

The Air Operations Center initiated and assisted in three SAR intercept missions on 23 March. The first intercept was accomplished at 1041M on 6 BABYFOOD, a P2V; the second intercept was accomplished at 1251M on WILSON 8, a WB-29; and the third intercept was accomplished at 1645M on WILSON, a WB-29. All three aircraft were escorted back to Eniwetok for safe landings. STABLE 3, an SA-16, was utilized for all three missions and control was very satisfactory. The time from scramble to airborne for STABLE 3 averaged less than six minutes. This efficiency was directly contributable to integration of SAR, and approach and area control, into the AOC team.

An airlift conference was conducted aboard the USS ESTES on 18 March. Joint Task Force SEVEN, Task Groups 7.1, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 personnel attending were:

and

The purpose of this meeting was to discuss problems associated with JTF SEVEN airlift operations.

New allocations of responsibilities were agreed upon with Headquarters, JTF SEVEN, the over-all supervisory agency establishing necessary priorities. Task Group 7.3 was charged with water transportation,

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helicopter transportation, loading list, preparation and providing Task Group 7.4 with air control, communications and seadrome facilities. Task Group 7.4 was charged with aircraft scheduling, aircraft, airdrome, seadrome and crash boat control.

Functions to be discharged from the USS ESTES were agreed to be airdrome control, seadrome control, loading list, preparation, boat pool operation, and aircraft and crash boat control. It was agreed that functions were to be discharged from the USS BAIROKO.

Specifically, it was agreed that Task Group 7.4 would control all airlift operations in the Bikini area. It was further agreed that Task Group 7.4 would have full tower control responsibility, including control over Task Group 7.3 helicopters at both TARE strip and the water landing area.[55]

It was agreed that daily C-47 or PBM operations from TARE strip would be employed whenever TARE strip was open, using the following schedule subject to aircraft availability:

	Depart FRED	Arrive TARE	Depart TARE	Arrive FRED
Regular Flight	1000	1130	1145-1200	1315-1330
Regular Flight	1500	1630	1645-1700	1815-1830

It was also agreed that daily PBM or SA-16 operations from the water landing area might be employed whenever TARE strip was closed:

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55 - Ltr, Subj: Airlift Operations, dtd 12 Mar 54 to CJTF 7

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	Depart FRED	Arrive TARE	Depart TARE	Arrive FRED
One SA-16	0800	0930	0945-1000	1115-1130
1 PBM or 1-SA-16	1500	1630	1645-1700	1815-1830

It was agreed that the Task Group 7.4 Senior Air Controller aboard the USS ESTES would be responsible for confirming the above schedules with the Eniwetok AOC each night at 1700 for the following days operations. He would also notify the Task Group 7.3 transport officer of the confirmation of the schedule or any necessary changes in the schedule. It was further agreed that this officer would also notify the Task Group 7.3 transportation Officer of any subsequent changes in airlift aircraft schedules immediately upon being informed of these changes by the Eniwetok AOC. The Task Group 7.3 Transport Officer would receive all space requests from one designated officer from each Task Group, prepare the manifest and provide it to the Task Group 7.4 TARE Airfield Detachment Commander aboard the USS ESTES for dispatch to the airstrip. The Task Group 7.3 transport officer would also arrange for passenger boat and helicopter transportation to and from the airlift landing area. It was agreed that the Task Group 7.4 Airfield Detachment Commander would arrange for transportation for firefighting and control tower personnel to the TARE airstrip. The Task Group 7.4 Detachment Commander would also insure that manifests were carried to the TARE strip by a responsible NCO or officer with authority to insure that no passenger boarded the aircraft who was not properly manifested.

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The Command Ship was again successful in performing its mission during ROMEO. Positive control of all aircraft was continually maintained throughout the mission. No radar, IFF or communications failures occurred. The radar video return from the ROMEO cloud was 10 to 15 miles in diameter. It was persistant for about 30 minutes and then began to dissipate. By H/45 minutes the cloud had completely faded from the radar scopes. The cloud formation on scopes did not hamper air control to any degree during ROMEO. No IFF or radar blip fades occurred. Communications were normal.

All of the ships port holes and most of its doors were secured prior to H-Hour. This reduced the explosion effects on the CIC team. Radioactive fallout did not restrict the desired movements of the Command Ship, which was back in the Bikini Lagoon by H/5:30 and ready to resume its additional mission of control of IFR airlift traffic into Bikini.

The thoroughly trained CIC team worked throughout the ROMEO mission. Controller assignments and aircraft assignments to individual controllers for ROMEO Shot were identical to BRAVO through H-Hour. The post H-Hour sampler control procedures were modified to avoid passing of control between CIC controllers. Each controller directed and tracked the flight the fighters throughout their mission. When the fighters switched to the sampling control frequency, the controller also switched to that channel and monitored instructions.

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issued by the Control RB-36. The controller then was immediately ready to take back control of the flight when it was released by the Control B-36.

A check list (Annex A, Operations Order 3-54, as amended) was utilized on ROMEO and BRAVO Shots. The check list again proved indispensable during ROMEO. Thecheck list used by the Senior Air Controller in the CIC was actually a detailed schedule of events tailored to the needs of the Command Ship. It was in detail as to the schedule of events that must occur in appropriate sequence. The events were listed with the exact time of event should occur. This assured the Senior Air Controller that no important item effecting his mission was overlooked. It would be very difficult for a Senior Air Controller to function at peak efficiency without this aid. The check list contained a great number of items with some events occuring at the same time, therefore, a check list monitor was utilized. The check list monitor accomplished the routine items and assured that the Senior Air Controller did not overlook any of the important items that he must take action on. The check list, being a part of the Operations Order and distributed to all concerned agencies, was a great value, as items of action could be referenced by item number over radio circuits without violation of security.

The Air Operations Center was successful in performing its mission

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during ROMEO Shot. The procedures used for ROMEO Shot were the same as for BRAVO Shot. The Air Operations Center coordinated all landings, departures, approaches, and take-offs in the Eniwetok area with no difficulty. The approach control section of the Air Operations Center monitored the departure and arrival schedule against the pre-planned flight path of each aircraft to insure that proper separation limits were adhered to. WILSON 1 (WB-29,) was the only aircraft not having a properly operating IFF, but this was corrected by crew members and was operating properly when the aircraft returned to the Eniwetok control area. The radio telephone procedure of point-to-point radio operators showed significant improvement over BRAVO Shot and because of this, the radio circuit load was reduced. The Air Operations Center had no communication or equipment failures.

The Control Destroyer's mission was again routine with no emergencies occurring requiring its control or search and rescue aid.

ROMEO was originally scheduled for 11 March. All air, communications and control units were "peaked" for the event. The succession of 24 to 48 hour postponements from 11 March until 27 March, the actual detonation day, tended to result in a lessening of the readiness of all units. Aircraft were destined to remain too long on the ground since the "new" detonation date always loomed 24 to 48 hours ahead. Communications and control systems, land and ship-based, likewise could not be completely shut down for thorough maintenance, since many components were required to conduct essential "R-Minus 2 and Minus 1"

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business. Operations, communications and maintenance personnel with long on-duty R-1 and R-2 day assignments, were faced with a fatigue problem imposed by these demanding days falling in constant succession.

The most significant aspect of ROMEO shot, from an Air Task Group point of view, was, therefore, not the overall success of the air operation, but the fact that this success was achieved in face of 17 days of successive 24 to 48 hour postponements.

Highlights of the Air Task Group's accomplishments during ROMEO shot included: the mounting of 16 F-84 sorties by the Test Aircraft Unit although only 15 aircraft were assigned; the repair of an FB-36 and successful accomplishment of its B-36's sampling mission after an abort; and, the lack of significant failure by any single component of the Air Task Group communications or control systems.

The success of this mission in face of the long postponement period was achieved mainly through the following measure:

Decisions were made by the Air Task Group Commander that several announced postponements would in reality be longer than the 24 to 48 hour period officially announced. He based these decisions on thorough study of weather and radiological forecast analysis. They involved a certain amount of calculated risk, but were obviously necessary. These decisions afforded the Air Task Group and subordinate Commanders with a time schedule adequate to keep units in a reasonable state of readiness; Effective leadership and direction at Group and Subordinate levels insured maximum advantage being taken of this "unofficial" time schedule. A judicious aircraft flying schedule was maintained.

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Essential maintenance of control and communications equipment was conducted at the expense of certain desirable R-1 and R-2 communications and air control functions. Critical R-1 and R-2 personnel were re-scheduled on a "skeleton force" backed by an "on-call force" basis.

This postponement problem would likely be faced during the balance of this as well as future operations. This solution guarantees reasonable success if predictions are correct, and forfeits as little as possible, if not.

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COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

All communications and navigational aids functioned satisfactorily during the BRAVO operational period. A few last-minute changes in the details of the communications scheme of operations were as follows: The 2100 kilocycle frequency assigned to circuit J-408 was interfering with the radio teletype receiver aboard the Command Ship. This frequency was changed to 3060 kilocycles, thus clearing up most of the interference aboard the ship. The passing of weather traffic from Eniwetok to the Command Ship was one of the most vital functions of the entire communications effort. This traffic was passed over circuit J-401 a multiplex radioteletype circuit manned at the Eniwetok end by AACS personnel and aboard ship by Navy personnel . To augment the shortage of qualified multiplex and technical controller personnel and to provide closer coordination, [redacted] the 1960th AACS Squadron Commander, and two AN/FGC-5 technicians were placed aboard the Command Ship for the duration of the BRAVO operational period. This proved to be so successful that it was decided to continue to place at least three AACS personnel aboard for each succeeding shot. Due to the critical nature of the voice time broadcast from the bunker at Station 7200 on NAN,

[redacted], J-5 of Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, obtained permission for the Communications Element to place a "Q" cleared radio technician in the bunker during the shot period. His duties included the maintenance of the two BC-640 VHF transmitters used for voice time broadcast and to switch transmitters in case one of them failed, and also to watch the AN/URN-5 radio homing beacon and the AN/CPN-6 racon,

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both of which were located within a hundred yards of the firing bunker.

BRAVO day was forecast as poor for radio propagation by the Central Radio Propagation Laboratory. The forecast proved to be true; QRN and QRM bothered all voice and radio teletype circuits, but, on the whole, communications continuity was maintained.

Within three hours after the blast, the Command Ship was washing down everything, including antennas, above decks. Naturally, this raised havoc with voice and radioteletype circuits to the ship. In addition, some indications especially from Task Group 7.2's long/haul circuits, pointed to ionospheric disturbances due to the blast. However, aircraft control circuits, both voice point-to-point and air-ground maintained continuity. Some improvising was necessary. The VHF relay aircraft came through when the chips were down and the control Destroyer acted as a voice relay for circuits J-407 and J-408.

The period between BRAVO and the next shot and in improvising for the second shot. The immediate changes necessary were to prepare the voice time VHF transmitter, the radio beacon and the racon on NAN for unattended operation, for, on all subsequent shots, NAN and the firing bunker would be evacuated. Also, Rongerik would be uninhabited for the second shot. On B plus seven days, the Communications Element put three men back on NAN and on B plus nine days, three men temporarily re-entered Rongerik.[56]

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56 - Memo for Comdr, TG 7.4, dtd 7 Mar 54: Subj Electronic Fac for ROMEO

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One change was made to the over-all communications scheme. Joint Task Force sent down a requirement for a rad/safe radio operator position on circuit J-411 in the radsafe office aboard the Command Ship.[57] This was installed by Task Group 7.3 and the AOC set up circuit checks starting at 1400 on 10 March.

To give better protection to classified messages encrypted in an off-line system, the GODRESS (a type of system in which the addressees are encrypted in the text) method was used. Due to the addressees being at numerous locations in the Pacific Proving Grounds, (of which the originators of messages had no knowledge), considerable retransmission was required. Because the messages had to be deciphered before the addressees were known, the delay was too great to meet operational requirements. Therefore, JTF SEVEN made a decision that the operational necessity outweighted security and that PLAINDRESS (a type of message in which the complete address is contained in the heading) method would be used.[58]

The total security protection afforded by SIGTOT-SAMSON to unclassified messages destined for the Zone of Interior was sacrificed to allow alternate routing over non-secured circuits.[59]

All communications preparations were complete for ROMEO to R-1 Day, but, the shot was posponed because of unfavorable weather conditions.

57 - Msg fr CJTF 7, DTG 060028Z, Contl No. 3-2964C
58 - Msg fr CJTF 7, DTG 080018Z, Contl No. TG-4717-X-U
59 - Msg fr CJTF 7, DTG 080300Z, Contl No. 3-3005C

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Communications element personnel had gone into Rongerik by PBM on R-1 to prepare the homer for 24-hour unattended operation, as well as to open up the CW circuit to enable a Rawinsonde team to send out observations. The voice time script to be broadcast from the firing bunker was finally scheduled to be put on one VHF channel only, as no aircraft were to be critically positioned and it was felt that if the VHF transmitter failed, a new manual broadcast could be given from the CIC. Finally, the NAN Racon had been put back in operation and was scheduled to operate unattended right through the shot period.

During the succession of R-2 Day postponements suffered by the Task Group, things did not stand still. In fact, things went wrong. The first order of business was to set up a PBM or SA-16 run into Rongerik on R-1 Day take in three Communications personnel, a Rawinsonde team and a radsafe monitor. This trip was faithfully set up each day, and just as faithfully cancelled each night. This, of course, could not be prevented, but, was a product of the 24 hour delays.

Interference reared its ugly head on Eniwetok. The victim, the Loran Station: the transgressor, the transmitter building and it's attendant array of antennas. Joint Task Force notified us of frequency changes to be made to solve the problem.[60] On the evening of 13 March, we came up on the new frequency for circuit J-401, 2815 kilocycle, vice 2068 kilocycles. Very late the same night, most of the communications brains on the island were clustered around the monitor scope in the Loran Station observing the beautiful green pattern of interference.

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60 - Msg fr CJTF 7, DTG 072310Z, Contl No. 3-3044C

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There was not the slightest trace of the Loran Signal. That particular bad offender was quickly traced to interference from one of our 96C transmitters. During the remainder of the night this particular transmitter was removed from the air and conditions improved. In fact, on 14 March the Coast Guard Loran Station sent a reassuring message to the Commander, 14th C. G. District Honolulu.[61] The interference never was completely creared up, however, by a few more minor changes in antennas and by diligent maintenance of transmitters, the interference did not preclude the proper monitoring of the Loran signal.

On 10 March, the CIC called and requested that the VHF relay circuit get off 151.2 megacycles on the REFLECTOR Aircraft - AOC leg. No reason was given, but it was presumed that there was interference with one of the scitntific programs. Fortunately, crystals were available on 147.6 megacycles for both the BC-640 and the AN/ARC-1. The necessary changes were made and a REFLECTOR test flight was made on 12 March. During the flight of three and one-half hours duration, successful relay voice contact was maintained between the AOC and CIC for approximately 75 percent of the time.

On 15 March, a message was received from Lt Roberts, Communications Officer, Task Group 7.1, stating that for succeeding shots the Racon on NAN would remain activated through the shot period, and that the LF homer would be kicked on approximately H/1 minute by a passing shock wave.[62]

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61 - MSg fr Eniwetok Loran St , to Comdr 14th C.G. Dist, DTG 131020Z
62 - Msg fr CJTF 7, DTG 082313Z, Control No. 3-3019Z

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The 100 kw diesel generator in Building 90G caused an undue workload in operational preparation. Upon arrival of the main echelon of the Task Group in the forward area, it was found that the unit was in place, but it was not connected to anything. Considerable work by the Assistant Director of Materiel and by ____ ersonnel finally culminated in a one hour test run of the generator under full load on 11 March, during which time everything worked perfectly. As the next shot was scheduled on 13 March, it was decided to postpone a 24-hour full load run until the day succeeding the shot. The shot was postponed. Then, on Monday, 13 March, the island of Eniwetok lost its primary power source due to a break in the cable to Parry. This happened about 1830 hours. Soon thereafter, this unit was placed in operation, was observed to be functioning properly was left in the care of a power man. About an hour and half later, the voltage started to fluctuate; the fluctuation got steadily worse, and about 0230 the next morning it was so bad that the unit was turned off. Later on Tuesday morning, r electricians took over, re-seated the brushes, checked the voltage regulator, and started it up again. Finally, at 1730, it was operational and it took over for the AOC, the Weather Central and the Headquarters Building. Then at 1630 on Wednesday, a complete segment of the Rotor came loose when a 3/4 inch bolt snapped. Naturally, the generator, as such, no longer was available. ___ took the generator to Parry for attempted repairs and a 60 kw diesel driven generator from the GCA Site was moved to Building 90G on 19 March.

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After it was in place, the control panel was discovered to be malfunctioning. [redacted] personnel worked on this until 22 March. Then on 23 March, the generator took over under full load and ran a service test for seven hours. No more trouble was encountered during the month. The wrecked 100 kw generator was shipped to Honolulu for repair and rewinding.

Immediately after BRAVO, the AF Controller aboard the Control Destroyer reported that there were insufficient high frequency transmitters available for his purposes. The Task Group 7.3 Operations Order was checked and it was verified that the Control DDE was to guard two Air Force voice circuits, one Navy CW circuit, and provide a LF radio homing beacon. This matter was brought to the attention of J-5 of Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, by telephone 3 March. It was discovered that none of the destroyers in the Eniwetok area had the necessary capability transmitter-wise, and the problem was resolved by the Task Force Senior Air Controller when he approved using one HF point-to-point circuit, J-407, a LF radio homing beacon, and two VHF channels for aircraft control from the destroyer. [63], [64], [65], [66],

On 23 March, a message was received from Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, requesting that VHF radio equipment be installed on TARE airstrip.[67] It was to be operated on Channel B, 126.18 megacycles

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63 - Msg fr CJTF 7 to CTG 7.3, DTG 042257Z, Control No. 2908C
64 - Msg fr CTG 7.3 to CJTF 7, DTG 050915Z, Control No. 2924C
65 - Msg fr CJTF 7 to CTG 7.3, DTG 072320Z, Control No. 3002C.
66 - Msg fr CJTF 7 DTG 171136Z, Control No. TX-159
67 - Msg fr CJTF 7, DTG 220356 Control No. TX-259

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by airfield personnel to assist in local aircraft operations and passenger control. The Communications Element installed an SCR-624 on 25 March. Task Group 7.1 furnished the 110 volt, alternating circuit, power.

Major Brady, Commander of Communications Element, started on a project to assist in supply roll-up and in planning for future operations. Major Brady was preparing five studies:

1. Communications equipment and facilities to be left in place and operated during the interim period between overseas tests;

2. Equipment and facilities on hand and needed for the next operation;

3. Class 16 and Signal Corps items on hand but surplus to one and two above;

4. Master Communications scheme for next operation with recommended new sites, construction and equipment;

5. Equipment on hand surplus to four, above.

In final preparation for ROMEO, the Communications Element had to send men to Rongerik on R-1 Day to service and turn on the homer, and to NAN to inspect and service check the homer, Racon and VHF transmitters there. In preparation for ECHO, Channel "H" was being installed in the Eniwetok Control tower to replace Channel "B" during the period of the voice time broadcast, and two SCR-640 VHF transmitters, these evacuated from the tower at Bikini after BRAVO, were being readied for installation on Parry for the broadcast of the time hack.

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Communications on ROMEO "Day" were normal. The Task Group was fortunate in this one respect: practically all facilities used on shot day were in use on all other days. The Rongerik homer was turned on the day before and functioned satisfactorily. The VHF relay circuit, of course, was also used only on shot days. This circuit was operational from 261732Z to 262154Z. During this period, automatic voice relay between the CIC and the AOC was effective 63 percent of the time and manual voice relay was available 100 percent of the time.

One phenomenon observed on BRAVO Day was also evident on ROMEO Day: The Kwajalein multiplex circuit went out immediately after the shot and remained out for several hours. In addition, two CW circuits to Kwajalein were out for an hour after the shot. Indications were that some aspect of the detonation was interfering with long haul circuits; Task Group 7.2 had the same trouble on their Honolulu circuits - both were out for at least an hour.

The broadcast of the voice time script was unsatisfactory. In explanation of the method used from H-3 hours to H-15 minutes, time hacks were given by manual voice from the Command Ship. At H-15 minutes, a prepared tape took over in conjunction with a tone signal from the sequence timer, both operating unattended in the bunker on NAN. The voice portion on the tape was satisfactory, but the tone hacks on the minute were not readable. This immediately noticed in the CIC and a Task Group 7.1 scientist grabbed a mike and gave a verbal "Hack"

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simultaneously with the Tone. Of course, the two transmitters heterodyned in the aircraft receivers. In addition, the tape itself was subject to much criticism because there was not a count down between the five second warning and the minute Tone. Immediate corrective action was taken after ROMEO. A new tape was cut incorporating the count down and superimposing the Tone Signal right on the tape. Task Group 7.1 personnel agreed that experience had proven that the tape could be run independently of the sequence timer and still remain syncronized with other events.

Other than the above, there were no communications failures. IFF equipment functioned without exception and communications were available to everyone when needed. ROMEO joined BRAVO in being exceptionally satisfactory electronics-wise.

Communications Security

On 2 and 3 March [redacted] of the Director of Operations Office, 1808th AACS Wing, Tokyo, visited Headquarters, Task Group 7.4. During the visit, [redacted] requested that [redacted] visit the Joint Relay Center (Eniwetok) which was operated by Task Group 7.2 (Army). [redacted] was informed that considerable difficulties had been encountered and that local coordination with the Air Force Communications Center at Kwajalein had failed to solve them. [redacted] on being informed of this situation, detailed [redacted] to investigate the matter and coordinate with all AACS Units involved and the Joint Relay Center. After studying the situation at Eniwetok, [redacted] proceeded to Kwajalein and reviewed

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the procedures there. On 5 March, M[redacted], accompanied by the OIC of the Air Force Communications Center at Kwajalein, visited the Joint Relay Center at Eniwetok and settled most of the differences. At 0930 hours, M time,6 March, a meeting was held at the Communications Element, Test Services Unit at Eniwetok. Those attending were Commander, Communications Element; [redacted], Assistant Communications Officer, Task Group 7.4; [redacted], 1960th AACS Squadron, Kwajalein; I[redacted], Operations Officer, Communications Element and M[redacted], 1808th AACS Wing, Tokyo, Japan. M[redacted] stated that the difficulties were narrowed down to three items as follows; (1) Since the SIGTOT-SAMSON equipment on Channel two of the multiplex radio-teletype circuit to Kwajalein was not running continuously, the personnel of the Joint Relay Center could not tell when the channel was operational. It was agreed that the SIGTOT tapes would be run continously except when the circuit was logged as "out" by the technical controller maintaining the multiplex equipment. The running of the SIGTOT continously had been agreed upon during January. However, due to technical and maintenance difficulties, the habit was formed of having one side of the duplex channel idle when the other side was operating. (2) The SIGTOT-SAMSON equipment at Kwajalein was installed in an on-line crypto room which was separate from the teletype relay center. On-line scrabble procedures were used in the on-line crypto room. The use of tape relay procedures at the Joint Relay Center (Eniwetok) and on-line procedures was causing considerable confusion. It was agreed that tape relay procedures would be used at both terminations. Since equipment was not available in the

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on-line crypto room at Kwajalein to ZVA multiple addressed messages, (the station called is responsible for relay or delivery to all stations in line two heading or to stations indicated) suitable equipment for ZV/ing of messages was installed. (2) Confusion existed over the proper use of channel checks. It was agreed that the Joint Relay Center (Eniwetok) would make a channel check, using operating signals ZIC (channel number of last message transmitted to you is _____) and ZID (Channel number of last message received from you is _____) every hour on the hour and the Air Force Communications Center (Kwajalein) would make channel checks every hour on the half hour.

At 1445M hours, 6 March, a meeting was held in Building 90 to further discuss the traffic procedures and problems. Those attending were: [redacted] Communications Officer, Task Group 7.4; [redacted], Assistant Communications Officer, Task Group 7.4; [redacted], Commander, Communications Element; [redacted], J-5 Division Joint Task Force SEVEN; [redacted], OIC, Joint Relay Center (TG 7.2); [redacted] 1960th AACS Squadron, Kwajalein; [redacted] Operations Officer, Communications Element; and [redacted] 1308th AACS Wing, Tokyo, Japan. The items mentioned in the 0930M hours meeting were reviewed and reaffirmed. It was stated that [redacted] would write out the procedures required and furnish copies to the Joint Relay Center (Eniwetok) and the Air Force Communications Center (Kwajalein). The subject of alternate routing of unclassified messages that might be held at Kwajalein in case both the ASM2-1 and SAMSON channels between Kwajalein and Hickam were out and protection could not

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be furnished unclassified traffic was also discussed. (NOTE: The reason for protecting unclassified traffic was to prevent accumulation by an interceptor of data for evaluation.) It was decided that unclassified messages could be alternately routed through Guam, in the event the Kwajalein-Hickam channel was out, and minimize transmission time.

was to proceed to Hawaii on 7 March to further coordinate the alternate routing procedures between the Army CommunicationsCenter (UHP) and the Air Force Communications Center (JHP). At 1010M hours, 19 March, a meeting was held at the Joint Relay Center (Eniwetok). Those attending were: , J-5 Division, Joint Task Force SEVEN: Assistant Communications Officer, Task Group 7.4; Capt CIC , Joint Relay Center (Eniwetok); , J-5 Division, Joint Task Force SEVEN; , OIC, Army Communications Center, Hawaii (UHP); M/Sgt , Operations Division, 1808th AACS Wing, Tokyo, Japan; T , NCOIC, Air Force Communications Center (Eniwetok). The difference in policy between the Army and Air Force, as pertained to accepting messages containing garbles, was discussed. The Army policy was not to accept any messages that contained garbles. The Air Force Policy was to accept messages with minor garbles and a notation placed on the message delivered to the addressee that a re-run would be requested, if desired. Normally, the message was complete enough with minor garbles to satisfy the addressee. (J-5 Division, of Joint Task Force SEVEN, stated he would send a message to the Chief Signal Officer, US Army,

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asking if the Army Communications Centers would accept messages with minor garbles in order that delivery could be expedited. It was agreed that alternate routing procedures as defined in the Signal Corps publication SIGAM-2, which was a supplement to JANAP 127A, would be used. This procedure is outlined in ACP 127B, which was not effective at this writing.

On 15 March, it was observed that some of the teletype operators at Kwajalein and Eniwetok were not fully trained in their AFSC, i.e., Eniwetok operators were not sufficiently familiar with procedure and tape cutting. Their speed was not good enough for preparing tapes for emergency messages; 10 minutes or more were required to prepare an emergency message of 30 words. Kwajalein was not sending notification of delivery of message (ZDF) on messages that carried ZFF (request time message delivered to addressee) in the heading. Approximately two out of every four cases of ZDF had to be requested to service messages as operators at Kwajalein apparently were not observing headings with ZFF in them. The NCOIC of the Teletype Section, Communications Elemtnt, Eniwetok was contacted in regards to unacceptable delay in preparing emergency messages for transmission. The NCOIC of the Teletype Section stated that all teletype operators would be tested in preparing tapes and those operators that were slow in preparation of tapes, and who, had forgotten the procedure, would be given further training.

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The Assistant Adjutant, Task Group 7.4, maintained a chart showing the elasped time, from the originator to addressee, on messages received during March. The data on the chart indicated an increase in the efficiency of the communications system.

Joint Task Force SEVEN stated in their Operations Order 1-53 that messages containing TOP SECRET and/or RESTRICTED DATA information would be encrypted in an off-line system. Since the policy stated above was not binding on organizations outside of Joint Task Force SEVEN, an occasional TOP SECRET or RESTRICTED DATA message was received at the Joint Relay Center (Eniwetok) from Air Force organizations which had transmitted the message by on-line SIGTOT method.

the Communications Security Officer of Joint Task Force SEVEN discussed this problem with . Communications Security Officer of Task Group 7.4, by telephone on 5 March. It was decided the best way to approach the problem was to ask each unit, that transmitted such a message by on-line SIGTOT, to encrypt that type message in an off-line system in the future.

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TECHNICAL PROJECTS

The flyaway aircraft scheduled for use in return of BRAVO radioactive samples to the Zone of Interior arrived on schedule in accordance with the MATS Operation Order 6-54. The crews were briefed and all details of coordination accomplished in accordance with Annex "U" of Joint Task Force SEVEN Operations Order 3-53. Between 0700 and 0745 on B-Day the first two flyaway aircraft were positioned in front of the MATS Terminal nose-to-tail so as to be ready for loading the samples and immediate departure. These two aircraft departed on BRAVO Day at 1437M and 1452M. No difficulty was experienced in the operation of the first two flyaways. The third flyaway departed close to its departure time, but was unable to return all of the samples because of heavy fall-out from BRAVO detonation which did not allow for complete sample recovery. It departed 1800M on B/1. The fourth flyaway was held over to load on additional samples delayed because of the aforementioned fall-out. Its departure time was 1450M on B/6. The operation was observed and from comments received appeared to progress without difficulty and as planned. One comment received was the fact that the MATS Terminal at Eniwetok transmitted departure times using the incorrect date when converted to Zebra times. This was brought to the attention of the MATS personnel and wasn't likely to happen on subsequent operations.

On B-2, thorough inspections were performed on airborne IFF control and radar equipment, the airborne beacon, and the interrogator system in the AOC. All equipment was in peak operating condition. Maintenance personnel accomplished operational checks and calibration of all

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airborne transponders in the period B-3 to B-1. During this operation all assigned aircraft had operating transponders. However, the transponders in one VIKING aircraft and one HARDTIME aircraft, not considered as assigned aircraft, were not operational. This equipment had been inspected prior to mission and it was believed that the possibility of operator error could account for this failure. This equipment was not available for inspection subsequent to the shot.

The Raydist transmitters in ELAINE 1 and 2 were inspected on B-1 and found to be operating properly. The plate meter in the B-47 transmitter was found to be defective, but this did not impair operation in any manner as tuning could be accomplished with other instruments. The condition was reported and Hastings personnel were to furnish a replacement.

Prior to the mission it was necessary to discard the storage batteries that had furnished the primary power source for the Raydist gound stations. This was because of unanticipated drain. The batteries were replaced with gasoline driven auxiliary power units and this change was completed by B-3 days when Hastings personnel boarded the USS Curtiss for operation of the recording station.

Meetings had been held, prior to movement of the operations to the Pacific Proving Ground, which involved the methods and criteria used for positioning aircraft. The organization responsible for the safe positioning of aircraft was the WADC, which had subcontracted the technical portion to Allied Research Associates and UCLA. At the

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conclusion of these Statesides meetings, the Commander of Task Group 7.1, [redacted], was satisfied that the procedures would truly place the aircraft in a safe position if he provided a correct yield forecast on which to base the decision of positioning.

On 20 February, the final positioning meeting was held at Parry Island. At that time [redacted] commented that he had received the final forecast of yield for the BRAVO device, which was [redacted] as a maximum yield and [redacted] as a probable yield. This device, incidentally, [redacted] insisted that the positioning of the effects aircraft should be based on the maximum possible, because of doubt in his own mind as to the complete reactions. With this thought in mind, the committee concurred and positioned the B-36 at 50,000 feet horizontal range and 33,000 feet altitude, and the B-47 at 48,000 foot horizontal range and 35,000 feet altitude.

BRAVO was scheduled for 0645 on 1 March. The weather was considered satisfactory and all task groups were ready for the operation. At 0645, the device was detonated and the results appeared to be extremely good from the observers' point of view at Eniwetok.

The take-off schedule for aircraft was closely adhered to and sample collecting by manned aircraft commenced. Fifteen F-84G and two FB-36 type aircraft were used for this purpose. It was considered that 12 operational F-84's could constitute the required number of samplers. In addition, a WB-29, with "shoe box" type sampler, was employed at

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H/1 hour for the purpose of obtaining samples which the scientists hoped would contain heavy elements. The two FB-36 aircraft were used in an attempt to obtain samples at higher altitudes. Specificially, it was the desire to get samples in the main cloud in an effort to determine whether they were more representative than those below the main portion. Sampling progressed as planned and the heavy nuclide samples from the WB-29 and some gas samples from the F-84's were transported from Eniwetok to Parry in minimum time by H-19 and L-13 type aircraft, which were standing by for that purpose. The other samples destined for the United States were recovered from the aircraft, packaged and transported to the C-97 aircraft for shipment as outlined above. In addition to the sample plan above, a C-47 aircraft was standing by for immediate dispatch to Bikini Atoll for recovery of samples in that area. These aircraft were never called for.

The equipment in the control RB-36H operated satisfactorily with ranges in excess of 75 miles for both upper and lower radars. CASSIDY radio beacon was held at 175 miles and used for ADF. The control mission was a success from a radar standpoint.

The radar equipment in the effects aircraft also performed satisfactorily as did the AOC control equipment. No failures occurred and the AOC was able to perform the control mission for their assigned area.

During the operation, the Raydist system monitoring the B-36D failed, possibly due to an error of one of the Hastings engineers.

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No Raydist data was recorded from this aircraft. The data for the B-47 was usable, but ambiguities existed. On reduction, these were eliminated and the final result for the B-47 position was 2985 feet over.

The detonation of BRAVO shot obviously had a greater yield than predicted. Early data, such as ball of fire, indicated approximately 15 megatons. The effects aircraft were in approximate position and when they arrived back at the base the B-47 revealed no abnormal effects, but the B-36 had obvious external damage. In the days that followed BRAVO the positions that these aircraft reached were determined. The B-36 was 1002 feet short according to scope photography. The Raydist did not function. The B-47 was positioned 1800 feet over according to their scope photography, but later reduction of data from Raydist placed the B-47 2985 feet over, as noted above. This could be the reason why the B-47 experienced no damage. The damage sustained by the B-36 was as follows:

(1) Radar dome crushed from rear;

(2) Main gear wheel door flattened against wheel and panels dished;

(3) Main column nacelle fairing blown in;

(4) Nose door panels dished with some popped rivets and skin tears;

(5) Lower forward nacelle cowling panels dished and buckled with some popped rivets and skin tears;

(6) Lower aft turret door panels dished;

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(7) Slight distortions in light gauge skin of lower aft fuselage;

(8) Combined blast and gust loads deflected forward and aft of bomb bay doors into bomb bay between hinge point and buckled door structure approximately four feet from front of each set;

(9) Some distortion of bottom of bulkhead number 5;

(10) Some torn rivets at right horizontal stabilizer tip;

(11) Compression wrinkle pattern middle section of vertical stabilizer at leading edge;

(12) Slight thermal damage in the form of minor paint blistering on elevators; elevator trim tabs; lower rounded portion of wing trailing edge between center and inboard engine, and inboard engine and fuselage;

(13) Slight thermal damage on aft section of main gear wheel doors;

(14) Slight warping of aluminum lacquered drag strut wing fairing and lacquer blistered and scorched;

(15) Curtain on optics in periscope charred;

(16) Black coating on ADF antenna fairing blistered;

(17) Rear right upper and lower blisters cracked and rubber scorched;

(18) Aluminum lacquered prop spinners scorched;

(19) Aluminum lacquered 24 ST .016 web of horizontal stabilizer trailing edge fairing scorched and buckled where exposed; some popped and loose rivets in spanwise rivet lines on top surface of horizontal stabilizer leading and trailing edge fairings.

The repair of the damage on the B-36 was completed prior to ROMEO. Under normal maintenance conditions it was estimated that 750 man-hours

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would have been expended to accomplish this repair.

Because of the greater than expected yield and an adverse wind condition, a large amount of persistent fall-out was experienced at various atolls east of shot point. A large amount of fall-out occurred in the Bikini area, which resulted in a revision of the shot schedule, both as to time and location. Since no one was able to work in the area, the next shot was postponed for two days and scheduled for the BRAVO crater.

The flyaway aircraft scheduled for use in returning ROMEO radioactive samples to the Zone of Interior arrived on schedule in accordance with the MATS directive as adjusted for the new date of detonation - 13 March. Since the shot was postponed many times, the three C-97 aircraft remained on the ground for approximately two weeks. This had the normal adverse effects on maintenance, and flyaway 22 landed at Johnston Island with one engine giving trouble. Flyaway's 21 and 22 departed Eniwetok Island at 1640 and 1650 on ROMEO Day. They departed late because the cloud maintained its shape longer than expected, necessitating late FB-36 sampling. Because of very light fall-out in the Bikini area, sample recovery was performed early, thereby allowing flyaway 23 to depart Eniwetok at 0825 on ROMEO plus one day. This aircraft returned Project 7.4 samples only. Flyaway 24 departed Eniwetok at 1910 on R/3 and carried the remaining samples back to the Zone of the Interior.

The operator on the B-47 effects aircraft experienced poor sensitivity during orbit and runs, although the equipment produced good

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sensitivity and range to and from the shot area. It was the operator's opinion that failure of equipment in the shot area could be attributed to interference from other radars operating in the vicinity.

Inspection of the equipment, including power and sensitivity checks and spectrum analysis, showed the equipment to be in excellent condition and operating better than minimum requirements dictated. Inspection of scope photographs showed considerable radar interference. Targets could be seen at short ranges, but it appeared there was a deterioration of radar returns at medium and long ranges which could not be attributed to interference.

One plausible explanation was that adiabatic charts showed the presence of several temperature inversions at altitudes below the B-47. This would create a condition of less than standard atmospheric refraction and restrict the range. Other aircraft did not experience this difficulty, however, they were not at the same altitude and aspect.

Extensive studies had been made in an attempt to relate weather conditions to radar performance, but at the reporting date no reliable method was available for predicting radar performance under various weather conditions. It was known that local areas of moisture lapse can severely restrict radar ranges at isolated altitudes.

As a precaution, all participating aircraft in future operations were to have frequencies selected to give minimum interference. The frequency determinant for the airborne radar sets was the magnetron type 4J32. The midpoint of the "X" radar band was 9375 MCS and the band extended from 9320 to 9430 MCS. Magnetrons vary in frequency

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within these tolerances and by judiciously selecting individual tubes, sufficient separation of frequency may be obtained to prevent serious interference. The 97th Bomb Wing Detachment was instructed by TWX to select magnetrons with frequencies between 9320 and 9375 MCS and that the Air Task Group aircraft radar frequencies would be between 9375 and 9430 MCS with a minimum separation of five MCS.

The B-36D effects aircraft experienced minor radar failure. The deflection coils in the pilot's indicator burned out for no apparent reason. On investigation, it was found that the operator failed to make necessary changes in the junction box for one scope operation. However, this was not normally maintenance performed by an operator. This gave improper functioning of displaced center. With the exception of the displaced center operation, PPI operation was normal and satisfactory.

The RB-36 control aircraft encountered minor radar difficulties during the operation. The generation of the indicator reticles failed because of improper soldering in connectors in the cross hair resolver, and the wind slew control failed because of a corroded switch contact. Closer inspections would eliminate these troubles in the future.

The equipment in the AOC performed satisfactorily. One airborne IFF in WILSON 1 was weak giving a maximum range of 25 miles. The fighter aircraft were observed at maximum distances of 235 miles.

Regarding Raydist, the FM link for the system used with the B-36D was not operating properly and therefore no data was obtained.

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Good data was obtained for the B-47.

No formal meeting was conducted for the purpose of positionin the effects aircraft for ROMEO. Aircraft were positioned on yiel forecast, which was [redacted]. The reason f the wide spread of probability for this device was an outgrowth of BRAVO results, indicating that fuel reactions concerning device components too uncertain at that time for attempting a high probability yield prediction. Therefore, it was informally decided t position the B-36D at 37,000 feet altitude with a horizontal range 50,000 feet, and the B-47 at 35,000 feet altitude with a horizont range of 50,000 feet.

The positioning of other aircraft remained the same with the exception of the C-54 Photo aircraft, which were moved to 50 miles

The sampler aircraft take-off schedule was again closely adhe to and sample collecting by manned aircraft commenced. The aircra used for sampling were 15 F-84's, two FB-36's and one WB-29 for he nuclide sampling. All aircraft were very successful except one F- which had a malfunction of its tip tanks causing both tanks to be salvoed, and one FB-36 which aborted with landing gear trouble, bu later completed its mission.

Since the shape of the radioactive cloud persisted for some t sampling was extended for a longer period.

The RB-36 control aircraft was directed by the CIC not to complete its mission of obtaining crater photography, and one of the B-50 HARDTIME aircraft was modified on R/1 by personnel of TG

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and the Test Aircraft Unit, so as to have this capability. The mission was accomplished on R/2. For all future shots it was planned to modify one of the HARDTIME aircraft prior to shot date minus one with a capability for crater photography. They would accomplish the mission as soon as rad safety would permit, returning to the home station as soon as practicable, thereafter. It was not a good idea to do this photography with the RB-36 due to possible contamination.

The positioning of the B-47 effects aircraft was well over because of the electronic failures. The B-47 was plotted at 73,000 feet and Raydist provided data indicating range of 73,300 feet. The B-36 was 1 second early and a little to the left. Raydist malfunctioned on this aircraft and no results were obtained. The B-36 sustained damage similar to that experienced on BRAVO shot, although not quite as extensive. Repair was estimated at 100 man-hours. The fall-out on inhabited areas during and after ROMEO shot was minor, and re-entry into the Bikini Atoll was accomplished the evening of R-Day, which allowed for sample recovery at an early time. Most of the heavy fall-out went to the northwest as predicted, however, a secondary fall-out was experienced on the morning of R/2 days.

A conference was conducted at this Headquarters on 29 March for the purpose of ascertaining what positions of PEWTER aircraft would allow to accomplishment of the requirements of Project 9.1, Cloud Growth and Rise. The discussion involved recommended positions for KOON only. Personnel attending were: Colonel William W. Perry, TU-13, TG 7.1; Lt

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this Headquarters.

The discussion was opened with presenting pictures from BRAVO which indicated why it was impossible for him to satisfy Project 9.1 requirements. The tremendous and swift growth of the cloud while the aircraft were positioned at distances of 50 to 60 miles from detonation point were important factors. It appeared that the big problem surrounding positioning of these aircraft at greater distances entailed a control problem necessary for accurate positioning at H-Hour. Specifically, positive control from BOUNDARY FARE was lost at approximately 70 miles from Ground Zero in the desired quadrants. This meant that the actual control distance from BOUNDARY FARE was approximately 100 miles. It was suggested, as a possible solution, that these aircraft could be positioned to greater distances, 100 to 125 miles, and the control could be handled by DIRTY FACE (the MOC). If this could be accomplished, two of the aircraft, one at 250 degrees and 12,000 feet and the other at 240 degrees and 14,000 feet, would be well within the control capability of DIRTY FACE at all times, a distance of approximately 80 miles. The base line for triangulation reduction of data was 80 miles if these aircraft were positioned 110 miles from detonation point.

It was concluded that PEWTER ONE and PEWTER TWO, in order to accomplish the requirements of Project 9.1, should be under the control of DIRTY FACE. PEWTER ONE would be 290 degrees and 110 miles from Ground [redacted]

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Zero at 14,000 feet altitude. PEWTER TWO would be at 250 degrees and 110 miles from Ground Zero at 12,000 feet altitude. This was a tentative conclusion which was changed later when HF control from BOUNDARY TARE was found to be satisfactory.

Time hacks would come from BOUNDARY TARE to DIRTY FACE by Reflector relay aircraft over Reflector relay circuit or JIG 407. The AOC Controller would then give time hacks to the aircraft commander.

To provide continuity between the aircraft commander and controller, the PEWTER ONE controller from BOUNDARY TARE would be brought to the AOC for control of PEWTER ONE and TWO.

Control of PEWTER ONE and TWO would be exercised on Able Channel from the second PPI scope in the AOC. This channel would be made available by using transmitter and receiver equipment now reserved for special Naval aircraft control which, to date, had not been used.

To provide documentary photography, PEWTER THREE could be positioned as close as blast, gust and thermal would allow. It was recommended that this position be at 270 degrees and approximately 40 miles.

To accomplish the above, it was necessary for the Commanders of Task Group 7.1 and 7.4 to approve the recommendations contained herein to include specific position for PEWTER THREE.

On 30 March, C

attended the final positioning meeting at Task Group 7.1. The following decisions and tentative plans were reached at that time:

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stated that range of yield for KOON shot was [redacted] and that positioning of all aircraft would be based on [redacted]

Based on a [redacted] yield for KOON, the HARDTIME B-50 IBDA aircraft were moved within 12, 20 and 27 nautical miles and the same patterns used for ROMEO.

After a short discussion of control problems, surrounding the PEWTER aircraft, it was tentatively decided to position two C-54 type aircraft at 75 miles from Ground Zero at 210 degrees and 330 degrees, and the third C-54 to be 50 miles from Ground Zero at 90 degrees. Since the two aircraft at 75 miles were borderline control positions, it was agreed to check the possibilities of controlling with HF by actual flight on the morning of 31 March. This check proved that VHF positioning could be used satisfactorily.

Further discussion included the effects aircraft. No firm figures were available at that time. However, it appeared advisable to change the inbound heading of the B-47 from 90 degrees to 70 degrees for more dependable use of the Raydist.

On 31 March, the test run of the C-54 was held in conjunction with the USS ESTES with affirmative results. Based on this, Task Group 7.1 was notified and the following firm positions prepared for the Operations Order:

PEWTER ONE - 75 miles from Ground Zero at an altitude of 14,000 feet and 330 degrees;

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PEWTER TWO - 50 miles from Ground Zero at an altitude of 10,500 feet and 90 degrees;

PEWTER THREE - 75 miles from Ground Zero at an altitude of 12,500 feet and 210 degrees.

On 31 March, [redacted] called this office and informed us of the approval of positions for the effects aircraft. He stated he would confirm this with a TWX. The confirmation had been prepared for the Operations Order and was as follows:

The B-36 would be at an altitude of 40,000 feet with horizontal range of 34,960 feet, or 5.75 nautical miles at 090 degrees from Ground Zero.

The B-47 would be at an altitude of 35,000 feet with horizontal range of 34,700 feet at 070 degrees from Ground Zero. This new heading was coordinated with the Pilot and Navigator of the B-47.

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FLIGHT SAFETY

On B-2 days all aircraft maintenance test flights were completed and minor repairs and adjustments were made to give the highest "in commission" rate possible for the first shot. The aircraft status was looking good and everyone was ready for the final day prior to BRAVO.

B-1 found the whole island humming with last minute preparations. The Operations Directorate had to assure complete coordination between the AOC and Control Tower, the AOC and CIC, and all participating organizations.

In the afternoon of B-1, the process of marshaling the aircraft was begun. The problems concerning marshaling had been conquered in the two rehearsals and was accomplished with ease on this day. Marshaling of aircraft was necessitated at Eniwetok due to the limited parking areas and the large number of aircraft participating in the operation. Marshaling was accomplished on the engine run-up pad at the west end of the runway and most taxi-ways and ramps. After the last aircraft was in position, the major part of the Operations responsibility was over until the first aircrews reported to their aircraft for crew inspections.

, Director of Operations, was in place aboard the RB-36 controller, to carry the command function for the Commander into the sampling area which is normally beyond the control of the CIC.

worked very closely with the Deputy Commander in the AOC. Frequent checks of the control tower were made to insure that

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all functions of the operation were being properly conducted and supervised.

The Control Tower and all aircraft were briefed to maintain radio silence on VHF Channel "D" for one hour prior to H-Hour. This was to prevent conflict with the time hacks and count down. One discrepancy was noted, but the tower advised the aircraft crew of the radio silence.

All take-offs were within a few seconds of their scheduled time, with the exception of the three B-50 (HARDTIME) aircraft. HARDTIME ONE had a low indicated oil pressure on one engine and was 31 minutes late on take-off. He subsequently declared an emergency with the engine malfunctioning. However, H-Hour was so near he continued the mission and feathered the engine after H-Hour. He was intercepted by an SA-16 (STABLE) aircraft on his return to Eniwetok and escorted to the base. HARDTIME TWO had a propeller stick in reverse pitch on his preflight check and was 50 minutes late on take-off. Due to the take-off aborts of the first two HARDTIME aircraft, and knowing that if their discrepancies were repaired in time, they would have to be sandwiched into the tight take-off schedule, the Deputy Commander required HARDTIME THREE to take off five minutes prior to scheduled time. For the coordinating of some 30 odd sorties to be flown by aircraft varying from high speed jet fighers and huge 10-engined bombers to the slower, but necessary, twin-engine transport and rescue aircraft, the take-off record was considered excellent. It might be mentioned at this point that the B-50 HARDTIME aircraft were not the responsibility of this Group for

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during these shots, although the Group was responsible for the actual positioning and control during the mission itself.

One of the VIKING aircraft, when cleared to taxi from the B-36 turn-around pad to the southwest parking ramp, began a power check on the runway. This procedure was not in accordance with his previous briefing. He complied with our request to discontinue the power check and get off the runway.

A minor question arose during the mission. To what decay area would aircraft that were accidentally contaminated proceed? It was quickly resolved that they would be cleared to their parking area to await decay and eventual decontamination if necessary. If it was found that they were too "hot" to return to their parking area, they could decay on the isolated portion of the ocean road or a new parking area that was built just east of the GCA Unit location.

It was found that poor coordination was lacking in use of crash-fire vehicles as fire guards for aircraft starting their engines. In one case, when a fire guard vehicle was requested, it was more than 15 minutes and two telephone calls later that a vehicle was on the scene. It was determined that request for dispatch of these vehicles should be made by Midwatch 1 (Director of Materiel) and/or Midwatch 2 (Staff Maintenance Officer) through Maintenance Control. This would be effected through the use of radio between jeeps and Maintenance Control. It would expedite the reporting of fire guard vehicles where they would be needed most and more effectively accomplish their mission. Little control over

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those vehicles was effected prior to or during B-Day.

An abort parking area was established for all aircraft aborting take-off on BRAVO shot. The information was disseminated at the crew briefings but was not passed to the alert crew who would guide and park these aircraft. When HARDTIME TWO aborted and taxied into the abort area the "follow me" jeep tried to return him to his original parking place which required weaving in and out of parked aircraft to gain access to a clear taxiway. Definite instructions were passed to the alert crew to preclude recurrence of this erroneous procedure. The aircraft were to cut their engines in the abort area and be towed to their parking area. This procedure would lessen the likelihood of an aircraft accident.

Several minor discrepancies were noted during operations in connection with BRAVO shot. These included three aircraft taxiing without wing-walkers; one taxiing too fast; one starting an engine with no fire guards; one aircraft taxiing with no lights on; one aircraft landing short of runway by approximately 30 feet; one observer on the B-36 effects aircraft not properly secured in event a blister should have blown off the aircraft; and one B-50 aircraft being refueled upwind and near to jet aircraft with their engines running and other minor items.

As a whole and taking into consideration the discrepancies noted herein, BRAVO was considered an outstanding operation. All commanders, maintenance personnel and aircrews were highly commended for the excellence of the mission. When such statements can be made about a mission so complex as BRAVO, it had to be well-planned, supervised and executed.

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With the close of the mission on B-Day, all operations and flight safety personnel breathed a sigh of relief and immediately began the same diligent procedure in preparing for the next shot.

On 3 March, TG 7.4 received the first mar on its perfect record in aircraft operations. On that date a minor aircraft accident involving an H-19 and an SA-16 occurred. This minor accident did not effect our accident record, but opened our eyes to the fact that we had been lax in enforcement of our regulations. The day before (2 March) the Bikini Detachment had returned to Eniwetok due to the heavy contamination at Bikini. These people began to operate from Eniwetok without any formal briefing on current Eniwetok operational procedures. While taxiing out for a take-off one of the new helicopter pilots attempted to taxi between a parked helicopter an an SA-16. The distance was very narrow (approximately 12 feet wider than the helicopter rotor blade circle) and in going through the space one of the rotor tips struck the SA-16 left elevator. Both parts were reparable with approximately 90 hours labor. An accident report was submitted on 11 March. Corrective action was taken to preclude this type accident in the future.

On the morning of 3 March, an orientation of all Task Group 7.4 crash-rescue personnel and all Task Group 7.2 fire-fighters was conducted by ___ The subject was "Fire and Atomic Weapons." After the discussion on their responsibilities and what they could expect if we should have such a device enveloped in fire, a film was

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shown on the subject. A make-up meeting was conducted on 4 March for those who were unable to attend.

Supplement IV to Group Regulation 62-2, "C-54 Aircraft Commanders' Take Off and Pre-Landing Data Cards," was published on 6 March.

The Commander received a requirement for helicopter participation in sample recovery around Eniwetok Atoll after ECHO shot. On 9 March, made a helicopter landing at each required site to observe conditions affecting landings, safety precautions necessary and any improvements that might be necessary prior to operations. Maps of each site were taken and plotted the exact landing spots. All sites were considered safe for helicopter operation except two which were on a deep sand pit. It was determined that a water craft would be necessary to recover samples from these two sites at RUBY.

The study of the Test Support Unit Crash-Rescue Section that was submitted to the Commander late in February was returned on 9 March. The Commander's comment was that no additional personnel would be requisitioned for this project. A copy of the study, with the comments of all staff sections and the Commander, was forwarded to the Commander of the Test Support Unit.

On 11 March forwarded a DF to the Deputy Commander recommending that no take-off and pre-landing data cards be required for SA-16 and C-47 aircraft. This DF was approved and forwarded to

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the Commander for approval. On 12 March the Commander gave his approval and returned the DF to the Flight Safety Division. Information of this approval was forwarded to the Test Services Unit to relieve them of the responsibility of preparing these cards.

conducted a Flight Safety Survey of the Test Services Unit on 11 and 12 March. This survey was conducted in accordance with D/FSR Flight Safety Survey Guide No. 1. The Unit was deemed to be in excellent agreement with the guide. An agressive accident prevention program was very evident and no recommendations were made by

The first Flight Safety Publications from the D/FSR were received at this location on 13 March. Two letters had been previously written requesting that the distribution be increased and the address changed. The publications received were the February issues of the Aircraft Accident and Maintenance Review and posters for the bulletin boards. No Flying Safety magazines had been received as of the end of March. This lack of distribution was very disheartening.

On 15 March the first Flight Safety Committee meeting was held. presented the prupose of the committee, reviewed two incident reports and the Minor Accident Report. Nominations for the Maintenance Man of the Month and Crew of the Month were read, but since some of the Units had not submitted nominations, the Commander advised all Unit Commanders to submit the February nominations by 19 March and the March nominations by 5 April. Two committees were appointed to

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screen the nominations and recommend to the Commander their choice for each award. Recommendations were to be made after all nominations were received in April. All awards are to be presented at the April Flight Safety meeting.

The monthly Flight Safety meeting was conducted on 16 March. This meeting was held in the Task Group briefing room and the following subjects presented: Discussion and demonstration of the S-4 High Altitude Suit by : and of the SAC Test Detachment; two incident reports by , the Minor Accident Report, 3 March, by ; GCA capability, by ; VHF/DF, by . and a lasting comment of :

"The most fatal error in flying safety is to accept prevailing conditions as satisfactory."

More than 220 people attended this meeting and many comments were received on the effectiveness of the presentations. Plans were immediately started for an interesting meeting in April. It was a known fact that interesting meetings keep interest in Flight Safety very high, whereas dull meetings tend to dampen this interest.

On 18 March, coordination was effected between the Commanders of the Test Support and Test Aircraft Units for a safer operation pertaining to helicopters and jets. The Test Support helicopters had been landing very close to the jet aircraft parking and run-up area. These helicopters were whipping up rocks and light debris which were in turn blown toward the jet parking area. When jets were in the run-up area, these rocks and debris could easily be sucked into the intake and ruin

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an engine. The jet aircraft run-up area was moved and the helicopter landing area was not to be closer than 100 feet to the jet parking area. Both units agreed to this and were well pleased with the arrangement. This improved safety conditions tremendously.

The crash alarm and wreckage removal systems were given a check on the night of 20 March. A Navy F4U landed with only one gear extended. (This was not a concern of the Air Task Group except where our facilities were involved.) This was the first actual opportunity to check both operations. No major deficiencies were noted and it was anticipated that both systems would not function properly when needed.

An incident report was forwarded to this headquarters from the Test Services Unit on 24 March. This incident report pointed out that a WB-29 had declared an emergency with one engine feathered and had to make an emergency go around due to a C-54 being cleared by the tower to land ahead of him. The C-54 apparently did not clear the runway in time for the WB-29 to safely land so the go around was effected. The Flight Facilities Officer and tower operator on watch at the time of the incident were contacted and the provisions of AFR 92-4 were re-emphasized. No aircraft were to be permitted to land if an emergency had been declared or was obvious.

The beaching and re-floating of an SA-16 was monitored by [redacted] on 26 March. This aircraft was practicing water landings and had the right propellor go into full feather position when reversing

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the propellers on one landing. The propeller could not be unfeathered so the wheels were extended and the aircraft was beached for stability. After repairs, attempts were made to float the aircraft again but the tide was too low. At high tide the aircraft was again floated, a take-off made and uneventful return to the airstrip was accomplished. There was no damage to the aircraft.

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ROMEO

The weather caused numerous delays in the firing of ROMEO. The shot was originally scheduled for 11 March, then later changed to 13 March. There were to be many more changes of R-Day before the weapon was actually fired. This delay was quite disconcerting and caused much consternation among all the Air Task Group personnel. To fit this particular situation, a familiar squib was borrowed from Shakespeare: "Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou?" Eventually this shot was to be fired on 27 March.

During the delay we had to fly the aircraft many times in order to keep them from getting "grounditis." These additional flights cost us many aircraft hours that had not been planned for. These flights proved worthwhile and timely for they brought forth discrepancies that had accumulated due to the aircraft setting on the ground so long. A good example of this was corrosion in the sequence valve of the landing gear side strut on two B-36 aircraft.

One of the B-36 shakedown flights, the landing gear system would not cycle properly and there was some concern as to their safe landing. Safe landings were accomplished and discrepancies corrected. However, on R-Day another abort of a B-36 sample aircraft was evvected due to landing gear trouble. A quick turn around of two hours was accomplished after minor repairs.

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED [redacted]

These were but a few of theproblems caused by such a long delay. Another of the major problems was the stagnation of the aircrew personnel. Prior to each mission the crews keyed themselves to a high pitch, but with each delay the crescendo began to subside and a state of placidity reigned. This is not the desired feeling forsuch an operation for it is conducive to laxness among the crews and a contributor to aircraft accidents.

A special Flight Safety meeting was held on 16 March to inject new spirit into the crews and to pass on some timely Flight Safety reminders. This meeting was deemed very successful and many favorable comments on it were passed to . Attendance was good - - more than 220 personnel were present. To further rebuild the spirit and pitch desired, made daily visits to the flight line and all unit operations to discuss the operation. Through these visits, the constant reminder of flight safety standpoint, the missi n was a success.

The minor discrepancies noted were corrected prior to KOON shot. Some would require new operating procedures; some would require more effective supervision; and others would require more and better judgment from air and ground crews.

When operating with such a complicated take-off schedule as we were compelled to do, it was imperative that each aircraft be perfectly spaced. In the event a take-off abort was effected, it was necessary

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to work the aborting aircraft back into the schedule at an appropriate place where he would not hinder other aircraft in their taxiing or take-off. One violation of this was a Navy aircraft (13 BABYFOOD) abort. He pulled back into his parking area to correct the discrepancy. A WB-29 (WILSON 1) was cleared onto the runway from his parking area to taxi to the end of the runway for run-up. To do this he had to pass the Navy parking area. Prior to reaching this area the Navy aircraft returned to the runway, thus causing the WB-29 to stop and hold position on the runway. The Navy aircraft made a 180° turn and re-entered the parking area.

An example of poor pilot judgment was demonstrated when one aircraft entered the traffic pattern with two F-84 aircraft in take-off position. He continued his pattern and turned on final approach just as the fighters were beginning their take-off roll. When the JATO fog from the fighters obscured the runway, he had to pull up and go around, thus consuming more time than was necessary. Had he properly planned his landing to coincide with the JATO take-offs his landing could have been expedited.

The different occasions were noted where helicopters violated the rules of good safety techniques. One helicopter made his landing approach in front of a P4Y Navy aircraft which was about four miles out in final approach. Another helicopter landing on the runway in front of two F-84 aircraft that were in take-off position with their JATO units armed. This could have been disastrous in case of a misfire. Here we had poor pilot judgment as well as poor control tower procedures.

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Another example where poor tower procedures were noted, was the traffic jam at the intersection of the runway and the taxiway entering the east end of the northeast ramp. The tower had a B-50 taxi in and cut his engines. Immediately following were two more B-50's and two C-54's. There was not room for all five aircraft to clear the runway due to the pile up behind the B-50 with his dead engines. If an emergency landing had been necessary it could have been disastrous due to the runway block.

Another runway block was caused when the B-36 (FLOYD 2) aborted and returned for a minor repair. A Coleman tractor was on the end of the runway to position the B-36 for repair and run-up. While both the Coleman and the B-36 were on the runway, an F-84 returned from his sampling mission and had to circle the airfield until the landing end of the runway could be cleared. He landed before the B-36 was completely removed from the runway, but this was to expedite his exit from the radioactive aircraft.

Proper corrective action was taken to preclude the possibility of a recurrence of these discrepancies. As each mission was flown more experienceswas gained and it was visioned that even fewer discrepancies would be noted when KOCN rolled around.

Immediate preparation for KOCN was started in an effort to make up some of the time lost due to the ROMEO delay. Regardless of the hurry in preparations, no sacrifice of Flight Safety would be condoned.

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CHAPTER VI

MATERIEL

ADMINISTRATION

Due to the lack of AFDC Form 54's, a new system for handling of classified and unclassified correspondence was introduced by the Adjutant's Section on 12 March. This system had proved successful by the end of the reporting period.

Special orders were received on 23 March appointing Major Wendell G. McKoy a certifying officer for custom tags and gift certificates.

[redacted]

RG 342 [redacted]
Location Technical Library / A-2
Collection AFWL
Folder History of Task Group 7.4 Provisional, March 1954 - OPERATION CASTLE

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED WITH DELETIONS BY AUTHORITY OF DOE/OO* [signature] 4/30/86
REVIEWED BY DATE
* DNA LTR 7/10/85 (FLCHR) PAGES 91 THRU 313 [signature] 7/[illegible]

NOTE: This is Folder 2 of 5
Containing pages 97 thru 313

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SUPPLY

Prior to the departure of Task Group 7.4 from Kirtland AFB, certain components of ARC-2 and ARC-1 communications sets were procured from the Navy and shipped to Kirtland AFB for test work. These components arrived after the departure of Task Group 7.4 from Kirtland AFB and were requested for shipment to AF 2272 SO on 1 March.[68]

The Logistics Liaison Officer at SMAMA was requested to check the availability of a compressor and tank to be used as a starting unit for a 100 kw diesel generator which was back-up power for the AOC.[69]

The Staff Supply Officer and Staff Transportation Officer gave J-4 of JTF SEVEN a verbal presentation of the Task Group 7.4 concept of roll-up for the weather islands.[70]

During the operations on 1 March, the B-36 effects aircraft suffered considerable damage from blast effect to the bomb bay doors, radome, inspection doors and wheel-well doors. These items were ordered through the Base Supply Officer and the Logistics Liaison Officer, SMAMA, for earliest possible delivery. Special airlift was requested through J-4 of JTF SEVEN. The deadline for the receipt of these items was established as on or about 14 March.[71] This was based upon the schedule of events at that time.

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68. TWX fr TG 7.4 to TG 7.4 (Rear), cite TGMS 3-2, DTG 010330Z, (UNCL).
69. TWX fr TG 7.4 to SMAMA, cite TGMS 3-21, DTG 030210Z, (UNCL).
70. R&R fr Subj: Staff Visit Report, dtd 3 Mar, and Wea Rept Elm, Prov., Operations Plan 1-54, dtd 1 Mar, (CONF)
71. TWX fr JTF 7 to SMAMA & JTF 7 LNO, Travis AFB, DTG 050335, Control No. 3-29740, (CONF).

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The Staff Supply Officer accompanied the Deputy Commander of the Test Services Unit on an inspection of the Communications Element Supply. The inspection was in the form of a progress check on items written up on the inspection conducted 3 February. A regular inspection was scheduled for 25 March, by representatives of this Headquarters.[72]

Certain of the items, required for the B-36 effects aircraft, were not stock listed and required additional data to identify by the depot. This information was submitted on 5 March, by referring to the appropriate Technical Order, drawing number, page number and item number.[73]

Upon completion of Operation GREENHOUSE and IVY, a considerable amount of communications equipment remained in the Pacific Proving Grounds. This equipment suffered corrosion due to climatic conditions and damage from installation and handling. In addition, certain of these items were no longer required in support of future communications schemes. In an effort to return to appropriate supply channels those communications items no longer required, a joint committee composed of AACS representatives and Headquarters, Task Group 7.4 representatives, was proposed. In furtherance of this program, a representative from the 1810th AACS Group, Hickam AFB, visited this Headquarters on 8 March. He advised us that a representative of the 1810th AACS Group would arrive on or about 1 April to work with Task Group 7.4 personnel and other AACS personnel at Eniwetok in determining disposition of excess communications items. In order that these

72. R&R fr Maj [redacted] Subj: Staff Visit, dtd 3 February, and R&R fr [redacted] Subj: Unit Supply Inspection, dtd 5 March.

73. TWX fr TG 7.4 to [redacted], cite TGMS 3-45, DTG 050350Z, (UNCL).

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components, not in use from such sets as SCR-399 and SCR-499 might be disposed of, a request was forwarded to AMC on 10 March, for authority to break certain sets down into their components in order that they might be handled as such. This authority was requested for one each SCR-399, two each SCR-499, three each SCR-624, one each RC-256 and three each RC-257.[74] A reply was received from the prime depot at Rome, N. Y., on 25 March, approving the request and giving disposition on those items to be shipped.[75]

The original support agreement with WADC for the B-47 was to the effect that WADC would support this aircraft with a flyaway kit from Wright-Patterson AFB. The kit would be replenished from the same source by direct communication from the operating detachment at Eniwetok. On or about 5 March a request was received from WADC advising the detachment in the forward area to channel their requests direct to the Logistics Liaison Officer at SHAPE. This being unacceptable to this Headquarters, the WADC detachment was advised that they could place their requests for re-supply on the Base Supply Officer at Eniwetok who would, in turn, go to the appropriate Zone of Interior supply agency. WADC was advised of this change in procedure on 8 March.[76]

A letter was published, subject: "Roll-up of Supplies and Equipment," for the guidance of all units in handling their materiel in preparation for departure from this station.[77]

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74. TWX fr TG 7.4 to AMC, cite TGMS 3-108, DTG 101025, (CONF).
75. TWX fr Rome AF Depot to TG 7.4, cite RMSND 3-3-60 E, dtd 22 Mar, (CONF
76. TWX fr WADC to TG 7.4, cite WCTH-3-2-E, dtd 031425, Control No. 4572, (UNCL), and TWX fr TG 7.4 to WADC, cite TGMS 3-80, DTG 080315, (CONF
77. Ltr fr TG 7.4 to All Units, Subj: "Roll-up of Supplies and Equipment, file TGMS 400.2, dtd 8 Mar (UNCL).

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The Staff Supply Officer and Staff Transportation Officer conducted a meeting of all key people having to do with roll-up on 11 March. The primary participants in this meeting were Unit Supply Officers, the Base Supply Officer, the Army Depot Supply Officer and the D/Materiel, Test Support Unit. All questions presented by the various representatives were answered either by Air Force participants or the Task Group 7.2 Depot Supply Officer.[78] In addition, prior to the meeting, the Base Supply Officer and rad-safety monitor evolved a procedure for handling the turn-in of radiologically contaminated materiel and briefed all present. This consisted of establishing a decay area and periodic monitoring of items in order that they would not be placed in supply channels while unsafe to handle.

The Logistics Liaison Officer was directed to report to this station on or about 22 March, for a conference on materiel matters pertaining to roll-up. A number of matters pertaining to Zone of Interior installations had to be resolved by the Logistics Liaison Officer and an on-the-spot briefing was considered necessary in order that he might more effectively present the problem to those agencies.[79]

A decision to operate amphibious aircraft from the Bikini lagoon area created a requirement for seaplane mooring buoys. A request was submitted to representatives of Task Group 7.3 on 12 March for the loan of three buoys together with chain and anchor.[80]

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78. M&R fr Subj: "Roll-up Conference," dtd 11 March.
79. TWX fr TG 7.4 to SWAMA, cite TGMS 3-130, DTG 112015Z, (UNCL).
80. TWX fr TG 7.4 to the USS CURTIS, cite TGMS 3-153, DTG 122211, (CONF).

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Information copies were received on 13 March, from JTF SEVEN indicating that AVGAS would be accounted for by the Army POL Officer in accordance with USAF Regulations effective 1 July 1954.[81]

The Logistics Liaison Officer, SMAMA, was advised on 14 March, that the Materiel conference, originally scheduled for 22 March, had been delayed and he would be notified of the proper reporting date.[82]

Upon completion of Operation CASTLE, the L-13 aircraft at this station were to be replaced by L-20 aircraft. Since the L-13's, in use here, were the last to be used by the Air Force, special consideration regarding disposition of spares was requested.[83] The Logistics Liaison Officer was requested to determine final disposition in order that he might brief all concerned during the Materiel conference to be held in the early part of April.[84]

JTF SEVEN Administrative Order 2-53, required that each Task Group submit a roll-up plan on or about 1 April. This plan was to be prepared for submission in two documents. One was the Supply and Transportation Roll-up, for all units other than the weather islands,[85] and the other was the Roll-up Plan for the weather islands.[86] Materiel received approval on 30 March, by 1st Indorsement, dated 29 March, on the TDY units other than weather islands.

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81. TWX fr JTF-7 Wash, to JTF-7 Eniwetok, cite (none), DTG 05[illegible]Z (UNCL) and TWX fr JTF -7 Eniwetok, to JTF-7 Wash, DTG 092115Z (UNCL), and TWX fr JTF-7 Wash, to JTF-7 Eniwetok, DTG 102045Z (UNCL), and TWX JTF-7 Eniwetok. to JTF-7 Wash, DTG 112320Z, (UNCL).
82. TWX fr TG 7.4 to SMAMA, TGMS 3-174, DTG 142240Z, (UNCL).
83. Ltr fr TG 7.4 to SMAMA, Subj: "L-13 Aircraft", dtd 4 Dec 53,(CONF).
84. TWX fr TG 7.4 to SMAMA, cite TGMS 3-124, DTG 180325, (CONF).
85. Ltr fr TG 7.4 to JTF-7, Subj: "Materiel Roll-up", dtd 22 Mar, (UNCL)
86. Ltr fr TG 7.4 to JTF-7, Subj: "Weather Island Roll-up", dtd 17 Mar, (CONF).

[redacted]

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Since the handling of the weather island property had been unsatisfactory during the interim between IVY and CASTLE, a recommendation was submitted to the Commander of the Air Weather Service for handling these packages upon completion of Operations CASTLE.[87] Briefly, the proposal was that an Air Weather Service Unit such as the 6th Weather Squadron at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, be responsible for this property during the interim and rebuild the packages for a future operation. In a further attempt to insure that the weather island property was being properly maintained and operated at present, a letter was written to the Commander, PACDIVMATS, requesting a Supply Inspection Team from that headquarters visit each weather island during April.[88]

In further preparation for the arrival of the AACS representative in the interest of disposing of excess communications property, the Staff Communications Officer was taken on an inspection of the Base Supply facilities by the Staff Supply Officer on 19 March. He was acquainted with accounting, storage and other pertinent supply procedures as well as the appropriate personnel.

The Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional, submitted a study on the altitudes attained with the balloons in use at the various weather observation installations.[89] Since the desired altitude of 90,000 feet was not being reached consistently, it was recommended that additional balloons be procured. After studying the matter and working with the Commander, Weather Reporting Element, a request for additional

87. Ltr fr TG 7.4 to Air Wea Svc, Subj: "Weather Island Equipment", dtd 18 March. (CONF).
88. Ltr fr TG 7.4 to COMPACDIVMATS, Subj: "Weather Island Packages, dtd 17 March, (CONF).
89. Ltr fr Wea Reptg Elm, Prov., to Test Svs Unit, w/2 Inds, Subj: "Weather Balloons, dtd 13 March, (SECRET).

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balloons was submitted by the Base Supply Officer to the Logistics Liaison Officer, SMAMA, in order that further tests could be accomplished and possibly higher altitudes reached.

In accordance with agreements reached between the Base Suppy Officer at Eniwetok, and the Base Supply Officer at Hickam AFB, regarding emergency repairs by commercial facilities in Honolulu, a 100 kw generator was forwarded to Hickam on 22 March, for repair and return. This generator unit was powered by a Cummins Diesel Engine and constituted emergency power back-up for the AOC. Due to an apparent materiel failure in the generator, damage was sustained beyond the capability of local facilities to repair.

The Staff Supply Officer conducted an inspection of the Test Support Unit Personal equipment Section on 22 March. This was a follow-up to an inspection conducted 6 February, in which unsatisfactory conditions were noted.[90]

The Staff Supply Officer conducted a follow-up inspection of the Communications Element Supply on 25 March. During the course of the inspection, the Commander and D/Materiel, Task Group 7.4, visited the activity for the purpose of making a first hand evaluation of progress made. Inspections accomplished on the Unit Supply during February and early March indicated a number of unsatisfactory conditions. These pertained primarily to incomplete Plant Account records and poor progress made on the ordering of spare parts for equipment in use. The Plant Account property in use by the various AACS activities at Eniwetok and Bikini was not accounted for in accordance with AF Manual 67-1 in that

90. I&R fr Subj: "Inspection of Personal Equipment Section, dtd 22 March (UNCL).

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properly accomplished hand receipts were not on file and the AF Forms 90A's were not up to date. In addition, spare parts had not been ordered for the equipment. During January, the project of ordering these spares was started by an officer placed on TDY to the Pacific Proving Grounds by the 1808th AACS Wing, Tokyo. Only about 300 line items were ordered in January and little or no progress made on bringing the Plant Account records to acceptable standards. This was the condition of the account at the time of an inspection on 3 February by the Staff Supply Officer of Task Group 7.4. As a result of action taken by , a considerable effort was put forth by all concerned to bring the account up to acceptable standards. The Commander of the 1808th AACS Wing, assigned additional personnel and the Commander, Test Services Unit took a more agressive interest in the activity so that during the month of February more than 3,100 line items were ordered. This completed the initial orders for new items and allowed effort to be placed on adjusting old stock levels during March. This was accomplished by reviewing the levels to determine their validity by comparing consumption and necessity for standby items. New requests were then processed through the Base Supply Officer to order items bringing the on-hand figure to the proper level.

Progress was started on the Plant Account records. The Base Supply Officer furnished a consolidated listing of all items which the records at Base Supply indicated were charged to the Communications Element. This listing of non-expendable items was used as a basis for an inventory of each activity. These inventories were then compared with the master consolidated inventory and overages and shortages noted. Further research of these discrepancies indicated that many of the overages were actually

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

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components of sets charged as a separate line item and, therefore, were not actually overages in the true sense. Many of the shortages were determined to be mis-identified items and requiring nothing more than an IAV to correct the discrepancy. Research continued on the account and when completed there would be overages and shortages for which proper accounting had to be made. Overages will be picked up on the records and shortages accounted for inaccordance with AF Manual 67-1, either by use of the one percent droppage allowance, where authorized, or Report of Survey. Based upon the progress made to the date of the inspection and the sound plans outlined for the immediate future, the activity was considered satisfactory.[91]

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91. R&R fr [redacted] Subj: "Report of Inspection", dtd 25 March.

[redacted]

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TRANSPORTATION

The Staff Transportation Officer and the Staff Supply Officer visited [redacted] at JTF SEVEN and discussed matters pertaining to the weather island roll-up plan. Joint Task Force SEVEN Administrative Order 2-53 desired that the weather island equipment be shipped to Eniwetok and then to the ZI. Task Group 7.4 disagreed with this plan. At the end of the meeting it was resolved that the LST would pick up the Rongerik cargo, proceed on to the other weather islands and pick up cargo and personnel. Their final destination would be Pearl Harbor. Personnel were to debark at Honolulu and fly to the Zone of Interior. It it was decided that the LST would not continue to the ZI, the cargo would be trans-shipped by available MSTS.

During the Operation on 1 March, a B-36 aircraft suffered blast damage. A request for special airlift for replacement parts was sent to JTF SEVEN on 5 March. The Air Materiel Command provided a C-124 to fly these parts from Kelly AFB, Texas, to Travis AFB, California, and MATS provided a C-124 from Travis to the forward area. The total weight for these parts was 13,500 pounds and cubic footage was 2,096.

[redacted] compiled and handcarried the special airlift requirement to JTF SEVEN Headquarters on 10 March for approval. This special lift was required for the roll-up of Task Group 7.4 and its components.

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[redacted] visited the Task Group 7.2 Transportation Officer on 15 March, to coordinate the roll-up plan on the shipment of footlockers and personnel by air and water to the Zone of Interior.

A letter was written to the Commander of the Test Support Unit on 20 March, requesting by number and type the Air Force Special Purpose Vehicles which would be used during the interim period. This information was to be given to Task Group 7.2 in order that they might plan for the necessary support.

The Materiel Roll-up Plan was submitted to Headquarters, JTF SEVEN, for approval on 20 March, in accordance with JTF SEVEN Administrative Order 2-53.

The Redeployment Chart for Task Group 7.4 and its components was completed on 24 March and sent to Task Group 7.2 in order that they might plan and prepare the necessary air and water lift to return Task Group 7.4 to the Zone of Interirer.

A vehicle processing line was started at the B-50 Hanger on 24 March. The object of this line was to wire brush all rust spots on the vehicles, spot paint with primer and then completely paint the whole vehicle with OD paint. Task Group 7.4 had 64 vehicles assigned from Task Group 7.2 and it was planned to treat all of these vehicles in this manner.

[redacted] attended the monthly Eniwetok Transportation Board meeting at Task Group 7.2 on 25 March.

[redacted]

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It was brought out that there would only be 21 C-54 flights in the month of April. This did not seem adequate. However, the C-97 flyaways arriving prior to each shot brought all the cargo and mail available.

The USS LEO was scheduled to depart Oakland on 3 April and arrive at Eniwetok approximately 15 April. Oakland NAS was planning to ship six L-20 aircraft for Task Group 7.4, to replace the L-13's already in use.

The Materiel Roll-up Plan was approved and returned from JTF SEVEN on 29 March. It was sent to Task Group 7.2 for their approval and/or comments. Upon return it was to be included in the Task Group 7.4 Operations Order as an annex.

WOJG McCready completed a sepia on the Redeployment Chart on 30 March. Ten copies were reproduced in order that JTF SEVEN, Task Group 7.2 and personnel concerned might have copies for their use.

The repainting of vehicles was being completed at the rate of two a day. As of 30 March, 16 of the 31 jeeps had been repainted. After the completion of the jeeps, work was to start on the three-quarter ton trucks.

The MATS Terminal received a message on 31 March from COMAIRDIVMATS increasing the April airlift with approximately five C-97 flights.



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MAINTENANCE

The H-19A type aircraft assigned to the 4930th Test Support Unit since early 1952 had been continuously exposed to salt spray, rain and other inclument conditions. A rigid corrosion control program had failed to eliminate rust, although definitely extending the serviceability and use of these three aircraft. AFSWC had been queried on 17 March, as to possible depot overhaul or replacement with H-19B aircraft inasmuch as four of the remaining helicopter aircraft were "B" models and deletion of one series would conserve warehousing space and many maintenance problems.

A follow-up inspection of the personal equipment section of the Test Support Unit was conducted by the Staff Maintenance Officer on 23 March, to determine progress made since the original inspection on 6 February .

On 23 March, arrangements were made with [redacted] Parry for the fabrication of a fuel line for an F-84 aircraft. The necessary tools for fabrication as such a fuel line were not on hand at field maintenance shops. Due to an early date of the proposed mission, this above action was necessary to prevent the F-84 aircraft from being AOCP on mission day.

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INSTALLATIONS

A request was made on 2 March, to Task Group 7.5, for the installation of a 220 volt, three phase, 60 amp, fused power box on the existing power panel in the joint transmitter building. This separate fuse box for the multiplex transmitter was necessary so that in the event of a power failure of one transmitter the other could be used. Due to the increasing power requirements of both Air Force and Army facilities, the Commander of Task Group 7.2, had placed with Task Group 7.5, the requirement of reworking all power to Building 4 and laying any additional lines necessary to insure that all power requirements be met. This work, it was anticipated, would be completed in early April, and would include the necessary wiring for the multiplex transmitter.

On 3 March, the Chief of Staff, submitted a request to the Staff Maintenance Officer to make quarters available for 35 SA-16 maintenance and flight crew members and 24 project participants, which would be over and above the personnel brought from Bikini. Of the SA-16 personnel, 19 were officers and 16 were airmen.[92]

In answering the the above request, the Staff Maintenance Officer stated the first 14 project participants would be billeted in building 42 and the 10 remaining project participants would be accommodated in

92. R&R fr Chief of Staff to Staff Maint Off, Subj: "Additional Personnel", dtd 3 March.

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building 10 (transient officers billet). A work order was submitted 5 March to Task Group to erect six tents for housing the SA-16 personnel at the following locations with a deadline of 11 March:

1. One tent in the officer tent area east of building 38.
2. Three tents in the airmen tent area west of buildings 40, 41 and 42.
3. Two tents north end of tent row "G" west of building 47.[93]

started work on the tents on 6 March and completed them 11 March.

As a result of transferring all aircraft from Bikini to Eniwetok, a serious parking problem was encountered. A study of the Navy parking area resulted in space for the additional SA-16's, and as all other parking areas were filled, it was decided by that a new area could be graded, rolled and stabilized for the F4U aircraft not needed operationally. This requirement was made known to Task Group 7.5 on 4 March and was completed by on 7 March.

Arrangements were made on 10 March for two sets of nose wheel tiedown rings to be set in the decontamination pad and decay area for the B-36 aircraft. These aircraft returning from a mission were contaminated to an extent that prohibited refueling and were tail heavy when empty. Tiedown rings were considered necessary to prevent possible damage to an aircraft as a result of high winds while in this lightened condition. Tiedowns were ready for use on 23 March.

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93. Memo for: Chief of Staff fr Staff Maint Off, Subj: "Housing for Additional Personnel", dtd 6 March.

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The Briefing Room fan was repaired on 16 March, by

A request was submitted on 13 March, for the refueling and helicopter buildings to be connected to island power supply. This was accomplished by on 31 March. All wiring and fixture placement inside of buildings was done by the electrical department of the Test Support Unit.

On 16 March, this Headquarters received information that the power cable from Parry to Eniwetok Island had been severed. All units and elements were advised of the emergency power situation and to take immediate action in complying with the power conservation directive,[94] which limited the use of electric power so as not to jeopardize the mission of the respective Task Groups.

The power cable from Parry to Eniwetok was repaired by Holmes and Narver, and the island was connected to normal powere late in the afternoon of 21 March.

On 18 March, the 100 KW diesel generator, used to furnish the emergency power to the Air Operations Center, broke down. Investigation divulged that a loose bolt had come off and had fallen between the armature and field, causing considerable damage. was consulted as to the possible repair, but were unable to repair it due to the lack of facilities. Arrangements were then made to send

94. Ltr fr TG 7.2 to TG 7.4, Subj: "Conservation of Water and Electricity", dtd 16 March.

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED [redacted]

the armature to Hawaii for rewinding and repair. A 60 KW generator was moved into building 90 G to provide the necessary emergency power until the armature was returned and the 100 KW generator repaired.

An emergency requirement was established on 18 March, for a safety static cable, 40 feet high, suspended between two telephone poles approximately 260 feet apart, with the cable between positioned so that it was directly over the wing, lengthwise of a B-36 aircraft, parked on the decontamination pad. Separate lines attached on one end to the static cable and the other to decontamination personnel washing the aircraft, prevented anyone from falling from the slippery wings when wet. This installation, including red obstruction lights and area flood lights on the telephone poles, was completed on 20 March.

An emergency request was placed on [redacted], on 20 March, to repair several holes in the southwest parking apron which was caused by a C-97 taxiing into position. The propellers sucked the bitumen seal up, damaging one propeller to the extent that AOCP action was required. The patching of the ramp was finished 21 March, including two holes in the Navy parking area.

Arrangements were made with [redacted]r, on 22 March, to repair the runway shoulder damage caused by an F4U accident on 20 March. Damage was repaired the same day the request was made.

The Staff Maintenance Officer, and [redacted] conducted a survey of Engebi landing strip on 22 March to [redacted]

AFWL/[redacted]

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~~113~~ 114

[redacted]

determine if it was feasible to ready the emergency landing strip for the F-84's. It was found that a total of 3,000 feet was usable, although the first 1,500 feet was in good shape and the next 1,500 feet in only fair condition. Approximately three days grading and compacting was required for the additional 1,100 feet necessary to make the total length of the strip 4,100 feet. The requirement was established and Task Group 7.5 informed on 24 March it was believed this strip would be ready for emergency use (only) in early April.

On 30 March, preparations were being made to start the removal of the old sealing compound on the decontamination pad so the new polystyrene seal could be sprayed on. It was necessary that this work be done between the decontamination of aircraft. The old compound is not making a permanent seal.

The installation of the tumbler type photo washer in the photo lab was completed on 31 March.

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CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI 020945Z [redacted]

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TGG 3-16 X FOR [redacted] YIELD MUCH HIGHER THAN EXPECTED RESULTING IN HIGH CONTAMINATION ENTIRE BIKINI ATOLL X COMPL RESHUFFLE OF SHOT SCD THEREFORE NEC X I AM XMITG HEREWITH PRES TENTATIVE SCD X ONE ONE MAR [redacted] CMA TWO TWO MAR [redacted] CMA TWO NINE MAR [redacted] CMA FIVE APR [redacted] CMA ONE FIVE APR [redacted] CMA TWO TWO APR [redacted] WILL DEFINITELY BE DETONATED NEXT BUT POSSIBLY ONE ONE TWO OR ONE THREE MAR IF PREP DIFFICULTIES ARE ENCOUNTERED DT AND SLANT OR ORDER OF FIRING OF OTHER DEVICES IN ABOVE SCD MAY BE CHANGED AFTER [redacted] DETONATION X REQ YOU INFORM ME BY TWX OF ANY CHANGES THIS CAUSES IN SCD OF SAC PROJECT PARTICIPANTS X MSG BEING EXMITED TO YOU SOONEST RE DAMAGE TO BRAVO DASH THREE SIX EFFECTS PROGRAM ACFT.

[redacted] 1 of 1

TGG 4207

TG 3-2217SRD

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TAB 1

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
San Francisco, California

9 MAR 1954

TGO 319.1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, Task Group 7.4 Provisional

SUBJECT: Trip Report, CTG 7.4 Visit to Kwajalein, 5 March 1954

1. PURPOSE: To coordinate evacuation, aircraft staging, parking, maintenance and allied matters.

2. CONFEREES:

a. Task Group 7.4:

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b. Naval Air Station, Kwajalein:

Admiral Clark and Staff

c. Joint Task Force SEVEN:

Captain Hughes, JTF SEVEN Liaison Officer, Kwajalein

d. Special Air Unit:

Commander Kynyon

2. DISCUSSION:

a. SA-16 staging through Kwajalein:

(1) [redacted] informed that three (3) additional SA-16's would stage through Kwajalein in the near future enroute from Kickam to Eniwetok. [redacted] pointed out that this staging would create no problem at Kwajalein.

[redacted]

3-3016S T.B NO. 2

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(2) s explained that these three (3) aircraft would be used solely to augment the Eniwetok - Bikini airlift operation and would not reduce the SA-16 SAR support requirement. He stated that maintenance personnel should arrive in the near future from Hickam to maintain these aircraft but pointed out that some SA-16 maintenance might be required from Kwajalein pending arrival of the maintenance personnel from Hickam. stated he would assist as much as possible with his limited resources if such a problem arose.

b. Possible F-84 landings at Kwajalein:

(1) (pointed out that a possibility exist that Task Group 7.4 F-84's might have to land at Kwajalein, and that these aircraft will probably be "HOT".

(2) It was further pointed out that two conditions might exist, either of which could necessitate a landing at Kwajalein:

(a) An emergency landing of an F-84 element, when Kwajalein is closer to these aircraft than Eniwetok.

(b) A planned landing of one or both of the last F-84 sampling element to increase sampling time when cloud drift is unusally fast.

(3) It was agreed that the code word for such landings at Kwajalein would be "CHILIPEPPER" and that messages would be sent to Kwajalein in text as outlined in attachment #1, advising Naval Air Station, Kwajalein of any impending F-84 landings. Attachment #2 will govern general support action required for such a landing by Task Group 7.4. Eniwetok.

(4) It was further agreed that Naval Air Station would:

(a) Park any "CHILIPEPPER " aircraft immediately.

(b) Meet aircraft with fork lift and pallet and remove pilot.

(c) Transport pilot to shower immediately and insure decontamination.

(d) Provide guards with film badges to guard aircraft.

(e) Provide fork lift, low boy, parking space for C-97 and housing for the sample recovery operation.

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[redacted]

(f) Provide fresh water for aircraft decontamination (cockpit level to be reduced below 50 mr).

(g) Provide ground equipment for F-84 aircraft on a "share" basis.

c. Evacuation of Task Group 7.4 Radiological Sensitive Personnel to Kwajalein:

(1) Task Group 7.4 plan for evacuating approximately 500 radiological sensitive personnel to Kwajalein in event of fall-out at Eniwetok was discussed and agreed upon in principal. explained that such a possibility is unlikely but should be planned for. stated ample parking space exists for required aircraft, that messing would be adequate, but that billeting would be "grim". stated this fact would be acceptable. Task Group 7.4 agreed to bring its own specialized maintenance equipment along with aircraft. Naval Air Station agreed to furnish their limited general maintenance equipment on a "share" basis.

(2) It was agreed that a message would be forwarded by designating a code word to signify that such an evacuation is immient. The code word "CITATION" has been so designated and a TWX dispatched to containing this information (See attachment #3).

d. Eager Beaver Participation: The Task Group "Eager Beaver" Plan was thoroughly discussed and agreed as adequate. (See Attachment #4). This plan was originally drafted during Director of Operations trip to Kwajalein on 25 February, tested on 1 March and rewritten for this conference. (See Top Secret Document in Classified Files for additional Information).

e. Film Badges: Naval Air Station, Kwajalein reported a shortage of film badges. will refer this matter to JTF SEVEN for action.

s/

, USAF
Director of Operations

[redacted]

3-3016S

T.B NO. 2

119

[redacted]

"CHILIPEPPER" (Hot Aircraft Report)

I. Text of Message:

a. For emergency landing of F-84 element at Kwajalein:

"Emergency CHILIPEPPER arriving at _____ (Time)."

b. For planned landing of one or more F-84 elements at Kwajalein to increase sampling time:

"Execute CHILIPEPPER Plan at _____ (Time of arrival of 1st aircraft)."

II. Transmission Procedures:

Both of the above messages will be submitted in the clear by the USS ESTES CIC to the Eniwetok AOC on J-407 or J-408. The Eniwetok AOC will have an officer hand carry the message to the Eniwetok Communications Center, declare it "operational immediate" and insure it is transmitted in the clear to Kwajalein. He will standby in the Communications Center until the message is receipted for. The AOC will then notify the CIC of the time the message was received at Kwajalein. The AOC will insure that support action is taken at Eniwetok as outlined in Annex H Appendix 1 Operations Order 2-54

Atchmt #1

TAB NO. 2 3-3016S

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CONTROL AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES
FOR
EAGER BEAVER AIRCRAFT

[redacted]

1. COMMUNICATIONS:

a. Call Signs:

(1) CASSIDY - Control B-36

(2) BOUNDARY TARE - Control Ship

b. Radio Frequencies:

(1) 126.18 MCS - Primary VHF Channel to CASSIDY and BOUNDARY TARE (B).

(2) 5897.5 KCS - Primary HF voice communications between EAGER BEAVER, CASSIDY and BOUNDARY TARE.

(3) 450 KCS - Frequency of CASSIDY Homer "AEZ".

(4) 272 KCS - Frequency of Homer in Bikini Atoll "BI"

(5) 1675 KCS - Frequency of Homer in Rongerik Atoll "RII".

2. INSTRUMENTATION:

a. We are making available two (2) radiation instruments which have been developed for the primary purpose of sampling. They are the JASPER, a gamma rate meter reading to 500r per hour, and the integron, which is a dosimeter which will register a total dose [illegible] We have another gamma rage meter which we use for general survey purposes which we call the TIB which is very adequate for sampling during H plus 6 hour period. These meters have been checked up to 30,000 feet. Since the integron is an electronic device and all electronic devices are notoriously liable to failure in this climate, we have standard pocket dosimeters

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available. We recommend that these instruments be kept in a deh midified room.

3. CONTROL PROCEDURES, TAKE-OFF TO RENDEZVOUS:

a. EIGER BEAVER aircraft will be prepared to take-off upon receipt of "SCRIBBLE" order from BOUNDARY TARE. This order will be forwarded from the CIC, BOUNDARY TARE to Kwajalein Communications Center through the Eniwetok Communications Center. It will be issued as quickly as a decision can be made on time EIGER BEAVER aircraft can begin sampling operations. The message will read as follows:

Pass to EIGER BEAVER

PART I

"CASSIDY'S PRESENT POSITION IS (longitude and latitude) at (time)."

PART II

"CASSIDY'S ESTIMATE POSITION AT(time) is (longitude and latitude)."

PART III

"Reporting Position is (longitude and latitude)."

"Reporting Time is _____."

The Joint Task Force SEVEN Liaison Officer at Kwajalein will be responsible for insuring that this message is acknowledged by the Kwajalein communications Center and for its immediate delivery to EIGER BEAVER air crews.

b. If more than one EIGER BEAVER aircraft participates in the mission, the call sign of the lead aircraft will be EIGER BEAVER ONE and the call sign of the next aircraft will be EIGER BEAVER TWO, etc. These

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TAB NO. 2

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aircraft will take-off receiving normal tower and Kwajalein control instructions until 100 miles out on course for the reporting point. They will fly in formation. CASSIDY will be at 35,000 feet altitude, with homer transmitting on 450 KCS.

c. When 100 miles out from Kwajalein on course, EIGER BEAVER aircraft will establish contact with BOUNDARY TARE on 5897.5 KCS or VHF Channel B. EIGER BEAVER aircraft will proceed to reporting position and home on CASSIDY'S Homer when directed. The range of this homer should be approximately 100 nautical miles. BOUNDARY TARE and CASSIDY will provide all available information to EIGER BEAVER aircraft to assist them in rendezvousing with CASSIDY. This information will be transmitted on the HF or VHF radio frequencies designated above. In event EIGER BEAVER aircraft are unable to establish radio contact with BOUNDARY TARE or CASSIDY on any of the above channels, CASSIDY will remain in the Cloud Area until directed arrival time of EIGER BEAVER aircraft at reporting point plus one hour. CASSIDY'S Homer will be on during this period.

4. SAMPLING PROCEDURES:

a. The cloud condition, when EIGER BEAVER aircraft arrive in the area, should appear as a tremendously large vapor cloud covering perhaps, 125 to 175 miles across, reaching to high altitudes. It should be white in color, stable and widely dispersed. There should be very light or no turbulence during this period of sampling operation. Cloud visibility will vary with the meteorological conditions on "shot day". With reasonable wind velocities aloft and minimum horizontal and vertical shear the cloud should be clearly visible at H plus 6 hours.

[redacted]

NLD 10-3

b. CASSIDY will give EIGER BEAVER aircraft the best directions on areas and altitudes to sample that are available to him. These directions will, of necessity, be in general terms because at this late time there is practically no probability of there being an opportunity for point sampling, as the relatively small points containing highly radioactive material will have already dispersed. CASSIDY TWO will attempt to give EIGER BEAVER aircraft an altitude range, such as 40 - 50,000 feet or 40 - 55,000 feet, in which material is thought to still exist. Upon arrival in this suggested area, it is recommended that EIGER BEAVER aircraft follow radiac instrument indications.

c. When instruments give indications that the aircraft is in a satisfactory radioactive area, it is recommended that the aircraft establish an oval or orbit pattern, flying back through the same position from different angles. This could be done, for instance, by making timed turns. There is some possibility that visually the aircraft may be able to detect a radioactive area. This would be indicated by a brownish colored area within the white vapor-like cloud. At this period of time, the area best for sampling should be below and up-wind of this brownish colored area. In the time period of H plus 5 to H plus 6 hours, sampling becomes a hunt and seek proposition. With the general area outlined, it is up to the pilot to visually seek areas that look promising. This procedure should be followed until the radiation dosage is built up to that which will provide an adequate sample.

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d. At H plus 6 hours it can be anticipated that peak intensities in the cloud will be approximately 4r, plus or minus 3r. Intensities are such that with a reasonable total radiation exposure, it will be possible to spend the maximum amount of time in the cloud. Since the amount of sample collected is directly related to radiation exposure received in the cloud, the sample size required by an EAGER BEAVER unit would determine the personnel exposures required for the mission. Our organization has set an allowable exposure of for all personnel in the Task Force other than special missions in which sampling is included. We are planning to expose our pilots to 12r during the entire operation and hope to utilize them for three to four cloud sampling missions. The sampling pilots who are permanently assigned to our sampling organization, who will be expected to fly in future atomic tests, we will attempt to limit to for this operation. We have been allowed a maximum exposure of for the sampling effort. It has been suggested that a exposure per sampling mission received during the H plus 5 to 7 hour period will produce a very adequate sample if the sampling device is of reasonable degree in efficiency.

e. In addition to the in-cloud exposures, EAGER BEAVER aircraft have the problem of exposure on the return flight to Kwajalein due to the external contamination of the aircraft. Since we have had no experience at all with your aircraft, we made the assumption that the return exposure should amount to 50% of the in-cloud exposure, so that if is absorbed in the cloud, 1r will be absorbed on the return trip for a total of for this entire mission. The 50% figure will be a little conservative and will certainly depend on the cleanliness of your aircraft at the time

[redacted]

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APPENDIX 1
TO
ANNEX "H"
OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 2-54
SAMPLER AIRCRAFT LANDING AT KWAJALEIN

1. PURPOSE:

a. The purpose of this Appendix is to establish the procedures for F-84 sampling aircraft when winds aloft are such that these aircraft are required to proceed southeast to a point of no return for ENIWETOK and are therefore required to land at KWAJALEIN.

2. PROCEDURES:

a. During the course of the sampling mission, the Command Post aboard the USS Estes is kept advised of the movement of the radioactive cloud. It will be the responsibility of the Commander, Task Group 7.4 to determine that F-84 sampler aircraft will continue with this mission and land at KWAJALEIN. When this decision has been made:

b. BOUNDARY TARE will notify the ADC of the aircraft landing at KWAJALEIN.

c. Upon completion of the sampling mission, TIGER aircraft will contact CASSIDY for range and bearing to KWAJALEIN. BOUNDARY TARE will assist CASSIDY in every way possible.

d. BOUNDARY TARE will notify the ADC and KWAJALEIN giving approximate ETA and informing them that the aircraft are contaminated.

e. The ADC will notify the Test Support and Test Aircraft Units of the Commander's decision to land aircraft at KWAJALEIN

3. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The Test Support Unit will:

(1) Provide one (1) C-47 aircraft for airlift of maintenance personnel, sample removal team, decontamination team and equipment to KWAJALEIN.

(2) Provide the following for aircraft and personnel decontamination:

(a) One (1) case Tide per aircraft.

(b) Two (2) long handle brushes.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(c) Rad-Safe disposable clothing, including gloves.

(d) Change of clothing for both pilot of aircraft and decontamination personnel.

(e) Two (2) GM counters.

(f) Towels.

(g) Ivory Soap.

b. The Aircraft Unit will:

(1) Provide one (1) crew chief for each aircraft landing at KWAJALEIN who will accompany the recovery team and equipment.

(2) Provide the following equipment for sample recovery:

(a) One (1) shipping container (IVY type).

(b) Extended diagonal cutters.

(c) Remote handling puller.

(3) Provide two (2) individuals who will perform both recovery of samples and aircraft decontamination if the number does not exceed three (3) aircraft. In the event that more than three (3) aircraft land at KWAJALEIN, a yard stick of one (1) individual per one and one-half (1½) aircraft over three (3) will be applied.

4. Aircraft landing at KWAJALEIN will be given further instructions by the KWAJALEIN Tower as to parking of their aircraft.

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CTG 7.4, ENIWETOK, MI [redacted] PRIORITY

X

COMDR, NAVAL AIR STATION, KWAJALEIN, MI X

CITE TGOT_____REF OUR DISCUSSION OF FIVE HR X CITATION REPEAT CITATION CHX WILL BE THE CODE WORD USED TO DESIGNATE OUR DECISION TO EVACUATE RADIOLOGICAL SENSITIVE PERS TO YOUR STA X THE CODE WORK WILL BE FOL BY THE DT AND ESTIMATED TIME OUR FIRST ACFT WILL ARR YOUR STA

X SENDS

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Attchmt #3 3-3-16S TAB NO. 2

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CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI 030545Z [redacted]

PRIORITY

COMDR AFSWC KIRTLAND AFB N MEX XX

X

TGG 3-26 X FOR [redacted] X RFUTMSG CITE SWG DASH THREE

DASH ONE X MANY THANKS FOR PROMPT AND EFF ASST IN THE MATTER OF ADD MPH

AIRLIFT X (IS SENDING TODAY TO HQ USAF A FORMAL REQ FOR A MIN

OF THREE SIERRA ALPHA DASH ONE SIXS WITH CREWS AND MAINT PERS X HIS MSG

INDICATES YOU AND COMDR ARDC AS INFO ADEE

IN ORDER THAT THE CITE NUMBER OF HIS MSG MAY BE USED IN ANY FURTHER INFORMAL

CONTACT YOU MAY DESIRE TO MAKE X TG SEVEN PNT FOUR IS PREPARED TO TAKE ACFT

AND ACFT CREWS AND MAINT PERS AT ANY TIME X MAINT KITS OR CRITICAL SPARES

SHOULD BE BROUGHT WITH ACFT SINCE NO SIERRA ALPHA DASH ONE SIX PARTS OR

SPECIAL TOOLS ARE AVAL HERE X NEW SUBJ CIR TODAYS INFO ON REVISED STAFF ACFT

STILL CARRIES NEY SHOT DT AS ONE ONE MAR BUT GRAVES TOLD TG THREE MAR MIN

TWO OR ONE THREE MAR MORE PROBABLE DT X SECOND CHANGE IS THAT [redacted] ETED

LOCKS MORE PROBABLE FOR NUMBER THREE [redacted]

DELETED

[redacted] TWO TWO MAR CM[redacted] TWO NINE MAR X

DELETED DELETED

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

AFWL/[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

3 March 1954

Dr. Harold Plank
Task Group 7.1
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear Hal,

Now that we have completed the BRAVO participation of the series in which we are engaged, it is necessary for future planning to get an opinion from you as to the effectiveness of our present equipment and methods used in pursuit of the sampling mission. In order to define specific deficiencies which may have been incurred during BRAVO, I have a list of questions on which I would like to have your comments and which, I believe, covers all phases of this sampling operation. The answers to these questions will allow more detailed and effective planning for the next shot in the series.

I particularly want to determine from you whether the planning for this sampling mission and the execution was sufficient to meet the requirements which you had previously documented. It is desirable to obtain your answers to these questions in writing so that they may be incorporated in the TG 7.4 History for utilization by future Air Task Groups. The questions we have in mind are:

a. Was the RB-36 control aircraft in its initial position as per your request?

b. Did this position satisfy your need for directing capability?

c. Did the cloud photo mission interfere with the control mission?

d. Were the directions to the sampling pilots from the RB-36 properly given and executed?

e. Was the internal environment on the control RB-36 adequate as regards window frosting, personal equipment and space?

f. Did the training of the sampling pilots in Rad-Safety and Rad-monitoring appear to be adequate to insure successful completion of the sampling mission?

3-2862S TAB NO 4

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130

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g. Were the communication facilities on the control RB-36 adequate for your scientific control party?

h. From the execution of the mission can you indicate any inadequacies in TO 7.4 planning.

i. Was there any phase of the mission which presented difficulties which prevented you from directing this mission as you had intended?

j. Was the sampling mission successful?

There probably are many other questions which could be asked. However, lacking these questions I would like you to feel free to comment on any other items from which you feel we may benefit. The answers to these questions, I am quite sure, will be a burden to you by their time consumption. However, it will be appreciated if you could expedite the answers in consideration of the planning which must be accomplished between now and the next mission.

Sincerely,

Brigadier General
Commander

AF 3-28628

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TAB No. 4

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
APO 187 (HCU) c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

312
JF- 4944

11 March 1954

Commander, Task Group 7.4
Joint Task Force Seven
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear

Thank you for your letter of 3 March 1954 requesting comments on the BRAVO sampling mission and suggestions as to the missions to come. For the record, you may be interested in the data in Appendix I which represent the sample material collected by the aircraft in BRAVO. You will note that only two aircraft returned with less than 10 fissions. This achievement is emphasized by the fact that on MIKE Shot, only four of the twelve sampling F84G aircraft returned with more than 10^{16} fissions, while in KING Shot, none of them collected this amount.

I wish to reply to your specific questions as follows:

a. The RB-36 was in position at 60 nautical miles at 130° azimuth from zero point on initial position as requested by Project 11.2 and agreed to by Project 9.1. The pressure altitude was 37,500 feet rather than the 40,000 feet requested.

b. Apart from multiple layers of intervening cirrus cloud lying in the banks in the southeast quadrant, this position satisfied the directing capability requirement. On approach to initial position at a pressure altitude of 37,500 feet, we were flying in and out of the top of the middle cirrus layer. After completing the photo mission maneuver, we made a 180° turn (to the right) and climbed to 42,000 feet pressure altitude. We cleared the top of the cirrus by approximately 1,000 feet during return to a position south of zero point and rendezvous with the reconnaissance aircraft (Sniffers). Throughout the time required to go to this southerly position, our view of the details of the cloud below 60,000 feet was obscured by the consolidation of the upper and middle layers of cirrus in its vicinity. These circumstances caused us initially to evaluate the probable success of the sampling mission as very poor. The mission would have been a failure if the RB-36 had not been able finally to find a position under the overhanging cloud from which a relatively clear view of it lower portions could be maintained. If the Sniffers had approached

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TG NO. 3-3114SRD

TAB NO. 5 (1)

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over the cirrus, rather than climbing through the cloud deck, they might have assisted in finding a favorable position earlier after shot time.

c. The photo mission did not interfere with the control mission.

d. The directions to the sampling pilots were properly give and skillfully executed. It would be preferred if directions could be given primarily with reference to right or left of the clouds' consolidated center area as seen from the RB-36's position. General vectors might be used to help clarify these directions with the understanding that such vectors have considerable error.

e. The internal environment on the RB-36 was suitable with the exception of frost on the windows to the rear of the co-pilot's position. This condition caused me to try to look around the co-pilot, and action which was hazardous to the operation of the aircraft. It is requested that the windows on the co-pilot's side on the RB-36, as well as on both sides of RB-36 No. 1083, be fitted with the double window arrangement presently used on the A-C's side of the RB-36. This arrangement was extremely effective in preventing frost formation.

f. The training of the pilots in rad safety and monitoring procedures was in general adequate to accomplish the mission. Only one pilot read the radiation rate instruments in his aircraft with a decimal point error, and only one failed to operate his gas sampling equipment.

g. The special communications facilities furnished in the RB-36 were excellent.

h. With no intent to carp at an excellent result, I would like to suggest that TG 7.4 might have accomplished some of the minor requirements such as special communications, defrosting fitting, etc., before moving to the forward area. Delayed installation in this case gave neither communications nor visibility capability in the Dry Run of 10 February 1954. Visibility capability was not established until a modification was made on 28 February for a March 1 shot date — with no chance for flight test. Fortunately, this modification was very successful in eliminating frost. Such delays cause harassment with details in a period when time for them cannot well be spared.

i. It was perhaps a deficiency on my part that the WB-29 remained under Boundary TARE's (CIC) control so long after zero time. It had been intended to have Wilson I come under our control at about H/5 minutes for what essentially was to be a mission of opportunity. Apparently, I had not conveyed this desire effectively. Boundary Tare's direction to the WB-29 were proper under the conditions and this aircraft performed its mission successfully.

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TG NO. 3-311(SP)

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TAB NO. 5 (2)

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JF-

11 March 1954

j. The data mentioned in the introductory paragraph of this letter indicate that the BRAVO sampling mission was very successful. It is my belief that the degree to which such missions are effective reflects the degree to which Air Force operational problems and the scientific problems imposed by the cloud are mutually understood and reconciled. It is noteworthy that your operations were flexible enough to avoid compromise of the sampling mission through a period of temporary loss of your surface control facilities.

There would appear to be few areas in which improvement can be made. Some of these have been mentioned above and are summarized as follows:

a. Complete defrosting modifications in RB- and FB-36's.

b. Bring in Sniffers at an altitude above cirrus cloud enroute and in the local shot area.

c. Maintain interim training of sampling pilots on special instruments and equipment between shots.

d. Transfer control of the WB-29 to the RB-36 at an earlier time.

Sincerely,

Encl: Appendix I
HFP/jrv
Distribution:
1A -
2A -
3A -
4A -
5A -
6A -
7A -
8A -

[redacted]

TG NO. [redacted]

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TAB NO. 3 (2)

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APPENDIX I

Total Fissions Collected by Aircraft Type on Castle BRAVO Shot

B4G Type A/C	Fissions Collected
030	1.34×10^{16}
037	1.45
032	0.55
049	1.53
033	1.34
051	1.63
046	1.82
053	2.00
038	1.38
042	1.14
043	2.24
045	2.34
B-36 Type A/C	
1086	3.16×10^{16}
1083	3.64
WB-29 Type A/C	
7335	0.12×10^{16}

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TG No. 3-3114SNP

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TAB NO. 5.(a)

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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TGO 353

19 MAR 1954

SUBJECT: Interim Training of Sampler Pilots

TO: Commander
Test Air Craft Unit
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Your attention is invited to the two letters attached. Letter No. 1 was sent from Commander, Task Group 7.4 to [redacted] following BRAVO shot. Letter No. 2 is [redacted] reply. Referring specifically to the final page of [redacted] s letter it is requested that you take the following action.

a. Complete defrosting modifications on the canopies on the RB and FB-36 aircraft.

b. You will assure that a program is established to maintain the interim training of sampler pilots on special equipment and instruments between shots.

2. This Headquarters has taken the necessary action to assure compliance with the following requests of

a. SNIFFER aircraft will be brought to the control B-36 above cirrus clouds. This will be accomplished by BOUNDARY TARE.

3. It is desired that the action requested in paragraph 1a and b above be indicated by indorsement hereon.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander

TAB NO. 6

3-3185SRD

[redacted]

AFWL/NR

136
9

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

PROGRAMMING PLAN NO. 2-54 6 March 1954

SUBJECT: Information for Project Participants

OBJECTIVE:

1. To meet, greet, and show Project Participants the scope of the CASTLE Activity to promote better understanding, in the various commands of the USAR, of the Task Group 7.4 mission. Also, to provide those participants, with a "need to know", the information required for them to better apply themselves toward fruitful goals in this field.

PRELIMINARY STAFF CONSIDERATION:

2. In each case, the day set for the mission will be properly disseminated to all.

3. Project Participants have been officially invited to attend this mission and have been requested to arrive at 0800 hours, M time three (3) days before the mission.

4. The responsibilities outlined herein are recurrent for each mission throughout the Operation.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM:

5. The participants may hot have arrived on their scheduled time.

6. A mission may be delayed after arrival of the participants.

7. A scheduled period may be cancelled due to unforseen circumstances.

8. A coordination problem exists between FRED and ELMER islands.

9. A coordination problem exists within the Task Group and with Task Group 7.2.

10. A determination must be made as to what Project Participants can be given the briefing and tour at FRED accorded the Official Observers.

11. A transportation problem exists.

12. Clothing, messing, and billeting must be arranged for.

13. All participants must be properly cleared and badged for access to areas of interest within their clearance limitations.

AFWL/NED

TAB /

Programming Plan 2-54, "Info for Project Participants", dtd 6 Mar 54

14. Briefings must be arranged according to a set schedule.

15. Some participants will require airborne transportation on mission day.

AGREED COURSES OF ACTION:

16. Definite responsibilities will be placed with the staff.

17. Wide distribution of the participant list and schedule of events will permit rapid coordination of changes to be effected.

18. In cases of mission delay after participants have arrived, the three day schedule will be adhered to and extra curricular activities such as boating, swimming, fishing, or sleeping will be instituted to interest the participants during hours not scheduled.

19. Provided participants arrived after their schedule time, they will be given the Security and General Briefing at Bldg. 90 and will take up the outlined schedule from that time.

IMPLEMENTATION REQUIRED:

20. The Director of Operations will:

a. Make up a Project Participants Schedule to include 0800 hours on mission day minus three to the time aircraft carrying these participants are airborne on mission day. This schedule will include the names of the individual responsible for each portion thereof to include travelling by bus, boat, or aircraft, and for all briefings.

b. Coordinate this schedule with JTF SEVEN to assure tie-in with the Official Observer and Senior Project Participant Schedule.

c. Furnish this schedule five (5) days before mission day to the Adjutant, Task Group 7.4, for distribution as outlined herein.

d. After receiving a list of participants, from the Deupty Commander, who will require a space aboard an aircraft on mission day and who do not have previously scheduled transportation, make arrangements for this airlift and inform Protocol by Disposition Form of the arrangements made. Further, they will present this information to the participants in the VIP aircrew briefing.

e. Be completely responsible for the VIP aircrew briefing.

[redacted]

TAB

Programming Plan 2-54, "Info for Projedt Participants", dtd 6 Mar 54

f. Make all arrangements with Test support Unit for H-19 or L-13 airlift required for lift between Elmer and FRED and for lift required inpursuit of the participants schedule.

g. Inform Protocol when the above arrangements have been made and substance of the arrangements.

h. Arrange for setting up briefings and tours not otherwise the responsibility of a staff agency of the headquarters as defined herein. Be responsible to designate individuals to give briefings or tours and will be responsible to assure the briefings are conducted properly.

i. Assure coordination at FRED of Official Observer tour.

j. Assure that the Senior Project Participants visit FRED for 1400 briefing on mission day minus three is coordinated with JTF SEVEN.

k. Assure that Protocol is informed at all times as to the status of arrangements made as regards briefing of, or tours for participants

l. Coordinate original planning of schedule with Protocol to obtain protocol list of personnel to be in charge of participants from place to place and from time to time.

m. Assure that Base Operations, the AOC, and the MATS Terminal are briefed on advising the TG 7.4 Adjutant upon the arrival of any Project Participants.

n. Accept full responsibility in assuring that the Senior Controller in the CIC is positively and completely briefed, by means to include mimeographed patterns, on actions to be taken by aircraft before H-hour and for fifteen(15) minutes after H-hour. This is particularly required for all VIKING aircraft.

21. The Director of Material will:

a. Arrange for all transportation other than air in accordance with the schedule for participants provided by the Director of Operations.

b. Make arrangements with subordinate agencies for clothing to be provided the Project Participants during their stay.

c. Inform Protocol by Disposition Form when arrangements have been made in accordance with the schedule. This report must be available prior to closing hours on mission day minus four.

AFWL/MO

TAB

Programming Plan 2-54, "Info for Proj Participants " , dtd 6 Mar 54.

d. Assure that transportation is available as arranged and stand by from mission day minus three until after mission day to rearrange transportation if required due to a change of schedule.

e. Accept changes in the schedule only from the Director of Operations, Protocol, or the Headquarters Com and Section.

22. The Commander or Deputy Commander will:

a. Upon receipt of the list of Project Participants, contact appropriate agency in JTF SEVEN to ascertain which of the Q cleared people will be allowed access to exclusion areas on ELMER on a "need to know" basis. This information will then be given to Protocol and to Director of Operations.

b. Prepare and give a briefing to the Project Participants as scheduled. This will normally be approximately 1400 hours on mission day minus three. It will be given to both Senior Project Participants from ELMER and the Project Participants at the same time and will be tailored to fit the "need to know" of the people involved.

c. Notify Director of Operations of those participants who will require airlift on assigned aircraft on mission day.

23. The Personnel Security Officer will:

a. Upon receiving the list of project personnel from Protocol, check the official list and process clearance cards for same.

b. When receiving the list from Protocol, of the Project Participants who may join the Official Observers at ELMER in the tour of exclusion area, make arrangements with Security at ELMER to card and ready badge said personnel. This may include obtaining direct permission from DMA for these people.

c. Prepare and distribute proper clearance badges to the participants as shown in the schedule prepared by Director of Operations

d. Coordinate with JTF SEVEN personnel to assure proper badges are available for Senior Project Participants upon their arrival at FRED.

e. Notify Protocol by Disposition Form when the Security portion of this plan is ready.

24. The Adjutant will:

a. Distribute the Project Participant list and the Project Participant schedule, when received from Protocol and Director of Operations, as follows:

(1) Five copies - Director of Operations
(2) Five copies - Director of Materiel
(3) Two copies - Director of Personnel
(4) Two copies - Personnel Security Officer
(5) Three copies - Adjutant
(6) One copy - Chief of Staff
(7) One copy - Deputy Commander
(8) One copy - Historian
(9) One copy - Commander
(10) Two copies - Comptroller
(11) Thirty copies - Protocol
(12) Five copies - TG 7.2 (with letter of transmittal)
(13) Ten copies - JTF SEVEN (with letter of transmittal)
(14) Eight copies - Test Support Unit (with letter of transmittal)
(15) Fifteen copies - Test Left Unit (with letter of transmittal)
(16) Two copies - Test Sv Unit (with letter of transmittal)

b. Distribute these documents by hand-carry method to expedite delivery.

c. Assure that all incoming messages concerning Project Participants are delivered to the Protocol Section.

25. The Chief of Staff will:

a. Upon receipt of the Project Participant Schedule, stand by to assist Protocol on meeting or billeting arrangements which fall outside of Protocol responsibilities as outlined in TG 7.4 HOI 900-1, dated 20 February 1954.

b. Arrange with TG 7.2 the opening of the Post Exchange as indicated on the schedule.

c. Monitor progress of the Schedule to keep the Commander informed of delays or malfunction of procedure.

26. The Director of Personnel will:

a. When furnished a copy of orders of the Project Participants, take care of signing the participants in and out according to governing regulations.

27. The Protocol Section will:

a. Pursue duties as outlined in TG 7.4 HOI 900-1, dated 20 February 1954.

Programming Plan 2-54 "Info for Project Participants", dtd 6 Mar 54

b. Receive messages concerning incoming participants, compile complete list for publication and distribution by the Adjutant. Pass original messages to Security after this compilation.

c. Request the Deputy Commander give the Director of Operations a list of those participants who will need airborne lift on mission days so that Operations may make arrangements for them.

d. In coordination with Director of Operations furnish protocol list to be included in the schedule as person in charge from place to place and time to time.

e. Coordinate issue of Class X clothing to Project Participants and coordinate return of same.

f. Give Security thelist of personnel who are to be granted access to the briefing and tour with the Official Observers.

/s/ Earl W. Kesling
Deputy Commander or Commander

/s/ Ray M. Hawley
Director of Materiel

/s/ Paul H. Fackler
Director of Operations

/s/ B. E. Forrest
Director of Personnel

/s/ W. R. Hanna
Personnel Security Officer

/s/ Wayne Maki
Protocol Officer

/s/ A. J. Amerson
Adjutant

/s/ H. H. Mahon
Chief of Staff

AFWL/NID

TAE

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI 050250Z [redacted]

PRIORITY

COMDR PACDIVMATS HICKAM AFB TH XXX

XX

COMDR ARS WASH DC

TGDC 3-42 X RE TWX ARS SLANT COMDR DASH COCOA LIMA DASH THREE SIX ON HQ USAF DIR PROJECT CONCERNING SEVEN SIX ARSRON SIERRA ALPHA DASH ONE SIX ACFT X ALL THREE REF SIERRA ALPHA DASH ONE SIX ACFT ARE TO BE PHYSICALLY STA WITH SEVEN EIGHT ARSRON AT ENIWETOK INSTEAD OF KWAJALEIN X THREE SIERRA ALPHA DASH ONE SIX PRES AT ENIWETOK WITH THIS SQ X IT IS DESIRABLE FOR ALL SIX TO BE MAINTAINED TOGETHER AND COMDR SEVEN EIGHT ARSRON PREFERS THIS TO BE DONE AT ENIWETOK X REQ THREE ZERO DAY STOCK LEVEL OF SPARES BE FWD BY AIR WITH THE THREE SIERRA ALPHA DASH ONE SIX TO ENIWETOK WITH BACK UP SPARES TO BE FURN BY ALPHA FOXTROT SEVEN ONE FOUR SIERRA OSCAR UPON REQ X IMPERATIVE THAT SUFFICIENT MAINT PERS ACCOMPANY THREE SIERRA ALPHA ONE SIX ACFT FR SEVEN SIX ARSRON X PERS NOW AVAL TO SEVEN EIGHT ARSRON ARE ABSOLUTE MIN FOR MAINT OF THREE ACFT PRES ON HAND X REQ SECRET CLNC BE HELD BY ALL PERS BEFORE ENTRANCE AT ENIWETOK X

[redacted] 1 1

TGDC 4208

Captain, USAF
Adjutant

[redacted]

AFWAM

TAB NO. 8

143

No Tab No. 9
received.

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK 072045Z [redacted]

ROUTINE

COMDR SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR XX

COMDR AFSWC KIRTLAND AFB N MEX XX XX

TGG 3-73 X FR AT SAC AND GEN HILLS AT AFSWC X FINAL

REVISED SHOT SCD FOL X STATES THAT ORDER OF DEVICES TO BE

DETONATED NOW FIRM X SHOT DT WILL BE MET AS CLOSELY AS WEA ALLOWS X

OCCASIONAL WEA DELAYS MUST BE ANTICIPATED IN ORDER TO AVOID CONCENTRATED

FALL OUT EXPERIENCED [redacted] X POSSIBILITY EXISTS CMA THOUGH SLIGHT CMA

THAT ANY PARTICULAR SHOT DT MIGHT BE FWD ONE DAY IF READINESS OF DEVICE

AND EXPER PERMITS AND WEA TRENDS INDICATE THAT POSTPONEMENT OF SEVERAL

DAYS WOULD OTHERWISE OCCUR X [redacted] ONE THREE MAR CMA [redacted] TWO MAR

CMA [redacted] TWO NINE MAR CMA [redacted] EIGHT APR CMA [redacted] ONE SEVEN

APR CMA AND [redacted] TWO FOUR APR X END X

[redacted] 1

/s/

07/2015/Mar 54 TGG 4207 1st Lieut., USAF
Asst Adjutant

AFWAM

[redacted]

TAB NO. 10

144
145

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI 13/0415Z

[redacted]

PRIORITY

XX

COMDR SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

COMDR AFSWC KIRTLAND AFB N MEX XX XX

TGG 3-164 X FO. — AT SAC AND AFSWC FR :

ROMEO EVENT HAS BEEN DELAYED FOR FOUR EIGHT HRS DUE TO WIND COND WHICH WOULD CAUSE SERIOUS FALL OUT ON ENIWETOK AREA X EFFECT OF THIS DELAY ON DT OF REMAINING DEVICES UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME X YOU WILL BE FURTHER ADVISED ON COMPL OF ROMEO EVENT X END X

[redacted] 1 1

13/1608Z/Mar 54 TGG 4207

[redacted]

TAB NO. 11

146
145

No Tab. No. 12
received.

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGO 580

17 Mar 54

SUBJECT: Airlift Operations

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187, (HOW), c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. A complete survey of the Bikini lagoon was made to determine the safest place and most expeditious procedures to be used for PBM and SA-16 water landings at Bikini during freight and passenger airlift. An SA-16 pilot, recently assigned, was used as an advisor on this survey due to his extensive experience of over 2000 water landings.

2. The survey has indicated that, a very experience pilot possibly could land at considerable risk in any part of the lagoon. In most of the lagoon, even though the aircraft was landed safely, it would encounter detrimental buffeting on the hull. One area, shown on the attached map, was considered to be a safe area for everyday use because of the shelter provided by HOW island and because the parallel of ground swell lies at a 90° angle to the prevailing wind. The lagoon in this area is normally very calm and has been chosen as the area designated for all water landings at Bikini.

3. In an absolute emergency, and still at pilot's discreation, it may be possible for our most qualified pilot to land parallel to and just North of TARE. This, however, can only be considered as an emergency measure and not within safety limits desired for this operation.

4. The pilots on this airlift feel that they can better judge safe water condition for landing than someone shipboard because he can view it at 2000 feet to determine swells. Further, the final land or no land decision must be made by the pilot concerned, therefore an officer of TG 7.4 qualified in water landings will not be required aboard the USS Bairoko. Normally, the Bairoko will not be in the area designated as water landing area, therefore, would be in no position to make recommendations on actual landings.

5. To complete the requirements for water landing inter-atoll lift, request action be taken to provide a rubber, aircraft buoy in the place shown on the attached map.

APPROVED

TG NO. 3 31740

[redacted]

TG NO. 33

146

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED [redacted]

Hqs TG 7.4, APO 187, subj: "A/L Opr"

6. It is further suggested that the use of helicopters for getting passengers to water landing craft may be most desirable. With the concurrence of your headquarters and TG 7.3, request a barge be furnished, with a landing circle painted thereon, for helicopter landings and placed as shown on attached drawing. A small boat or raft should then be provided to take personnel from the barge to the amphibian tied up at the buoy.

7. It is recommended that TG 7.3, through THUMBTACK, exercise normal tower control of airlift aircraft operating in the Bikini area. A Task Group 7.4 Liaison Officer will be placed aboard the USS Bairoko to coordinate TG 7.3 and TG 7.4 matters.

8. Further recommend Task Group 7.4 exercise, through BOUNDARY TARE, enroute or area control of all airlift aircraft operating in the Bikini area.

9. This proposed means of controlling airlift operations would enable the CIC, BOUNDARY TARE, in coordination with the ACC Eniwetok, to control all enroute traffic. Communication would be maintained between the two to assure immediate passage of flight schedules, flight plans flight altitudes, time of take-offs and landings, cancellations, personnel and cargo loads, etc. The CIC, BOUNDARY TARE, after vectoring aircraft to the landing area, will alert the CIC aboard the BAIROKO where final airlift control would be accomplished in conjunction with helicopter control. After take-off of inter-atoll traffic, the BAIROKO would pass control back to the CIC for further clearance.

10. Approval of the above proposal is requested.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/

1 Incl.
Map

Deputy Commander

TG NO. 3-21.4.C

[redacted]

TAF NO. 13

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED [redacted]

J-3/373.3 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Airlift Operations 22 MAR 1954

Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN, APO 187 (HOM), c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4 Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Reference paragraphs 2 and 3 of basic letter. The recommended water landing area is approved and will be used except in absolute emergencies.

2. Reference paragraph 5 basic letter. Action will be taken by this headquarters to secure and install buoy as requested.

3. Reference paragraph 6, after consultation with Task Group 7.1 and 7.5 it does not appear that helicopter operations to and from the water landing area are required. Therefore, at this time the barge is not considered necessary. Should a need for such become apparent at a later date, CTG 7.5 has indicated that a 32 x 129 feet barge can be provided. For your information a padded motor whale boat is available for transfer of passengers from amphibious aircraft to larger boats or barge.

4. Reference paragraph 7, general agreement was reached in conference on 17 March 1954, that tower control of airlift aircraft and helicopters operating in the Bikini area will be exercised by TG 7.4 representatives aboard the USS ESTES. It is therefore recommended that the Task Group 7.4 Liaison Officer be placed aboard the USS ESTES to function as you desire. Representatives of CTG 7.3 and CTG 7.4 attended the 17 March conference, minutes of which will be forwarded at an early date.

5. Reference paragraphs 8 and 9. Approved except that TG 7.4 representation aboard the USS ESTES, will as per agreement referred to in paragraph 4 above, exercise tower as well as enroute control in the Bikini area.

BY COMMAND OF

/s/

1 Incl
n/c

Chief of Staff

[redacted]

TG NO. 3-3174C

TAB NO. 43

148

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED [redacted]

Hq, TG 7.4, Ltr, TGO 580, Subj: Airlift Operations, dated 17 March 1954

TGO 580 (17 Mar 54) 2nd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California 25 MAR 1954

TO: Commander, Test Support Unit, ATTN: Base Operations Officer, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Forwarded for your information. Desire all SA-16 and PBM crews be briefed according to the approved Bikini Water Landing Area and Procedures.

2. Request this correspondence be returned to this headquarters for file.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

/s/

1 Incl:
n/c

USAF
Adjutant

SWSO (17 Mar 54) 3rd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SUPPORT UNIT, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California 9 APR 1954

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

All SA-16 and PBM crews have been briefed in accordance with 2d indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/

1 Incl:
n/c

Adjutant

TG NO. 3-31740

[redacted]

TAB NO. 2

AFWL/HO

[redacted]

PP JHKUR
PP UHPJ ZVA
PP JHKQR UHPJA 222

DE UHPJC Ø5
P 1ØØ32ØZ ZNJ
FM CTG 7.3
TO CJTF 7
INFO CTG 7.4
NAVY GRNC

/ [redacted] IN VIEW OBSERVATIONS RECENT SEA PLAN OPERATIONS AT BIKINI I CONSIDER IT MOST IMPORTANT FOR SAFETY OF PERSONNEL THAT THE PBM FIVE ABLE AND CREW BE IMMEDIATELY ASSIGNED TO MY OPERATIONAL CONTROL FOR INSTRUCTION AND SUPERVISION IN ROUGH WATER LANDINGS AND TAKE OFFS PRIOR TO FURTHER PASSENGER OPERATIONS X I WILL RETURN THE PBM DETACHMENT TO CTG SEVEN PNT FOUR WHEN THEY ARE CONSIDERED FULLY QUALIFIED FOR THE PLANNED FUTURE OPERATIONS

1Ø/2138"Z

TG NO. 4-4108C

[redacted]

AFWC/HQ

TAB NO. 13

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED [redacted]

CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI 20/0506Z

PRIORITY

XX

COMDR 3D AIR RSQ GP KOMAKI AB, NAGOYA, HONSHU, JAPAN

XX

TGG 3-250 X TO X THIS MSG REFERS TO YOUR DISCUSSIONS AT KWAJALEIN WITH AND TO MY CTG SEVEN PNT FOUR THREE DASH ONE ONE EIGHT DTD ONE ZERO ZERO FIVE ZERO ZULU MAR X THIS MSG IN THREE PARTS X PART ONE X REGRET THAT I COULD NOT COME TO KWAJALEIN TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJ WITH YOU PERSONALLY X NEXT BEST SOLUTION WAS TO SEND X INTENTION IN MY ABOVE REF MSG TO YOU AND IN SENDING A TO KWAJALEIN WAS TO MAKE TWO POINTS CLEAR X THESE ARE CLN PAREN ALPHA PAREN IN VIEW OF THE RQMTS FOR SAR HERE AS WELL AS AT KWAJALEIN THERE APPEARS TO BE A NEED FOR A COMDR AT BOTH LOC X UNDER PRES SET UP CMA IS ATTEMPTING TO FULFILL RESP HERE AS COMDR RSQ ELM CMA TEST SVS UNIT AND AT THE SAME TIME FILL THE PSN OF COMDR SEVEN EIGHT SQ X HE IS UNABLE BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF THESE RESP AND THE DISTANCE SEPG THESE LOC TO FILL BOTH PSNS SATISFACTORILY X PAREN BRAVO PAREN UNDER PRES CONCEPT SIERRA ALPHA ONE SIX MAINT ON ACFT LOCATED HERE AS WELL AS AT KWAJALEIN IS BEING PERFORMED ONLY AT KWAJALEIN X RESP OF SQ AT KWAJALEIN IN TWO RECENT SEARCHES COUPLED WITH THOSE HERE APPEAR BEYOND THE MAINT CAPABILITY OF THE SQ AT ITS PRES MANNING X THAT THIS IS OBVIOUS IS POINTED OUT BY THE

1 3

[redacted]

TAB NO. 14 (1)

151/152

[redacted]

PAGE TWO

FACT THAT THE SIERRA ALPHA ONE SIX RQMTS FOR THE CASTLE OPR MENTIONED IN MY ABOVE REF MSG HAVE NOT BEEN MET DUE TO THE MAINT STATUS OF THE ACFT X PART TWO X COMPLICATING THE MAINT SIT MENTIONED IN ITEM BRAVO PART ONE ABOVE IS THE PRESENCE HERE OF TWO SIERRA ALPHA ONE SIX ACFT FR THE SEVEN SIX ARS WHICH WERE REQ FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVG AMPH LIFT BETWEEN ENIWETOK AND VARIOUS OTHER ATOLLS X AS EXPLAINED TO HQ USAF BY CJTF SEVEN IN THE REQ FOR THESE ACFT CMA RADIOACTIVE FALL OUT FR FIRST SHOT DENIED FURTHER EXTENSIVE USE DURING THIS OPR OF THE BIKINI AIRSTRIP THUS NECESSITATING THE EMPLOYMENT OF WATER LANDING AIRLIFT AT BIKINI X THESE TWO ACFT ARR WITH INSUFFICIENT SPARES AND MAINT PERS TO PERMIT THEM TO BE SELF SUFFICIENT X IT WAS APPARENTLY ASSUMED THAT REQUIRED MAINT SPT WOULD BE PROV BY THE SEVEN EIGHT SQ X THESE TWO ACFT THEREFORE FURTHER STRAINED THE MAINT CAPABILITY OF THE SEVEN EIGHT SQ X PART THREE X MY ABOVE REF MSG WAS SENT THEREFORE TO SUGGEST TO YOU THAT IF IT IS AT ALL POSSIBLE FOR YOU TO DO SO AN ADD QUAL AIR RQS OFF MIGHT BE PROV FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS OPR SO THAT A COMDR WOULD BE AVAL HERE AS WELL AS AT KWAJALEIN X FURTHER CMA MY MSG SUGGESTED THAT IF ADD MAINT SPT COULD BE PROV TO THE SEVEN EIGHT SQ FR YOUR RESOURCES FUTRUE COMMITMENTS AT KWAJALEIN AND

2 3

[redacted]

ABRIDGED

TAB NO. 14 (2)

154

152

[redacted]

PAGE-THREE

FOR THE CASTLE OPR MIGHT BE MORE CLOSELY MET THAN IS PRES THE CASE X THE ASGMT OF FURTHER SIERRA ALPHA ONE SIX ACFT WOULD NOT ASSIST ME IN ANY WAY X NOR HAVE I ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR REQ ADD ACFT X PROPER MAINT AND SUPV OF THOSE NOW ASGD WILL FILL THE BILL X REQ YOUR COMMENTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT YOU ARE IN A PSN TO ASSIST ON EITHER OR BOTH OF THESE TWO PROBLEMS X END X

HOWELL M. ESTES, JR., BRIG GEN, USAF A. J. EMERSON, CAPTAIN, USAF

200505Z Mar 54 TGG 4207 ADJUTANT

[redacted]

TAB NO. 14 (3)

15

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

O 231135Z ZNJ
FM COMDR 3 AIR RSQ GP
TO JHKQR/COMDR 7.4 TEST SVC UNIT
INFO ZEN/COMDR ARS WASH DC

/[redacted]ITE 3 ARG 25914 COMDR. PERSONAL PD
THIS MSG IN THREE PARTS PD PART ONE CLN YOUR ATTN IS INVITED TO MY MSG
THREE ARG TWO FIVE NINE ONE TWO PD I HAVE DIRECTED THAT
REPT TO YOU TO BE COMDR RSQ ELEMENT CHM TEST SVC ELEMTNT
CHM ENIWETOK PD I AM SURE YOU WILL FIND VERY CAPABLE PD
PART TWO CLN I HAVE FURTHER DIRECTED THAT SUFFICIENT SPARE PARTS AND
MAINT PERS BE DISPATCHED FR SEVEN SIX SQ AT HICKAM TO SEVEN EIGHT SQ
AT KWAJALEIN TO SPT THE TWO ADD SIERRA ALFA DASH ONE SIX YOU NOW HAVE
AT ENIWETOK PD PART THREE CLN UPON ARRIVAL OF I HAVE
DIRECTED TO RTRN TO THE SEVEN EIGHT SQ PD I TRUST THE ABOVE
IS SATISFACTORY CHM IF NOT PLEASE ADVISE PD I WILL REMAIN IN THE THIRD
AIR RSQ GP NAGOYA AREA UNTIL TWO SEVEN HR FIVE FOUR
23/1414Z

HA 64
FM COMDR AIR RSQ SVC WASH ATN NAGOYA JAPAN
TO ZEN/COMDR 76 ARS HICKAM
ZEN/COMDR 78 ARS KWAJ
INFO/ JHKQR/COMDR 7.4 TEST SVC UNIT ENIWETOK ATTN
/S E C R E T/ CITE 3 ARG 25912 COMDR. TRUE DTG TWO THREE ZERO TWO
THREE ZERO ZEBRA PD THIS MSG IN FOUR PARTS PD PART ONE CLN COMDR SEVEN
SIX AIR RSQ SQ WILL IMMED DISPATCH SUFFICIENT SIERRA ALFA DASH ONE SIX
MAINT PERS AND SPARE PARTS TO SEVEN EIGHT RSQ SQ IN ORDER TO PROV FULL
AND COMPL MAINT SPT FORTHE TWO SIERRA ALFA DASH ONE SIX YOU PREVIOUSLY
DISPATCHED TO PROJ CASTLE PD THESE PERS WILL AUGMENT THE SEVEN EIGHT
SQ MAINT SEC PD PERS WILL REMAIN UNTIL PROJ CASTLE IS COMPL PD. PART TWO
CLN CMDR SECND RSU GI WILL IMMED PLACE LT C ON TDY
TO REPT TO R PMT FOUR TEST SVC UNIT PD
WILL COMD THE RSQ ELEMENT CHM TEST SVCS UNIT AT ENIWETOK PT
HE WILL CARRY OUT INSTRS ISSUED BY COMPL COORDINATION
WILL BE EFT BETWEEN T TO INSURE SAR COVERAGE
AT KWAJALEIN AND ENIWETOK PD PART THREE CLN UPON ARRIVAL OF
AT ENIWETOK CHM WILL RTRN TO THE SEVEN EIGHT SQ AND
ASSUME COMD OF THAT UNIT PD PART FOUR CLN ADDRESSEE WILL ACKNOWLEDGE
REC AND UNDERSTANDING OF THIS MSG PD NOTIFY ME WHEN PERS WILL ARRIVE
AT SPECIFIC LOC PD I CAN BE CONTACTED THRU COMDR THIRD AIR RSQ GP

CRYPTO NOT CLN BLANK PORTION IN LINE NINE WAS RECEIVED IN GARBLED FORM PD
WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST
23/0425Z

AFHRA

TAB NO. 15

156
154

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

[redacted]

23 March 1954

Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear [redacted]

A fact clearly understood by all airmen is that aircraft which sit on the ground for extensive periods collect serious maintenance deficiencies with an increasing possibility of an abort on the next flight the longer the period the aircraft remain grounded. This well known principle may not be quite so obvious to those unaccustomed to maintaining and operating aircraft. I will therefore explain that the reasons for this deterioration in maintenance condition lie in such difficulties as drying up of various neoprene seals in numerous hydraulic lines, corrosion of metal surfaces which must move past one another with close tolerances, sticking valves caused by precipitation of sediment in the valves or by lack of the lubricating action of the fluid which normally flows through the valve and seepage of moisture and/or corrosion into numerous electrical circuits and devices. Frequent flight eliminates the cause of these conditions since all of the various systems of the aircraft are operated, thereby expanding seals, lubricating the close tolerance surfaces and the valves, and heating the electrical circuits, thus preventing the accumulation of moisture. It is possible, by operating the aircraft on the ground, to activate a considerable number of these systems but unfortunately, the remainder can be activated only in flight.

As examples of these conditions, on our flights yesterday, when we exercised all of our aircraft, the landing gear would not retract on two B-36's and numerous F-84's had tip and pylon tanks which would not feed due to stuck valves.

In order to counteract this serious deterioration of maintenance in this prolonged period of relative inactivity of our critical aircraft, I am taking the risk of flying our aircraft frequently. Specifically, my process is as follows:

3-3214-S TAB NO. 16

[redacted]

[redacted]

155
157

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

Letter to [redacted] 23 March 1954

Each day, Weather Central here gives me the same briefings as are given to you, except projected one day further. While you, on any D-2 morning, are considering the weather for D-D, I am studying the weather for D-day and D/1. If the trends look unfavorable for D as well as D/1, I decide that I am then in D-3 day and announce this to my commanders. They can then fly their aircraft and still have two days for inspection and maintenance. If D and D/1 look favorable, then of course the aircraft are not flown.

While the above procedure permits me to do the best possible job of keeping our aircraft in a quality maintenance condition, it has the disadvantage of placing me in a somewhat awkward situation in the event of a rapid unforecasted change in the weather. So for my guesses have been correct but the possibility of a miss always exists. Should such a rapid change occur after I have made such a decision as above, it is probable that 100 percent of my aircraft cannot be made available, None the less, in my estimation this is a risk which must be accepted if we are to be certain of having the truly critical aircraft in a position to complete the desired missions.

From my discussions with [redacted], it seems apparant that the B-36 Samplers are the most critical aircraft in the Task Group. It appears to be their opinion that they would be willing to fire in weather which would preclude obtaining F-84 samples but in which we would be relatively certain of obtaining B-36 samples. At the same time, however, the RB-36 Control aircraft is also critical if we are to have the Sample Direction Team in the air looking for any possibility under which F-84 samples might be obtained.

Consequently, to meet the peculiar conditions of this period of prolonged delay, I have placed priority for maintenance of my aircraft as follows:

First Priority - Two (2) B-36 Samplers
One (1) B-36 Sampler Control

Second Priority - F-84 Samplers
WB-29's
Rescue Aircraft
One (1) C-54 Photographic Aircraft
C-47 Inter-Atoll Airlift Aircraft

Third Priority - All other aircraft

[redacted]

156

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

Letter to 23 March 1954

In the event that the above analysis of criticality of my aircraft is not in agreement with current scientific programs, it is requested that I be advised so that the necessary priority modifications may be made.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

AFWL/NID

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

23 March 1954

M
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear

It would appear to me, if a prolonged period of upper air winds resulting in a favorable fall-out situation should occur, it would be your desire to fire a maximum number of the remaining devices in the shortest possible period of time. I have therefore caused my staff to make a thorough study of our ability to cope with shot intervals of 5, 6, and 7 days. This study reveals that we could operate continuously on a seven-day interval but would not be able to provide 100 percent of critical aircraft with only a 5 or 6 day interval.

The basic reason for this time requirement lies in the tremendous amount of effort required to decontaminate B-36 aircraft. Our experience in decontaminating three (3) B-36's, three (3) B-29's, and 15 F-84's, D[redacted] was that decontamination was completed on the last B-36 on B plus 4½ days. Since it is necessary to position our aircraft for take-off by 1700 on D minus one, it is obvious that practically no maintenance time would have been available had [redacted] been fired five or six days following [redacted] and that time would have been limited, at best, on a seven day schedule.

It was apparent, therefore, that the major problem to be attacked was that of reducing the time required for decontamination. A thorough review of our equipment and personnel resources was undertaken resulting in placing of an order with for night lighting and safety harness facilities over the decontamination pad, in obtaining additional decontamination equipment and in scheduling all available manpower to work on decontamination on a continuous 24-hour per day basis. By these means we feel that, after a reasonable period of decay, we can decontaminate a B-36 in ten (10) hours. This is a tremendous reduction of the time experienced[redacted] Following the next detonation, we shall put into effect this program to determine our minimum decontamination time.

[redacted]

TG NO. 3.3215.2.2

[redacted]

TAB NO. 27 (2)

15
160

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

Letter to 23 March 1954

Attached as Inclosure #1, hereto, is a schedule which expresses on a day-to-day basis our activities in decontamination, maintenance, test hops, and other preparation for a shot on a seven (7) day schedule. Using the procedure mentioned above after the next shot, we will be able to advise you as to the closeness with which we have been able to meet this tentative work schedule. Please note that this schedule is based on having only the B-36 Samplers contaminated. High contamination of the B-36 Control aircraft, as occurred on BRAVO day, will cripple us severely.

In the event that it is your desire to fire any shot on a schedule of less than seven days following the previous shot, this will not mean that we will not be able to participate, rather, it will mean that we will not be able to participate with 100 percent of critical aircraft. For example, on a five day schedule we could provide one B-36 Sampler on one shot, two the next, one the next, two the next, etc. In F-84's, we could probably provide eight to ten on a five day schedule and ten to twelve on a six day schedule.

Certain actions could be taken by your Headquarters which would improve our capability in this connection. These are as follows:

a. Eliminate the requirement for the RB-36 to take crater photography. (It is the opinion of [redacted] that the RB-36 was contaminated on BRAVO day by flying through an area of fall-out while taking the crater photographs.)

b. Permit an increase in allowable radiation dosage for B-36 maintenance personnel beyond the 3.9 R total, upon request.

c. Eliminate the participation of the B-36 Effects aircraft on all but the most vital shots. (This would not only decrease my maintenance workload between shots, but would also make available an additional maintenance team to ready the B-36 Samplers and Control aircraft for the next shot.)

d. In the event of a five or six day schedule, authorize, if necessary, the participation of one (1) B-36 Sampler on one shot, two the next, one the next, etc.

e. Provide TG 7.4 with any decontamination units currently in the custody of Task Group's 7.1, 7.2, and 7.5 which are above and beyond their requirements.

[redacted]

TG NO. 3-3213

TAB NO

159
16

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

23 March 1954

Letter to

The above information is furnished to give you the best possible outlook on our capability as we see it at the moment lacking proper basic data to compute exactly our decontamination time requirements. Naturally we will do everything possible to provide you with 100 percent of all critical aircraft regardless of the length of interval between shots. It appears reasonable however to face reality and thus recognize that the highest of intentions cannot always be met, even by an all out effort if adequate time is not available.

Sincerely,

1 Incl.
Sed of Activities

[redacted]

TG NO. [redacted]

[redacted]

TAB NO. [redacted]

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[redacted]

SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITY

R	B-36 Samplers return	1400
R/1	Decay	
R/2	F-1 begins decontamination.	0730
	F-1 completes decontamination.	1730
	F-1 begins maintenance.	1800
	F-2 begins decontamination.	1800
R/3	F-2 completes decontamination.	0400
	F-2 begins maintenance.	0430
	TIGER aircraft (F-84's) begin decontamination (four (4) at a time).	0500
	TIGER aircraft complete decontamination. (TIGER aircraft begin maintenance as they complete decontamination).	2100
R/4	TIGER aircraft begin test hops	0730
R/5	F-1 and F-2 complete inspection and correction of maintenance discrepancies.	0000 -0500
	F-1 and F-2 run-ups or test hops if necessary.	0800
R/6	F-1 and F-2 complete correction of all maintenance discrepancies	1600
	TIGER aircraft complete maintenance.	1700
	Aircraft begin positioning.	1700
R/7	Execute mission.	

Total hours available after decontamination, F-1: 95*
Total hours available after decontamination, F-2: 89*
Total hours available after decontamination, TIGERS: 72*

*Includes minimum sleeping and eating period for maintenance crews.

[redacted]

Incl #1.

TG No. [redacted]

TAB NO. [redacted]

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CG S-237-54E

29 March 1954

Commander, Task Group 7.4
APO 187
Inter-island

Dear --

Thank you for your informative letters of 23 March. I have taken the liberty of passing them on to Al Graves for his perusal and comments.

From the performance of your group to date, I have no doubt that whenever a shot takes place your participation will be all one might ask. The relative priorities for maintenance which you set forth are in full accord with our concept of the overall mission. With regard to my headquarters, the following apply:

1. The RB-36 will accomplish crater photography only if the mission cannot be satisfied by other aircraft and only to the extent to which it can do so without experiencing significant contamination.

2. If necessary, B-36 maintanence personnel will be permitted an increased allowable radiation dosage up to 7.8r, upon request.

3. While participation of the effects B-36 is desirable in all scheduled events, your efforts should be directed toward assuring its participation in YANKEE and NECTAR; other activities paced accordingly.

4. Whenever possible, two B-36 samples should participate. Where less than seven days intervene between shots, participation of only one will be acceptable.

5. My staff is now determining the availability of the decontamination units you require and will keep you informed.

From what you have presented, it would appear that a four day interval between any two shots would permit participation of only a portion of F-84 samplers plus possible participation of one B-36 sampler. If we must accept such a situation in order to avoid a weather delay we will most certainly accept it.

Sincerely Yours,

[redacted] /s/

3-3288S

[redacted]

TAB NO. 18

162
164

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4 PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

312 24 March 1954

Major
Air Force Special Weapons Center
Kirtland Air Force Base
New Mexico

Dear

I feel that I have been more than a little remiss in my responsibility to keep you informed on our progress in this operation. I hope I can bring you up-to-date with this letter and in the future give you a report every ten days or so.

Upon arrival in the forward area, it was evident that a program was needed to restore order. Supplies had not been properly stored, vehicular parking areas were not established, and old boards, wire, cable drums, etc., were scattered throughout the areas. Personnel, aircraft and vehicular safety hazards were prevelent. We immediately started assigning areas of responsibility for clean-up and with hard work on the part of everone, a little paint here and there, and the erection of fences in the appropriate areas, we now have the base looking more like an Air Force Base in the Z.I. and everything is in its proper place. Everyone is now aware of the importance of keeping all areas in a neat and orderly manner and periodic inspections are made to insure compliance.

In January and the first part of February, had not started projects that were to have been completed in November and December. Some of these were; completion of the parachute building, wiring of the radiac and shop buildings, completion of the aircraft decontamination pad, erection of prefab buildings and tents, and electrical wiring throughout the area. In an effort to insure that everything essential to the operation would be completed as early as possible, we used Air Force personnel on the erection of prefabs and tents and rearranged the priority of other projects. All projects were completed by 1 March, however, it certainly isn't desirable to have the operating units arrive for an operation and not have adequate support facilities available. I believe the reasons for this situation are: (a) accepted more projects than they could handle with the personnel available, (b) Inadequate drive here and insufficient push from home, and (c) Lack of clear delineation of the respective authorities of the Army and Air Force Commanders in the Interim Force.

[redacted]

AFWL/TRD

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

Letter to [redacted] 24 March 1954

Operationally, the mission has proceeded very smoothly. In our build-up for BRAVO shot we conducted a total of six (6) rehearsals. These began as partial rehearsals to work out individual mission deficiencies. Later, the individual missions were gradually combined so that on 16 February a complete Air Force rehearsal was accomplished. The full scale dress rehearsal was held on 23 February with only minor deficiencies showing up. The results of the air operation of the BRAVO event were extremely gratifying. All aircraft performed their assigned mission. The sampling operation, according to J-11 people from LASL, was the best that has ever been run out here.

The Task Group Headquarters and those of the subordinate Units have labored conscientiously and effectively. Operations Division, Task Group Headquarters, broke down considerably just prior to and during BRAVO. Realignment of this Division has resulted in improved work. All other Staff Sections have turned in a great performance. The Headquarters 4930th has been consistently weak but you are aware of the reason for this. The headquarters of the other two Units have been superb.

The Effects mission on BRAVO event can be considered as more successful than past attempts. Following several conferences which included [redacted] the Effects B-36 and B-47 were positioned on the thermal curve for an anticipated yield of 12 mt, and the remaining aircraft the gust curve for 20 mt. The best indications we have at present is [redacted] at about 15mt. There was no damage to the B-47, but we did get superficial damage on the B-36. Details were forwarded to you by TWX at the time. It looks as though we finally got relatively decent data at about 60% design limit load for the B-36.

The C-47 Inter-Atoll airlift performed by the 4930th during the build-up and pre-mission phase was excellent. There was only one (1) abort during this period. The BRAVO event and the resultant contamination of the airstrip at Bikini almost put us out of the airlift business. The two (2) PEM aircraft which were to arrive under our operational control on or about the 15th of January did not reach here until 27 and 28 February respectively. Their in-commission capability is not high due to lack of spare parts, maintenance personnel, etc. With the close out of the Bikini airstrip due to contamination, it was readily apparent that our amphibious lift was totally inadequate. It was at this time that your aid was requested in obtaining Air Force amphibious help. Two (2) SA-16 aircraft arrived 9 March. At the present, the Bikini strip was cooled sufficiently to permit us to fly two (2) C-47 missions per day, although it will probably be closed again to us after ROMEO and certainly after KOON.

[redacted] TAB NO. 19

[redacted]

AFWL/HO

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

Letter to G [redacted] 24 March 1954

As you have certainly heard, after BRAVO there was considerable fall-out on the northern Marshalls. The 28 weather island personnel from Rongerik and approximately 275 natives from Rongelap and Utirik were evacuated to Kwajalein. At Kwajalein, the AEC has set up a medical group under 7.1 to study the effects of the heavy radiation fall-out on the natives and our weather people. The dosages range from approximately .. at Utirik, at Rongerik, at Ailinginae, and at Rongelap.

At the present, all those exposed are symptom free and only the Rongelap group are showing any signs of radiation damage other than changes in the blood counts. Approximately 25 Rongelap people were epilating on the 17th day, post-shot. In addition, they were showing a skin rash on the scalp and folds of the neck. The relationship of the rash to radiation has not been established but is suggestive of BETA injury because of its distribution and association with epilation. The mean white blood counts are down about 3,000 cells on all the individuals from 40-150 R. LASL personnel are collecting urine samples to determine if a significant amount of the radioactive fall-out has been absorbed into the body through the mouth or lungs. With the exception of the lowered white blood count, the USAF group have shown no signs or symptoms of radiation injury to date. I will continue to monitor this program.

The error in fall-out quantity prediction which caused the fall-out to concentrate on the Atolls to the east of Bikini caused General Clarkson understandable concern over future fall-out possibilities at Eniwetok. With this in mind, he had plans drawn up for the evacuation from Eniwetok of those individuals who can be termed radiation sensitive, such as sampler pilots, sample removal personnel, decontamination personnel, etc. These plans outline the action necessary to evacuate these people to Kwajalein on the first indication that a measurable amount of fall-out would occur at Eniwetok. These emergency procedures were firmed up on visits with Admiral Clark at Kwajalein, In addition to this air evacuation of personnel to Kwajalein, other plans were drawn up in the event that all personnel would have to be evacuated from Eniwetok. I hope we are fortunate enough that these plans will not be needed.

The Project Participant Program seems to be working very well. However, dut to improper briefing of a controller aboard the Command Ship, the first group of observers did not get to see the detonation. It was planned that at H-hour the observer aircraft would be approximately sixty miles out in a side aspect position. Three minutes after H-hour they would turn to a tail aspect until after blast arrival or H plus seven

[redacted]

TAB NO. 19

3-3226SRS

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minutes, whichever was sooner. They could then be free to turn to any position. The individual on the radar scope controlling these aircraft turned them to a tail aspect one minute prior to H-hour and of course they had to hold this position until the shock wave had passed. Consequently, they didn't get to see much. You can rest assured that action has been taken to prevent recurrence of this unfortunate error.

We have had very few personnel problems since arrival in the forward area. However, in the few cases that have occurred requiring immediate action, has fulfilled our requirements very expeditiously. We are continually surveying the Group to determine if any overages exist. It is still my policy to return to the Z. I. individual or individuals who are no longer required. It would be a great help to have out here now to assist us in completing our studies and recommendations on the permanent Air Task Group and the Interim Force. A TWX was sent to you on this.

As of this date we are awaiting favorable weather conditions for ROMEO. It was originally scheduled for 11 March, but was changed to 13 March immediately subsequent to BRAVO due to contamination of entire Bikini Atoll. Since that time it has been delayed daily due to winds aloft. We have been having a period of unfavorable winds which will not permit a detonation due to the fall-out problem. It was most unfortunate that MIKE failed to contaminate Eniwetok completely. Had it done so, proper plans would have been made for CASTLE. As it is, one gets the impression that all hands have been rather astounded by widespread area of intense contamination. The continuing delay has at least gotten everyone stirred up. If we wait for the ideal winds desired we will have to wait for a typhoon and fire on the back side of it. Seems to me only one typhoon comes by every four years, so this may be a long TDY. Consequently, investigations are now underway to determine ways and means to fire the remaining devices at Eniwetok, on barges in the open ocean, or in any other manner than that originally planned.

This would be a most interesting period for you to observe. Hope you can come out for ten days or so around the first, though you may not see a shot.

Warmest personal regards to you and Alice.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

TAB NO. 19

3-3225SRD

[redacted]

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI 292330Z [redacted]

PRIORITY

CO DR SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR XX

CO DR AFSWC KIRTLAND AFB N EX XX XX

TGG 3-331 X FR AT SAC AND AT AFSWC X

FURTHER TO MY TOC THREE DASH THREE ONE NINE FOL YIELD INFO HAS BEEN X ITTED BY CJTF SEVEN TO HIGHER AUTH CLN BHANG ETER GIVES [redacted] YIELD APRX NINE MEGATONS X THIS V LUE UNCERTAIN X EARLY BALL OF FIRE PHOTO DATA GIVES NINE PNT FIVE MEGATONS X THIS V LUE IS PROBABLY CORRECT WITHIN ONE MEGATON X AS LAT R INFO BECOMES AVAL AND IS CORRELATED WITH THE ABOVE YOU WILL BE FURTHER INFORMED X END X

[redacted]

30 March 54 TGG 4207

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[redacted]

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CTG 7.4ENIWETOK MI [redacted]

ROUTINE

CO:DR AFS'C KIRTLAND AFB N:EX XX

292345Z XX

TGDC 3-334 X REURMSG AFSWC DASH SUD DASH THREE DASH TWO ZERO X THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS X PART ONE X I DO NOT CONSIDER IT WISE TO RELS AT THIS TIME DUE TO FOL REASONS CLN ALPHA X MAIN OBJ IN COMING FWD WAS TO TN PERS FOR FUTURE OPR X TWO SHOTS NOT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT FOR TNG X BRAVO X BRAVO FALLOUT PROBLEM IS OF MAJ CONCERN AND POINTS OUT POSSIBILITY OF LIKE PROBLEMS ON OTHER SHOTS X WITH FIVE MORE TO GO IS REQUIRED TO MONITOR OUR RAD SAFE RESP FOR AF PERS UNTIL MORE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE PROBLEM X COCA X THE PROGRAM HAS BEEN DELAYED TO THE POINT THAT SAMPLING WEA IS OF LESSER PRIORITY IN SHOT CONSIDERATION THAN PROPER WINDS X IS MOST VALUABLE ON THE SAMPLING CON TEAM DURING THIS PERIOD WHEN SAMPLING WEA COND ARE SOMEWHAT LESS THAN DESIRABLE X DELTA X PECULIARITIES WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED ON THIS OPR SUCH AS CONTRACTION OF RADIATION DOSAGES BY RONGERIK AF WEA PERS AND RONGELAP NATIVES ARE SUPPLYING US WITH INFO NOT AVAIL ELSEWHERE X IT IS FELT THAT CAN GAIN VALUABLE INFO FOR THE AF FR THIS SOURCE X ECHO X THE CONTAMINATION AND BETA RADIATION ON THE BRAVO DASH THREE SIX SAMPLER IS OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST TO THE SAC IS PERS PREPARING STUDIES ON THIS CONTAMINATION X FOXTROT X THIS GP TRYING TO WRITY A FINAL RPT WHICH WILL

[redacted]

AFWL/HO

TAB NO. 21 (1)

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PAGE TWO X

BE OF VALUE IN SUCCEEDING PROGRAMS [redacted] ELPING IN PREP OF

CONSIDERABLE MAT ON SAMPLING PROCEDURES AND RECM CHA DECONTAMINATION AND

IMPROVEMENTS FOR AIRBORNE RADIAC INST X AS YET TIME HAS NOT PERMITTED

MUCH OF THIS TO BE ACCOMP X PART TWO X WOULD APPRECIATE RETENTION OF

THRU APR X HE CAN BE RELS IN TIME TO BE ZI BY ONE MAY X END X

[redacted] 2 2

29 Mar 54 TGDC 4208 Adjutant

[redacted]

AFWL/HQ

T/B NO. 22 (2)

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGDC 319.1 27 February 1954

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit to Kwajalein (Uncl)

MEMO TO: [redacted]

1. [redacted] plans to visit Kwajalein 5 March 1954 in C-54 with take-off at 0745 hours. Personnel to accompany him will be:

2. This visit is to discuss aerial evacuation of FRED, care of contaminated samplers which might land there in emergency, and the incorporation of BU participation.

a. Required Action:

(1) [redacted]

(a) Set up C-54 and crew

(b) Complete Final Evac Plan to include name and rank of personnel involved, and number of aircraft by model on which each man will ride.

(c) Prepare in coordination with Headquarters personnel, as required, a complete briefing on BU subject.

(2) [redacted]

(a) Notify [redacted] of his desired presence and take-off time. Also, what is to be discussed.

(b) Prepare complete plan for emergency care of up to two flights of two F-84's, post shot.

TAB NO. 22

3-3013S

[redacted]

AFWL/NQ

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

(3) [redacted]

(a) Prepare to discuss above plan

[redacted]ckler

(4) C
a[redacted]

(a) Be prepared to discuss complete plan for [redacted] participation as prepared by Col Fackler and coordinated in 7.4. All above officers should contact Lt. Spicer for TS document concerning this subject.

3. When action is required above is accomplished, please notify C [redacted]. Telephone 4208, Bldg. 90.

/s/ [redacted]

[redacted]
Deputy Commander

[redacted]

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

INTERVIEW

GENERAL ESTES

with

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION INFORMATION TEAM

Q. what is the mission of your Task Group?

A. The mission of the Air Task Group in support of the overall Joint Task Force SEVEN mission consists of three primary functions, cloud sampling, aircraft effects measurements, and technical photography and secondary functions including inter and intra atoll airlift, weather reconnaissance and reporting, air rescue, and communications.

Q. , lets take first the mission of sampling and discuss that. Now by sampling, just what do you mean; and what do you take samples of?

A. The Sampling program consists of collecting particulate and gaseous matter from the atomic cloud. Particulate samples are colected on a special type of filter paper. Gaseous samples are pumped by special devices into bags or bottles in the aircraft.

Q. Who establishes the requirements for this part of your mission?

A. The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and the University of California Radiation Laboratory state the quantity of sample desired. We plan the size of the air units necessary to take this quantity.

Q. What type of aircraft are used to collect these samples?

A. F-84 jet aircraft and featherweight B-36 aircraft.

Q. How much radiation do the aircrews receive on one of these sampling missions?

A. This depends on three factors; the time of penetration with relation to time of detonation, the time spent in or near the cloud, and the time spent in his contaminated aircraft on the return trip to base.

Q. Can you give an example of the amounts of radiation received?

A. A sampler entering the cloud two to three hours after detonation would normally be flying in a radiation field of approximately sixty to one hundred roentgens per hour. Radiation of this intensity would limit the time the aircraft could spend in the cloud to a minute and a half or less. The later samplers might experience radiation intensities of five to twenty roentgens per hour and could remain in the cloud for period of from thirty to forty minutes. In both these examples, the crews would receive on the order of one to two roentgens of exposure.

[redacted]

AFWL/HO

TAB NO. 23 (1)

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174

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

Q. What special protection have you provided for the air crews, if any?

A. Several measures have been taken, each of which is quite effective. All of our sampling aircraft are pressurized. We have placed in their pressurization systems a special filter which prevents the engry of radioactive particles into the aircraft. Just in case any small particle might get by this filter, we require all crew members to breathe 100% oxygen during and after sampling. The crew members are thus, in effect, wearing a gas mask. Secondly, we have provided lead vests for each crew member. These vests decrease the amount of radiation reaching the vital organs of the individual. Lastly, we make certain that the aircraft are as clean as possible prior to take off so that oily areas, for instance, do not act as a collecting agent thereby increasing the radiation field that the pilot must ride in after his departure from the cloud on the way back to base.

Q. _____ it seems to me that with this particulate matter on the outside of the aircraft, normal means of evacuating the aircraft would not be safe for the crew. How do you handle this problem?

A. For the F-84's, we have constructed a platform and placed this on a forklift. This is moved up to the cockpit of the F-84. The pilot steps on to this platform and thus is moved away from the aircraft without touching any part of it. On the B-36's, of course we have a different problem. To protect these air crews we have them put on gloves and use extreme care in climbing through the crew hatches so that they do not touch the outside skin of their aircraft.

Q. What happens to these aircraft with this particulate matter on them?

A. The aircraft are isolated to allow the radiation to decay for approximately forty-eight hours. They are then put on the decontamination pad or wash rack and thoroughly washed and scrubbed with a combination of detergent, kerosene and chemicals. Afterwards they are given a fresh water rinse. This process very effectively reduces the contamination of the aircraft.

Q. What is the radiation intensity level after the aircraft are decontaminated?

A. The decontamination process just described is continued until the cockpit reading is approximately twenty-five mr/hr. No flying of any aircraft is permitted until the level has been brought down at least to this figure.

[redacted]

[redacted]

TAB NO 23 (2)

[redacted]

Q. To return a moment to the crews flying these aircraft, with the protection you have provided do they become contaminate?

A. Yes, they sometimes have small amounts of contamination on their clothing and the exposed portions of their body. They are then put through the personnel decontamination center. Here, they take one or more showers, are checked again for radiation, and then given clean clothing as required.

Q. Speaking again of the sampling process, are the pilots told where to go in the cloud or is this left to their own judgement?

A. It is certainly not left to their own judgement. We have a highly experienced control team which rides in the B-36 control aircraft and gives definite directions as to when and where sampling should be accomplished. To accomplish this, the control team observes the detonation and the growth of the nuclear cloud, observing the areas from which representative samples should be obtained. After cloud intensities have decreased sufficiently, the sampler pilots are then given directions by radio as to the altitude, the area and the time that they will make their penetrations into the cloud. Of course, each pilot has attended thorough schooling on the maneuvers he will be expected to perform and in radiation safety matters. This schooling minimizes the directions he must be given by the control team.

Q. You spoke of an experienced control team. Would you explain this?

A. The control team is composed of a scientist from Los Alamos and two Air Force officers. These three have worked together for several years and have observed and directed sampling on more than thirty-five nuclear detonations.

Q. I certainly would agree that they are experienced. Now I would like to cover what happens to these samples once they are obtained?

A. Immediately after the aircraft lands the samples are removed, and placed in an especially designed lead container. Specially trained personnel using long handled tools are employed in this rather touchy work. The containers are placed aboard fast, long range, transport aircraft and returned to scientific laboratories within the United States so that within a matter of hours after the sample is collected they are in the hands of laboratory personnel.

Q. You listed an aircraft effects program as your second primary mission. What aircraft are used for this?

A. We are using a B-36D and a B-47, both aircraft being especially instrumented to record certain data.

[redacted]

AFWL/TRD

TAB NO 23 (3)

[redacted]

Q. What effects data do these aircraft collect?

A. They are instrumented to measure the effects on aircraft structures of the blast, gust and thermal phenomena associated with atomic detonations. Based on the expected yield of the device to be fired, scientific personnel determine a slant range distance from Ground ZERO at which the aircraft can be placed to measure the desired effects without endangering the crew. It then becomes our job to put the aircraft at this exact point in space at the exact moment of detonation.

Q. How is the actual positioning accomplished?

A. The desired position is made good by the coordinated effort of the crew members responsible for flying and navigating the aircraft. An orbital flight pattern is planned by the Headquarters. This pattern is flown by the crew several times just prior to shot time so timing adjustments can be made to take into account the existing winds over shot point. By this means, the crew can refine its timing to such an extent that they arrive at their assigned shot time position with an error not in excess of plus or minus three seconds.

Q. To obtain this data it would appear that the aircraft would have to be reasonably close to the detonation point. In what ways are the air crew of these aircraft protected?

A. These air crews primarily need protection from the heat and intense light. The B-36D has a coating of white paint on the under surface of the aircraft. The purpose of this is to increase the reflectivity of these surfaces thus preventing scorching of the metal. Of course, it also reduces the heat experienced by the crew. Additionally, thick asbestos curtains are placed over all windows and ports so that the thermal pulse does not strike any crew member directly. The crew is also protected from the intense light by these curtains. The aircraft receives slight superficial damage from blast which in no way endangers its flying characteristics.

Q. What is the utilization of this data as gathered?

A. The information is used in order to design better aircraft for the future and to develop techniques for safe delivery of atomic weapons with our current aircraft.

Q. I would like to cover next the third major phase of your mission, that of technical photography. What aircraft are used and what types of photography are involved?

[redacted]

AFWL/AMD

TAB NO 23 (4)

[redacted]

A. The aircraft used are C-54's, RB-36's and B-50's. The C-54's have a bank of cameras located at the cargo entrance and from altitudes of around 10,000' and a distance of about 80 miles, take ball fire and cloud rise and growth photography. The RB-36 is taking photography from about 60 miles at 40,000' for a study of cloud phenomenology. The B-50 aircraft are taking radar scope pictures at 15 to 30 miles at 30,000' for study of indirect bomb damage assessment and base surge characteristics. The information thus obtained is added to that photography performed on the ground.

Q. I get the impression from what you have said that quite a number of aircraft are airborne at shot time. How do you know that all of them are where you want them at shot time?

A. Throughout each shot operation, we operate approximately 40 aircraft. Since the shots are fired in darkness, obviously we must control each of them carefully. For this purpose, we operate two radar control centers, one on land at Eniwetok and one aboard a Navy ship at Bikini. Each aircraft is brought from Eniwetok to Bikini, is positioned there in his assigned position and is then sent back to Eniwetok under continuous radar surveillance. Throughout this process, all aircraft are in constant radio communication with the control centers and through this communication link receive their instructions.

Q. You mentioned that you are responsible for inter and intra atoll airlift. Are any of these aircraft flying at shot time?

A. No. These are, in the main, helicopters and small liaison type aircraft which are used to transport scientists and construction workers from the camps to the shot sites and measurement stations and C-47 aircraft transporting these same people between Eniwetok and Bikini. Their job is completed the day before the shot and begins again the day after the shot when we begin collecting scientific data from the measurement stations and initiate work on the next shot.

Q. It would seem to me that weather information would be important in one of these operations. Is this so?

A. Yes, weather is all important. It has become perhaps the greatest single factor in the operation. It affects the ability of the scientists to collect data, our ability to take photographs and to collect samples and, above all, it determines where the areas of radioactive fall out will be. To insure the correctness of their forecast for shot time, our weather people have a tremendous responsibility.

[redacted]

AFWD/NEB

TAB NO 2 (E)

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

Q. Out here in the middle of the Pacific, how do they obtain the information on which to base their forecasts?

A. Of course they obtain data from all established Pacific stations such as Tokyo, Hawaii, Guam, Wake, Kwajalein, and so on. In addition, our Weather Reporting Element has teams of twenty men taking radiosonde observations at each of four atolls surrounding the Eniwetok-Bikini area. To supplement this information, eight B-29 aircraft, specially modified to gather weather information are dispatched three per day flying ten to twelve hour missions in the areas of doubtful weather.

Q. I presume that you have seen several atomic detonations. Have you gained any major impression from these observations?

A. Definitely so. The major impression anyone receives who sees an actual detonation of one of these devices which are known to the public as "hydrogen bombs" is of its stupendous power. It is an impression which one cannot gain from pictures, diagrams or movies. It is simply not possible to compare them to the shots in Nevada. Naturally, if we are to guard against attack by any possible enemy, we must have the know how to construct and deliver these fearful devices, but having seen one detonated, one immediately hopes that they may never be used against mankind.

Q. This brings to mind our own FCDA. We must presume that other nations have these devices and might use them against us. Do you feel that our civil defense measures are adequate?

A. We have only made a beginning in civil defense. My father, a retired Army officer, has responsibilities in connection with the Civil Defense of Washington, D. C. During a visit he paid me several months ago, I was appalled at his lack of specific knowledge of the power and effects even of our smaller atomic bombs. Undoubtedly, for security reasons, we cannot tell all of the public everything we would like to regarding protection from atomic attack. It would seem, however, that the least we can do would be to educate fully those involved in Civil Defense planning so that their plans may give the public the greatest possible measure of protection.

[redacted]

AFWL/NW

TAB NO 23 (6)

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[redacted]

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGOP 452 31 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Positioning of Aircraft for KOON Shot

1. On 30 March attended the final positioning meeting at Task Group 7.1 Headquarters. The following decisions and tentative plans were reached at that time:

a. [redacted] stated that range of yield for KOON Shot was [redacted] and that positioning of all aircraft would be based on [redacted]

b. Based on [redacted] yield for KOON, the HARDTACK B-50 IBDA aircraft were moved into 12, 20, and 27 nautical miles with the same patterns as used for ROMEO Shot.

c. After a short discussion of control problems surrounding the PEWTER aircraft, it was tentatively decided to position two (2) C-54 type aircraft at 75 miles from Ground Zero at 210° and 330°. The third C-54 to be 50 miles from Ground Zero at 90°. Since the two (2) aircraft at 75 miles are border line control positions, it was agreed to check the possibilities of controlling with HF by actual flight on the morning of 31 March.

d. Further discussion included the effects aircraft. No firm figures were available at this time; however, it appeared advisable to change the inbound heading of the B-47 from 90° to 70° for more dependable use of the Raydist.

2. On 31 March 1954, the test run of the C-54 was run in conjunction with the USS ESTES with affirmative results. Based on this, Task Group 7.1 was notified and the following firm positions prepared for the Operations Order:

a. PEWTER 1 - 75 miles from Ground Zero at an altitude of 14,000 feet and 330°.

b. PEWTER 2 - 50 miles from Ground Zero at an altitude of 10,500 feet and 90°.

[redacted] TAB NO. 24

3-3287SRD

[redacted]

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

Hq TG 7.4 TGOP Subject: Positioning of Aircraft For KOON Shot

c. PEWTER 3 - 75 miles from Ground Zero at an altitude of 12,500 feet and 210°.

3. On 31 March 1954, [redacted] J-3, Task Group 7.1, called this office and informed us of the approval of positions for the effects aircraft. He stated he would confirm this with a TWX. The information has been prepared for the Operations Order and is as follows:

a. B-36:

(1) Altitude - 40,000 feet

(2) Horizontal Range - 34,960 feet or 5.75 nautical miles

(3) Bearing - 090° from Ground Zero

b. B-47:

(1) Altitude 35,000 feet

(2) Horizontal Range - 34,700 feet

(3) Bearing - 070° from Ground Zero. (This new heading was coordinated with the Pilot and Navigator of the B-47 aircraft.

/s/

[redacted]
Chief, Technical Projects.

3-3287SRD TAB NO. 24

[redacted]

AFWL/HO

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

CTG 7.4 PROV.
ENIWETOK MI

112236 Z UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

CJTF 7 (REAR)
WASH DC

X

X

CJTF 7
ENIWETOK MI (COURIER)

CITE TGS 3-136 REQ THAT QUEEN CLNC INVES FOR FOLG NAMED PERS BE DISC:

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AMN ONE AMN

THIRD AMN SECOND J, AF

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(MC. ,

UNCLASSIFIED 1 1

USAF, PSO

TGS/WRH/rbr 4212

Captain, USAF
Adjutant

WAB NO. 25

AFWL/HO

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

CTG 7.4, PROV
EXMALTOK MI

190345 Z UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

X

CJTF 7
WASH DC

X

DTG 171530 Z UNCLASSIFIED

CITE TGS 3-231 REF URMSG DTG 171530 Z. REQ THE FOLG QUEEN CLNC INVES BE DISC:

. REQ

THAT FOLG CASES BE FWD THIS HQ FOR STATEMENTS FM IMDIV:

. REQ THE

FOLG CASES BE CONTD BUT DESIRED INFO AND STATEMENTS BE OBTAINED FM PROVOST AT 19TH AIR DIV, CARSWELL AF BASE, TEXAS, OFF PRESENT PHYSICAL LOCATION:

UNCLASSIFIED

TGS/WRH/rbr 4212 Adjutant

AFMD/MD

TAB NO. 26

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

5 March 1954

SUBJECT: Security Letter

TO: All Personnel

1. Information concerning the detonation of the first in a series of tests is classified CONFIDENTIAL, except for that which has been officially announced in the two (2) AEC releases, dated 9 January 1954 and 1 March 1954 as quoted below:

1st Release - 9 January 1954

"During this month men and material will begin moving to the Pacific Proving Grounds of the Atomic Energy Commission to carry out a further phase of a continuing series of weapons tests of all categories. These tests are part of the Atomic Energy Commission research program for the improvement of weapons, pursuant to its responsibility under the AEC Act. These tests will be conducted by Joint Task Force Seven (JTF 7), commanded by [redacted], USA. There will be no observers other than US officials."

2nd Release - 1 March 1954

"Louis E. Strauss, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission announced today that Joint Task Force SEVEN has detonated an atomic device at the Atomic Energy Commission's Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. This detonation was the first in a series of tests."

2. The fact that an official release was made regarding the "First detonation in a series of tests," automatically downgrades that portion of information to unclassified. HOWEVER, it is desired that no reference be made to this first detonation in letters home.

3. Let the folks back home gain their information through the newspapers, radio and TV, regarding our work here in the Pacific Proving Grounds. By doing this, there is no possibility of you becoming involved in a security leak through misinterpretation of what is classified and what is not classified.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

[redacted]

TAB NO. 27

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGS 18 March 1954

SUBJECT: Official AEC Announcement Regarding Operations at the Pacific Proving Ground

TO: All Personnel

1. An official announcement was made by the AEC on 11 March 1954 that:

"During the course of routine atomic tests in the Marshall Islands, 28 US Personnel and 236 Residents were transported from neighboring atolls to Kwajalein Island according to plan as a precautionary measure. These individuals were unexpectedly exposed to some radioactivity. There were no burns. All are reported well. After completion of the atomic tests, they will be returned to their homes."

2. No information beyond the content of the official AEC Announcement is to be made public by statements, letters, interviews or conversations. The provisions of Security Memorandum Number 2, Headquarters Joint Task Force SEVEN, dated 11 February 1954 remain in effect in regard to all other information. Future public statements will be distributed when they are made.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

TAB NO. 28

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

MEMO FOR THE RECORD 17 March 1954

SUBJECT: Arrangements for Project Participants at Parry

1. visited Parry Island to make firm arrangements for Project Participants to join the Official Observers in their briefing and tour. The following procedure was established and is to be followed on subsequent shots.

2. will determine who, of the Project Participants, should participate with the Official Observers. He refers the names of these people to , who concurs for . He then notifies of such names.

3. hand-carries the list to JTF SEVEN who will write a TWX to DMA stating these names as people who have a need to know and who will be allowed to join the Official Observers unless they hear to the contrary. will then assure that such list gets to for the arrangement of passage into Exclusion Areas. Director of Operations, after having been informed of this transaction will pursue completion of coordination of schedule with JTF SEVEN ( ) and Programming Plan 2-54 will be pursued as on ROMEO.

TAB NO. 29

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HUA187
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EUA146
RR UHP ZVA UHPJA UHPJD BHPC UHPJB
RR UEP ZVA
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FM CJTF 7 WASHDC
TO UHPJA/CTG 7.1 ENIWETOK MI
UHPJD/CTG 7.2 ENIWETOK MI
BHPC/CTG 7.3 ENIWETOK MI
UHPJB/CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI
INFO UHPJA/CJTF 7 ENIWETOK MI
DA GRNC

REQUEST YOU FURNISH THIS HQ VIA MSG THE ESTIMATED NR OF QUEEN CLEARANCE REQUESTS YOU WILL SUBMIT FOR THE PERIOD ONE APR THROUGH THREE ZERO SEP FIVE FOUR

12/17ØØZ

CTG 7.4, PROV
ENIWETOK MI

150322 Z UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

X

CJTF 7
WASH DC

X

DTG 121655 Z UNCLASSIFIED

CJTF 7
ENIWETOK MI (COURIER)

CITE TGS 3-179 REF URMSG DTG 121655 Z. THIS HQ ANTICIPATES NO RPT NO QUEEN CLNC REQ WILL BE SUBM FOR THE PERIOD 1 APR THROUGH 30 SEP 54.

UNCLASSIFIED

W. R. HANNA, Lt Colonel, USAF

TGS/WRH/rbr 4212

A. J. [illegible]
Capt, USAF
Adjutant

[illegible] NO. 34

[illegible]

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGS 380.01

18 March 1954

SUBJECT: Violation of AFR 205-1 and AFR 205-6

TO: Commander
Air Force Special Weapons Center
ATTN: Inspector General
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico

1. This headquarters received OSI Report of Investigation pertaining to A/3c [redacted].

2. The Report of Investigation was inclosed in a double-sealed envelope (the inner-envelope stamped Secret) with an inclosed letter of Project Participants, (Classified Secret) and two (2) copies of unclassified Special Orders.

3. The inner-envelope was addressedto; Commander, 4930th Test Support Group, APO 187, c/o PM San Francisco, Calif., the outer-envelope was addressed to; Commander, Task Group 7.4, Prov. APO 187, c/o PM San Francisco, Calif. Both envelopes were opened by Task Group 7.4 message center and did not show signs of tampering prior to delivery.

4. This Report of Investigation was received and possibly reviewed by persons not authorized to the information contained therein, which is considered to be a violation of AFR 205-1.

5. Attention is invited to AFR 205-6, par 16 a, b and c, dated 1 September 1950, which prescribes the proper handling and mailing of Reports of Investigations.

6. This matter is brought to your attention for whatever action you deem necessary to preclude any future violation of this nature.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lt Colonel, USAF
Personnel Security Officer

AFPMAHQ

IG File 4966
TAB NO. 32

187
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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

GROUP REGULATION) 24 March 1954

NUMBER 205-5)

Departure Security Procedure

Purpose 1
Scope 2
References. 3
General 4
Responsibility. 5
Procedures. 6
Disposition 7

1. PURPOSE: To establish policy and procedures for maintaining security after departure of personnel from the Pacific Proving Grounds.

2. SCOPE: These instructions are applicable to all personnel, assigned or attached to Task Group 7.4, including all persons on TDY with this Group and Project Participants.

3. REFERENCES:

a. Section IV, Headquarters JTF SEVEN Security Memo #4, dated 15 August 1953, "Security Clearances".

b. Headquarters JTF SEVEN Security Memorandum #7, dated 22 October 1953, "Security Instructions for Special Categories of Personnel."

c. Headquarters, JTF SEVEN Security Memorandum #10, dated 2 March 1954, "Departure Security Procedures".

d. Task Group 7.4 Group Regulation 205-4, dated 22 February 1954, "Personnel Clearance Policy and Termination."

4. GENERAL: All personnel who depart the Pacific Proving Ground either during the Operational phase or after completion of the Operation will be required to undergo certain departure security procedures.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES: All Unit and Element Commanders are responsible for insuring strict adherence by all personnel under their command or sponsorship, to the provisions of this regulation.

6. PROCEDURES: Responsible individuals, as cited in paragraph 5, above, will insure that all personnel departing the Pacific Proving

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TAB NO. 33

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

Ground at any time during the operational phase or upon completion of the operation will:

a. Read and sign a departure statement (Incl #1).

b. Receive a departure security briefing.

c. Turn in any CASTLE identification badge held.

d. Have travel orders stamped "HAS NO BADGE". This can be accomplished at Bldg #135, Test Support Unit Security Office or Bldg #90, Task Group 7.4 Security Office.

e. In addition to a, b, c and d above all "Q" cleared personnel, who are being reassigned outside of Joint Task Force SEVEN will be required to read and sign applicable Security Termination Statement (Type A or B, Inclosure Number 1, TG 7.4 Gp Reg 205-4).

7. DISCUSSION:

a. Departure Statement: Departure Statements (Incl No. 1) will be obtained on all individuals departing the Pacific Proving Grounds, and forwarded to Task Group 7.4 Security Officer, where they will be kept on file for a period of one (1) year, after which time they will be removed from the files and destroyed.

b. Security Termination Statements: Security Termination Statements of terminated "Q" clearances will be forwarded to Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, ATTN: Personnel Security Officer, who will forward to Headquarters JTF SEVEN, ATTN: A C of S, J-2 in accordance with the provisions of Section IV, Headquarters, JTF SEVEN Security Memorandum No. 4.

c. CASTLE Identification Badges: Badges collected from personnel who are departing the Pacific Proving Ground on final departure, will be forwarded to 4930th Test Support Unit, Bldg #135, ATTN: Capt Morris, who will in-turn forward to CTG 7.5 (E-2, Badge Office) for final disposition.

d. Badges collected from personnel departing the Pacific Proving Grounds, but who expect to return before the completion of Operations, will be held by Task Group or Unit Security Officer for re-issue to the individual upon return to the Pacific Proving Grounds.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

Chief of Staff

Adjutant

AFWL/HO

1 Incl:
Departure Statement

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT

FOR USE OF ALL PERSONNEL UPON DEPARTURE FROM THE FORWARD AREA

I hereby agree that I will disclose no information whatever to any unauthorized person regarding the nature, time, success, failure, or other details of tests held or to be held by the Joint Task Force. After a news release by the AEC has been made I will disclose no information other than that contained in the official release. I understand that non-disclosure of details of these tests is important to the continued success of the nuclear research program, and has a definite bearing on our national security.

Signature of Witness	Signature of Departee
Agency of Project	Agency or Project
Date	Date

(Local Reproduction Authorized)

AFWL/NO

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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FM COMDR AFSWC KIRTLAND AFB NMEX
TO COMDR TG 7PNT4 ENIWETOK MI
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SWOTR-3-25 PD CMA TECH REP SIKORSKY ACFT CMA ARR KIRTLAND
FB 17 MAR ASGD TG 7.4 BY HQ PATT AFB CMA REPLACING
TECH NOW IN FORWARD AREA PD HAS ONLY CONFIDENTIAL CLNC
PD HAVE REQ TOP SECRET FR HQ AMC PD REQ UR COMMENT AND FURTHER
IN TRUCTIONS PD
18.0005Z MAR JWFKD

TAB NO. 34

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Washington 25, D. C.

AFPDP 201.61

2 March 1954

SUBJECT: Air Force Officers' Responsibilities to the Public

TO: Commanders, All Air Force Activities, ZI and Overseas

1. All Air Force officers are representatives of their service in official and unofficial contacts with the public. Such representation is both a military and civic responsibility and will be so evaluated.

2. Effective 1 April 1954, a mandatory statement to indicate "the manner in which an officer carries out his civic responsibilities and represents the Air Force in his dealings with the public" will be made in the "comments" section (Section IV) of the AF Form 77, "USAF Officer Effectiveness Report," and Part 7 of the AF Form 78, "AF General Officer Efficiency Report." These statements should be supported by facts based upon knowledge and/or purposeful observation and be sufficiently specific to differentiate among those officers who contribute to positive impressions of the Air Force, those who contribute to negative impressions, and those who contribute no impression at all.

3. To varying degrees, every officer has opportunities to represent the Air Force in the eyes of the public in such a way as to mold public impressions. As a guide, the following examples of these opportunities are indicated, along with relevant types of information that should be obtained for evaluative purposes:

a. In an official capacity, officers deal with the public in numerous situations. These include contacts with civilian groups, members of the press, local community officials, contractors, vendors, and representatives of other Government agencies. Whether an officer is presenting data to a civilian group or coordinating a routine matter with an employee of another Government department, he is contributing to an impression of the Air Force. It is important for the rating officer to know whether this impression is good or bad and to determine whether the officer takes advantage of opportunities to inspire confidence in the Air Force.

b. When off duty, in daily civilian contacts, an officer is presented with an even greater variety of opportunities to represent the Air Force. The manner in which officers take advantage of these opportunities should be determined. For example:

(1) Does he participate in some community programs and to what extent? If not, does he possess a potential in this area of responsibility?

(2) Does he possess ability to speak before groups or demonstrate skill and interest in speaking activities?

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TAB NO. 35

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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2 March 1954

AFPDP 201.61
SUBJECT: Air Force Officers' Responsibilities to the Public

(3) Does he, while in uniform or civilian clothes, maintain an appearance which reflects favorably on the Air Force?

c. At times, officers may have opportunities to represent the Air Force through the medium of writing for publication. Through their demonstration of technical competence and/or presentation of factual material, a base of public understanding as to the desirability or essentiality of Air Force actions can be established. An officer's ability or potential in this area should be evaluated.

4. This letter will be brought to the attention of all officers.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

Air Adjutant General

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
AIR FORCE SPECIAL WEAPONS CENTER
Kirtland Air Force Base
New Mexico

SWPM 210.3 16 Mar 54

SUBJECT: Reassignment of L

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. In reference to the reassignment of I g, it is proposed to have M Military Personnel Officer, DCS/Personnel, this Headquarters, assume the additional duty of Commander, Task Group 7.4 (Rear), upon departure of on or about 26 April 1954. All matters requiring action will be referred to the proper staff agency within this headquarters.

2. Captain this headquarters, will assume responsibility for Building T-502 and all Task Group property therein. Necessary action will be taken to insure that the building and property are in readiness upon the return of your headquarters to the ZI.

3. Provided these proposals meet with your concurrence, this headquarters will proceed accordingly.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

/s/
/t/
Colonel, USAF
Vice Commander

TG 7.4 No. 5060

TAB NO. 36

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

SUBJECT: Appointment of Evacuation Officer

TO: Director of Operations
Director of Materiel
Personnel Security
Comptroller
Adjutant

FROM: Dir of Personnel DT: 24 Mar 54 #1

1. Captain has been designated as the Evacuation Officer for the Bikini area for Task Group 7.4, Provisional.

2. Each section having personnel in the Bikini area, whether ashore or afloat, will immediately forward a report, by name and location, of such personnel, to the Director of Personnel, this Headquarters.

3. When any personnel are sent or removed from the Bikini area, immediate notification will be made to the Director of Personnel, this Headquarters.

/s/
/t/
F
Director of Personnel

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TAB NO. 37

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGP

24 March 1954

SUBJECT: Appointment of Evacuation Officer

TO: Commander, Test Support Unit
Commander, Test Aircraft Unit
Commander, Test Services Unit
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

has been designated as the Evacuation Officer for the Bikini area of Task Group 7.4, Provisional. Each unit presently having personnel in the Bikini area, whether ashore or afloat, will immediately send a report, by name and location, of such personnel, with an information copy to this Headquarters. Further, when any personnel are sent to the Bikini area or removed from the Bikini area, an immediate notification by the fastest means possible will be sent to , with an information copy to this Headquarters.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

/s/ A.
/t/
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

TAB NO. [illegible]

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGP 311

25 March 1954

SUBJECT: Receipt and Action on Granite and other Personal Messages of an Emergency Nature

TO: Commanders
All Task Group 7.4 Units and Elements

1. It has become evident within the past few weeks that Granite and other type personal messages of an emergency nature are received addressed to the 4930th Test Support Group, Eniwetok, M. I. The reason for this is probably that the 4930th Test Support Group is listed as the permanent party unit located at Eniwetok.

2. The following will apply whenever a Granite or personal type message is received:

a. If addressed to the 4930th Test Support Group but does not pertain to a member of that unit, the Unit Commander or Adjutant concerned will be contacted and advised immediately.

b. The Unit Commander or Adjutant concerned will have the message picked up from the 4930th Test Support Group headquarters without delay.

3. The Unit Commander will take positive action immediately to insure the following:

a. The message has his personal attention and is acknowledged, if required, with the least practicable delay.

b. Upon receipt of a message of an emergency nature, each Unit Commander, or his duly appointed representative, will contact the American Red Cross Field Director, since the Field Director may have further information on file, and if not, there are various tangible and interpretative services which his organization can offer.

c. The Director of Personnel, Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, will be notified immediately, provided an emergency exists and a leave is required or desired.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

AFWL/NO

TAB 39

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

26 February 1954

MEMO FOR: Chief of Staff, Task Group 7.4

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to JTF SEVEN

1. Purpose: To discuss funding problems with , JTF SEVEN, on 24 Feb 54.

2. Persons Contacted:

Comptroller, JTF 7.

3. Discussion:

a. Reference should be made to the following:

(1) JTF 7 Administrative Order 2-53, Appendix IV to Annex A.

(2) JTF 7 SOP 170-1, Reimbursable Transactions, Dated 23 Dec 53.

(3) Paragraph 2 of 1st Indorsement by Headquarters JTF 7, dated 16 Oct 53, to letter from this Headquarters, subject: "Status of Funds and Reporting," dated 12 Oct 53. Paragraph 2 is quoted:

"It is the concept of this headquarters that:

a. The provisions delineated in the memorandum [illegible], Assistant Secretary of Defense, 9 March 1953 remain unchanged.

b. Costs of certain aircraft modification, travel, transportation, and communications expenses, incurred by Task Group 7.4 on Joint Task Force business will continue to be funded by JTF SEVEN. (The Term "Joint Task Force business" includes the aircraft modification program, procurement and development of special equipment, and staff coordination with other elements of the Task Force, including this headquarters.)

AFMLMO

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Memo For: Chief of Staff, subj: "Report of Visit to JTF 7", dtd 26 February 1954

c. Task Force funds will also continue to be utilized for procurement of special equipment not standard to any of the military services."

b. The following questions were asked Major Crea and his answers expressed his interpretation of JTF 7 funding responsibility for the operational and interim periods.

(1) QUESTION: May JTF 7 funds allotted to TG 7.4 be used to reimburse 7.2 for "housekeeping supplies and other items of common supply" and "special purpose vehicle spare parts common to both Army and Air Force" issued to TG 7.4 and to 4930th during the interim period?

ANSWER: "No. Air Force funds should be used." In the discussion that followed it was pointed out that TG 7.4 had no Air Force funds at its disposal to use for this reimbursement. It was also pointed out that during the interim period, the 4930th would have to depend on AFSWC for funds of this type. Major Crea suggested that if TG 7.4 could prepare an estimate of the fund requirements for this purpose, JTF 7 would forward the problem to USAF.

(2) QUESTION: May JTF 7 funds allotted to TG 7.4 be used to pay the TDY, Communications, Transportation and Headquarters Overhead Expenses of the 4930th during the interim period, as it is during the operational period?

ANSWER: "Yes, since it is considered that the 4930th is accomplishing part of the mission of JTF 7 during the interim period."

(3) QUESTION: To whom will funds be allotted for TDY, Communications, etc. during the interim period for the 4930th?

ANSWER: "They will be allotted to Task Group 7.4 as long as it is operational, then to Task Group 7.2 if 7.4 is deactivated."

c. Discussion was also held regarding the request for additional funds from AMC for the aircraft modification work performed by the various

AFWCMD

Memo For: Chief of Staff, subj: "Report of Visit to JTF 7", dtd 26 Feb 54

AMC Air Materiel Areas. Major Crea requested that AMC's request be sent to him and he would have the Comptroller's office, rear echelon in Washington, coordinate with AMC and AFOAT-1 for more justification and an increase of funds. The letter has been submitted to JTF 7 and Headquarters AMC notified.

4. Recommendations:

a. First a decision must be made whether or not the Base Supply Officer is to completely stop stocking "housekeeping supplies and equipment" and "special purpose vehicle spare parts common to both Army and Air Force" and let TG 7.2 furnish all requirements for these items. If this decision is made, then the Base Supply Officer should make an estimate of the requirements for these items and the question of funding forwarded to JTF 7 for resolving.

b. Reference item 3b(3) above. It is recommended that funds for the use of 4930th during the interim period be allotted to AFSWC since there will also be fund requirements by AFSWC for the planning phases of future tests.

HAROLD R. MEADOWS
Major, USAF
Comptroller

AFWL/MO

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 (HOM) c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

JF-4894

9 March 1954

SUBJECT: Minimum Flight Requirements

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4

1. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 50-3 dated 29 December 1953 and other pertinent regulations, the following is submitted.

2. It is requested that the following rated officers have their minimum flying requirements waived for the remainder of Operation CASTLE. It is further requested that these officers be authorized incentive pay in accordance with existing regulations.

3. All of these officers have Bikini Atoll as their duty location. It is anticipated that some of these officers may obtain their minimum flight requirements; however, in view of shipboard operation and the lack of airlift between atolls, the mission of CASTLE would be seriously impaired if said officers are required to participate in frequent aerial flights.

/s/

Deputy for Administration

DVM/afb
DISTRIBUTION:
1-2 - CTG 7.4 (
3-6 - CTG 7.4 (
7 - CJTF-7
8 - CJTF-7
9 -
10 -
11 - J-3)
12 -
13 -
14 -
15 -
16 -
17 -
18 -
19 - M&R (J) File
20 - M&R (J) Seq
21 - M&R LASL
22 - J-3

TAB NC

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

TGO 210.49 MAR 26 1954

SUBJECT: Minimum Flight Requirements

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.1
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Reference is made to your letter, subject, "Minimum Flight Requirements," File No. 4894, Headquarters, Task Group 7.1, dated 9 March 1954.

2. Your request for relief from compliance with the minimum flight requirements under Air Force Regulation 60-2 for the seven (7) rated personnel as listed is not favorably considered.

3. Your request for authorizing incentive pay without meeting the flight time requirements for the seven rated personnel as listed is not favorably considered.

4. Adequate flight facilities for obtaining incentive flight pay time and to meet all requirements of Air Force Regulation 60-2 are available at Eniwetok. Upon notification to , telephone FRED 4254, preferential scheduling will be given to rated personnel of Task Group 7.1. Special arrangements have been made on the two (2) WB-29 daily weather reconnaissance flights for obtaining weather, hood and/or total time for minimums. These flights are of approximately twelve (12) hours duration. Night minimum requirements may be obtained any night in C-47 aircraft with as little as six (6) hours prior notice. GCA minimums may be obtained during these night flights.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

cc: Comdr, Test Support Unit
ATTN: Base Oprs Officer

TG No. 5140

TAB NO. 42

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGC 120 27 Feb 54

SUBJECT: Reimbursable Transactions

TO: Commander
Test Support Unit
ATTN: Base Accountable Officer
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. This letter summarizes policies on reimbursable transactions within the Joint Task Force and Task Group 7.4.

2. Army - Navy - Air Force Property.

a. Non-expendable property may be loaned between the three military services without reimbursement in the furtherance of the joint mission.

b. With certain exceptions, transfer of expendable supplies among Army, Navy, or Air Force agencies will be on a reimbursable basis. Exceptions to this rule are based on missions assigned to the various Task Groups and are listed below:

(1) CTG 7.2 is responsible for maintenance of all DOD general purpose vehicles in the forward area. To this end, 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance parts will be issued to the using services without reimbursement. Parts and labor expended in maintenance of general purpose vehicles in TG 7.2 shops will not be reimbursed by the DOD agency owning the vehicle.

(2) Reimbursement will not be made for spare parts and shop labor expended in maintenance of technical service (Army purchased) equipment on loan to another Government agency, including the AEC and its contractors.

TAB NO. 43

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Hq TG 7.4, Prov., APO 187, c/o PM, SF, Calif., Subj: "Reimbursable Transactions"

(3) CTG 7.2 will provide all POL products other than aviation (Class 06A) and Marine POL products to DOD agencies on Eniwetok Island without reimbursement.

(4) POL required for generation of electric power or evaporation of fresh water on Eniwetok Island will be provided by CTG 7.2 without reimbursement.

3. Common Supply.

a. Housekeeping equipment and supplies required by CTG 7.4 will be provided on a reimbursable basis by CTG 7.2 as mutually agreed upon with CTG 7.4 and with additional supply personnel assistance furnished by CTG 7.4 as required.

b. Special purpose vehicle spare parts common to both Army and Air Force will be provided on a reimbursable basis by CTG 7.2 as mutually agreed upon with CTG 7.4.

c. Other items of common supply which cannot be obtained through normal Air Force supply channels may be furnished, on a reimbursable basis, by CTG 7.2 to the extent practicable. (Such requirements will be coordinated in advance with CTG 7.2.)

4. Transfers to Other Government Agencies.

a. The Air Force Base Accountable Officer is authorized to transfer expendable supplies to the Army or Navy or Atomic Energy Commission on a reimbursable basis.

b. The Air Force Base Accountable Officer will accumulate all properly accomplished issue slips (AF Form 446) for a period of one (1) month and will summarize such issues on an AF Form 104B or 104C (USAF Requisition and Shipping Document). The shipping document will be prepared in a minimum of five copies and marked "Reimbursement Required." The original and three (3) copies of the shipping document, with the original AF Forms 446 attached (in such transactions the No. 2 copy is the valid voucher. Reference paragraph 227e(1)(b), Section XXVI, Part I, AFM 67-1), will be forwarded by letter of transmittal to the Comptroller, Task Group 7.4, for processing in accordance with AFR 172-22.

5. Transfers From Other Government Agencies.

a. The Air Force Base Accountable Officer is authorized to receive transfers of expendable supplies from the Army or Navy on a reimbursable basis.

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

Hq TG 7.4, Prov., APO 187, c/o PM, SF, Calif., subj: "Reimbursable Transactions"

b. The Air Force Base Accountable Officer is not authorized to receive non-expendable items from the Army or Navy on a reimbursable basis without the prior approval of the Commander, Task Group 7.4.

c. Standard Forms 1080 to effect the reimbursement will be transmitted to Comptroller, Task Group 7.4, by the Agency transferring the expendable supplies in accordance with existing regulations.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

HEADQUARTERS
AIR FORCE SPECIAL WEAPONS CENTER
Kirtland Air Force Base
New Mexico

SWCB 5 March 1954

SUBJECT: Funding for Air Force Subsistence

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Reference letter this Headquarters, subj: Review of Standard Form 1080, dated 3 March 1954.

2. Attached letter from Headquarters, Task Group 7.2 is self-explanatory.

3. Attention is invited to paragraph 6, Headquarters, USAF, letter subj: Budgeting and Funding for Air Force Subsistence in Continental United States. This Headquarters has not received instructions that we are to reimburse the Army at this level for subsistence issued overseas (AEC Pacific Proving Ground). Request you clarify the attached SF 1080 with Headquarters, Task Group 7.2 and Joint Task Force 7. If an agreement or policy letter has been issued by Joint Task Force 7, or the Army, spelling out the responsibility for the Air Force (AFSWC) to reimburse the Army for subsistence in the forward area, please make same available to this Headquarters.

4. Request your Headquarters clarify with Headquarters, Task Group 7.2 the Air Force agency that has reimbursed the Army in the past for subsistence issued to Air Force units in the AEC Pacific Proving Ground.

5. In accordance with this Headquarters' letter referred to in paragraph 1, request the SF 1080 for subsistence be checked for propriety of reimbursement and returned to this Center. Also request we be informed the period of time that is covered in the subsistence issued by the weather station.

6. To enable this Headquarters to justify subsistence requirements that is the responsibility of this Center to pay for Air Force units located in the AEC Pacific Proving Ground for period 1 January 1954 thru 30 June 1954, Fiscal Year 1955 and Fiscal Year 1956, request you furnish

AFWL/MO

TAB NO. 44

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

SWCB Subj: Funding for Air Force Subsistence

the applicable information that is referred to in paragraph 4d(1) thru (5) of Headquarters, USAF letter, subj: Budgeting and Funding for Air Force Subsistence in Continental United States. In order that Air Force (AFSWC) requirements for subsistence in the AEC Pacific Proving Ground can be included in AFSWC Fiscal Year 1955 Financial Plan and Fiscal Year 1956 Budget Estimate and Third and Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 1954 Financial Plan, request you submit the requirements by teletype not later than 30 March 1954. This due date is established in order that we may meet our due date to Headquarters, Air Research and Development Command. If your Headquarters finds this deadline impossible to meet, request you notify us when we can expect your answer.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
1. Ltr fr TG 7.2, dtd 24 Feb 54, subj: Subs Issued to Wea Sta, APO 187, w/1 Incl
2. Ltr fr Hq USAF, dtd 17 Dec 53, Subj: Bud and Funding for AF Subs in CONUS, w/1 Incl

TAB NO. 44

AFWL/NO

209
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Ltr, Hq AFSWC, Kirtland AFB, N.M., SWCB 120, subj: "Funding for Air Force Subsistence"

TGC 120 (5 Mar 54) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o PM, San Francisco, California, 19 MAR 1954

TO: Commander, Air Force Special Weapons Center, ATTN: DCS/Comptroller, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico

1. Task Group 7.2 has been requested to submit all future billings through this Headquarters.

2. The attached letter, with Standard Form 1080 from Task Group 7.2, is returned for cancellation as it was submitted in error from Task Group 7.2. Reimbursement for subsistence has been accomplished in the past in accordance with AFR 172-55.

3. As requested in paragraph 6 of basic letter, the following information is submitted:

a. For the purposes of this estimate, the following assumptions are made:

(1) That there will be no requirement for subsistence funds during the balance of Fiscal Year 1954.

(2) That the scope of any future operations will be comparable to present strengths and operational period (average of 5 months).

(3) That the 4930th Test Support Group will be the interim force with the spaces recommended in the proposed Interim Table of Distribution.

4. Based on the above assumptions, the following airmen strength figures are used in the computations:

	OPERATIONAL PERIOD	INTERIM PERIOD
Headquarters Task Group 7.4	61	--
4930th Test Support Group	519	184
4926th Test Squadron	121	--
Sub-Total (AFSWC Personnel)	701	184
1500-3 ABW Det (MATS)	11	
Det 2, AWS, 57th SRS (MATS)	24	

AFWL/TNO

TAB NO. 44

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[redacted]

Ltr, Hq AFSWC, Kirtland AFB, N.M., SWCB 120, subj: "Funding for Air Force Subsistence"

TGC 120 (5 Mar 54) 1st Ind (Cont'd)

	OPERATIONAL PERIOD	INTERIM PERIOD
1960-1 AACS Det (MATS)	46	
Effects Test Element (SAC)	111	
Hqs Det (MATS)	10	
Recon Det (MATS)	243	
Wea Reporting Det (MATS)	95	
Wea Central Det (MATS)	6	
Comm Det (MATS)	167	
Air Rescue Det (MATS)	16	
Photo Det (MATS)	13	
AC&W Det (ADC)	4	
1110th Air Sup Det (Hqs Comd)	3	
Grand Total Airmen	1,455	184

5. The uncertainty of the schedule of future operations makes it difficult to prepare a budget estimate for a given fiscal year. Therefore, three alternatives are given which would be applicable to any given year:

a. If no operation is held, the cost of subsistence for airmen would be for the 4930th Interim force only:

184 x $1.4378 x 365 = $96,563.

NOTE: The daily ration is increased by 30% for this station.

b. If an operation is held and AFSWC would be required to pay for subsistence cost of AFSWC personnel only, the cost would be:

400 x $1.4378 x 365 = $209,919.

The average number of airmen would be approximately 400 based on the strength figures of 701 for five months and 184 for seven months of the year.

c. If an operation is held and AFSWC would be required to pay for subsistence cost of all Air Force personnel, the cost would be:

710 x $1.4378 x 365 = $372,606.

[redacted] TAB NO. 44 (2)

AFWL/MO

[redacted]

Ltr, Hq AFSWC, Kirtland AFB, N.M., SWCB 120, subj: "Funding for Air Force Subsistence"

TGC 120 (5 Mar 54) 1st Ind (Cont'd)

The average number of airmen would be approximately 710 based on the strength figures of 1,455 for five months and 184 for seven months of the year, plus transients.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:
w/d incl No. 2
1. n/c

[redacted]

AFWL/TMD

TAB NO. 44 (3)

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
ASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGC 130

29 March 1954

SUBJECT: Monetary Inventory Accounting System

TO: Commander
Air Force Special Weapons Center
ATTN: DCS/Comptroller
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

1. Reference is made to messages from this Headquarters, Numbers TGC 3-105, TGC 3-292 and messages from your Headquarters, SWC 3-77, SWP 3-159 and from Commander T[illegible]

2. [redacted] departed this station on 24 March 1954 with thirty (30) days leave authorized.

3. [redacted] departed this station on 24 March 1954 reporting directly to AFSWC.

4. [redacted] and [redacted] are being retained until the completion of the operation and are detailed to duty in Base Supply to set up the Monetary Inventory Accounting System. [redacted] is also being moved to Base Supply to work on the accounting system. Another clerk is being moved from Headquarters 4930th to augment the section. The balance of personnel needed will be furnished from personnel presently available in Base Supply and from the space tentatively allocated for this system. At the completion of the operation, [redacted], Accountant on duty in Post Exchange (Army Augmentation), will be assigned to Base Supply for training in the accounting system.

5. Our conception of the Comptroller functions for the 4930th in accordance with your letter, SWCA, subject: "Expense Accounting," dated 18 Feb 54, follows:

a. There will be no expense accounting functions performed by 4930th.

b. AF Forms 446 and 447 will be transmitted to your Headquarters for posting after routing thru the Supply Section.

AFWL/HO

TAB NO. 45

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

Hq TG 7.4, Prov., APO 187, c/o PM, SF, Calif, subj: "Monetary Inventory Accounting System"

c. Statistical Services and Graphics work will be accomplished as required with available personnel as now authorized and recommended in the Interim Table of Distribution.

d. Control of TDY and communications funds issued by Obligation Authorities will be accomplished by the Adjutant.

e. Cost codes will be entered on documents by the units and checked by the Accountant in the Base Supply Office.

f. Personnel change sheets will be prepared by the units and checked by the Statistical Services Clerk and forwarded to the Accountant in Base Supply, who will check them prior to submission to your Headquarters.

g. Any other items pertaining to costs will be forwarded as they become known.

6. Our interpretation of the provisions of AFM 67-7 is that the responsibility for the accomplishment of the Monetary Inventory Accounting System rests with the Base Supply Officer. Available Comptroller type personnel are being provided to the Base Supply Officer to accomplish this work.

7. If our conception of the Comptroller functions and our interpretation of the new accounting system is not in consonance with your desires or directives, request we be informed. The proposed visit by Lt Colonel Smith should clear up any further questions or problems.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

cc: Comd4 4930th TSU

DCS/Pers, AFSWC

TAB NO. 45 (2)

AFWL/NO

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

FROM: Commander, AFSWC, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Eniwetok, M.I.

SWP-3-159. OUR MSG SWPMO 3-77 AND URMSGS 3-105 AND 3-292 X

DEF INTERESTED IN RETN DATES OF

COMPT PERS 7.4 FISCAL COST AND ACCOUNTING FUNC FOR PLANNING PURP.

NEW SUBJECT: FURTHER REQ RETURN DATES ON AND

ASGD 4930TH COMPT DUTIES X WHO WILL ASSUME FUNCTIONS FOR 4930TH AND WHAT ARE YOUR PLANS FOR COMPT FUNCTIONS DURING INTERIM PD X PLEASE REPLY ASAP.

25/2358Z MAR

TAB NO. 4E

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

FROM: Commander, Task [illegible]up 7.4, Rear, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Eniwetok, M.I.

CITE TGGR 3-116 X FOR [illegible] URMSG TGC 3-292, TGC 3-105 AND SWC 3-77 APPARENTLY FR CONTENT URMSG TGC 3-292 RECD THIS DT YOU INTEND TO RTRN TG 7.4 FISC AND COST ACCT FUNCTION TO AFSWC, KAFB.

[illegible], AFSWC COMPT AGREES TO TAKE ON FUNCTION IMMED WHEN NEC RECORDS ARR. AFSWC D/P IS SENDING SEP TT REQ INFO ON DEPT DT OF [illegible]. ALSO INFO ON EST RELS DT [illegible], AFSWC COMPT STILL CONCERNED OVER ABILITY 4930TH TO HANDLE ACCT REQ DIR BY AFM 67-7. HIS THOUGHT ALONG THIS LINE IS: ARE ANY OF THE PERS PRESENTLY ASG TO TG 7.4 OR 4930TH THAT COULD BE SHIFTED TO ASSUME THIS COMPT RESP? THIS WOULD BE THE PROPER MOVE RATHER THAN SHIPPING NEW PERS FROM AFSWC. COMPT, AFSWC STATES HE WILL RELY ENTIRELY ON UR RECM AND HAS REQ YOU MAKE CONTENTS OF THIS TT KNOWN TO 4930TH. TRIP OF COMPT, AFSWC TO PAC, AS YOU KNOW, IS DELAYED. THEREFORE, IF COMDR, 4930TH HAS QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS ON IMPLEMENTING PROV OF COMPT PORTION OF AFM 67-7, REQ TT TO LT COL SMITH WITH INFO TO THIS OFFICE.

26/0110Z MAR

AFWL/MO

T.B NO. 47

2

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

FROM: Commander, AFSWC, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, APO 187, Eniwetok, MI

SWC-3-77. ATTN COMPT URMSG TGC 3-105. CONCURRENCE IS GIVEN TO DISCUSSION LAST SUMMER ON MAINT OF TG FISCAL AND COST RCD AT AFSWC. HOWEVER CMA NEW HEAVY ACCTG RQMT ARE BEING PLACED UPON COMDR 4930TH EFF 1 APR BY AFM 67-7 ENTL MON INV ACCTG PRO PD MSG SWMS 3-32 ATTN AF 2272-SO SENT 10 MAR ON THIS SUBJ FOL BY TWO AIRMAIL COPIES OF MANUAL PD SUGGEST YOU REV NEEDS FOR ACCTG PERS IN LIGHT OF THIS MANUAL PD RQMT OF AFM 67-7 MUST BE PERFORMED WHERE VALID VOU ARE LOCATED AND CANNOT BE PERFORMED AT KIRTLAND FOR 4930TH FD FORMS 1009 AND 1010 REQ FOR 31 MAR 54 INV LISTING MUST BE LOCALLY REPRODUCED PD WE WILL SUP SMALL INITIAL QTY OF OTHER ACCTG FORMS WHEN OUR SP PRTG TAKES PLACE LATE THIS MO I

LEAVING 1 APR FOR IS PD MAY HAVE TIME TO DISCUSS YOUR PROBLEMS IF YOU WILL SEND MSG INDICATING SUBJ YOU DESIRE TO COVER PD FEEL FREE TO CALL ON AFSWC ACCTG DIV FOR ADVICE AT ANY TIME PD

16/0118Z MAR

TAB NO. 48

AFWL/MO

[redacted]

Hq Wea Rept Elm, Subj: Radiation Monitoring and Operational Readiness Plan for Rongerik Atoll

TGOR (6 Mar 54) 2nd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. This headquarters concurs in the general plan outlined in basic correspondence for the re-entry of RONGERIK.

2. Provide below are certain additional coordinative and implementation requirements to guide the planning effort of your headquarters for the periodic re-entry into RONGERIK and the eventual re-establishment of its weather reporting facilities to normal operating condition. The completion of these actions will aid in accomplishing the objective of this important mission.

a. The Test Services Unit has conducted the first in a series of re-entry missions to RONGERIK to inspect, service, maintain and operate the equipment installed thereat. Succeeding re-entry missions for this purpose will be conducted approximately five (5) days to one (1) week apart and the period any team remains on RONGERIK will not exceed rad-safe limits. The initial re-entry team was transported to RONGERIK via surface vessel. It is contemplated that amphibious aircraft will be used for subsequent trips and that the team will consist of five (5) to seven (7) personnel.

b. The Commander, Test Services Unit, is authorized to make arrangements to secure necessary transportation for subsequent re-entry missions, in accordance with procedures which already exist for normal logistical support of the weather islands. In the event that transportation for future re-entry missions can not be obtained from this source, the Commander, Test Services Unit, is authorized to coordinate his requirement with the Commander, Test Support Unit, who will make every effort to provide airlift support for this project with available amphibious aircraft. The Commander, Test Support Unit, has been advised concerning this contingency.

c. A qualified DUKW operator, who is also a qualified DUKW maintenance and repair mechanic, will accompany each re-entry team, to restore the RONGERIK DUKW to a fully operational condition and to operate the vehicle for the team on each re-entry mission to RONGERIK.

[redacted]

TAB NO. 49

AFWL/NHO

Hq Wea Rept Elm, Subj: Radiation Monitoring and Operational Readiness Plan for Rongerik Atoll

The Test Services Unit will coordinate this requirement with the Director of Personnel, this headquarters, who is initiating appropriate action.

d. A Radiological Safety Monitor will accompany, and be a member of, each re-entry team; and it is the responsibility of the operating unit to insure that this requirement is fulfilled.

e. The Commander, Test Aircraft Unit, will provide the Test Services Unit with a fully qualified Radiological Safety Monitor who will accompany, and become a member of each re-entry team, until such time as the radiation level on RONGERIK does not constitute a hazard to personnel. The Commander, Test Aircraft Unit, has knowledge of this requirement and will be contacted directly in further coordination to be effected by the Commander, Test Services Unit.

f. As part of his specific duties, the Rad/Safety monitor will:

(1) Insure that no member of the re-entry party is unduly exposed to excessive radiation.

(2) Brief the team prior to take-off concerning the radiation hazards which they are likely to encounter.

(3) Determine the radiation hazard at each location on RONGERIK scheduled for re-entry during a mission, this function to be completed before an individual enters the particular location.

(4) Coordinate the issue of film badges, dosimeters, etc., to all members of the re-entry party, supervise the use and handling of the equipment and insure its proper post-mission disposition.

g. On each re-entry mission, radiation intensities, as indicated by detection instruments, will be recorded and forwarded to the Director of Operations, this headquarters, ATTN: Technical Projects Division, upon return of the team to ENIWETOK. In addition, samples of coral and other contaminated debris, found in the vicinity of working areas at RONGERIK, will be obtained under the direct supervision of the Rad/Safety monitor, who will convey the samples to a representative of Task Group 7.1 upon return of the team to ENIWETOK. The Rad/Safety member of the team also will record on a map or sketch the approximate physical location on the island at which each sample was collected. To assist in recording this important data, there are attached hereto, as Inclosure #1,

forty (40) copies of a hand-drawn map of RONGERIK (not drawn to scale). Details concerning the foregoing rad/Safety requirements first should be obtained from Lt Colonel James E. Crosby, Directorate of Operations, this headquarters.

h. The Commander, Test Aircraft Unit, has been requested to provide the Test Services Unit with the following items of equipment to support at least six (6) personnel who will constitute the re-entry team:

(1) Fatigue type suits

(2) Heavy socks

(3) Shoes

(4) Protective gloves

(5) Fatigue type caps

(6) Shoe protective covers

(7) T-1B monitors (Approximately four (4))

(8) Film badges

(9) Pocket dosimeters

(10) Bottles or other adequate containers for water, food, and soil samples.

The exact quantities, types and sizes as appropriate, of the above items, which are required for this operation, will be transmitted to the Test Aircraft Unit through direct coordinative action by the Commander, Test Services Unit. The Rad/Safety member of each re-entry team must insure that the protective devices and equipment are properly worn and/or used at all times.

i. The Commander, Test Services Unit, will be responsible for organizing the re-entry team and insuring that necessary materiel, particularly emergency and protective equipment adequate to meet the requirements of the operation, accompanies each re-entry party. He will insure that ~~all~~ personnel, including the aircraft crew, possess required film badges, dosimeters, etc, this latter function to be coordinated with the Rad/Safety monitor. He will insure that the entire re-entry party are

FWL/HO

[redacted]

TAB NO: 42

thoroughly briefed on all aspects of their mission and that the re-entry plan is appropriately coordinated with all agencies providing support for his mission.

j. Within two (2) days subsequent to the return of a re-entry team, an over-all report covering the entire mission will be submitted in triplicate to this headquarters, ATTN: Director of Operations. This report will include, but not be limited to, coverage of the following important topics.

(1) Conditions of equipment and its operational status in general.

(2) Any unusual condition affecting special equipment which indicates excessive maintenance or replacement requirements.

(3) Any abnormal condition of utilities and related facilities which may adversely affect living conditions when RONGERIK is re-occupied for normal operations.

(4) Any observation which indicates damage to or deterioration of equipment, housing and working areas or impairment of supplies.

(5) Any other pertinent observation which the Commander, Test Services Unit, considers significant to the re-establishment of the weather reporting capability on RONGERIK ISLAND.

k. With reference to personnel who were evacuated from RONGERIK, the Commander, Test Services Unit, will submit a report which will reflect the movement of each evacuee for whom he is responsible, to include dates and locations, from the time the individual was evacuated until he reaches his ultimate duty destination in the forward area. Thereafter, a report will be submitted on the individual whenever he is transferred within the area and until he departs from the forward area in a permanent status. These reports will be submitted to the Director of Personnel, this headquarters.

l. Provided that radiological contamination has dissipated safely, the Commander, Test Services Unit, will re-establish the weather reporting facilities to normal operation subsequent to 1 May 1954.

[redacted]

Hq Wea Rept Elm, Subj: Radiation Monitoring and Operational Readiness Plan for Rongerik Atoll

Only personnel who previously have not been exposed to radiation intensities considered excessive, will be assigned to man the weather reporting installation on RONGERIK ISLAND.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:
Map of Rongerik (40 cys)

[redacted]

AFWL/MKP

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[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGOR

SUBJECT: Requirements for Support of the RONGERIK Re-entry Operation Under Programming Plan No. 1-54

TO: Commander
Test Support Unit
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. RONGERIK Island, one of four (4) outlying islands used primarily for weather reporting purposes in the forward area, has become temporarily unsafe for prolonged habitation. Current estimates indicate that its re-occupation is not likely to take place prior to 1 May 1954, as a result of radiological contamination precipitated by the BRAVO event.

2. All personnel have been evacuated from RONGERIK Island.

3. The existing radiological hazard will not preclude visits to RONGERIK, provided the period of occupation does not exceed Rad/Safe limits.

4. During the interim between evacuation and re-establishment of RONGERIK to normal operational status, small groups of personnel (re-entry teams or parties) will be transported from ENIWETOK Airfield periodically, to service, maintain and operate, on a limited scale, the equipment and facilities which are located on this outlying weather island.

5. The Test Services Unit is now completing the first in its series of re-entry missions. Five (5) to seven (7) personnel comprise each team. Succeeding re-entry mission will be conducted approximately five (5) days to one (1) week apart and the period any team remains on RONGERIK will not exceed four (4) hours, until the radiation hazard is safely reduced. The initial team was transported to RONGERIK via surface vessel. It is contemplated that amphibious aircraft will be used for subsequent trips.

6. The Test Services Unit has been furnished transportation for its initial re-entry team in accordance with procedures which already exist for normal logistical support of the outlying weather islands. In the event that necessary transportation for these special re-entry missions cannot be obtained in the future from this source, the Commander, Test Services Unit has been instructed to coordinate this requirement for support with you directly

[redacted]

AFWL/HO

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[redacted]

TGOR Hq Task Group 7.4, Subj: Requirements for Support of the RONGERIK Re-entry Operation Under Programming Plan No. 1-54

7. It is desired, therefore, that the Commander, Test Support Unit, upon receiving a request for the transportation of a re-entry team, make every effort to provide airlift support for this important project with his available amphibious aircraft. Whenever the amphibian is used, its mission will be to airlift the Test Services Unit re-entry team to RONGERIK, remain until on-site activities are concluded, then reload the party aboard the aircraft and return them to ENIWETOK.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

[redacted]

AFWL/HO

TAB NO 50

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGO

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Requirements for Support of the Rongerik Reentry Operation Under Programming Plan No. 1-54

TO: Commander
Test Aircraft Unit
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Rongerik Island, one of the four outlying islands used primarily for weather reporting purposes in the forward area, has become temporarily unsafe for prolonged inhabitation. Current estimates indicate that its reoccupation is not likely to take place prior to 1 May 1954, as a result of radiological contamination precipitated by the BRAVO event.

2. All personnel have been evacuated from Rongerik Island.

3. The existing radiological hazard will not preclude visits to Rongerik, provided the period of occupation does not exceed Rad/Safe limits.

4. During the interim between evacuation and reestablishment of Rongerik to normal operational status, small groups of personnel (reentry teams or parties) will be transported from Eniwetok Airfield periodically, to service, maintain and operate, on a limited scale, the equipment and facilities which are located on this outlying weather island.

5. The Test Services Unit is now completing the first in its series of reentry missions. Five (5) to seven (7) personnel comprise each team. Succeeding reentry missions will be conducted approximately five (5) days to one (1) week apart and the period any team remains on Rongerik will not exceed four (4) hours, until the radiation hazard is safely reduced. The initial team was transported to Rongerik via surface vessel. It is contemplated that amphibious aircraft will be used for subsequent trips.

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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TGO Subj: (Uncl) Requirements for Support of the Rongerik Reentry Operation Under Programming Plan No. 1-54

6. To insure successful accomplishment of the reentry operation, certain support must be furnished to the Test Services Unit by other organizations of the Task Group. It is desired, therefore that the Test Aircraft Unit take necessary action to support this mission in accordance with the following requirements:

a. Provide the Test Services Unit with a fully qualified Radiological Safety Monitor who will accompany, and become a member of, each reentry team. The Rad/Safe monitor will:

(1) Be responsible for insuring that no member is exposed to excessive radiation.

(2) Brief the team prior to departure on each mission concerning the radiation hazards which are likely to be encountered.

(3) Determine the radiation hazard at each location on Rongerik scheduled for reentry during a mission, this function to be completed before an individual enters the particular location.

(4) Coordinate the issue of film badges, dosimeters, etc., to all members of the reentry team, supervise the use and handling of the equipment and insure its post-mission disposition.

(5) On each reentry mission, maintain a continual record of the contamination levels indicated throughout areas entered at Rongerik.

(6) Supervise and direct the collection of radiologically contaminated coral and other materials, to be delivered to the Task Group 7.1 representative upon return of the team to Eniwetok. Indicate on a drawing similar to the attached copy a hand-drawn sketch of Rongerik, as accurately as possible, the point at which the sample was collected. Additional copies may be obtained from the Test Services Unit. Details concerning the foregoing rad/safety requirements first should be obtained from Directorate of Operations, this headquarters.

b. Provide the following items of equipment to be supplied for [illegible] six (6) personnel who will comprise each reentry team:

[redacted]

[redacted]

(1) Fatigue type suits

(2) Heavy socks

(3) Shoes

(4) Protective gloves

(5) Fatigue type caps

(6) Shoe protective covers

(7) T-1B monitors (approximately four (4))

(8) Film badges

(9) Pocket dosimeters

(10) Bottles of other adequate containers for water, food and soil samples.

Exact quantities, types and sizes as appropriate, of the above items, will be ascertained by the Test Aircraft Unit through direct coordination with the Test Services Unit. The Rad/Safe member of each reentry team must insure that the protective devices and equipment are properly worn and/or used at all times.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:
Map of Rongerik Island

[redacted] TAB NO. 51

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

LEGEND

R/S	RADIO SONDE
P&P	STEEL MATTING
	BARRACKS TYPE BUILDING
	TENTS
	SAND DUNE
1	QUARTERS
2	QUARTERS
3	DISP & SUPPLY
4	MESS & KITCHEN
5	R/S BLDG

T A B 53

Message from JTF SEVEN,

26 March 1954,

"Shot Scheduling,"

located in CASTLE 311 Folder

in the TG 7.4 Classified Files.

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGOP 10 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Operations

SUBJECT: Investigation of Effects of Planned Future Shots on Task Group 7.4 Equipment and Facilities

1. Operations Analysis was requested to study some of the problems which must be faced by Task Group 7.4 in planning for weapons or devices detonated at various locations at Eniwetok Atoll. Specifically, the problems to be investigated were:

a. At the levels of overpressure and gust velocity anticipated from planned future shots, what measures must be taken to safeguard aircraft on the ground from damage?

b. Under the same conditions, how can damage to the hangar be avoided?

c. What measures must be taken to prevent damage by the anticipated water wave?

2. The future shot to be considered, their locations, and estimated maximum yields were:

a. DELETED at Site RUBY,

b. at Site FLORA

c. DELETED at Site FLORA,

Site RUBY is 16.9 nautical miles from the center of FRED runway. Site FLORA (MIKE Crater) is 21.0 nautical miles distant.

3. The following overpressures and gust velocities would be expected at the center of FRED runway for the shot locations and yields mentioned in 2 above:

DELETED

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[redacted]

Because the overpressures listed above are essentially acoustic, the effects are subject to acoustic aberrations such as diffraction caused by temperature inversions or wind shears, which could reduce the overpressures and associated gust velocities below the values listed, for the distances involved. For example, although about .7 psi was anticipated at EMER for MIKE shot of Operation IVY, only .36 psi was experienced.

4. Through the last two series of tests in Nevada, ARDC has been investigating the effects of atomic bursts on aircraft on the ground. The only people in this area who are well acquainted with these tests are Mr. Frank Janik, Structures Branch, Aircraft Laboratory, WADC, and Messrs Howard Zwemer and David Knodel, of Allied Research Associates, contractor to WADC, here as advisors to Project 6.2. Consequently, a conference was arranged with them to discuss the problems involved. Unfortunately there are no copies of the reports on the Nevada tests available here. However, on the basis of their experience, they believed that there was no risk of damage at the overpressures anticipated, for tactical and cargo type aircraft parked nose toward Ground Zero, but were not sure of the effects on light aircraft and helicopters. As a result of discussion, the following list of precautions was developed, to reduce the risk of damage to aircraft to the minimum:

a. All aircraft must be parked nose toward Ground Zero, with the area in front of them carefully cleared of possible missiles, chocked, with their brakes set, and with fuel tanks full or nearly full. They should be parked far enough apart so that slight shifts in position will not cause collisions between aircraft.

b. Gust locks should be placed on all control surfaces.

c. Where convenient, any type of aircraft should be tied down. It is more important to tie down aircraft such as the C-47, which sits in a three-point attitude on the ground.

d. Doors, windows, hatches, bomb bay doors, etc. should be opened so that there are no sealed enclosures such as cockpits, cabins, or bomb bays.

e. L-13's should be stored in the hangar with their wings folded.

f. Helicopters should be evacuated or stored in the hangar with rotors folded and secured.

g. The L-13's and helicopters could be further protected by tying them down to sand bags or piling sand bags around their landing gear.

[redacted]

AFMLDHO

TAB 54

[redacted]

As an additional safety measure one could provide spoilers on the lifting surfaces of the parked aircraft. It is questionable whether the effort can be justified, however. For tactical or cargo aircraft up to about one hundred foot wingspan, one or more two by fours could be tied to the upper surfaces across the span. For larger aircraft, rows of sand bags might be employed, perhaps in two courses.

5. In order to probe the aircraft damage problem further, the question of higher overpressures was discussed. The only opinion they were willing to state was that overpressures higher than .7 psi would carry with them an increasing risk of damage, and that at 1.0 psi or above, some damage was to be expected.

6. In order to take advantage of the planning done during Operation IVY for protection against the effects of the MIKE detonation, the "Final Report of JTF 132", and the "History of Operation IVY" were consulted. These documents are available through Classified Files at JTF SEVEN. The information available there was as follows:

a. H-19's were evacuated to the REDOVA.

b. H-13's were crated and stored on FRED.

c. Some of the L-13's were tied down and sand bagged. The nature of extent of the sand bagging was not described.

d. The balance of the L-13's were secured with their wings folded.

7. To obtain what information was available concerning protection of and damage to the hangar on MIKE shot, Mr. Coray, Holmes & Narver Project Manager, and Mr. Boettcher, of Engineering Division, Holmes & Narver, were contacted. Although the records are not complete, it was determined that the hangar doors were blocked open, and that columns were installed to support the roof. However, the loads imposed on the structure by the shock hitting it from the north side, and then sweeping inside from both ends was such as to lift the roof, and leave some small amount of permanent set in the structure. This deflection allowed one or two doors to come free of the tracks, and fall. The only repair necessary on the building was to realign the door tracks.

8. Further discussion brought forth the fact that no plans are being made for protection of even critical scientific laboratory buildings. It has been decided to accept damage and expend funds on repair, rather than spend large amounts on storing and tying down buildings and protecting equipment. If this decision was reached on the basis of the

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TAB 54

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MIKE experience, it may be unconservative, since overpressures much larger than those encountered on MIKE shot could be attained.

9. A trip was made to Bikini to consult [redacted], of Scripps Institute of Oceanography, who is project officer for Project 1.6 (Water Wave Studies), Task Group 7.1, to discuss what water waves might be expected at FRED from the shots listed in 2 above. Since Dr. Isaacs has no instrumentation in Eniwetok Lagoon, and therefore has not studied the lagoon configuration or the geometry of MIKE Crater in detail, he could only offer an opinion regarding the water wave problem. DELETED [redacted] on Site RUBY he felt sure that the solid island and reef would prevent development of any important water wave. For shots in the MIKE Crater, on the basis of breach in the reef being small, and the water over the reef at the lip being rather shallow, he believes that the water wave developed for a shot of essentially MIKE yield could not produce a wave more than two or three times the size of the MIKE wave. Since it is understood that the water wave at FRED on MIKE Shot was about two feet high, this sets the maximum at about six feet. Considering the underwater and beach topography of the lagoon side of FRED, he felt that water would not come above the beach anywhere but at the lowest points, and even there only small volumes of water would be encountered. Therefore no protective measures would seem to be required.

Operations Analysit

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGO 12 March 1954

SUBJECT: Airlift Operations

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. A complete survey of the Bikini lagoon was made to determine the safest place and most expeditious procedures to be used for PBM and SA-16 water landings at Bikini during freight and passenger airlift. An SA-16 pilot, recently assigned, was used as an advisor on this survey due to his extensive experience of over 2000 water landings.

2. The survey has indicated that, a very experienced pilot possibly could land at considerable risk in any part of the lagoon. In most of the lagoon, even though the aircraft was landed safely, it would encounter detrimental buffeting on the hull. One area, shown on the attached map, was considered to be a safe area for everyday use because of the shelter provided by HOW island and because the parallel of ground swell lies at a 90° angle to the prevailing wind. The lagoon in this area is normally very calm and has been chosen as the area designated for all water landings at Bikini.

3. In an absolute emergency, and still at pilot's discretion, it may be possible for our most qualified pilot to land parellel to and just North of TARE. This, however, can only be considered as an emergency measure and not within safety limits desired for this operation.

4. The pilot on this airlift feel that they can better judge safe water condition for landing than someone shipboard because he can view it at 2000 feet to determine swells. Further, the final land or no land decision must be made by the pilot concerned, therefore an officer of TG 7.4 qualified in water landings will not be required aboard the USS DAIROKO. Normally, the DAIROKO will not be in the area designated as water landing area, therefore, would be in no position to make recommendations on actual landings.

5. To complete the requirements for water landing inter-atoll lift, request action be taken to provide a rubber, aircraft buoy in the place shown on the attached map.

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TAB NO. 55

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

6. It is further suggested that the use of helicopters for getting passengers to water landing craft may be most desirable. With the concurrence of your headquarters and TG 7.3, request a barge be furnished, with a landing circle painted thereon, for helicopter landings and placed as shown on attached drawing. A small boat or raft should then be provided to take personnel from the barge to the amphibian tied up at the buoy.

7. It is recommended that TG 7.3, through THUMBTACK, exercise normal tower control of airlift aircraft operating in the Bikini area. A Task Group 7.4 Liaison Officer will be placed aboard the USS BAIROKO to coordinate TG 7.3 and TG 7.4 matters.

8. Further recommend Task Group 7.4 exercise, through BOUNDARY TARE, enroute or area control of all airlift aircraft operating in the Bikini area.

9. This proposed means of controlling airlift operations would enable the CIC, BOUNDARY TARE, in coordination with the AOC Eniwetok, to control all enroute traffic. Communication would be maintained between the two to assure immediate passage of flight schedules, flight plans, flight altitudes, time of take-offs and landings, cancellation, personnel and cargo loads, etc. The CIC, BOUNDARY TARE, after vectoring aircraft to the landing area, will alert the CIC aboard the BAIROKO where final airlift control would be accomplished in conjuction with helicopter control. After take-off of inter-atoll traffic, the BAIROKO would pass control back to the CIC for further clearance.

10. Approval of the above proposal is requested.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:
Layout Map

cc: CTG 7.1
CTG 7.3
CTG 7.5

TAB NO. 55

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

AIRLIFT CONFERENCE MINUTES
(USS ESTES - 18 and 19 MARCH 1954)

1. PURPOSE: To discuss problems associated with JTF SEVEN Airlift Operations.

2. CONFEREES:

JTF SEVEN
JTF SEVEN
Task Group 7.1
Task Group 7.3
Task Group 7.3
Task Group 7.4
Task Group 7.4
Task Group 7.4
Task Group 7.5

3. DISCUSSION:

a. General Responsibilities: Allocation of the following general responsibilities were agreed upon and directed by JTF SEVEN:

(1) Headquarters JTF SEVEN.

(a) Overall supervision.

(b) Priorities (where necessary).

(2) Task Group 7.3.

(a) Water Transportation.

(b) Hrs Transportation (VIP)

(c) Loading List (manifest).

(d) Aircraft control and communications facilities.

(e) Seadrome facilities.

(3) Task Group 7.4.

(a) Aircraft schedules.

(b) Approach control.

(c) Airdrome and Seadrome control.

(d) Crash rescue crew (Operational control of ATC).

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(e) TARE tower (light only).

(f) HRS landing (TARE strip only).

(4) Ships Responsibilities.

(a) USS ESTES AGC-12

1. Airdrome control.

2. Seadrome control.

3. Loading list (manifest).

4. Coordinate boats and HRS.

5. Aircraft control and communications facilities.

6. Approach control.

7. House rescue crew (fire crash crew).

(b) USS BAIROKO.

1. HRS control (except TARE strip).

2. Coordinate with ESTES.

3. Alternate for ESTES.

b. Airlift Control Operations: It was agreed that Task Group 7.4 would control all airlift operations in the Bikini area. It was further agreed that Task Group 7.4 would have full tower control responsibility, including that over Task Group 7.3 helicopters at both TARE strip and the water landing area. The attached letter of responsibilities (Atchmt #1) outlines agreements on detailed control procedures.

c. Water Landing Problems: The attached letter (Atchmt #2) was discussed and agreements were reached as outlined in first indorsement (Atchmt #2) thereto.

d. Aircraft Scheduling, Space Allocation and Manifesting:

(1) It was agreed that the following airlift schedules would be flown by Task Group 7.4, subject to aircraft availability:

(a) Daily C-47 or PBM operations from TARE strip to be employed whenever TARE strip is open:

	DEPT FRED	ARR TARE	DEPT TARE	ARR FRED
Regular Flt	1000	1130	1145-1200	1300-1330
Regular Flt	1500	1630	1645-1700	1815-1830

TAB No. 35

(b) Daily PBM or SA-16 operations from water landing area to be employed whenever TARE strip is closed. Each flight will be either one PBM or two SA-16's:

By req only	0800	0930	0945-1000	1115-1130
Regular Flt	1500	1630	1645-1700	1815-1830

(2) It was agreed that the 7.4 Senior Air Controller aboard the USS ESTES would be responsible for confirming the above schedules with the Eniwetok AOC each night at 1700 for the following days operation and for notifying the TG 7.3 transport officer of the confirmation of the schedule or any necessary changes in the schedule. It was further agreed that this officer would also notify the TG 7.3 transport officer of any subsequent changes in airlift aircraft schedules immediately upon being informed of these changes by the Eniwetok AOC. It was further agreed that the TG 7.3 transport officer would receive all space requests from one designated officer in each task group, prepare the manifest and provide it to the TG 7.4 TARE airlift detachment commander for dispatch to the airstrip. It was agreed that the TG 7.3 transport officer would arrange for passenger boat and helicopter transportation to and from the airlift landing area. It was agreed that the TG 7.4 TARE Airfield Detachment Commander would arrange for transportation for firefighting and control tower personnel to the TARE airstrip. It was agreed that the TG 7.4 TARE airfield detachment commander would assure that manifests are carried to the TARE strip by a responsible NCO or officer with authority to insure that no passenger boards the aircraft who is not properly manifested.

DAVID F. MARPO R
Lt Colonel, USAF
Chief, Operations & Training

TAB NO. 55

AFWL/PAO

B/L Hq TG 7.4, Prov, Subj: Airlift Operations, dtd 12 Mar 54

(12 Mar 54) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN, APO 187, (HOW), c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California, 3 April 1954

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Reference paragraphs 2 and 3 of basic letter. The recommended water landing area is approved and will be used except in emergencies.

2. Reference paragraph 5 of basic letter. Action will be taken by this headquarters to secure and install buoy as requested.

3. Reference paragraph 6, after consultation with Task Group 7.1 and 7.5 it does not appear that helicopter operations to and from the water landing area are required. Therefore, at this time, the barge is not considered necessary. Should a need for such become apparent at a later date, CTG 7.5 has indicated that a 32 X 129 foot barge can be provided. For your information a heavily padded 16 foot motor whale boat is available for transfer of passengers from amphibious aircraft to larger boats or barge.

4. Reference paragraph 7, general agreement was reached in conference on 17 March 1954, that tower control of airlift aircraft and helicopters operating in the Bikini area will be exercised by TG 7.4 representatives aboard the USS ESTES. It is therefore recommended that the Task Group 7.4 Liaison Officer be placed aboard the USS ESTES to function as you desire.

5. Reference paragraphs 8 and 9. Concur except that TG 7.4 representation aboard the USS ESTES will, in keeping with the agreement referred to in paragraph 4 above, exercise tower as well as airborne control over the Bikini area.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL CLARKSON:

[redacted]
HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGO 7 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional

SUBJECT: Electronic Facilities for ROMEO

1. Following is resume of action to date concerning electronic facilities clobbered by BRAVO:

a. Voice Time Script Broadcast: It is my understanding that for the next shot, voice time will be given from BOUNDARY TARE, manually, from H-3 hours to H-15 minutes. At this latter time, the voice time tape will be cut in to our two BC-640 VHF transmitters located in the bunker at Station 7200 (NAN). During BRAVO, these two transmitters were both set to operate on B Channel, but only one was used at a time, with a Communications Element Sergeant standing by to manually switch over in case one of the transmitters malfunctioned. Only one VHF antenna was installed on the 300 foot tower. I still consider that we should have 100% back up for this last 15 minutes of time hacks. Our present planning was to broadcast on B and D Channels simultaneously. The only problem here is the construction of an antenna multicoupler switch so that two transmitters (on different frequencies) can use the same antenna. An AACS Technical Representative is working on this right now. The broadcast from two transmitters on the same frequency from one antenna is impossible. Likewise, Colonel Bowen and Dr. Ogle believe that it will be too hot to install an additional antenna on the tower any time before the next shot. With all the attendant problems present in the simultaneous broadcast on B and D from one antenna and not being able to install a second one, I recommend we settle for a one channel, no back up voice time hack for ROMEO. No aircraft are critically positioned.

b. NAN RACON: The condition of this equipment is unknown. However, it is believed and hoped that one or two men working from two to four hours each should be able to get this racon back on the air. It will remain at its present location. Thought has been given to moving it into the main bunker, but in addition to the time to dismantle and move, it would take one man at least a full day to install the antenna atop the bunker. Another argument against moving the racon into the main bunker is that it would then be within 50 feet of the tower, which would probably blank out a fairly large sector of space

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TAB NO. 56

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as far as the signal is concerned.

c. NAN Homing Beacon: It is hoped that the AN/URN-5 presently in place can be put back in operation without too much trouble. The homer came back on the air after B-Day when the NAN power was turned on. However, it was not keying the "BI" identification. As a last resort, we can always use the Curtiss homer if it is in the Bikini area.

d. Action to be taken at NAN: One maintenance offier, one Philco Technical Representative and two airmen technicians from the Communications Element are scheduled to leave late Sunday afternoon by ship for Bikini. They are taking tools, test equipment and spare parts. They will keep us advised of the situation.

e. Rongerik Homer: As you know the Test Services Unit is scheduled to make its first survey of Rongerik Wednesday. One maintenance officer and two technicians from the Communications Element will accompany this trip. Present planning is that the homer there will be fixed for unattended operation. It is capable of running thusly for over fifty hours. We will have to get a technician into and out of Rongerik on the day prior to ROMEO. It is desirable that this be done no sooner than H-12 to H-14 hours.

f. Bikini Strip: No action has been taken concerning control tower facilities. Next week, the available resources will be almost completely used up on the aforementioned facilities, plus the routine work required at Eniwetok.

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FM CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK ATOLL MI
INFO CTG 7.4
DA GR121

[redacted]/ FOR COMMO PD RAD SAFE OFFICER THIS HQS REQUIRES CW POSITION IN RADSAFE OFFICE PAREN NAV OPERATIONS RCOM PAREN USS ESTES OPERATING ON CIRCUIT JIG DASH FOUR ONE ONE FOR COMM WITH WEATHER RECON AIRCRAFT PD FAC REQUIRED FM HOW HOUR UNTIL HOW PLUS FOUR EIGHT HOURS PD USE WILL BE PRIMARILY INTERCEPT WITH ONLY LIMITED NR OF XMSSNX PD TG SEVEN PNT TWO CANNOT PROVIDE OPRS PD REQUEST ESTES INSTALL REMOTE OPERATING POSITION IN RAD SAFE OFFICE AND PROVIDE OPRS FOR PERIOD REQUIRES
06/0455Z

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[redacted]

AFWL/HO

TAB NO. 57

240
94-2

R 080018Z
FM CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK ATOLL MI
TO JHDQR/CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI

ATTN ALL CRYPTO OFFICERS PD USE OF PLAIN DRESS HEADINGS AUTH 08/0044Z

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TAG NO. 58

AFWL/HO

[redacted]

R 080300Z ZNJ
FM CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK ATOLL MI
TO ZEN/HA AACS ANDRES AFB WASH DC
INFO CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI
DA GR C

[redacted] THIS MSG AUTH XMSSN OF JTF SEVEN UNCLASSIFIED TRAFFIC IN THE CLEAR OVER USAF FAC WHEN CIRCUIT OR EQUIPMENT CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT RELAY AND DELIVERY DELAYS WOULD BE INTRODUCED BY WAITING FOR ON LINE CIRCUITS OR EQUIPMENT TO COME BACK PD ALT ROUTE IS ALSO OBVIOUS REASONS THIS CANNOT BE A FIXED THING CMM IT IS SUGGESTED THAT ZEBRA AND YOKE MESSAGES BE ALT ROUTED IMMEDIATELY CMM OBCE MSGS ONE FIVE TO THREE ZERO MINS CMM PETER MSGS FROM THREE ZERO TO FOUR FIVE MINS AND ROGER AND MIKE TRAFFIC AFTER ONE TO ONE PNT FIVE HOURS PD THIS IS A CHANGE FROM BASIC CONCEPT OF TARE SLANT ABLE PROTECTION FOR ALL JTF SEVEN UNCLASSIFIED TRAFFIC BUT DELAYS CMM ESPECIALLY FOR HIGH PRECEDENCE MSGS CMM CANNOT BE ACCEPTED PD IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT ALL POSSIBLE JTF SEVEN UNCLASSIFIED WILL STILL BE PROCESSED OVER ON DASH LINE FAC PD ESTIMATE ONLY APPROX FIVE PERCENT OF TOTAL UNCLASSIFIED TRAFFIC WILL HAVE TO BE ROUTED IN THE CLEAR BECAUSE OF THE ABOVE CONDITIONS PD THIS MSG IN NO WAY ALTERS THIS HQ REQUEST FOR SECURE FAC TO JIG WILLIAM ZEBRA FOR CASTLE
08/0336Z

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[redacted]

AFWL/HO

TAB NO. 59

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

R 072310Z ZNJ
FM CJTF 7
TO CTG 7.4

/C[redacted] ENIWETOK LORAN STA MONITORING EXPERIENCING HARMFUL INTERFERENCE ENIWETOK XMIT TWO ZERO SIX EIGHT KCS AND FIVE TWO ZERO FIVE KCS PD REMEDIAL ACTION FOLS CLN REF RECENTLY ACTIVATED RADIO TELEPHONE VOICE CIRCUI DASH ENIWETOK COM XMIT FIVE TWO ZERO TWO KCS VICE FIVE NINE THREE ZERO KCS PD CIRCUIT JIG DASH TWO ZERO FOUR CMM ENIWETOK XMIT TO FIVE NINE THREE ZERO KCS VICE FIVE TWO ZERO FIVE KCS PD CIRCUIT JIG DASH FOUR ZERO ONE CMM ENIWETOK PAREN AF PARFN XMIT TO ESTES TWO EIGHT ONE FIVE KCS VICE TWO ZERO SIX EIGHT KCS PD ACTIVATE IMMEDIATELY AND ADVISE WHEN OPERATIONAL

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[redacted]

AFWL/CNO

TAB NO. 60

[redacted]

P 131020Z
FM CO COAST GUARD LORAN STATION ENIWETOK MI
INFO UHPJB/CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI

[redacted] CITE 0767 PD LORAN RATES 1LØ AND 1L1 MONITORABLE CONTINUOUSLY FOR 24 HOURS FOLLOWING FREQUENCY CHANGES BY JTF SEVEN PD INTERFERENCY REDUCED TO MINIMUM PD FUTURE GOOD LORAN CONDITIONS ASSURED

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[redacted]

AFWLMO

TAB NO. 61

P 082313Z
FM-CTG SEVEN PNT ONE
TO UHPJB/CTG SEVEN PNT FOUR ENIWETOK MI

/[redacted]TE JIG FOX 5079 PD FROM ROBERTS PASS TO LT COL NUGENT PD PRESENT PLANS TO LEAVE RACON PAREN AN SLANT CPN DASH SIX PAREN ACTIVATED AT ALL TIMES PD LOVE FOX HOMER WILL BE OFF AIR UNTIL HOW PLUS ONE MINUTE CMM HOMER TO BE ACTIVATED BY SHOCK WAVE ARRIVAL NAN

CFN 5079
08/2350Z

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[redacted]

TAB NO. 30

[redacted]

R 042257Z
FM CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK
INFO CTG 7.4

/C[redacted] TG SEVEN PNT THREE FOR COMMO PD HAVE REPORT THAT CONTROL DESTROYER DOES NOT HAVE XMITTING EQUIPMENT TO SIMULTANEOUSLY OPERATE CIRCUITS JIG DASH FOUR ZERO SEVEN CMM JIG DASH FOUR ONE ZERO CMM AND JIG DASH THREE ONE NINE PD ADVISE PD IF TRUE CAN CONTROL MISSION BE ASSIGNED ANOTHER DESTROYER HAVING THIS CAPABILITY

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[redacted]

TEL NO. 63

AFWL/NT

[redacted]

R 020915Z ZN J
~~FM~~ CTG 7.3
INFO CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK

[redacted] YOUR ZERO FOUR TWO TWO FIVE SEVEN ZEBRA X CONTROL DDE HAS CURRENT REQUIREMENTS GUARD THREE HIGH FREQUENCY CIRCUITS PLUS HOMER X TWO TBL AND ONE TCS EQUIPMENTS ON BOARD X SUGGEST LIST EN ONLY ON JIG DASH FOUR ONE ZERO AND LIMIT AIRCRAFT CONTROL TO VHF X FULL OPERATION JIG DASH THREE ZERO ZERO ESSENTIAL X REQUEST COMCORTDESDIV ONE TWO COMMENT

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[redacted]

AFWL/NP

TAB NO. 54

[redacted]

R 072320Z
FM CJTF 7 ENIWETOK
TO XZEN/CTG 7.3
INFO JHKQR/CTG 7.4

/[redacted]L/ URMSG ZERO FIVE ZERO NINE ONE FIVE ZEBRA PD ANNEX FOX YOUR OPERATION ORDER ASSIGNED GUARD MISSION THESE CIRCUITS TO CONTROL DOG DOG EASY INDICATING EQUIPMENT ON BOARD FOR OPERATION OF ALL PD NOW UNDERSTAND LIMITATIONS THIS VESSEL PD IS ASSUMPTION CORRECT THAT SAME LIMITATION APPLIES OTHER DOG DOG EASIES

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[redacted]

AFWL/TWO

TAB NO. 55

[redacted]

M 171136Z ZNJ
FM CJTF SEVEN
TO CTG SEVEN PNT FOUR

/[redacted]L/ PD FOR LT COL NUGENT X ALL DESTROYERS HERE HAVE SAME NUMBER OF TRANSMITTERS X NOTHING TO BE GAINED BY TRANSFERRING TO ANOTHER DESTROYER X LT COL HARBOUR FEELS SHIP CAN PERFORM ITS MISSION WITH JIG FOUR ZERO SEVEN HOMER AND TWO VHF CIRCUITS X JOHNSON CONSIDERED MSG OF DESTROYER CMDR AS FINAL ANSWER X BOWEN SENDS

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[redacted]

APPROVED

TAB NO. 66

R 220856Z ZNJ
FM CJTF 7
TO JHKQR/CTG 7.4

/C [redacted] REQUEST RADIO EQUIP BE INSTALLED TARE AIRSTRIP TO BE OPERATED ON BAKER CHANNEL BY AIRFIELD CREW PD SUGGEST SCR WIX TWO FOUR PD CTG SEVEN PNT FIVE WILL PROVIDE ONE ONE ZERO VOLT POWER
21/0942Z

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[redacted]

AFWL/NKI

TAB NO. 17

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE ROUTINE

CTG 7.4 AFB NM

010330Z

TGGT 2-109 UNCLASSIFIED

(----------I AFB CALIF

CITE TGMS 3-2 X INFO SMSIL AT SMAMA X URMSG TGGR 2-109 X RTRN THE ARC-3 SET FR C-97 ACFT 308 X OTHER ITEMS IDENTIFIED BY TGOC AS PARTS OF ARC-1 AND ARC-28 X REQ THESE BE SHIPPED TO AF-2272-SO MARKED FOR TASK GP 7.4

COMM

UNCLASSIFIED 1 1

, USAF

TGMS 4224

TAB NO. 68

AFWL/NO

UNCLASSIFIED

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI

ROUTINE ROUTINE

COMDR SMAMA MCCLELLAN AFB CALIF 030210Z

CITE TGMS 3-21 X FOR SMSIL X REF LTR FR MAJ MCKOY 24 FEB RE 350 PSI COMPRESSOR GAS ENG POWERED AND 100 GAL TK FOR RECEIVER X REQ YOUR EARLY CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER AND ADVISE

UNCLASSIFIED 1 1

RAY M. HAWLEY, COLONEL, USAF

TGMS 4224

TAB NO. 69

AFNOA/NO

HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROV
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
1 March 1954

OPERATIONS PLAN NO. 1-54 (This plan supplements Test Services Unit Plan Number 1-54)

CHART OR MAP REFERENCES: As required.

TASK ORGANIZATIONS:

WREP DET 1	WOJG John A Kapral
WREP DET 2	MSGT Keith McKay
WREP DET 3	TSGT William J Treadway
WREP DET 4	MSGT Clifford T Jones

ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY:

WEATHER CENTRAL ELEMENT, PROV.	Lt Col Herschel H Slate
1110TH AIR SUPPORT DET	Capt James I Eden

1. GENERAL SITUATION:

a. General:

Weather Reporting Element Headquarters and Detachments were est lished in the forward area in accordance with 6th Weather Squadron (Mob Operations Order Number 816-53. No specific provisions were made for r up as many factors were unknown when the order was written. Current In mation indicates subsequent operations will follow Operation CASTLE (CO FIDENTIAL) with requirements for weather reporting facilities at MAJURO KUSAIE, PONAPE and RONGERIK. Almost all the weather island equipment h now been used on two operations in the Central Pacific where corrosion, normal wear and tear and only minor maintenance have placed it in a con dition requiring depot reconditioning. Upon completion of Operation CASTLE, all nonexpendable items of supply at the weather islands will b shipped to Sacramento Air Materiel Area, California, for inspection, se regation, return to stock or shipped to appropriate zonal depot, unless otherwise directed as indicated in general instructions.

b. Assumptions:

(1) There will be operations similar to and subsequent to Op tion CASTLE (CONFIDENTIAL).

(2) MAJURO, KUSAIE, PONAPE and RONGERIK will be required as weather reporting islands on subsequent operations.

(3) Test Services Unit will provide a general roll-up order.

(4) A Landing Ship, Tank (LST) will be available for weather island roll-up.

(5) A Landing Craft, Utility (LCU) will be available to load LST at Rongerik.

TAB NO. 70

(6) Task Group 7.4 will provide transportation for all personnel to the Zone of the Interior.

(7) All weather island supplies and equipment will be returned to the Zone of Interior for depot reconditioning and return to stock during the interim period.

(8) All equipment and supplies will be picked up by the LST at the weather islands and transported to the Oakland Army Port.

(9) Radioactive equipment will be negligible.

(10) SMAMA will inspect, segregate and reship the WREP supplies to the appropriate zonal depot.

2. MISSION:

Each Weather Reporting Element Detachment will roll-up their activity in accordance with the instructions contained herein and before the dates indicated in paragraph 4b(1).

3. TASK FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS:

a. WREP DET 1 will accomplish the following:

(1) Document, pack and crate property as indicated in paragraph 3x prior to LST arrival.

(2) Document, pack and crate technical expendables for transfer to AF 2272 SO.

(3) Document, pack and crate perishables, food and POL products for transfer to Supply Officer TG 7.2, APO 187, c/o PM, S.F.

(4) Prepare DUKW and allied equipment for shipment to USAF Army Property Custodian, APO 187, c/o PM, S.F.

b. WREP DET 2, WREP DET 3 and WREP DET 4 will accomplish the following:

(1) Document, pack and crate property as indicated in paragraph 3x prior to LST arrival.

(2) Transfer all perishables, food and POL products to the representative of the Trust Territories on an AF Form 446. Copies of these forms will be delivered to the Commander, WREP.

x. General Instructions:

(1) Preliminary Roll-up: (On or about 1 April 1954)

(a) An inventory of all supplies, expendable and non-expendable, and an accurate record maintained indicating quantity on hand until beginning of final roll-up.

[redacted]

(b) Preparation of shipping documents on non-expendable supplies in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 4.

(c) Survey made of boxes and crates to determine their serviceability. Unserviceable boxes will be replaced or repaired. Item should be reshipped in the same containers received in when practicable.

(d) Unused or reparable supplies and equipment will be moved to the LST loading area. This will be accomplished only after packing, crating and documentation have been completed. Security cargo or items subject to pilferage will not be moved to the LST loading area until final roll-up operations.

(e) Helium cylinders will be banded on pallets and marked for shipment to the Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, California in accordance with instructions caontained in paragraph 4a(3). Full cylinders will be tagged with a yellow (AF Form 50) tag, and empty cylinders will be tagged with a green (AF Form 50) tag.

(f) All buildings used by WREP detachments at the various islands will be cleaned and repaired to the best possible condition and repainted at the end of this operation. Buildings will be closed and locked and the keys delivered to the representative of the Trust Territories at the island. Keys for the buildings at Rongerik will be delivered to the Commander, 4930th Test Support Group at Eniwetok. Care will be exercised to insure that the buildings will withstand the weather during the interim period. This will include anchoring the buildings with heavy wire and insuring that the foundation is solid. Electrical fixtures and wiring in the buildings will remain intact. Remove light bulbs and treat receptacles with corrosion preventative compound.

(g) Rejected rawinsonde transmitters and modulators will be tagged as reparable and shipped to SMAMA.

(2) Final Roll-up: (Commencing K-day)

(a) All areas used by WREP Detachments will be left clean. All trash containers will be cleaned and trash disposed of by burning or other approved methods.

[redacted]

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(b) 6th Weather Squadron (Mobile) property)GMC-1A, etc.) will be carried as TAT equipment to TINKER AFB, OKLAHOMA.

(c) Helium cylinder roll-up will be completed during this time.

(d) Perishables, food supplies, POL products, and POL containers will be transferred to the representative of the Trust Territories at the island on an Issue Slip, AF Form 446. Issue slips will be prepared in six copies. Except Rongerik - Four copies of each completed AF Form 446 will be forwarded to Commander, WREP.

(e) Medical expendable supplies will be disposed of in the same manner as paragraph 3x(2)(d). Where drugs or narcotics are transferred, the detachment commander will so indicate in the drug and narcotic register.

(f) Rawinsonde expendable supplies of a critical nature will be shipped to SMAMA in accordance with applicable directives.

(g) All other expendable supplies will be stored in buildings if unperishable or disposed of at the detachment commanders discretion.

(h) Photographic film will be carried as TAT equipment to TINKER AFB, OKLAHOMA.

(i) Cameras will be shipped as Security Cargo to SMAMA.

(j) A record of all expenses incurred for labor, services and materiel and a written verification statement by the detachment commander will be picked up by the Commander, WREP prior to departure of the detachment from the weather island.

(k) Vehicles and power units and gasoline refrigeration units will be prepared for ocean shipment. Old oil will be replaced by clean oil and all openings sealed with water-proof tape. Fuel tanks will be drained prior to loading aboard the LST.

(l) Radio Set SCR-399 will be packed with dehumidifying crystals, sealed with water-proof tape, and banded. Crystals will be shipped as component parts of the set.

(m) The fork-lift at RONGERIK will be utilized to load equipment at PONAPE, KUSAIE and MAJURO. The detachment commander at RONGERIK is responsible for documenting the fork-lift.

[redacted]

(n) Bedding materiel will be laundered prior to packing and crating. Reparable bedding materiel will be tagged as such and packed separately from the serviceable bedding.

(o) Tentage and other canvas materiel will be spread and dried prior to packing. Fungus preventative will be used if available.

(p) Typewriters, calculators and similar equipment will be bolted to their cases. Light oil will be used as a corrosion preventative.

(q) The surf boats at RONGERIK and KUSAIE will be packed and crated as received.

(r) All containers will be properly documented, sealed, banded and tagged with appropriate serviceable or reparable tags.

(s) All equipment and tools will be tagged with appropriate serviceable or reparable tags.

(t) Technical Manuals will be carried as TAT equipment to Tinker AFB.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:

a. Marking and Documentation: The procedures for marking and documenting cargo are set forth below:

(1) Service color marking and the marron "X" will remain the same as when received.

(2) Marking of containers and equipment to be returned to SMAMA will be as follows:

TO: PTO
USA-AIR-SFPE

M/FOR: TRANS OFF
SACRAMENTO AIR MATERIEL AREA
McCLELLAN AFB, CALIFORNIA

(3) Helium cylinders (banded pallets) will be marked as follows:

TO: USA-AIR-SFPE

M/FOR: RECEIVING OFFICER
NAVAL AIR STATION
MOFFETT FIELD, CALIFORNIA

(4) Documentation will be on AF Form 104B. A minimum of twenty-four (24) copies of each shipping document will be prepared. Separate documents will be prepared for each class of supplies, i.e., 16-H, 17-B, 29 etc., and separate shipping documents will be prepared for each container or unit except when several

[redacted]

boxes make up one set of equipment. In such cases one document will be prepared and a notation entered thereon similar to "Set consists of Boxes 1 thru 10". Shipping documents will contain the following information: Ship From_____, Ship To_____, Mark For_____, No. of Packages_____, Weight_____, Cube_____, Description of Contents_____ _____, and Quantity Shipped.

(5) The following statement will appear in the body of the shipping document: Chargeable to_____.

(6) Distribution will be made as follows:

(a) One copy retained with UPREAL jacket file.

(b) One copy retained by the accountable or responsible officer or NCO.

(c) Three copies to be delivered to Commander, WREP (Two of these will be airmailed to consignee).

(d) One copy will be placed inside each container and two copies attached to the outside of the container. On shipment of sets, consisting of more than one box one copy will be placed inside each box of the set and two copies attached to the outside of each box.

(e) Sixteen copies to the LST commander for further distribution as follows:

1 Two copies for LST Commander.

2 One copy returned to consignor after signing by port authority. (Address will be: 6th Weather Squadron (Mobile), Tinker AFB, Oklahoma).

3 One copy retained in file manifest.

4 Three copies airmailed to the port of debarkation with manifest (Via Army-Navy Shipping Information Agency when destined to the U.S.).

5 Eight copies to accompany manifest aboard vessel.

6 One copy with manifest airmailed to JTF SEVEN Liaison Officer or Movement Control Agency at port of discharge of WREP cargo.

b. Transportation:

(1) Transportation for the evacuation of weather island supplies and equipment will be by LST. The LST will travel the following route

[redacted]

and approximate schedule:

ARRIVE	LOCATION	DEPART	REMARKS
K plus 12	RONGERIK	K plus 16	Off-load RONGERIK personnel and equipment consigned for Eniwetok.
K plus 17	ENIWETOK	K plus 18	
K plus 20	PONAPE	K plus 21	
K plus 23	KUSAIE	K plus 24	
K plus 27	MAJURO	K plus 28	Off-load KUSAIE and PONAPE personnel.
K plus 38	PEARL HARBOR	K plus 45	Off-load Navy property consigned to PEARL HARBOR. Possibly off-load all weather island equip for reshipment to SMAMA in case LST does not return to ZI.
K plus 55	NSC, OAKLAND, CALIF		Off-load all weather island equipment.

(2) Transportation of personnel from the forward area to permanent duty station will be commenced as follows:

DET NO.	PERM DY STA	NO. PERSONNEL off	Enl	Total	FWD AREA DY STA	DT TRANS DESIRED	MODE OF TRAVEL	FWD AREA DEP POINT
WREP-1	Sedalia AFB	1	1	2	Eniwetok	K plus 8	MATS	Eniwetok
WREP-2	Edwards AFB	0	2	2	Eniwetok	K plus 8	MATS	Eniwetok
WREP-3	Great Falls	1	3	4	Eniwetok	K plus 8	MATS	Eniwetok
WREP-4	Vernalis AFB	0	2	2	Eniwetok	K plus 8	MATS	Eniwetok
WREP-5	Tinker AFB	0	7	7	Eniwetok	K plus 10	MATS	Eniwetok
**WREP-6	Tinker AFB	1	23	24	Rongerik	K plus 19	MATS	Eniwetok
**WREP-7	Tinker AFB	0	21	21	Ponape	K plus 30	MATS	Kwajalein
**WREP-8	Tinker AFB	0	21	21	Kusaie	K plus 30	MATS	Kwajalein
**WREP-9	Tinker AFB	0	21	21	Majuro	K plus 30	MATS	Kwajalein
***WREP-10	Tinker AFB	1	2	3	Eniwetok	K plus 30	MATS	Kwajalein
*WREP-11	Tinker AFB	1	0	1	Eniwetok	K plus 35	MATS	Kwajalein

* Will remain at Hickam AFB until equipment departs Pearl Harbor.
** 2000 lbs TAT Equipment.
*** 500 lbs TAT Equipment.

WCEP-1	Tinker AFB	0	1	1	Eniwetok	K plus 1	MATS	Eniwetok
WCEP-2	Hickam AFB	2	0	2	Eniwetok	K plus 1	MATS	Eniwetok
WCEP-3	Hickam AFB	1	0	1	Eniwetok	K plus 4	MATS	Eniwetok
WCEP-4	Tokyo, Japan	2	0	2	Eniwetok	K plus 6	MATS	Eniwetok
WCEP-5	Tinker AFB	1	6	7	Eniwetok	K plus 10	MATS	Eniwetok
WCEP-6	Hickam AFB	2	0	2	Eniwetok	K plus 12	MATS	Eniwetok
WCEP-7	Hickam AFB	2	0	2	Eniwetok	K plus 15	MATS	Eniwetok

c. Supply Action:

(1) UPREALS will be inspected by an inspector from Task Group 7.4 prior to supplies being loaded aboard the LST.

(2) Incomplete or inadequate supply action pertaining to detachment supplies will result in delaying the LST movement as supply action will be complete and as prescribed prior to shipment.

(3) Each detachment commander will turn-in his completed UPREAL (AF Form 115), control register and supporting documents to Commander WREP prior to departure from the weather island.

5. Command and Signal Matters:

a. Command Relationship: Annex Hotel, 6th Weather Squadron (Mobile) Operations Order 816-53 remains in effect during the roll-up. All personnel will return to the jurisdiction of the 6th Weather Squadron (Mobile) in all respects after re-entering the Zone of Interior.

b. Command Posts: Command Posts remain as in paragraph 5b and 5c, 6th Weather Squadron (Mobile) Operations Order 816-53.

c. Communications: Communications will remain as during the operation until the SCR-399 is packed for final shipment. Subsequent to packing the SCR-399, if necessary, detachment commanders will request the Captain of the LST to send dispatches via his radio.

/s/Fellie F. Robinson
/t/FELLIE F. ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

END NO. 32

AFWL/TWO

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Staff Visit Report

DATE: 3 Mar 54 COMMENT NO 1

1. [redacted] and I visited J-4, JTF-7, 3 March 1954, to discuss weather island roll-up.

2. Persons present:

[redacted], Acting J-4, JTF-7
[redacted], Ass't J-4, JTF-7
Chief of Army Supply, J-4
Staff Supply Officer, TG 7.4
[redacted]s, Staff Transportation Officer, TG 7.4

3. Discussion:

a. We outlined to the officers present our concept of the weather island roll-up as follows:

(1) Utilize LST #551 to proceed to Rongerik on or about K / 7 for the purpose of transporting the Rongerik weather package and personnel to Eniwetok. Upon arrival at Eniwetok those items to be left here will be off-loaded and the LST will proceed to the southern islands. Those personnel off-loaded at Eniwetok would be transported back to the ZI by appropriate means. The resonsible officer for weather island roll-up would depart with LST #551 together with the remainder of the weather island package from Rongerik which is to be transported back to the ZI.

(2) The three (3) southern islands Kusaie, Ponape and Majuro will then be hit by the LST picking up the property and personnel from those three (3). LST #551 would then proceed to Honolulu where certain items would be off-loaded, specifically, a crane and some refrigeration units, loaned to the LST by the Navy for the outbound voyage.

(3) If the LST #551 is to proceed back to the ZI, the weather island packages will be left aboard and transported to the Oakland port. If, for any reason, the operations orders of LST #551 are changed, the cargo would be off-loaded at the Honolulu port and placed in the MSTS stream for shipment, back to the Oakland port in the routine manner. Colonel Fleming confirmed their agreement with this plan and the availability of LST #551 as far as the Honolulu port. He could not make a committment on the use of the LST beyond Honolulu.

AFWDJTHO

TAB NO. 70

261/263

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

(4) The second phase of our discussion had to do with our concept of the proper manner in which to handle the weather island packages during the interim. We explained to him briefly that we proposed to place this equipment in the hands of the organization of primary interest, that is; the Air Weather Service, for care, safeguarding, organizational maintenance and build-up for any future operation. Colonel Fleming stated that he considered this a good plan that he agreed with the concept but that he felt this was primarily the concern of the USAF and did not feel it appropriate for JTF-7 to do more than concur in the procedure. Commander Mather pointed out that in future operations, weather observation requirements would be laid on much as in the past depending upon the data required. That JTF-7 did not propose to tell the Air Force, in detail, how they would get the job done.

4. Recommendations:

a. That the weather island roll-up plan include the utilization of LST #551 as described above.

b. That early action be taken through USAF, MATS to Air Weather Service for the concurrence of that organization to accept the responsibility for the weather island packages at the home station of 6th Weather, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. This matter should be firmed up in order that documentation of the weather island packages could begin at an early date.

Major, USAF
Staff Supply Officer

AFWL/HO

TAB NO. 70

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

SUBJECT: Unit Supply Inspection

TO: COL HAWLEY FROM: MAJOR McKOY DATE: 5 Mar 54 COMMENT NO. 1

1. I accompanied Deputy Commander, Test Services Unit, on an inspection of the Communications Element Supply this date. I accompanied at his and request inasmuch as I had not intended inspecting this facility until on or about 25 March 1954. This will be in the form of a preliminary inspection report.

2. Persons Contacted:

Commander, Test Services Unit, Prov
Deputy Commander, Test Services Unit, Prov
Commander, Communications Element
, OIC, Communications Element Supply
. NCOIC, Plant Account
, NCOIC, Expendables

3. General Observations:

a. A project board has been established showing the sets on hand and making reference to the appropriate publications pertaining to these sets, that is, catalogues, Tech Orders, etc. This board also has a remarks column showing the status of ordering spare parts.

b. It was interesting to note during January two hundred twenty-three (223) line items had been ordered. During February three thousand one hundred sixteen (3,116) line items were ordered. The project of ordering the initial spares has been practically completed and the personnel are now ready to begin re-ordering to bring depleted levels back up to par. During February, when 3,116 line items were ordered, approximately 700 line items were issued and these stocks must be replenished.

c. The Plant Account records are being brought up to date and preparation is being made for an inventory of all Plant Account property. 90A's have been checked against the Plant Account records of Base Supply and a consolidated is now being prepared by Communications Element personnel from their own records. This includes breaking major sets down into their components in order that a proper inventory may be accomplished. and his personnel estimate the pre-inventory work should be completed by 8 March 1954. The inventory will begin on or about that time and they estimate will require approximately two (2) weeks to count. has established 25 March 1954 as a deadline date to complete this project and has set his personnel up on a two (2) shift operation in order to get the most work with the space and facilities available.

d. Since my last inspection of this unit, two (2) additional personnel have been assigned: , 64174, arrived 21 Feb 54 from the

AFWCHO

TAB NO. 70

263½

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

1954th AACS Squadron, Japan; A/2C Shankman, 64131, arrived 21 Feb 54 from the 1955th AACS Squadron, Japan.

e. One of the most urgent needs in this supply now appears to be additional bin storage in order that the items which have been placed on order can be properly warehoused upon receipt. A work order request for these bins has been submitted by the Commander, Test Services Unit.

4. Conclusions:

a. That outstanding progress has been made during the month of February in bringing the Communications Element Supply up to acceptable standards.

b. That and his personnel deserve recognition for the work they accomplished during this short period.

c. That satisfactory progress is being made to straighten out the Plant Account property.

d. That additional bins are needed for the storage of the expendables.

5. Recommendations:

a. That sufficient bins be constructed and made available to Captain Neher for storage of expendable supplies.

Major, USAF
Staff Supply Officer

AFMLPRD

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK ATOLL MI 050335Z MAR 54 [redacted]

OCOFT DEPTAR WASH DC PRIORITY ROUTINE
CO SMSIL MCCLELLAN AFB CALIF
LNO JTF 7 TRAVIS AFB CALIF OM
CJTF SEVEN (REAR) WASH DC MA
NO

COMATS WASH DC
COMPACDIVMATS HICKAM AFB TH
CO 1501 ATG MATS TRAVIS AFB CALIF
CTG 7.4 ENIWETOK MI (MAIL)

MSG IN FOUR PARTS PD PART ONE FOR OCOFT PD REQUEST ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING IMMED AIRLIFT FOR ONE EIGHT PIECES BAKER DASH THREE SIX AOCP CMM WEIGHT ONE ONE TWO FIVE POINDS CMM ONE FOUR FOUR ONE CUFT PD THERE ARE FOUR PIECES THREE TWO FEET LONG CMM THREE FEET HIGH AND SIX INCHES WIDE SMCLN ONE RADAR DOME SEVEN FEET BY SEVEN FEET BY TWO PNT FIVE FEET CMM WEIGHT TWO FIVE POINDS SMCLN ONE DOOR CMM SEVEN PNT FIVE FEET BY SEVEN PNT FIVE FEET BY ONE INCH CMM WEIGHT FIVE ZERO POUNDS SMCLN SIX PIECES ONE FOUR FEET LONG CMM TWO FEET WIDE AND ONE FOOT THICK PD URGENT MATERIAL ARRIVE ENIWETOK NOT LATER THAN ONE FOUR MAR PD POINTS OF PICKUP IN ZI WILL BE ADVISED BY CJTF SEVEN REAR PD PART TWO FOR , SMAMA PD ADVISE LOCATIONS CMM EXACT MEASUREMENTS CMM WEIGHTS CMM READINESS DATES FOR PICKUP ABOVE CARGO PD PART THREE FOR BETTIS PD COORDINATE ALL MOVEMENTS PD ADVISE CJTF REAR IMMED ALL PERTINENT INFO RECEIVED FROM PD PART FOUR FOR CJTF SEVEN REAR PD KEEP THIS HQ CURRENTLY ADVISED OF PROGRESS PD THIS REQUIREMENT IS ADDITIONAL TO MARTS AIRLIFT ALLOCATION PD THIS BULKY MOVEMENT MAY REQUIRE FULL CAPACITY UTILIZATION OF ONE SHERAN DASH NINE SEVEN AIRCRAFT OR COMPARABLE

[redacted] L.

J-4

050235Z MAR 54 241

AFWCMG

[redacted]

TAB NO. 12

265/267

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

Staff Visit

C 3 Feb 54

1. This date I visited the Communications Element supply set up (MCS) to determine the precentage of completion of ordering the necessary spares to support the communications equipment for this operation. I met [redacted] here on TDY from Itazuki AFB, Japan. He stated his mission was outlined to him by the 1808th MCS Wing in Tokyo as that of seeing to it that necessary spare parts were procured for the assigned equipment.

2. [redacted] arrived at Eniwetok on or about 3 Jan 54 for approximately four (4) months TDY with the Communications Element. [redacted] personnel situation was considered and the following personnel are assigned to his unit:

a. [redacted], arrived on or about 7 Dec 53.

b. [redacted], arrived on or about 1 Dec 53.

c. [redacted], arrived on or about 25 Dec 53.

d. [redacted], arrived on or about 3 Dec 53.

All of the above personnel are TDY. [redacted], is permanent party and arrived here in October 1953.

3. When questioned as to percentage of completion of ordering the necessary spares, C[redacted] stimated the job to be 25% completed. This seemed unsatisfactory to me at this late date and I questioned him regarding his working schedule. He indicated his people worked from approximately 0730 hours to 1600 hours and from 1800 hours to approximately 2200 hours daily. That he gave each man one (1) evening per week off to attend the movies. Assuming this schedule to be constant, it appears the men are working as many hours as could be expected. I further questioned [redacted] as to any other difficulty he had experienced which would have prevented him from getting these spares on order. He indicated that approximately one-half his time is taken up in the procurement of various communications gear from Base Supply for installation by the I&I Team.

4. When I asked him about the plant account property he stated that [redacted], who is a permanent party officer with the local MCS Detachment, is the responsible officer. He further advised that [redacted] now works as Adjutant and Administrative Officer for the Communications Element and has not been able to put any time into supply work for the Communications Element recently. He advised that he had been directed by the Commander of the Communications Element to take over the plant account from [redacted] and showed me a letter, dated 22 Jan 54, signed by [redacted] so directing. [redacted] is the Commander of the Communications Element.

AFWL/WD

TAB NO. 72 (1)

266268

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

5. I asked how long he estimated it would take for him to assume responsibility for the plant account property in a proper manner. He estimates approximately two (2) months. Not understanding the condition of the account, I questioned him as to why he felt such a long period would be required to take over this plant account. I was conducted on a brief inspection of his area where considerable supplies are stored outside, subject to the elements. A great portion of these were represented to me as components of sets, such as SCR399 and 499, which have been issued to AACS people from Base Supply and only a relatively few of the components actually placed in use. Some of these are scattered out into various locations where AACS property is in use in this area, for example, Bikini. I was not shown any records which would indicate that a locator system is in use for the control of this property, Time did not permit going into every detail of the operation, therefore, some type of locator system may be in use but it was not brought to my attention. In addition, I noted items which it seemed possible might be excess to their requirements and asked why he had not turned-in these items. An example was approximately twenty (20) or twenty-five (25) BC779 receiver and power supply units in storage in a hut. He stated he did not have authority to turn these items in to Base Supply and declare them excess to needs of this operation. Realizing that I am not in any position to judge whether the items are in excess I made no further investigation of the matter.

6. Conclusions and recommendations:

a. That since the project of ordering spares for the communications sets is only approximately 25% completed estimate) and recognizing the seriousness of a breakdown in communications as a part of the mission of Task Group 7.4, it is recommended that immediate action be taken to complete this project in order that these spares might begin to arrive in this area as soon as possible.

b. That since is here on TDY and is a permanent officer consideration be given to allowing to concentrate his efforts on research and ordering spare parts rather than performing the functions of the permanently assigned officer for the AACS Detachment. I realize this is a command perogative with the Commander of the Communications Element and I make this recommendation only with the idea of preventing from consuming several weeks in locating and inventorying the large plant account now signed out to If, at a later date, it is determined that is to remain here and the task of ordering spares has been completed, this might, at that time, be a wise course of action.

c. It is recommended that the Commander of the Test Services Unit, Provisional, have this matter brought to his attention in order that he might take whatever action he deems appropriate after evaluating the situation.

TAB NO. 72 (2)

267/2

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI

050350Z UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

CONDR SMAMA MCCLELLAN AFB CALIF

X

SMSIL 3-25 UNCLASSIFIED

CITE TGMS 3-45 X FOR SMSIL X URMSG SMSIL 3-25 X IT IS UNDERSTOOD DOOR OPERATING CYL NOT PART OF DOOR ASSY X REQ BOMB BAY DOORS BE BUILT UP AS FOL: REF T. O. 01-5EU-4, FIG 112, PAGE 279, ITEMS 1, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 AND 18 PLUS ALL HINGE FITTINGS FASTENED TO THE BASIC DOOR X MAROON STREAK 14 MAR IN MY TGMS 3-32

RAY M. HAWLEY, COLONEL, USAF

TGMS 4224

UNCLASSIFIED

A.J. ANDERSON, CAPT., USAF, ADJUTANT

APPROVED

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI 101025Z [redacted]

ROUTINE ROUTINE

PATTERSON AFB OHIO X

X

AACS LNO AMC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OHIO
COMDR AACS DET KWAJALEIN MI
COMDR 1810TH AACS GP HICKAM AFB TH

CITE TGMS 3-108 X FOR MCSDXB AT AMC X REQ YOU COORD THE FOL PROBLEM WITH THE APROPRIATE AGENCY CMA AMC CMA FOR EARLIEST SOLUTION X WE PRESENTLY HAVE ON HAND IN THE PAC PROVING GRD THE FOL COMM SETS OF WHICH ONLY CERTAIN COMPONENTS ARE REQUIRED CLN ONE EA SIERRA COCA ROMEO THREE NINE NINE CMA SIG CORPS STOCK NO TWO SIERRA THREE NINE NINE SMCLN THREE EA SIERRA COCA ROMEO FOUR NINE NINE CMA SIG CORPS STOCK NO TWO SIERRA FOUR NINE NINE SMCLN THREE EA SIERRA COCA ROMEO SIX TWO FOUR CMA AF STOCK NO ONE SEVEN ZERO ZERO DASH TWO SIX SIX TWO ONE NINE ZERO ZERO ZERO SMCLN ONE EA ROMEO COCA TWO FIVE SIX ALFA CMA AF STOCK NO ONE SEVEN ZERO ZERO DASH TWO SIX TWO TWO ONE ZERO SIX ZERO ZERO SMCLN THREE EA ROMEO COCA TWO FIVE SEVEN COCA CMA AF STOCK NO ONE SEVEN ZERO ZERO DASH TWO SIX TWO TWO ONE ZERO SIX FIVE FIVE X CERTAIN OF THESE ITEMS REMAINED AFTER OPR GREENHOUSE AND IVY AND HAVE SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE DUE TO CLIMATIC COND CMA HANDLING AND OTHER FACTORS X AFTER THE PRESENT OPR A CONSIDERABLE QTY OF THE EQUIP WILL REQUIRE OVERHAUL X SINCE THE COMPL SETS ARE NOT REQUIRED AND ONLY CERTAIN COMPONENTS ARE IN USE CMA AUTH IS REQ TO BREAK THESE SETS DOWN INTO THEIR COMPONENTS X THIS BASED PRIMARILY ON CLIMATIC COND AND OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES X WITH THIS AUTH CMA THOSE COMPONENTS NOT IN USE AND IN OUTSIDE STORAGE IN MOST INSTANCES DUE TO LACK OF STORAGE FAC CMA CAN BE EVAC AS EXCESS AND RTRN TO NORMAL SUP CHAN X REPLACEMENTS FOR THE COMPONENTS IN USE HAVE NOT CMA AS YET CMA BEEN AVAL IN ORDER THAT THE COMPL SETS COULD BE SHIPPED X THIS MATTER HAS BEEN COORD WITH AACS REPRESENTATIVES THIS AREA AND ONE EIGHT ONE ZERO AACS GP C.A.

AFWL/NO [redacted]

1 2

TAB NO. 24

269
271

[redacted]

[redacted]

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

ROUTINE ROUTINE

X

X

HICKAM AFB CMA WHO CONCUR IN THE ACTION RECM X YOUR EARLY CONSIDERATION THIS MATTER WILL SUBSTANTIALLY AID TASK GP SEVEN PT FOUR IN PLANNING AND EXECUTING ROLL UP OPR

[redacted]

[redacted] 2 2

TGMS 4224 USAF, ADJUTANT

TAB NO. 24

270 272

R 221630 Z

FM ROME AF DEPOT GRIFFIS AFB NY

TO: CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI

INFO: AIR MATERIEL COMMAND WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO

CITE MRSRD THREE DASH THREE DASH SIX ZERO DASH EASY PD AMC FOR MCSDXB X REF URMSG TGMS THREE DASH ONE ZERO EIGHT ONE EA SCR THREE NINE NINE SIG CORPS STOCK NO TWO SUGAR FOUR NINE NINE TO BE RETURNED TO AF NINE ZERO ONE CMA MARK FOR AF STOCK IN SIG ACCT PD BAL OF ITEMS TO BE RETURNED TO AF NINE ZERO ONE CMA MARK FOR CLASS ONE SIX BAKER STOCK PD AUTH IS GRANTED TO BREAK THESE SETS DOWN AND RETURN THEM BY COMPONENTS"

22/2137Z

AFWL/MO

TAB NO. 75

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

P 031425Z

FM: PATTERSON AFB OHIO

TO: COMDR TASK GP 7.4 DETACHMENT 6 ENIWETOK

FROM WCTM-3-2-E ATTN REF URMSG TGMS 2-163 PART 111. REQ FUTURE RQMTS FOR PARTS BE ADDRESSED THRU TG FOR ACTION. THIS OFFICE CALLED AT SACRAMENTO FOR ACTION ON CAMERA DOOR PARTS 2 MAR 54. MAINT BRANCH DIRECTORATE OF FLIGHT AND ALL-WEATHER TESTING WRIGHT AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER

03/1742Z MAR

TAB NO. 76

AFWL/MD

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI 080315Z [redacted]

ROUTINE ROUTINE

[redacted] PATTERSON AFB OHIO

X

WCTM-3-2-E UNCLASSIFIED

COMDR SMAMA MCCLELLAN AFB CALIF

CITE TGMS 3-80 X INFO SMSIL AT SMAMA X URMSG WCTM DASH THREE DASH TWO DASH ECHO X ORIG SPT AGREEMENT FOR WADC BRAVO DASH FOUR SEVEN BASED UPON FLYAWAY KIT RESUPPLIED DIR FR WADC X EMERG AND AOCP REQ TO BE PROCESSED THRU LOCAL BASE SUP OFFICER X IN VIEW URMSG CITED ABOVE SUP CHAN NOW ESTB THRU LOCAL BASE SUP OFFICER FOR ALL ITEMS EXCEPT WHEN IT IS KNOWN YOU HAVE THE ITEM ON HAND FOR FWD X

BEING NOTIFIED OF NEW PRO

[redacted]

[redacted]L 1 1

TGMS 4224

TAB NO. 76

AFWL/HO

275

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGMS 400.2 8 March 1954

SUBJECT: Roll-up of Supplies and Equipment

TO: Commanders, all Units and Elements
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. The following general concept for handling roll-up of supplies and equipment is for your information and guidance. Each Element and Unit Supply Officer with an appropriate number of personnel will remain after the completion of this operation until all supplies and equipment have been properly treated for corrosion control and turned-in to supply agencies or custodial responsibility transferred. All Unit Commanders are responsible that this policy is carried out effectively.

2. Items peculiar to TDY aircraft will be returned to the ZI as TAT when feasible. In those instances where the items cannot accompany the unit to its home station due to type of transportation available, weight and cube, etc., the items will be packed and crated and turned over to the Base Supply Officer for transportation purposes only to be shipped back on a space available basis. Where packing and crating is required, maximum utilization will be made by each unit of boxes and containers which were used in shipping the items to the forward area.

3. Office furniture: Base Maintenance will establish a furniture processing line in building #118 where each item will be inspected and necessary corrosion control performed prior to storage by Base Supply. This unit will function as a joint Maintenance and Supply activity for vouchering, inspection, painting, etc.

4. Office machines: will be cleaned and all metal parts subject to corrosion will be coated with a light oil prior to turn-in to Base Supply.

5. Hot lockers: will be cleaned, light bulbs removed and turned-in, electric cords carefully folded and all metal parts treated to prevent corrosion.

6. Tools: all hand tools and special tools will be carefully cleaned and coated with an appropriate corrosion preventative prior to turn-in to Base Supply.

AFWL/HO

TAB NO.77 274

7. Tents: will remain in place and custodial responsibility transferred to an officer designated by the Commander, Test Support Unit.

8. Maintenance Stands, Power Units and Aircraft Jacks: these items will be cleaned and painted and custodial responsibility transferred to the officer appointed by Commander, Test Support Unit, for storage, corrosion surveillance and maintenance.

9. Cots, folding, steel: maximum repair will be effected by each unit and all cots which had been renovated prior to issue will be carefully cleaned and spot painted prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. Those cots which were received by the various units without renovation will be segregated and turned-in as is to the Depot Supply Officer.

10. Mattresses and pillows: will be carefully brushed and dusted prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer.

11. Sheets, pillow cases and mattress covers: will be laundered and neatly folded prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. The Commander, Task Group 7.4, has requested the Army Depot Supply Officer to report any instances wherein it appears serviceable sheets have been ripped up in an effort to make up shortages.

12. Class "X" clothing: will be laundered and sized (waist size for trousers and collar size for shirts) prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. The Laundry Officer, Task Group 7.2, has agreed to giving laundry service priority involving roll-up items. He estimates approximately three (3) days service.

13. Miscellaneous items: for instructions on the turn-in of any items which are drawn from the Air Force Supply Officer or the Army Depot Supply Officer and are not covered in this letter, contact the appropriate supply agency direct. All turn-ins will be scheduled by the appropriate supply agency in accordance with priorities established by this Headquarters. It is requested that each unit use this document as a guide in evolving their roll-up plan. The roll-up plan should include the name of the officer designated as Project Officer for their unit roll-up, the name of the Unit Supply Officer and number of personnel to be retained to accomplish the necessary work. It is further requested that each unit estimate the date (K/____) they will be ready to turn their property into supply. This information will aid in establishing turn-in schedules.

14. In order that TDY units may close out Memorandum Receipt and Plant Accounts, appropriate action will be taken by Commander, Test

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

TGMS 400.2, Subj: "Roll-up of Sup & Equip", (Cont'd)

Support Unit, to house roll-up crews from the time the main unit departs until the roll-up crew has completed its job. This will include furnishing bedding and processing the remaining class "X" clothing of these personnel, through the laundry for turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. It is requested the roll-up plan for each unit be forwarded so as to reach this Headquarters not later than 10 April 1954.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

AFWL/NO

278
276

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Roll-up Conference

TO: FROM: DATE: 11 Mar 54 COMMENT NO 1

1. The conference was conducted at 1000 hours, 11 March, by the Staff Supply Officer and Staff Transportation Officer for the purpose of discussing the roll-up of materiel for Task Group 7.4 units and elements.

2. Persons attending:

3. Matters discussed: (see attached agenda)

a. After introduction of key personnel and a brief explanation of what we expected to accomplish in this meeting, was invited to discuss the turn-in of Army property. He outlined, briefly, his requirements, all of which appeared entirely reasonable. He agreed to accept turn-in's six (6) afternoons each week from Air Force units during the actual roll-up operation. He will accomplish a turn-in schedule for the units by coordinating with our office, and . After questions had been cleared for , he was excused from the meeting as I felt he had no particular interest in the balance of the discussion.

TAB NO. 78

277
277

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

b. [redacted] then outlined the general policies of the Test Support Unit regarding handling of office furniture and discussed, in some detail, the operation of a furniture processing line in the hangar.

c. The Base Supply Officer then discussed turn in of property, handling of reparables as well as the turn-in of radiologically contaminated items. [redacted], was present and offered some comment. The procedure agreed upon had been firmed up between [redacted] prior to the meeting and should present no difficulty whatever.

d. At 1050 hours the meeting was turned into a question and answer period which lasted until approximately 1105 hours. There being no further questions, I advised all present that overall responsibility for handling the roll-up was being vested in [redacted] confirmed that he would be [redacted] representative and that questions should be referred to any of them but that I had written the necessary policy documents and preferred that [redacted] execute the plan from here in. This seemed best since all information should be screened through one agency rather than the Supply Officers getting answers from me as well as from

3. The general tenor of the meeting seemed to be pleasant and satisfactory to all concerned and all questions presented were answered on the spot either by myself or one of the other participants.

1 Incl
Conf Agenda

/s/ [redacted]

AGENDA-MEETING

1000 Hours Building 77

11 March 1954

1000 Hours: Introductions.

1005 Hours: Brief Explanation of Purpose of Meeting.

1010 Hours: Permit Army Depot Supply Representative to Discuss Turn-in of Army Property.

1025 Hours: Director of Materiel, Test Support Unit - Discuss Operation of Furniture Processing Line.

1035 Hours: Base Supply Officer - Discuss Turn-in Schedule.

1045 Hours: Question Period.

1100 Hours: Meeting Adjourned.

Inclosure #1

279,281

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI 112015Z UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

COMDR SMAMA MCCLELLAN AFB CALIF X

X

CITE TGMS 3-130 X FOR SMSIL X REQ YOU REPT TO THIS HQ ON OR ABOUT 22 MAR FOR APROX 5 DAYS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COORD MAT MATTERS PERTAINING TO TASK GP 7.4

RAY M. HAWLEY, COLONEL, USAF UNCLASSIFIED 1 1

TGMS 4224 A.J. AMERSON, CAPT., USAF, ADJUTANT

TAB NO. 72

AFWLHQ

280 282

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI 112015Z UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

COMDR SMAMA MCCLELLAN AFB CALIF X

X

CITE TGMS 3-130 X FOR SMSIL X REQ YOU REPT TO THIS HQ ON OR ABOUT 22 MAR FOR APROX 5 DAYS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COORD MAT MATTERS PERTAINING TO TASK GP 7.4

RAY M. HAWLEY, COLONEL, USAF UNCLASSIFIED 1 1

TGMS 4224 A.J. AMERSON, CAPT., USAF, ADJUTANT

TAB NO. 73

281

[redacted]

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI

122211Z [redacted]

ROUTINE COURIER

COMDR USS CURTIS

X

X

7.3 LNO JTF SEVEN ENIWETOK MI (COURIER)

CITE TGMS 3-153 X REQ LOAN OF THREE EA SEAPLANE MOORING BUOYS TO TASK GP SEVEN PT FOUR FOR PURPOSE PROV SAFE ANCHOR FAC AT BIKINI FOR PAPA BRAVO METRO ACFT OPR THAT LOC X JTF SEVEN RECM DIR CONTACT ON THIS MATTER X UPON REC YOUR DECISION CMA WILL ADVISE NAME OF REPRESENTATIVE TO REC BUOYS

[redacted]

RAY M. HAWLEY, COLONEL, USAF

TGMS 4224

[redacted] 1 1

A.J. AMERSON, CAPT., USAF, ADJUTANT

TAB NO. 80

ARMED

284

292

CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK ATOLL MI

112320Z MAR 54 UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE ROUTINE

CJTF SEVEN (REAR) WASH DC

CTG 7.2 (MAIL)
CTG 7.4 (MAIL)

CJTF 7 (REAR)
MSG 102015Z MAR 54 UNCLASSIFIED

REUR DTG ONE ZERO TWO ZERO ONE FIVE ZEBRA PD AFFIRMATIVE

UNCLASSIFIED 1 1

MAJOR LARKIN/J-4/Saunders

110321Z MAR 54 240

TAB NO. 81

AFWDJTMC

285

283

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

R 102015Z

FM CJTF SEVEN WASH DC

TO UHPJA/CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK MI

DA GRNC

ASSUME URMSG DTG ZERO NINE TWO TWO FOUR ZERO ZEBRA APPROVES PROPOSAL THAT TG SEVEN PNT TWO POL OFFICER BECOME ACCOUNTABLE FOR AVIATION GAS AS OUTLINED REAR ECHELON MSG DTG ZERO FIVE TWO ONE TWO FIVE ZEBRA QUERY

10/2020Z

REF MSG 092240 ORIG BY [redacted], J-4

ACTION: J-4
INFO: COMD, J-2, J-3, J-5, COMPT, AG, AGPERS
LOG NO: F-1927
TIME RECD MC: 1245

11 MAR 54 DTG 102015Z

TAB NO. 37

AFWL/TID

286
284

CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK ATOLL MI

092240Z UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE ROUTINE

CJTF SEVEN (REAR) WASH DC

CJTF 7 REAR
MSG 052135Z MAR 54 UNCLASSIFIED

CTG 7.2 (MAIL)

REUR DTG ZERO FIVE TWO ONE THREE FIVE ZEBRA PD APPROVED

CAPT KNICKERBOCKER/J-4/Saunders

092115Z MAR 54 240

TAD NO. 51

AFWCMO

287
205

R 052135Z

FM CJTF SEVEN WASH DC

TO CJTF SEVEN ENIWETOK MI

DA GRNC

AIR FORCE QUERIED THIS DATE CMM WILL THE TASK FORCE BE WILLING TO HAVE THE PRESENT POL OFFICER TASK GROUP 7.2 BECOME ACCOUNTABLE AND ACCOUNT FOR AVIATION GAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AIR FORCE REGULATIONS IF APPROVED BY YOU EFFECTIVE 1 JULY 1954 PD AIL AVIATION GAS PROCUREMENTS WILL BE CHARGED DIRECT TO US AIR FORCE POL STOCK FUND PD AIR FORCE WILL REIMBURSE US NAVY FOR SHIPMENTS OF AVIATION GAS PD FURTHER INVENTORY WILL BE TAKEN OF AVIATION GAS 1 JULY 1954 AND REIMBURSEMENT TO THE US ARMY WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED ON INVENTORY AS OF THAT DATE

CFN 7.2 1 1954 1 1954

05/2140Z

DTG: 052135

ACTION: J-4

LOG NO: F-1628

TX-26

AFWL/HO

TAB NO. 81

[redacted]

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI 142240Z [redacted]

ROUTINE

COMDR SMAMA MCCLELLAN AFB CALIF

X

TGMS 3-130 UNCLASSIFIED

CITE TGMS 3-174 X FOR SMSIL X MYMSG TGMS THREE DASH ONE THREE ZERO X THE CONF BEING DELAYED X WILL ADVISE YOU OF NEW REPT DT WHEN IT IS DETERMINED

[redacted]

RAY M. HAWLEY, COLONEL, USAF [redacted] 1

TGMS 4224 A.J. AMERSON, CAPT., USAF, ADJUTANT

TAB NO. 32

AFWL/HO

389

207

No Tab. No. 83
received.

[redacted] 180325Z [redacted]

CTG 7.4 PROV ENIWETOK MI

ROUTINE

COMDR SMAMA MCCLELLAN AFB CALIF X X

CITE TGMS 3-214 X FOR SMSIL X REF SECOND IND CMA HQ AMC CMA DT TWO THREE DEC FIVE THREE CMA TO MY LTR TANGO GOLF METRO SIERRA FOUR FIVE TWO CMA SUBJ LIMA DASH ONE THREE ACFT CMA DT FOUR DEC FIVE THREE CMA COPY FURNISHED YOUR OFFICE IN JAN X SINCE LIMA DASH ONE THREE ACFT WILL BE REPLACED AT THIS INSTL IN THE NEAR FUTURE CMA REQ YOU DETERMINE DSPO ON SPARES PRIOR TO DEP FOR ROLL UP CONF LATTER PART OF MAR CMA THIS HQ X DUE TO LIMITED STORAGE FAC CMA LIMA DASH ONE THREE SPARES SHOULD BE REMOVED FR STORAGE LOC IN ORDER TO ACCOM LIMA DASH TWO ZERO SPARES BEING SHIPPED

[redacted]

RAY M. HAWLEY, COLONEL, USAF

[redacted] 1 1

TGMS 4224

A.J. AMERSON, CAPT., USAF, ADJUTANT

TAB NO. 84

AFWL/WD

288
291

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGM 400.2

22 March 1954

SUBJECT: Materiel Roll-up

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. In accordance with Joint Task Force SEVEN Administrative Order 2-53, the following roll-up plan is submitted for your approval:

2. SUPPLY:

a. Each Element and Unit Supply Officer with an appropriate number of personnel will remain after the completion of this operation until all supplies and equipment have been properly treated for corrosion control and turned-in to supply agencies or custodial responsibility transferred.

b. Items peculiar to TDY aircraft will be returned to the ZI as TAT when feasible. In those instances where the items cannot accompany the unit to its home station due to type of transportation available, weight and cube, etc., the items will be packed and crated and turned over to the Base Supply Officer for transportation purposes only to be shipped back on a space available basis. Where packing and crating is required, maximum utilization will be made by each unit of boxes and containers which were used in shipping the items to the forward area.

c. Office Furniture: Base Maintenance will establish a furniture processing line in building 118 where each item will be inspected and necessary corrosion control performed prior to storage by Base Supply. This unit will function as a joint maintenance and supply activity for vouchering, inspection, painting, etc.

d. Office Machines: Office machines will be cleaned and all metal parts subject to corrosion, will be coated with a light oil prior to turn-in to Base Supply.

AFWL/NO

TAB NO. 85

e. Hot Lockers: Hot lockers will be cleaned, light bulbs removed and turn-in, electric cords carefully folded and all metal parts treated to prevent corrosion.

f. Tools: All hand tools and special tools will be carefully cleaned and coated with an appropriate corrosion preventative prior to turn-in to Base Supply.

g. Tents: Tents will remain in place and custodial responsibility transferred to an officer designated by the Commander, Test Support Unit.

h. Maintenance Stands, Power Units and Aircraft Jacks: These items will be cleaned and painted and custodial responsibility transferred to the officer appointed by Commander, Test Support Unit, for storage, corrosion surveillance and maintenance.

i. Cots, Folding, Steel: Maximum repair will be effected by each unit and all cots which had been renovated prior to issue will be carefully cleaned and spot painted prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. Those cots which were received by the various units without renovation will be segregated and turned-in, as is, to the Depot Supply Officer.

j. Mattresses and Pillows: These items will be carefully brushed and dusted prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer.

k. Sheets, Pillow Cases and Mattress Covers: These items will be laundered and neatly folded prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. The Commander, Task Group 7.4 has requested the Army Depot Supply Officer to report any instances wherein it appears serviceable sheets have been ripped up in an effort to make up shortages.

l. Class "X" Clothing: Class "X" clothing will be laundered and sized (waist size for trousers and collar size for shirts) prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. The Laundry Officer, Task Group 7.2, has agreed to give laundry service priority involving roll-up items. He estimates approximately three (3) day service.

m. Miscellaneous Items: For instructions on the turn-in of any items which are drawn from the Air Force Supply Officer or the Army Depot Supply Officer and are not covered in this letter, contact the appropriate supply agency direct. All turn-ins will be scheduled by the appropriate supply agency in accordance with priorities established by this Headquarters.

AF[illegible]

n. Each unit will be directed to use this document as a guide in preparing their roll-up plan. The roll-up plan for each unit will include the name of the officer designated as Project Officer for each unit roll-up, the name of the unit Supply Officer and the number of personnel to be retained to accomplish the necessary work. Each unit will be requested to estimate the date (L plus or minus, L = last operation) they will be ready to turn-in their property to supply. This information will aid this Headquarters in establishing turn-in schedules with each supply activity.

o. In order to assist Project Officer and their unit Supply Officer in accomplishing 100 percent close out of Memorandum Receipt and Plant Accounts, the Commander of the Test Support Unit will be directed to house roll-yp crews from the time the main element departs until the roll-up crew has completed its job. This will include furnishing bedding and processing the remaining class "X" clothing of these personnel, through the laundry for trun-in to the Depot Supply Officer.

3. TRANSPORTATION:

a. Thr procedure for marking and decumenting cargo is contained in Task Group 7.4 Operations Plan 1-53 and Headquarters, Joint Task Force SOP 75-1. Requirements for the movement of personnel and cargo via MATS and MSTS will be established through subordinate agencies deployment layout chart.

b. Markings: Service color markings and other container markings, including the appropriately colored "X" and packing lists, will be the same as those prescribed for shipments to the forward area. Overseas addresses on shipments for return to the United States (including UEE equipment) will be marked as follows:

(1) "USA" will be the first part of the overseas address.

(2) "AIR" will be the second part.

(3) "SFPE" will be the third part. USA-AIR-SFPE.

(4) All containers will be marked with the Zonal address.

(5) Water shipments to: USA-AIR-SFPE
for: Zonal Address

(6) Air Shipments to: Air Freight Officers (MATS)
Travis AFB, California

for: Zonal address

c. Documentation: (Surface Shipments)

(1) Agencies having cargo ready for shipment will prepare and submit to Port Transportation Documentation Branch, two (2) copies of a Cargo Booking Request, Form TO 13, indicating the nomenclature, quantity, volume in cubic feet and the weight of each item, and, if cargo is of a special nature, the length, width and height dimensions will be included.

(2) A minimum of twenty (20) copies of all shipping documents (104B) will be prepared for each shipment ten (10) days prior to the arrival of the vessel. Distribution will be made as follows:

(a) One (1) copy retained by the accountable officer pending return of validated copy from loading port.

(b) Two (2) copies airmailed to the consignee (one to the accountable property officer if consignee is not accountable).

(c) Two (2) copies attached to the outside of the number one box of a shipment unit.

(d) Fifteen (15) copies with shipment to the loading port for further distribution as follows:

1. One (1) copy returned to consignee after signing for port authority.

2. One (1) copy retained in file manifest.

3. Three (3) copies airmailed to the port of debarkation with manifest (via Army-Navy shipping information agency when destined to the United States).

4. Ten (10) copies to accompany manifest aboard vessel.

d. Air cargo shipments will be accompanied by eight (8) copies of the shipping documents (with air movement designator indicated thereon) when delivered to the air terminal.

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4. PERSONAL BAGGAGE:

a. Personal baggage of personnel returning with units for which shipment numbers have been assigned and authorized by the Movement Directive for the return shipment, will be addressed to the Transportation Officer of the Zone of Interior port, camp, base or station concerned.

EXAMPLE:

TO: PTO-SFPE

SHIP TO: Transportation Officer
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico

FOR: R-7210-A
John H. Brown, AO-123456

b. Personal baggage of personnel returning on temporary duty orders will be addresses to the Zonal Address.

EXAMPLE:

TO: PTO-SFPE

FOR: John H. Brown
Capt, AO-123456
187 Perimeter Drive
Fort Worth, Texas

c. Shipments of personal baggage will be documented in twenty (20) copies just as for cargo shipments. If individual names are not incorporated into main document, then attached and become part of the main document.

d. Personnel returning via air and shipping unaccompanied hold baggage by surface will complete six (6) copies of Standard Form 116, "Request for Transportation of Household Goods". Four (4) of these will be submitted to the Transportation Officer at the Port of Embarkation. The remaining two (2) will be attached securely in a conspicuous place on the outside of the number one container of the shipment. A copy of the travel orders authorizing the shipment of personal baggage will be attached to each copy of Form 116.

e. Personnel returning via surface and shipping hold baggage to be further shipped to a Zonal destination will present six (6) completed copies of Standard Form 116, "Request for Transportation of Household Goods", and six (6) copies of travel orders authorizing the shipment of personal baggage to the Personal Property Section at SFPE.

f. Customs declaration will be prepared in accordance with Air Force Regulation 75-57 and a minimum of four (4) copies will be prepared by the individual concerned.

g. Items of personal baggage such as footlockers and trunks will be banded. All baggage is subject to inspection by the Customs Department.

5. MOVEMENT DESIGNATOR:

a. Personnel returning to the Zone of Interior by MATS will obtain a Movement Designator from the Transportation Officer, Task Group 7.4 (phone FRED 4237) prior to booking. Movement Designator will be put in the indorsement on the individual orders.

6. VEHICLES:

a. Prior to departure, all units will thoroughly clean their vehicles and turn them over to the Test Support Unit, Provisional. The Test Support Unit will remove all radios and flag brackets, if any, and turn the vehicles over to Task Group 7.2 for shipment to the Zone of Interior.

7. Roll-up for the Weather Islands was submitted to your Headquarters under seperate cover. Reference letter, Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, subject: "Weather Island Roll-up", dated 17 March 1954.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/Earl W. Kesling
/t/EARL W. KESLING
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGMS 17 March 1954

SUBJECT: Weather Island Roll-up

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
APO 187 (HOW), c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. In order to make the most economical utilization of transport facilities, the following plan for weather island roll-up is submitted for your consideration and/or approval.

a. The weather islands (Rongerik, Kusaie, Ponape and Majuro) will prepare all items for shipment prior to the arrival of the transport vessel. Expendable items such as POL products, food and medical supplies will be transferred to the Trust Territories in exchange for services rendered by the natives. All items to be shipped will be documented on shipping tickets, AF Form 104B or C, by weather island personnel. Commander, Task Group 7.2, will be requested to furnish a representative of the Transportation Officer to manifest each shipment in accordance with current procedures. This representative would accompany the LST to each island and be returned from Majuro, by air, prior to, or concurrent with, the departure of the LST. The itinerary of the LST would be substantially as follows:

Arrive Rongerik	K / 12
Depart Rongerik	K / 16
Arrive Eniwetok	K / 17
Depart Eniwetok	K / 18
Arrive Ponape	K / 20
Depart Ponape	K / 21
Arrive Kusaie	K / 23
Depart Kusaie	K / 24
Arrive Majuro	K / 27
Depart Majuro	K / 28
Arrive Pearl Harbor	K / 38

b. Personnel from Rongerik would be off-loaded at Eniwetok and returned to the Zone of Interior on available transportation. Personnel from Ponape, Kusaie and Majuro, together with the Project Officer, would proceed to Pearl Harbor aboard the LST. These personnel would be transported from Hickam Air Force Base by available transportation.

[redacted]

TAB NO. 66

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[redacted]

TGMS [redacted], Subj: Weather Island Roll-up

c. In view of damage which resulted to the vessel when the Rongerik package was unloaded, it is recommended consideration be given to a small craft to be used for shuttle from the island to the LST. The surf and beach at Rongerik makes a landing a hazard with further damage to the LST possible.

d. Supplies and equipment, belonging to Task Group 7.2, in use at Rongerik, would be returned to Eniwetok and turned over to the appropriate supply agency. Supplies and equipment on loan from the various agencies in the Honolulu area would be returned aboard the LST and off-loaded at Pearl Harbor. Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor, if LST #551 is scheduled to return to the Zone of Interior, the weather island equipment would remain aboard for transport to the Oakland port. In the event operations orders for LST #551 prevent the return of this vessel to the Zone of Interior, the supplies and equipment would be off-loaded at Pearl Harbor of the Honolulu port, as appropriate, and returned to the Zone of Interior by MSTS. All supplies will be manifested for shipment to the Transportation Officer, SMAMA, McClellan Air Force Base, California, unless approval of the Air Weather Service is received for shipping these packages to the parent unit at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. If this approval is received prior to the departure of the LST, the documents can be amended accordingly. Ir the approval is received subsequent to the departure of the LST and prior to the arrival at the Oakland port, the shipment can be diverted at Oakland. Exceptions to this will be certain items such as helium cylinders which must be returned to a specific agency other than an Air Force Supply Depot. The helium cylinders must be returned to Naval Air Station, Moffett Field, California. The total cargo from the weather islands is estimated at 607,734 pound and 1,025 measurement tons.

2. Your approval of this plan is requested in order that the Operations Order for roll-up of weather islands may be published.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[redacted]

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 137, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGMS 400 18 March 1954

SUBJECT: Weather Island Equipment

TO: Commander
Air Weather Service
Andrews Air Force Base
Washington 25, D. C.

1. During Operations IVY and CASTLE, detachments of your command have been utilized on isolated islands in the Pacific Proving Grounds area for the observation and recording of weather data. After IVY, the property with which these detachments had been equipped was returned to Hickam Air Force Base, T.H., for storage.

2. Indications are that no specific agency was given the responsibility for surveillance and general maintenance of this equipment. There were approximately three hundred (300) long tons involving some one thousand (1,000) measurement tons. During the planning of CASTLE, it was necessary to request the Commander, PACDIVMAT to cause his Base Supply Officer at Hickam Air Force Base to segregate, inspect and inventory these so-called packages in preparation for future operations. Since the property had not been maintained, a considerable portion of the items had to be condemned and salvaged. Replacements were then ordered by the Commander, 6th Weather Squadron, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, through Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, in accordance with Task Group 7.4 Operations Order 1-53.

3. I am of the opinion that handling the packages in this manner is unacceptable since the replacement factor on equipment was extremely high. In an effort to avoid this in the future, it appears appropriate to recommend that some agency accept primary responsibility for these weather island packages since weather observations in these isolated locations will be a continuing requirement for future operations. This being a mission which normally would be laid on your command in the future, I would appreciate your consider tion of an outline of a plan which, I believe, has merit. Briefly, it is as follows:

a. The property now in use by your detachments at four (4) isolated island locations be returned to Tinker Air Force Base and made the responsibility of whatever agency you desire for use in this or any other similar type operation in which you are engaged in the future.

b. Such a plan would achieve a number of desireable results:

[redacted]

AFWL/MD

TAB NO. 67

[redacted]

TCMS 400, Subj: Weather Island Equipment

(1) It will insure your detachments of on hand serviceable equipment with which they are familiar and can depend upon in future operations.

(2) It will prevent the wasteful deterioration of valuable equipment by being maintained in a ready condition.

(3) It would appear to increase the mobility potential of the detachments.

(4) It would very likely increase the efficiency of your detachments since they could be assured of arriving at the point of operation with properly maintained equipment.

(5) It would follow what appears to be a reasonable precept of placing primary responsibility for the handling of the equipment in the hands of a unit which will be using it under operational conditions and finally, but probably most important, it would save many Air Force dollars annually in the support of nuclear tests in the Pacific Proving Grounds.

4. For your further information, an evaluation of the weather island property by the Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional, is quoted in part in Inclosure No. 1. Inclosure No. 2 is a representative weather island package as requested by Commander, 6th Weather Squadron, Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. Only the non-expendable items are concerned in this proposal.

2 Incls:
1. 2nd Ind, in part, fr WREP to TSUP, dtd 13 Mar 54
2. Wea Island Package Inventory

HOWELL M. ESTES, JR.
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

AFWRL/WD

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B/Ltr fr TG 7.4, Prov., File TGMS 400.2, Subj: Roll-up of Weather Islands, dtd 17 Feb 1954

WREP (17 Feb 54) 2nd Ind 13 March 1954

HQ WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187

TO: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional, APO 187

********** ********** ********** ********** **********

2. Weather Reporting Element, Provisional Operations Plan Number 1-54 is submitted for approval.

3. Of particular importance are assumptions listed in paragraph 1b of the plan. A discussion of the assumptions follow:

a. Considerable operational equipment for the weather islands has been used for two operations. During the interim period, it was stored at Hickam AFB. During the entire period, it has been subject to tropical maritime corrosion and maintenance and corrosion control has been only of low order. Much of the operating equipment is now beginning to fail with the result that even the best of the remaining operating equipment cannot be considered reliable for subsequent operations. Non-operating equipment is in various stages of corrosion which can be corrected only by depot reconditioning. In addition some of the equipment is outdated and some unsatisfactory or inconvenient substituted equipment is in the weather island packages. Other equipment has been damaged by repeated movement and loading and unloading operations. In general, depot reconditioning of all weather island equipment should be undetaken at the conclusion of thei operation. All of this equipment should be returned to stock and reordered for the next operation. Experience gained on this and past operations show a definite need for preparation for a new requirements list for the weather islands. This list will be accomplished carefully considering the exact needs of each island prior to the conclusion of this operation.

********** ********** ********** ********** *******

/s/t/ FELLIE F. ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

AFWLMD

Incl #1

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGMS 17 March 1954

SUBJECT: Weather Island Packages

TO: Commander
Pacific Division MATS
APO 953, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Upon completion of Operation IVY the weather island packages, used by the MATS Weather Reporting Detachments in the Pacific Proving Grounds, were returned to Hickam Air Force Base. Information available at this time indicated the property and records, pertaining thereto, were in unsatisfactory condition causing the Base Supply Officer at Hickam Air Force Base to expend a tremendous number of man-hours in inspection and preparation for the present operation. In an effort to prevent a recurrence of this unsatisfactory condition, it is requested consideration be given by your headquarters to furnishing a team qualified in maintenance, communications, weather instruments and supply records for the inspection of these packages. It appears this could best be accomplished during the month of April prior to preparation for roll-up. Such a team could accomplish the following:

a. Insure that property is being properly maintained at present.

b. Advise the weather reporting personnel as to better methods for maintaining the equipment.

c. Make recommendations for items which, in their opinion, should be returned to the depot for rehabilitation.

d. Inspect the UFREAL to insure that the property was being accounted for properly.

e. Make recommendations for additions and/or deletions to weather island packages for future operations by observing the supplies and equipment in use on the spot.

2. If your headquarters concurs in this plan, an itinerary will be worked out with the Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional, (MATS), in order that they may be furnished transportation from Eniwetok to the various weather islands shortly after their arrival. It is anticipated this inspection tour would require approximately ten (10) days.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

13 March 1954

SUBJECT: Weather Balloons

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. This element has a requirement in its mission to provide rawinsonde observations to an average height of 90,000 feet.

2. Despite the fact that personnel assigned to this unit have produced most exceptional results in the zone of interior, averaging approximately 20,000 feet higher than personnel of other organizations, they have been unable to obtain the required 90,000 feet average here. Careful monitoring of their methods and spirit has shown that under the circumstances, the best possible heights are being obtained. A typical example of spirit instilled in the men is shown by the Eniwetok rawinsonde section over which I have operational control. For several months this particular station has held top honors in the 2143rd Air Weather Wing which is comprised of all stations in the Asiatic-Pacific area. Their heights averaged 62,000 feet but with improved methods and infusion of spirit for higher observations, they increased their average height to over 80,000 feet in about one month. The Weather Reporting Element overall height averages for January are 74,797 feet and for February (incomplete totals) 83,039 feet. With complete results, the February average can be expected to change only slightly.

3. The primary reason for failure to obtain the desired heights is that specific balloons ordered were not obtained as requested. ML-391C balloons were substituted for ML-391B balloons requested for daytime soundings. A 500 gram neoprene balloon was substituted for a 500 gram neoprene night flight Kaysam 50N balloon requested for night time soundings. It is not known at this headquarters who authorized the substitutions. Recent specifications received indicate that heights of 80,000 feet may be expected sixty per cent of the time, with the ML-443A, which is a backup balloon.

[redacted]

AFWTHP

T.S.U. NO. [redacted]

[redacted]

B/Ltr fr Hq, WREP, APO 187, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif., Subj: Weather Balloons, dtd 13 Mar 54

Other balloons received are admittedly of the poorer types available. The operators making the observations have done extremely well with the materiel at their disposal.

4. The secondary reason for failure to obtain the desired heights is the very low temperature encountered at the tropopause in this region which is much lower than in the United States. In general the balloons become hard and brittle losing their ability to expand or to retain their internal pressure as they rise and thus burst at a comparatively low altitude.

5. The third reason for failure to obtain the desired heights is moisture encountered, especially at Majuro, Kusaie and Ponape. Perhaps the ice crystals formed weaken the balloons, but this is a technical matter which I am not qualified or prepared to evaluate. The results are consistent. When excessive moisture is present, comparatively low heights are obtained and no amount of re-releases will produce increased heights.

6. If new balloons of the type originally requested are obtained, the 90,000 foot height might be attained or surpassed. The second and third factors (low temperatures and moisture) will undoubtedly have a detrimental effect, not experienced in the zone of interior on even these balloons. It is my personal opinion that an average of 90,000 feet will be surpassed but this cannot be guaranteed.

7. If new balloons are procured, the most expeditious supply action would require two and a half weeks to place them in the hands of the operating personnel. Thus 375 of each type would be necessary to complete the operation if Rongerik can be returned to operation by the end of this month or 300 of each type necessary if Rongerik is not returned to full operation but used only one or two days prior to shot-days.

8. Factors to be considered in making the decision on ordering additional balloons are as follows:

a. New balloons may attain average heights of 10,000 feet greater than present balloons. Many individual heights may be expected to 100,000 feet and above. This may or may not be at critical times.

b. New balloons would probably not be received prior to 27 March.

c. Additional expense will be required to obtain the balloons. The 500 gram night balloons will cost $900.00 if Rongerik is not returned to full operation and $1050.00 if Rongerik is in full operation during April. I understand that some $5000.00 originally set aside by Task Group 7.4 for the purchase of the original 500 gram balloon was not used, if so, this money should be available for that purpose. The other balloon is a standard Air Force item and should entail no additional expense. Other costs would be for transportation and handling which I have no means of estimating.

WL/HO

[redacted]

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

B/Ltr fr Hq, WREP, APO 187, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif., Subj: Weather Balloons, dtd 13 Mar 54

d. The highest possible heights are desired by weather forecasters and radiological safety people. It has been learned that serious fall-out may occur from heights above those attained by rawinsonde observations at present. Definite information at higher levels than presently obtainable to be made affecting the final order for firing each shot. Peculiar winds at these higher levels may indicate serious fall-out over such populated locations as Eniwetok or Kwajalein which would not be suspected without this information.

e. Better results may not be obtained with the new balloons, but if they are obtained, and there are good indications that they could be, the information received may be of sufficient importance to warrant the expense.

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

In view of the lack of certain required information at this level it is impractical to make a definite recommendation regarding the adviseability of securing different type balloons for this operation. Although we are not obtaining the rawinsonde heights desired by JTF-7, the factors mentioned in paragraph 9 of basic correspondence, plus any others which may have a bearing on the problem, should be weighed against each other to arrive at a decision. It is suggested that coordination between your Headquarters and JTF-7 may be adviseable. Request this Headquarters be notified of the decision reached.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s
/t,

[redacted]

TAB NO. 89

[redacted]

Hq, Wea Rept Elm, Prov., Subj: Weather Balloons

TGMS (13 Mar 54) 2nd Ind 20 March 1954

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

The Base Supply Officer has been requested to submit an emergency requisition for three hundred (300) each of the ML 443, ML 391B and the 5SN Night Flight balloons. Recommend direct coordination with AF 2272 SO for further information on availability.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

[redacted]

WL/MG

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Inspection of Personal Equipment Section

TO: FROM: DATE: 22 Mar 54 COMMENT NO 1

1. A follow-up inspection was conducted this date to determine the progress made since the inspection of 6 February. Persons contacted:

er

The Officer in Charge, , was not present as his primary duty is flying which takes up the majority of his time.

2. This inspection was set up on the Schedule of Events for 16 March but was delayed to date at request. The Personal Equipment Section presented a very creditable appearance as it was clean, neat and orderly and personnel contacted were cheerful and cooperative. A status board is maintained on the chutes, E2B Rafts (6-man), C2A Rafts (1-man) and B5 Vests (Mae Wests). This status board indicates date due for inspection, repack, etc., and current status of each item. The NCOIC stated that on chutes, the visual inspection, required every ten (10) days, is accomplished by he and his personnel, that all other matters pertaining to inspection of the chutes are handled by the parachute shop in Base Maintenance. Inspection and re-pack of life rafts is handled by the flotation shop, now a responsibility of Base Maintenance. All inspections on the B5 vest (Mae West) are handled by Personal Equipment Section.

3. Classified teletype, cite AFSWC-SWCTR-2-9, waived the provisions of AF Regulation 60-5, by allowing flights from Eniwetok to Bikini in support of the current operation, to be made without parachutes aboard; therefore, it is the policy of Base Operations that parachutes are removed from the aircraft and stored in the Personal Equipment Section except when required for flights to place chutes aboard an aircraft, the specified number were loaded and the status board coded to indicate for what flight the chutes were being used. The Personal Equipment Section has no log nature for the chutes in these cases.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations:

a. Reference Inspection Report, dated 6 February, indicates that recommendations in paragraph 4 have been complied with.

b. That the Personal Equipment Section continue to operate efficiently.

c. That the matter of the chutes not being signed out when placed aboard the aircraft be brought to the attention of the Test Support Unit, for whatever action he deems appropriate.

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

SUBJECT: Unit Supply Inspection

TO: FROM: DATE: 25 Mar COMMENT NO. 1

1. I performed a follow-up inspection of the Communications Element Supply this date. Reference inspections performed 3 February and 5 March, copies attached for your reference.

2. Persons Contacted:

3. General observations: Every phase of the operation of the Communications Element Supply has made, what I consider, outstanding progress since the initial inspection 3 February. My first impression on this particular inspection was extremely favorable in view of the very excellent appearance of the facility. I checked primarily into three (3) major phases of the operati.

a. Publications: ndicated that Tech Orders, Stock Lists, catalogues and other necessary publications are now coming through Base facilities in an excellent manner. About the only exception to this appeared to be the various volumes of AF Manual 67-1. I am referring this to the Base Supply Officer for assistance.

b. Expendable supplies: My initial inspection of this facility on 3 February, was primarily in the interest of determining the percentage of completion of ordering the necessary spares for the communications equipment. This project has now been completed and those items received appear to be accounted for properly. I ran a spot check on five (5) line items taken at random from the various card trays primarily for the purpose of checking location to determine the efficiency of the storage set up. This spot check revealed 100% accuracy in the locations and, considering the space and type bins available, I considered the storage satisfactory. ordering of expendables is now a matter of maintaining the necessary stock the stock levels as consumption dictates. Each stock sary data on the particular line item such as and storage location, in addition it shows the to which this space applies. These areas are purpose of adjusting stock levels up or down re-ordering to bring the balance on hand up to the Issues are made from this supply on a recapitulation stock record cards daily in order that the balance on

c. Plant Account Property: Incidental to my inquiry, regarding expendables, it was noted that the

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

appeared to be inadequate. Since that time additional personnel have been assigned as indicated in paragraph 3d of the inclosed inspection report, dated 5 March. One additional airman, S/Sgt Heesh, 64151, arrived on or about 8 March from Johnston Island for duty with this section. With this increase in qualified people, Captain Maher has been able to screen his Plant Account records, bring his forms 90A up to date, prepare a consolidated from his own records, compare that to the consolidated, prepared by Base Supply and furnished him 24 March, and accomplish an inventory of this property. This inventory has just been completed and the necessary research to clear up the various discrepancies has not been accomplished. When this has been done, accurate hand receipts will be accomplished for the signature of the various sections which draw supplies and equipment from the Communications Element. Information available indicates that the Commander, 1808th AACS Wing, Tokyo, arranged for the transfer of a Supply Officer for the Communications Element, scheduled to arrive shortly after 1 April. Upon his arrival, he can work with in the final rechecks of the property, accomplish whatever inventories he desires in order that he will be satisfied to assume responsibility for this account. Since indications are that this account has never been given the shake down it is now receiving, there will undoubtedly be a number of adjusuments in the records which may require Report of Survey action. At the same time it is believed that a tremendous quantity of supplies in dollar value will be picked up as overages and brought back to appropriate supply records. It is estimated that this process will be completed in about thirty (30) days.

4. Conclusions and recommendations:

a. That and his personnel are worthy of special recognition for the outstanding job they have accomplished in a short time.

b. That Commander, Test Services Unit, and Commander, Communications Element, are completely aware of the status of this account and have acted in an agressive and cooperative manner in bringing the account to acceptable standards.

c. That an interim project be established to provide either by local manufacture of otherwise, adequate, uniform bins for more efficient utilization of the limited space.

d. That building #640 be retained as a dehumidified storage facility for use by the Communications Element and/or AACS property for storage of those items of communications equipment, subject to deterioration from the climatic conditions.

1 Incl
Insp Rept for 3 Feb and
5 Mar 54

/s/ [illegible]
Staff Supply Officer

AFWL/MO

310
307

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

3 March 1954

SUBJECT: Housing for Additional Personnel

TO:

1. General- a. Information has been received that Task Group 7.4 will receive three (3) additional SA-16 type aircraft, with double crews, and necessary maintenance personnel.

b. In view of a probable rearrangement of shots, the occasion may arise when Task Group 7.4 will have to house a total of twenty-four (24) projects participants. Space is now available in Building 42 for fourteen (14) persons.

2. Required Action-

a.

(1) Determine if housing space is available for the crews and maintenance personnel of the SA-16's which will consist of approximately thirty-five (35) crew members, of which eighteen (18) will be officers and sixteen (16) maintenance personnel, one (1) of which will be an officer.

(2) Determine where the ten (10) project participants will be housed.

(3) If adequate housing is not ave[illegible] mentioned in paragraph 1 and 2 [illegible] tents are needed, where will [illegible] will erect them, and when can [illegible]

(4) Housing required for personnel [illegible] above the personnel from Biki[illegible]

(5) After necessary information [illegible] to the Chief of Staff, this [illegible] as to how all personnel are to [illegible] is necessary to assign a pri[illegible] do so in writing with a copy [illegible] information.

AFWL/HQ

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

B/L subj: "Housing for Additional Personnel"

b.

(1) Assist [redacted] in obtaining the information outlined above.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER

[redacted]

AFWL/HO

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff 6 March 1954

SUBJECT: Housing for Additional Personnel

1. Reference your memorandum, same subject as above, the following information as required in paragraph 2a (5), is hereby submitted:

a. The first fourteen (14) project participants will be billeted in Building 42.

b. Headquarters Commandant, Task Group 7.2 was contacted and he agreed, after consultation with the island Commander, that he could accommodate the ten (10) project participants in Building 10 (transient officers billet) along with eighteen (18) project participant officer crew members.

c. With the erection of one (1) tent in the officer tent area (east of building 38), the eighteen (18) SA-16 officer crew members and the one (1) maintenance officer can be billedted in the tent area together with the helicopter pilots and officers who were previously assigned at TARE.

d. Upon erection of the five (5) additional tents, the eighteen (18) project participant airmen crews, seventeen (17) SA-16 airmen crews and fifteen (15) SA-16 maintenance crews can be billeted in the airmen tent area.

2. AEC Resident Engineer, ELMER, was contacted on 5 March 1954 with a request for Holmes & Narver to erect six (6) tents in the following locations:

a. One (1) tent in the officer tent area east of building 38.

b. Three (3) tents in the airmen tent area east of buildings 42, 41 and 40.

c. Two (2) tents north end of tent row [illegible] east of building 47

3. [illegible] was contacted and in the company of the undersigned, surveyed the proposed tent construction area on 5 March 1954 and after consultation with the carpenter foreman, stated if he could begin construction on 6 March 1954 he could have all six (6) tents erected and ready for occupancy by 11 [illegible]

4. [illegible] received word at 0900 hours, [illegible] begin construction and has insured [illegible] his deadline [illegible]

AEWL/HC

310/313

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS TASK GROUP 7.2
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
APO 187 c/o PM, San Francisco, California

16 March 1954

SUBJECT: Conservation of Water and Electricity

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4
APO 187, c/o PM
San Francisco, Calif.

1. In light of the recent failure of the main power cable from [redacted] to FRED, drastic water and power conservation measures must necessarily be initiated at once on FRED. Authorities of the AEC Contractor have requested the cooperation of this Task Group in this matter. I understand such authorities have also contacted your Headquarters.

2. To assure coordinated, aggressive action so that the missions of our respective Task Groups will not be jeopardized, the actions outlined in attached letter are considered minimum requirements until the power situation clarifies. You are enjoined to cooperate in their implementation, as appropriate and applicable.

1 Incl:
Ltr CTG 7.2 (Conservation of
Water and Electricity)

Commander

TG4 (16 Mar 54) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

TO: All Units and Elements of Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

It is desired that each member [redacted] the letter and spirit of the enclosed [redacted] period of the emergency.

BY COMMAND OF VICE ADMIRAL [redacted]

1 Incl
n/c

[redacted]

311/314

HEADQUARTERS U.S. GROUP 7.2
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
APO 187 c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.

330.14 16 March 1954

SUBJECT: Conservation of Water and Electricity

TO: See Distribution

1. Due to the failure of the normal electric power supply for ENIWETOK Island it is necessary to curtail the use of electrical power and the consumption of fresh water until further notice, pending the completion of repairs to the electrical system.

2. All Unit Commanders and Officers in charge of activities on ENIWETOK Island will take immediate action to reduce consumption of electric power as follows:

a. Lights in all hot lockers located in billets will be disconnected.

b. Lights in billets will be limited to:
(1) one (1) light per tent
(2) one (1) light per room in Pacific type buildings

c. Personal radio receivers will be disconnected when not being utilized.

d. All outside lights including street lights, will be kept off, except those electric lights required for security purposes.

3. As electrical power is required to operate fresh water [illegible], Unit Commanders and Responsible Officers of activities will take immediate action to reduce consumption of fresh water to the minimum as follows:

a. All [illegible] will be closed [illegible] hours of 17[illegible] to 1530 hours daily and then only [illegible] will be used for sanitary purposes.

b. The use of [illegible] will be rigidly controlled.

c. The use of fresh water [illegible] will be prohibited.

d. [illegible] for the procurement of fresh water.

AFWL/HRD

312/215

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

330.1
SUBJECT: Conservation of Water and Electricity

4. The procedures enumerated above constitute only a few of the controls which may assist in alleviating the current power shortage. All personnel by initiative and vision are enjoined to assist in conservation of electrical power by such means as are at their disposal so that the operational efficiency and the health of the command are maintained at the current high level.

5. All personnel on ENIETOK Island will be informed of the contents of this directive and a copy of it will be posed on all unit bulletin boards until further notice.

BY ORDER OF

DISTRIBUTION:
"C"

31
31

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TASK GROUP 7.4 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
1 March 1954 thru 7 March 1954

ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
1	1 Mar 54	0000	Execute Operation Order 2-54
2	1 Mar 54	0145	First aircraft takes off (13 BABY FOOD)
3		0200	CTG 7.3 has helicopter alerted for emergency landing at Eniwetok
4		0345	CJTF passes confirming Execution Order to CTG 7.4
5		0430	First official observer aircraft (C-121) takes off from Eniwetok.
6		0630	SA-16, H-19 and crash boat alerted for take-off of F-84G (TIGER SNIFFER 1 & 2) at 0635.
7.		0641	CTG 7.4 notified [illegible] that all aircraft are properly positioned in space.
8		0645	H-HOUR.
9		0715	CTG 7.4 reports the operational status of the NAN LF Homer to CJTF SEVEN in the JOC.
10		1045	JTF SEVEN provides TG 7.4 with mission requirements for WILSON Aircraft (Cloud Trackers).
11			CJTF SEVEN announces the operational status of Bikini.
12		1306	Last Primary mission aircraft land at Eniwetok (TIGER BLUE 3 & 4).
		1500	ENIWETOK Airfield is opened to normal air traffic.
13		1700	USS ESTES departs Operational Area for Eniwetok.
14		2230	CJTF SEVEN advises TG 7.4 of weather tracks to be flown by next WB-29 Cloud Tracker.
15		1500	Post-mission preliminary examination of acft.
16		1600	TAU distributes flight schedule for 2 March.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF DOE/DOD
REVIEWED BY [illegible] DATE 7/6/96
* Flash (CNO) DOE ltr 7/6/95
** Page 314-439 of the History of Group 7.4 Provisional, Mar 54

RG 342
[redacted]
Location Technical Library / A-2
Collection AFWL
Folder History of Task Group 7.4
Provisional, March 1954 - OPERATION CASTLE
NOTE: This is Folder 3 of 5
containing Pages 314 thru 439
3-J9070
317
314

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

TASK GROUP 7.4 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
	2 Mar 54	0800	Daily operational briefing.
		0800	CTG 7.4 and CJTF SEVEN arrive at Eniwetok aboard the USS ESTES.
		0800	Decontamination of TG 7.4 aircraft begins in accordance with previously established priority schedule.
		0800	Inspection is conducted to assess the degree of any damage sustained by mission aircraft.
		0900	-54 departs Eniwetok for Tokyo via Guam.
		1045	JTF SEVEN advises TG 7.4 of weather tracks to be flown by next WB-29 cloud tracker.
		1445	Unit Commanders report the operational status of their aircraft to Commander, TG 7.4.
		1445	7.4 Staff and Unit Commanders meet to discuss status to date, to review proposed schedule of events and to establish a firm schedule for the first week in March.
		1600	Test Aircraft Unit distributes Flight Schedule for next day's operations.
			Post crater photo mission.
		1700	Evacuate Rongerik.
		1500	PBM route check and Rad Safe Survey of Bikini.

[redacted]

AFWL/NWD

[redacted]

TASK GROUP 7.4 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
	3 March	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		0730	Decontamination of aircraft continues.
		0800	Control B-36 team and scientific team meet to discuss BRAVO mission with Sampler Pilots (Continues until completed)
		0830	The Director of Materiel: Reviews maintenance plan of all activities to restore operational readiness and develops over-all plan to insure coordinated effort.
		1000	PBM route and Rad Safe survey at UTERIK.
		1300	Staff Supply Officer visits JTF 7 Hq J-4 office to discuss supply and personnel roll-up for weather islands.
		1500	Critique BRAVO Day (continues until completed)
			Personnel Security Officer visits J-2 of JTF 7.
			Complete analysis of BRAVO weather forecast.
	4 March	0730	Post mission "rest day", with exception of essential functions.
		0800	Decontamination of aircraft continues.

[redacted]

[redacted]

TASK GROUP 7.4 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
	5 March 54	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		0800	Decontamination continues.
		0800	All activities continue efforts to complete program they have established to rectify deficiencies noted throughout the actual mission.
		0800	Staff Supply officer visits Test Services Unit to discuss weather island roll-up with WREP personnel.
		0830	CJTF SEVEN and CTG 7.4 depart for Kwajalein via C-54.
		1300	Personnel Security Section re-evaluates existing security policies, practices and procedures of 7.4 to determine their adequacy in the light of actual operations.
		1300	Staff Supply Officer inspects 57th Strat Recon Sqdn Unit and Tech Supply.
		1330	CTG 7.4 Staff and Commander's conference on Schedule of Events for 2nd week of March.
			TG 7.4 clearance status report is forwarded to CJTF SEVEN.

[redacted]

AFWL/ANO

[redacted]

TASK GROUP 7.4 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
	6 March 54	0800	Inspection of Task Group 7.4 quarters areas.
		0800	Decontamination of F4U aircraft begins.
		1000	Review the post-mission status of Bikini airfield. Assess the impact which these conditions will have on future operations. D/M:
			Inspection of shops, flight line offices and other work areas of Task Group 7.4.
		1330	Conference to determine format and content for the final report of Task Group 7.4.
		1330	Prepare final draft for supply roll-up for TDY units.
			Submit tentative roll-up schedule for special airlift requirement to JTF SEVEN.
		1700	Task Group 7.4 Operations Order No. 3-54 is published; provided Task Group 7.1 has established the positioning in space for all test aircraft.
			Publish Schedule of Events for second week of March.
			JTF SEVEN meeting on evacuation of Bikini for next shot.
			Plan for amphibious airlift operation due from the Test Services Unit.
			Publishing of aircraft take-off schedule for ROMEO.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

TASK GROUP 7.4 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
	7 March 54	0800	Routine maintenance and engineering test flights as necessary. Testing and calibration of instrumentation continues, as required.
		1000	Complete distribution of VIP Plan.

ACSL/WD [redacted]

[redacted]

TASK GROUP 7.4 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
	8 Mar R-5	0700	WB-29 continue 3 metro flights
		0800	Commander's Operational Briefing. Forward roll-up plan for property to all units for planning purposes. Operations Order 3-54 is published, provided that Task Group 7.1 has established the positioning in space for test aircraft
		0830	Ground Safety meeting to be held in TG 7.4 Conference Room.
		1000	CJTF confirms R-Day & H-Hour and issues execute order for ROMEO. JTF SEVEN transmits message relative to closing of Eniwetok Airfield.
		1630	CTG 7.4 addresses all TG 7.4 personnel in main hangar.
	9 Mar R-4	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		0900	Meeting of TG 7.4 Staff on Roll-up.
		1000	D/M drafts weather island roll-up plan. PBM Survey flight to Rongerik.
		1300	Pursue VIP schedule. Coordinate the final mission acft schedule with JTF SEVEN.
	10 Mar R-3	0800	Final meeting of JTF SEVEN to determine positioning in space of test aircraft. CTG 7.4 reports the state of readiness of TG 7.4 to CJTF SEVEN.
		1000	Units report acft status to maintenance control.
		1500	Meeting on format and content of Final Report
		1600	TG 7.4 personnel board USS ESTES.
			Three (3) B-50 IBDA aircraft arrive at Eniwetok from Guam.
			Task Force Weather Central transfers operations from Eniwetok to USS ESTES.
		1700	JTF SEVEN notifies CINCPAC that Eniwetok and Bikini airstrips are closed to air traffic, only scheduled MATS and special observer flights will land at Eniwetok.
			TAI submits clearances for all R-Day mission acft to Base Operations.

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ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
	11 Mar R-2	0700	Project participants arrive at Eniwetok. Pursue VIP schedule.
		0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		0900	AOC confirms requirements for post-mission inter-atoll airlift operations. Notify CIC of all confirmed missions.
		1300	Acft status reported to maintenance control by all units.
			Test Acft Unit designates mission tower officer who reports to AOC for final briefing.
			Submit weather island roll-up plan to Commander TG 7.4 for approval.
			AOC insures pre-positioning plan is complete and adequately disseminated by Test Acft Unit.
		1400	Meeting TG 7.4 Staff & Unit Commanders to review proposed schedule of events and prepare the actual schedule for 15 thru 21 March.
		1700	Three (3) sample return acft arrive Eniwetok.
	12 Mar R-1	0700	TSU insures that final arrangements are made for continuous messing and transportation during the mission.
		0800	CTG 7.4 reports the state of readiness of TG 7.4 to CJTF SEVEN.
		0730	Acft status report submitted to CIC by AOC.
		0800	General briefing.
		0840	Specialized briefings begin.
		1000	Auth granted logistics Liaison Officer SMAMA 10 days TDY to discuss roll-up. Mission flimsies issued to all aircrews by Unit Commanders.
		1300	Pre-positioning of mission acft begins.
			Final position of DOLL HOUSE determined by 7.3 and 7.4.
			TSI checks crash phone operation.
		1500	CTG 7.4 boards USS ESTES.
		1600	TSU forwards any changes in operational plan to AOC for dissemination to the CIC and other control agencies.
		1720	Acft marshaling completed.
		1800	AOC communications and equipment checked.

APPENDIX

[redacted]

ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
	13 Mar R-Day	0001	Execute TG 7.4 Operations Order No. 3-54.
		0130	One (1) SA-16, one (1) helicopter and one (1) AVR crash boat establish and maintain local SAR alert at Eniwetok.
		0140	First aircraft take off (13 Baby Food).
		0200	CTG 7.3 has helicopter alerted for any emergency landing at Bikini.
			CTG 7.3 have one HRS ready to accomplish evacuation of crews of acft required to make emergency landing at TARE.
		0340	CJTF SEVEN passes confirming Execution Order to CTG 7.4.
		0410	First VIKING aircraft takes off from Eniwetok.
		0415	Second VIKING aircraft departs ENIWETOK.
		0420	Third VIKING aircraft departs Eniwetok.
		0625	SA-16, H-19 and AVR crash boat alerted for take off of F-84G aircraft at 0630 (Tiger Sniffer 1 & 2).
		0636	CTG 7.4 notifies CJTF SEVEN that all TG 7.4 aircraft are properly positioned in space.
		0640	H-Hour.
		0655	CTG 7.4 reports the operational status of the NAN LF Homer to CJTF SEVEN in the JOC.
		0710	CTG 7.4 transmits TARE report to AOC.
		0740	Official observer acft departs shot area for KWAJALEIN.
		1240	Flyaway 1 & 2 depart FRED for ZI with samples aboard.
		1301	Last primary mission acft lands at Eniwetok (Tiger Blue 3&4).
		1440	CTG 7.4 and Senior Controller return to ENIWETOK.
		1500	Eniwetok is open for normal air traffic.
			Should post mission developments indicate that Eniwetok may be subjected to contamination BOUNDARY TARE may be queried thru the AOC concerning pertinent instructions.
		2225	CIC advised of tracks for third WB-29 Wilson 4 cloud tracking mission information passed to thru CIC or from ELMER by telephone

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ITEM	DAY	HOUR	EVENT
	14 Mar R+1	0730	Post-mission rest day. Only essential missions will be performed.
		0755	Telemetered shot film records transported on PBM shuttle and helicopters from NAN to FRED if operational conditions permit.
		0840	CIC advised of tracks for fourth WB-29 Wilson 5 cloud tracking mission. Info passed to ..OC thru CIC or from ELMER by telephone.
		1000	Transport gas samples plus courier and baggage from ELMER by H-19. These samples are destined for ZI via Flyaway #3.
		1200	Flyaway 3 departs FRED for ZI with samples aboard.

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TASK GROUP 7.4 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

DAY	HOUR	EVENT
15 Mar 54 R/2	0730	Decontamination of aircraft begins.
	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		Units assess any damage to aircraft as a result of ROMEO mission.
	0900	Headquarters TG 7.4 Transportation Representative continues establishment of firm space requirements for April.
		Staff Supply Officer reviews progress of Base Supply Officer in preparation of Unit Supply Inventory Schedule.
		Flight Safety Committee Meeting.
	1500	Critique for ROMEO (continues until completed).
		Complete analysis of ROMEO weather forecast.
	1600	Control B-36 and scientific teams meet to discuss ROMEO mission with sampler pilots (continues until complete).
16 Mar 54 R/3	0730	Decontamination continues.
	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
	0900	Headquarters TG 7.4 Transportation Representative concludes meetings for the establishment of firm space requirements for April.
		Director of Materiel makes follow-up inspection of Personal Equipment Section of Test Support Unit.
	1000	Staff and Commanders meet to discuss coordination, planning or execution deficiencies relative to ROMEO event.
	1400	Director of Operations initiates meeting with TG 7.1 to determine the planned positioning in space for test aircraft.
	1500	Report from Director of Materiel to Commander, TG 7.4 on new parking plan for southwest parking ramp and helicopter parking.
[redacted]	1600	Flight Safety Meeting.
	1700	Recommended Final Report Format completed.
17 Mar 54 K-5	0730	Decontamination continues.

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DAY	HOUR	EVENT
17 Mar 54 K-5	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		Publish TG 7.4 Operations Order 4-54 provided that TG 7.1 has established the positioning in space for test aircraft.
	1000	Director of Operations submits to Commander, TG 7.4, statement of duties and responsibilities of Division Chiefs of Operations Directorate.
		Commander, JTF SEVEN confirms K-Day, H-Hour and issues execute order for KOON.
		Commander, JTF SEVEN transmits message relative to closing of ENIWETOK Airfield.
	1400	Director of Materiel reports to Commander, TG 7.4 on damage to TG 7.4 aircraft and on the in-commission outlook for 22 March.
18 Mar 54 K-4	0700	Three (3) WB-29 Weather Reconnaissance missions per day begin.
	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
	1000	PBM survey flight to RONGERIK.
	1200	Commander, TG 7.4 reports the state of readiness of TG 7.4 to Commander, JTF SEVEN.
	1300	Prepare VIP Schedule.
19 Mar 54 K-3	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		Project Participants arrive ENIWETOK.
	0900	Director of Materiel advises TG 7.2 of estimated aircraft fuel required on K-3, K-2, K-1, and K-Day. Coordinates refueling requirements between Fuel Servicing Unit and TG 7.2.
	1000	TG 7.4 personnel board USS ESTES.
	1700	JTF SEVEN notifies CINCPAC that ENIWETOK and BIKINI are closed to air traffic. Only scheduled MATS and official observer flights will land at ENIWETOK.
	1800	DOLL HOUSE begins constant listening watch on J-407.
20 Mar 54 K-2	0730	Official Observers arrive ENIWETOK.
		Pursue VIP Schodule.
	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
	0900	AOC confirms any requirements for post mission, inter-atoll airlift operations. Notify CIC of confirmed missions.

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DAY	HOUR	EVENT
20 Mar 54 K-2	0900	Specialized briefing for IBDA crews (scope photos, target studies, etc.).
	1000	Flimsies distributed to all crews of Test Aircraft Unit.
	0800	The Director of Materiel:
		Reviews maintenance plan of all activities for mission commitments and develops overall plan to insure coordinated effort for K-Day.
	1200	Meeting of TG 7.4 Staff and Unit Commanders to review proposed scheduled of events and to establish a firm schedule for 21 through 31 March.
		Test Aircraft Unit designates mission tower officer who reports to AOC for final briefing.
		AOC insures that pre-position plan is complete and adequately disseminated by Test Aircraft Unit.
	1600	B-50 IBDA aircraft arrive ENIWETOK from GUAM.
	1700	Three (3) sample return aircraft arrive ENIWETOK.
21 Mar 54 K-1	0700	AOC insures that tower personnel are briefed on K-Day mission.
		Test Support Unit insures that crash removal crews are briefed and prepared for K-Day assignment.
	0800	General and specialized briefings.
		CIC reports state of readiness of TG 7.4 to JTF SEVEN.
	0900	PBM departs on rawinsonde mission to RONGERIK.
	1230	Commander, TG 7.4 departs ENIWETOK for USS ESTES.
	1300	Logistics Liaison Officer SAMA due to arrive to discuss weather island roll-up. Director of Materiel: Makes physical check of all aircraft Forms #1 for any delayed maintenance or outstanding TOC's involving safety of flight.
		Marshalling of mission aircraft begins.
		Final position of DOLL HOUSE determined by TG 7.3 and TG 7.4.
		Test Support Unit checks crash phone operations.
	1400	Specialized briefing for VIP aircrews.
	1500	Commander, TG 7.4 boards USS ESTES.

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DAY	HOUR	EVENT
21 Mar 54 K-1	1600	Test Aircraft Unit forwards any changes in operational plan to the AOC for dissemination to the CIC and other control agencies.
		Director of Materiel: Conducts inspection of all fire fighting and crash removal activities.
	1700	Test Aircraft Unit submits K-Day aircraft clearances to base operations.
	1720	Aircraft marshalling completed.
	1800	AOC communications and equipment checked.
	2240	Commander, JTF SEVEN passes directive to Commander, TG 7.4 reference flight #1, WB-29 cloud trackers.

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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TASK GROUP 7.4 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

DAY	HOUR	EVENT
22 Mar 54 R-Day	0001	Execute TG 7.4 Operations Order 3-54.
	0125	One (1) SA-16, one (1) helicopter and one (1) AVR crash boat establish and maintain local SAR alert at ENIWETOK.
	0130	First Aircraft takes-off (13 Baby Food)
	0605	CTG 7.3 has one HRS ready to accomplish evacuation of crews of aircraft required to make emergency landing at TARE.
	0335	"Execute" order received by CIC from JOC; forward to AOC.
	0405	First VIKING aircraft departs ENIWETOK.
	0410	Second VIKING aircraft departs ENIWETOK.
	0415	Third VIKING aircraft departs ENIWETOK.
	0610	SAR SA-16, H-19 and crash boat alerted by AOC for first F-84 take-off (Tiger Sniffer 1 & 2)
	0620	First F-84 sampler flight takes-off.
	0626	CTG 7.4 notifies CJTF SEVEN that all TG 7.4 aircraft are properly positioned in space.
	0630	H-Hour
	0700	ransmits TARE report to AOC.
	0730	JTF SEVEN Official Observer aircraft depart operational area for destination.
	0835	Filter sample plus one monitor transported from FRED to ELMER via L-13 (Time of flight dependent upon time WB-29 lands) Helicopter dispatched to NAN, GEORGE, and TARE to accomplish rad-safe survey and early recovery.
	0850	Gas sample bags and monitor transported from FRED to ELMER via H-19. Filter sample plus one monitor transported from FRED to ELMER by L-13.
	0900	Director of Materiel inspects HARDTIME aircraft for damage.
	1200	Send message to Commander ARDC, Commander SAC and Commander AFSWC stating K-Day and request names of Project Participants.
	1300	One (1) Pewter C-54 aircraft departs ENIWETOK for HICKAM to complete 100 hour inspection. Director of Materiel submits JTF 132 MD-ES report "East and West bound airlift requirements".

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AFSWP/NWC

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DAY	HOUR	EVENT
23 Mar 54 R-Day	1335	Last primary sampling mission aircraft lands at ENIWETOK (FLOYD2).
	1400	FLYAWAY 1 and 2 depart FRED for ZI with samples aboard.
	1435	Bottle gas samples transported from FRED to ELMER via L-13 (or possibly H-19). H-19 will be required if a bag sample is involved.
	1450	One monitor plus 100 lbs of liquid samples (2 cu. ft.) transported from FRED to ELMER.
	1700	ENIWETOK open to normal traffic.
	2225	CIC advised of tracks for third WB-29 (W-4) cloud tracking mission. Information passed to AOC through CIC or from ELMER by telephone.
23 Mar 54 R+1	0730	Post-mission rest day. Only essential functions will be performed.
	0755	Telemeter shot film records transported via PBM or C-47 from NAN to FRED, if operational conditions permit.
	0840	CIC advised of tracks for fourth WB-29 (W-5) cloud tracking mission. Information passed to AOC thru CIC or from ELMER by telephone.
	1000	CTG 7.4 and Senior Controller return to ENIWETOK.
		Transport gas samples plus courier and baggage from ELMER by H-19. These samples destined for ZI via FLYAWAY 3.
24 Mar 54 R+2 & K-5	0730	Decontamination of aircraft begins.
	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		Units assess any damage to aircraft as a result of ROMEO mission.
	1000	CJTF SEVEN confirms K-Day, H-Hour and issues execute order for KOON.
		CJTF SEVEN transmits message relative to closing of ENIWETOK airfield.
	1300	Prepare and coordinate Project Participants and Senior Official Observer team program.
	1400	Director of Materiel reports to CTG 7.4 on damage to TG 7.4 aircraft and on the in-commission outlook for 29 March.
	1500	Critique of ROMEO mission in building #79 (to be continued until completed)

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DAY	HOUR	EVENT
25 Mar 54 K-4	0700	Three (3) WB-29 Weather Reconnaissance missions per day begin.
	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		Follow-up inspection of Communications Element supply.
		Individual sampler aircrews critique by Colonel Houghton, Dr Plank and Lt Colonel Fackler.
	0900	Positioning meeting at Headquarters TG 7.1 to firm final positions of all aircraft for KOON.
	1000	Meeting of Transportation Board.
	1100	Command & Staff observers of 341st squadron arrive from Guam for briefing on their participation.
	1200	CTG 7.4 reports the state of readiness of TG 7.4 to CJTF SEVEN.
	1300	Complete Project Participants schedule preparation.
	1400	TG 7.4 Staff and Unit Commander's meet to discuss coordination, planning or execution deficiencies relative to ROMEO event. Also review and coordinate firm schedule of events for 29 March through 2 April.
	1600	Publish TG 7.4 Operations Order 4-54, providing that TG 7.1 has established the positioning in space for test aircraft.
26 Mar 54 K-3	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		Project Participants arrive ENIWETOK. Execute Project Participants plan.
	0900	Director of Materiel advises TG 7.2 of estimated aircraft fuel required on K-3, K-2, K-1 and K-Day. Coordinates refueling requirements between fuel servicing unit and TG 7.2.
	1000	Director of Materiel submits JTF-7 MD-E6 report "Plan Movement of personnel by Air and Water for April".
	1600	TG 7.4 personnel board USS ESTES.
		Three (3) B-50 IBDA aircraft arrive from Guam. Radio and IFF checked in these aircraft. Radio Operators briefed in operation.
	1700	JTF SEVEN notifies CINCPAC that ENIWETOK and BIKINI are closed to air traffic. Only scheduled MATS and Official Observer flights will land at ENIWETOK.

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DAY	HOUR	EVENT
26 Mar 54 K-3	1800	DOLL HOUSE begins constant listening watch on J-407.
27 Mar 54 K-2	0730	JTF SEVEN Official Observers arrive ENIWETOK.
		Pursue VIP Schedule.
	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
		Director of Materiel review maintenance plan of all activities for mission commitments and develops over-all plan to insure coordinated effort for K-Day.
	1000	Films distributed to all aircrews of Test Aircraft Unit.
	1100	Logistics Liaison Officer SMAMA, arrives to discuss roll-up.
	1400	Test Aircraft Unit designates mission tower officer who reports to AOC for final briefing.
		Director of Operations insures that preposition plan is complete and adquately disseminated by Test Aircraft Unit.
	1600	Three (3) sample return aircraft (FLYAWAY 1,2 and 3) arrive ENIWETOK.
28 Mar 54 K-1	0700	AOC insures that tower personnel are briefed and prepared for K-Day mission.
		Test Support Unit insures that crash removal crews are briefed and prepared for K-Day mission.
	0800	General and specialized briefings.
		AOC report state of readiness of TG 7.4 to JTF SEVEN.
		Amphibious aircraft depart on rawinsonde and homer mission to RONGERIK.
	0900	Director of Materiel submits JTF-7-MB-E7 requirements for cargo and personnel by Water transportation.
	1230	CTG 7.4 departs ENIWETOK for USS ESTES.
	1300	Director of Materiel makes physical check of all aircraft Forms 1 for any delayed maintenance or outstanding TOC's involving safety of flight.
		Marshaling of mission aircraft begins.
		Final position of DOLL HOUSE determined by TG 7.3 and TG 7.4.

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DAY	HOUR	EVENT
28 Mar 54 K-1	1400	Specialized briefing for VIP aircrews.
	1500	CTG 7.4 boards USS ESTES.
	1600	Test Aircraft Unit forwards any changes in operational plan to the AOC for dissemination to the CIC and other control agencies.
		Director of Materiel inspects fire fighting and crash removal equipment.
	1700	Test Aircraft Unit submits K-Day aircraft clearances to Base Operations.
		PLANK-SLATER report to CTG 7.4 through AOC to CIC.
	1720	Aircraft marshaling completed.
	1800	AOC communications and equipment checked.
	1830	Deputy Commander TG 7.4 in place at AOC and all commanders immediately available.
	2240	JTF SEVEN passes directive to TG 7.4 concerning flight #1, WB-29 Cloud Tracker.
	2300	Meeting with to determine GO or NO GO.
	2330	Midnight Report to CTG 7.4 on USS ESTES.
29 Mar 54 K-Day	0001	Execute TG 7.4 Operations Order 4-54.
	0130	One (1) SA-16, one (1) helicopter and one (1) AVR crash boat establish and maintain local SAR alert at ENIWETOK.
	0140	First aircraft takes-off (13 Baby Food)
	0200	CTG 7.3 has one HRS ready to accomplish evacuation of crews of aircraft required to make emergency landing at TARE.
	0340	"Execute" order received by CIC from JOC; forward to AOC.
	0410	First VIKING aircraft departs ENIWETOK.
	0415	Second VIKING aircraft departs ENIWETOK.
	0420	Third VIKING aircraft departs ENIWETOK.
	0615	SAR SA-16, H-19 and crash boat alerted by AOC for first F-84 take-off (Tiger Sniffer 1 & 2)
	0625	First F-84 sampler flight takes-off.

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DAY	HOUR	EVENT
29 Mar 54 R-Day	0631	CTG 7.4 notifies CJTF SEVEN that all TG 7.4 aircraft are properly positioned in space.
	0630	H-Hour.
	0700	Transmits TARE report to AOC.
	0730	Official Observer aircraft depart operational area for destination.
	0835	Filter sample plus one monitor transported from FRED to ELMER via L-13 (Time of flight dependent upon time WB-29 lands) Helicopters dispatched to NAN, GEORGE and TARE to accomplish rad-safe survey and early recovery.
	0850	Gas sample bags and monitor transported from FRED to ELMER via H-19. Filter sample plus one monitor transported from FRED to ELMER by L-13.
	0900	Director of Materiel inspects HARDTIME aircraft for damage.
	1300	One (1) Pewter C-54 aircraft departs ENIWETOK for HICKAM to complete 100 hour inspection. Lookout Mountain Film aboard.
	1335	Last primary sampling mission aircraft lands at ENIWETOK (FLOYD 2).
	1400	FLYAWAY 1 and 2 depart FRED for ZI with samples aboard.
	1435	Bottle gas samples transported from FRED to ELMER via L-13 (or possibly H-19). H-19 will be required if a bag sample is involved.
	1450	One monitor plus 100 los of liquid samples (2 cu. ft.) transported from FRED to ELMER.
	1700	ENIWETOK open to normal traffic.
	2220	CIC advised of tracks for third WB-29 (W-4) cloud tracking mission. Information passed to AOC through CIC or from ELMER by telephone.
30 Mar 54 R+1	0730	Post-mission rest day. Only essential functions will be performed.
	0755	Telemeter shot film records transported from NAN to FRED via PBM or C-47, if operational conditions permit.

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DAY	HOUR	EVENT
30 Mar 54 K/1	0840	CIC advised of tracks for fourth WB-29, (W-5) cloud tracking mission. Information passed to AOC through CIC or from ELMER by telephone.
	1000	CTG 7.4 and Senior Controller return to ENIWETOK.
		Transport gas samples plus courier and baggage from ELMER by H-19. These samples destined for ZI via FLYAWAY 3.
	1200	FLYAWAY 3 departs FRED for ZI with samples aboard.
		Major Marginean arrives from AFSWC relative to organization and manning of Test Wing Headquarters, Test Sampling Group and interim organization.
31 Mar 54 K/2 & U-5	0730	Decontamination of aircraft begins.
	0800	Commander's Operational Briefing.
	1000	Units assess any damage to aircraft as a result of KOON mission.
	1400	Director of Materiel reports to CTG 7.4 on damage to TG 7.4 aircraft and on the in-commission outlook for 2 April.
	1500	Critique for KOON event. Complete analysis of KOON weather forecast.
	1600	Control B-36 and scientific team meet to discuss KOON mission with sampler pilots (to continue until completed)

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ENIWETOK ATOLL	A-29	EWO 3271	INST. SUBMARINE CABLE FOR SCIENT. PROGRAM	12-7-53	2-1-54	100	82	82	LACKS INSTALLATION OF 6 PR. #19 CABLE.
ENIWETOK LAGOON		3634 & Amd.1	ADDITIONAL SUBMARINE CABLE	3-4-54	3-6-54	100	99	-	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
VARIOUS	A-70	3570	TASK GROUP 7.1 - RADIO EQUIPMENT	1-28-54	3-15-54	83	99	75	"
			TEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION STRUCTURES						
ENIWETOK ATOLL		3096	CRUSHER & BATCH PLANT MOVEMENTS & RELOCATIONS	5-6-53	2-19-54		100		COMPLETED 2-19-54.
		3106	PRODUCE AGGREGATE STOCKPILES	5-27-53	-	-	99	-	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
FRED	A-33	ECO 3806	INSTALL ACID HOUSE, ACID LINES & BLOW DOWN DRAINS, BLDG. 56	12-15-53	1-1-54	100	82	81	COMPLETED APPROX. 90% MECHANICALLY, 80% STRUCTURALLY & 12% ELECTRICALLY.
	A-37	EWO 3246	MODIF. TO BLDG. 56	10-8-53	1-25-54	100	95	95	LACKS MINOR ELECTRICAL & FINAL CLEANUP.
		3267 & Amd.1	ELECT. DISTRIB. INTERCONNECTION	11-17-53	1-25-54	100	98	98	LACKS PERMANENT HOOKUP.
		3267 Amd.2	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION	1-28-54	2-15-54	100	93	92	LACKS INSTALLATION OF POWERHOUSE CONNECTION FEEDER "J" AND PRIMARY CROSS ARM CHANGE OUT.
		3326 & Amd.1	VOLTAGE REGULATOR STA.	10-1-53	12-15-53	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3397	SUBSTA. FF-630, FF-154, FF-607 ELECT. EXT. & SECONDARIES	12-14-53	1-25-54	100	96	95	ALL FENCE POSTS SET. LACKS INSTALLATION OF ALUMINUM FENCING.
	A-40	3244 Amd.5	ADDIT. PAVEMENT AIRFIELD TAXISTRIP	1-12-54	2-15-54		100		COMPLETED 2-28-54.
		3607	SEAL COAT PROTECTION	2-10-54	2-22-54		100		COMPLETED 3-2-54.
		3625	INSPECTION & REPAIR THREE GENERATORS, BLDG. 33	-	3-31-54	-	00	00	SCHEDULED TO START APPROX. 3-15-54.
	A-40.1	3244 Amd.1&4	AIRFIELD IMPROVEMENTS	9-18-53	1-1-54		100		COMPLETED 2-28-54.
	A-40.3	3373 Amd.1	NEW POL TANKS 28, 34 THRU 38 & 43	12-24-53	1-15-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
	A-40.8	3512	MODIF. DECONTAMINATION AREA	1-20-54	1-15-54	100	85	85	STRUCTURALLY COMPLETE. ELECT. APPROX. 80% COMPLETE.
	A-40.9	3518	FLOODLIGHTING OF PLANE PARKING AREA	2-22-54	3-1-54		100		COMPLETED 3-3-54.

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JOB 884
CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS REPORT FOR WEEK ENDING 6 MARCH 1954 ENIWETOK JOB I PAGE 7 OF 10

SITE	FEAT. NO.	WORK ORDER NO.	JOB DESCRIPTION	ACTUAL STARTING DATE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	SCHED % COMPL.	ACTUAL % COMPL.	% LAST WEEK	REMARKS
FRED	A-40.10	EWO 3527	FRESH WATER INSTALLATION, AIRCRAFT	1-20-54	2-1-54		100		COMPLETED 3-2-54.
	A-40.14	3563 Amd.1	ADDITIONAL STABILIZED AREA	2-1-54	2-10-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
	A-40.22	3636	LIGHT PLANE PARKING AREA	3-5-54	3-6-54	100	99	-	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
	A-44	3280 Amd.3	TYPE B-2 TENT	2-1-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3280 Amd.6	ADDITIONAL TENT REQUIREMENT (117 E)	2-8-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		3280 Amd.8	FRESH WATER SUPPLY LINE TO PROJECT 6.2 TRAILER	2-15-54	2-25-54		100		COMPLETED 3-3-54.
		3280 Amd.9	REFURBISH EXISTING STRUCTURE	2-22-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3280 Amd.11	BLDG. 117 F	2-23-54	2-27-54		100		COMPLETED 3-3-54.
		3544	POWER EXTENSION & WIRING TWO MONITOR TENTS	1-12-54	1-15-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
	A-66	3493	VARIOUS WORK STA. HOSPITAL, BLDG. 24	1-14-54	1-25-54		100		COMPLETED 3-3-54.
		3493 Amd.1	MODIF. STERILIZING ROOM, BLDG. 24	-	3-15-54	-	00	-	SCHEDULED TO START APPROX. 3-7-54.
		3553	MODIF. TO LAUNDRY, BLDG. 31	10-20-54	3-1-54	100	99	98	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3565	SILVERWARE DRAIN TRAYS, BLDG. 36	2-15-54	2-15-54		100		COMPLETED 3-2-54.
		3591	INSTALLATION OF ADDIT. KITCHEN EQUIP.	2-9-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3591 Amd.1	RELOCATION OF SINK, BLDG. 36	3-1-54	3-5-54	100	99	-	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		3595	PLUMBING & ELECT., BLDG. 117 A	2-9-54	2-6-54		100		COMPLETED 3-5-54.
	A-67	3506	ELECT. WIRING, BLDG. 80, AAF WHSE.	2-15-54	3-15-54		100		COMPLETED 3-5-54.
		3530	FLOODLIGHTING DEPOT SUPPLY AREA, DUMP AREA & GARBAGE PIER	2-22-54	4-1-54	38	99	50	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		3558	BEACH GRADIENT FOR LST	1-20-54	2-1-54		100		COMPLETED 2-20-54.
		3595	HOOD OVER SINK, BLDG. 117 A	2-8-54	2-20-54		100		COMPLETED 3-5-54.

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CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS REPORT FOR WEEK ENDING 6 MARCH 1954 ENIWETOK JOB I

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SITE	FEAT. NO.	WORK ORDER NO.	JOB DESCRIPTION	ACTUAL STARTING DATE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	SCHED % COMPL.	ACTUAL % COMPL.	% LAST WEEK	REMARKS
		EWO							
FRED	A-67	3600 Amd.1	POWER OUTLET, AOC ROOM, BLDG. 90	2-22-54	3-1-54		100		COMPLETED 3-3-54.
		3613	OBSTRUCTION LIGHTS	3-1-54	3-6-54	100	99	00	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		3626	SURVEY POINTS RHOMBIC ANTENNAE	3-1-54	2-23-54	100	99	00	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3627	TRAILER DOLLY LOCKING DEVICE	2-20-54	2-23-54		100		COMPLETED 3-3-54.
	A-68	3346	MODIF. TO BLDG. 15 & CRYPTO VAULT	9-18-53	1-25-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3346 Amd.1&2	MODIF. TO BLDG. 15	11-27-53	1-1-54	100	99	99	"
		3355 & Amd.1	ERECT NINE PREFAB. METAL BLDGS. 604 THRU 609, 612, 613 & 631	9-29-53	1-1-54		100		COMPLETED 3-5-54.
		3623	ADDIT. CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS, T.G. 7.4	2-22-54	2-28-54	100	99	99	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
	A-68.7	3542	DISPENSARY SINK, BLDG. 135	2-1-54	2-15-54		100		COMPLETED 3-2-54.
	A-68.11	3611	TEMPORARY EMERGENCY POWER CONNECTION, BLDG. 90	2-22-54	2-26-54		100		COMPLETED 3-5-54.
	A-68.12	3446 & Amd.1	PHOTO LAB - ARMY OWNED STEEL FRAME BLDG. 610	10-22-53	1-5-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
	A-68.20	3508	LIGHT MODIF., B-50 HANGAR, BLDG. 118	2-22-54	3-1-54	100	99	80	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
	A-68.25	3529	PAINTING AIR FORCE BLDGS.	2-4-54	3-1-54	100	99	05	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		3529 Amd.1	PAINTING AIR FORCE BUILDINGS	3-4-54	3-6-54	100	99	-	"
			MAINTENANCE WORK ORDERS - JOB III						
		MWO 7317	CENTRAL OIL SYSTEMS FOR DIST. UNITS	12-9-52	12-31-53	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		7505	REMOVAL OF SEDIMENT & GRAVEL FROM BOTTOM OF WELL AT BLDG. 186	3-1-54	3-31-54	21	20	-	REMOVAL OF SEDIMENT HAS BEGUN.

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CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS REPORT FOR WEEK ENDING 13 MARCH 1954 ENIWETOK JOB I PAGE 3 OF 6

SITE	FEAT. NO.	WORK ORDER NO.	JOB DESCRIPTION	ACTUAL STARTING DATE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	SCHED % COMPL.	ACTUAL % COMPL.	% LAST WEEK	REMARKS
EIMER	A-66	EWO 3632	SWIMMING AREA	3-1-54	3-2-54		100		COMPLETED 3-11-54.
		3642	ADDITIONAL OUTLETS & WIRING, ROOMS C & D, BLDG. 221	3-10-54	3-13-54	100	99	-	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
	A-67	3598	PONTOON FLOAT	2-8-54	2-20-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3633	ELECTRICAL MODIFICATION, BLDG. 232	3-1-54	3-6-54		100		COMPLETED 3-13-54.
		3637	DECONTAMINATION BARGE	3-4-54	3-6-54		100		COMPLETED 3-12-54.
		MWO 7317	MAINTENANCE WORK ORDERS - JOB III CENTRAL OIL SYSTEMS FOR DIST. UNITS	12-9-52	1-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		7501	SALT WATER SUPPLY, CMR & ASSY. AREA	-	INDEFINITE	-	00	00	TO BE DEFERRED UNTIL COMPLETION OF PRESENT OPERATION AS PIPING CHANGES REQUIRE POWER PLANT SHUTDOWN.
		7502	REPAIRS TO CARGO PIER	2-15-54	3-10-54	100	97	95	LACKS INSTALLATION OF A DOLPHIN.
ENIWETOK ATOLL	A-29	EWO 3271	INST. SUBMARINE CABLE FOR SCIENT. PROGRAM	12-7-53	2-1-54	100	82	82	LACKS INSTALLATION OF 6 PR. #19 CABLE.
ENIWETOK LAGOON		3634 & Amd.1	REPLACEMENT OF SUBMARINE CABLE	3-4-54	3-6-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS
VARIOUS	A-70	3570	TASK GROUP 7.1 - RADIO EQUIPMENT	1-28-54	3-15-54	98	99	99	
ENIWETOK ATOLL		3106	TEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION STRUCTURES PRODUCE AGGREGATE STOCKPILES	5-27-53	-	-	99	99	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
FRED	A-33	ECO 3806	INSTALL ACID HOUSE, ACID LINES & BLOW DOWN DRAINS, BLDG. 56	12-15-53	1-1-54	100	82	82	COMPLETED APPROX. 90% MECHANICALLY, 80% STRUCTURALLY & 12% ELECTRICALLY.
	A-37	EWO 3246	MODIF. TO BLDG. 56	10-8-53	1-25-54	100	98	95	LACKS POWER CHANGEOVER & FINAL CLEANUP.
		3267 & Amd.1	ELECTRICAL DISTRIB. INTERCONNECTION	11-17-53	1-25-54	100	98	98	LACKS PERMANENT CONNECTION OF STA. FF-135.
		3267 Amd.2	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION	1-28-54	2-15-54	100	93	93	LACKS COMPLETION OF FEEDER "J" AND PRIMARY CROSS ARM CHANGE OUT.
		3326 ...1.1	VOLTAGE REGULATOR STATION	10-1-53	12-15-53	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.

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CONTRACTOR'S CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS REPORT FOR WEEK ENDING: 13 MARCH 1954 ENIWETOK JOB I PAGE 4 OF 6

SITE	PLAT. NO.	WORK ORDER NO.	JOB DESCRIPTION	ACTUAL STARTING DATE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	ACTUAL % COMPL. LAST WEEK	ACTUAL % COMPL. THIS WEEK	% PLANT THIS WEEK	REMARKS
FRED	A-37	EWO 3397	SUBSTA. FF-630, FF-154, FF-607 ELECT. EXT. & SECONDARIES	12-14-53	1-25-54	100	96	96	LACKS INSTALLATION OF ALUMINUM FENCING.
	A-40	3625	INSPECTION & REPAIR THREE GENERATORS, BLDG. 336	-	3-31-54	-	00	00	AWAITING ARRIVAL OF SWITCHES, METERS, ETC. FROM STATESIDE.
		3638 Amd.1	TENTS FOR T.G. 7.4	3-8-54	3-18-54	80	90	-	TENT FRAMES ARE ERECTED AND TENTS ARE SET IN PLACE.
		3645	TIE-DOWN RINGS FOR AIRCRAFT	-	3-31-54	-	-	-	EWO ISSUED THIS WEEK. SCHEDULED TO START APPROX. 3-18-54.
	A-40.3	3373 Amd.1	NEW POL TANKS 28, 34 THRU 38 & 43	12-24-53	1-15-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
	A-40.8	3512	MODIFICATION TO DECONTAMINATION AREA	1-20-54	1-15-54		100		COMPLETED 3-12-54.
	A-40.14	3563 Amd.1	ADDITIONAL STABILIZED AREA	2-1-54	2-10-54		100		COMPLETED 2-10-54.
	A-40.22	3636	LIGHT PLANE PARKING AREA	3-5-54	3-6-54		100		COMPLETED 3-12-54.
	A-44	3280 Amd.3	TYPE B-2 TENT	2-1-54	3-1-54		100		COMPLETED 2-10-54.
		3280 Amd.6	ADDITIONAL TENT REQUIREMENT (117 E)	2-8-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		3280 Amd.9	REFURBISH EXISTING STRUCTURE	2-22-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3544	POWER EXTENSION & WIRING TWO MONITOR TENTS	1-12-54	1-15-54		100		COMPLETED 3-6-54.
	A-66	3493 Amd.1	MODIF. STERILIZING ROOM, BLDG. 24	-	3-15-54	-	99	00	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3553	MODIF. TO LAUNDRY, BLDG. 31	10-20-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	"
		3591	INSTALLATION OF ADDIT. KITCHEN EQUIP.	2-9-54	3-1-54		100		COMPLETED 3-13-54.
		3591 Amd.1	RELOCATION OF SINK, BLDG. 36	3-1-54	3-5-54		100		COMPLETED 3-13-54.
	A-67	3530	FLOODLIGHTING DEPOT SUPPLY AREA, DUMP AREA & GARBAGE PIER	2-22-54	4-1-54		100		COMPLETED 3-12-54.
		3613	OBSTRUCTION LIGHTS	3-1-54	3-6-54		100		COMPLETED 3-13-54.
		3613 Amd.1	ADDITIONAL OBSTRUCTION LIGHTS	-	3-25-54	-	00	-	EWO ISSUED THIS WEEK. SCHEDULED TO START APPROX. 3-15-54.
			ELECTRIC MOTOR REPAIRS	3-10-54	3-17-54	56	25	-	MOTORS HAVE BEEN REMOVED & ARE BEING REPAIRED.

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DATE	FEAT. NO.	WORK ORDER NO.	JOB DESCRIPTION	ACTUAL STARTING DATE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	SCHED. % COMPL.	ACTUAL % COMPL.	% LAST WEEK	REMARKS
FRED	A-67	EWO 3643	ELECTRIC MOTOR REPAIRS	3-10-54	3-17-54	36	25	-	MOTORS HAVE BEEN REMOVED & ARE BEING REPAIRED.
		3644	INST. OF EQUIP. IN BLDG. 155	-	3-18-54	-	-	-	EWO ISSUED THIS WEEK. SCHEDULED TO START APPROX. 3-15-54.
	A-68	3346	MODIF. TO BLDG. 15 & CRYPTO VAULT	9-18-53	1-25-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3346 Amd.1&2	MODIF. TO BLDG. 15	11-27-53	1-1-54	100	99	99	"
		3623	ADDIT. CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS, T.G. 7.4	2-22-54	2-28-54		100		COMPLETED 3-3-54.
	A-68.12	3446 & Amd.1	PHOTO LAB - ARMY OWNED STEEL FRAME BLDG. 610	10-22-53	1-5-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
	A-68.20	3508	LIGHT MODIF., B-50 HANGAR, BLDG. 118	2-22-54	3-1-54		100		COMPLETED 3-12-54.
	A-68.25	3529	PAINTING AIR FORCE BLDGS	2-4-54	3-1-54		100		COMPLETED 3-12-54.
		3529 Amd.1	PAINTING AIR FORCE BLDGS.	3-4-54	3-6-54		100		COMPLETED 3-12-54.
		3529 Amd.2	PAINTING OF BLDG. 640	3-10-54	3-11-54	100	99	-	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		MWO 7317	MAINTENANCE WORK ORDERS - JOB III CENTRAL OIL SYSTEMS FOR DIST. UNITS	12-9-52	12-31-53	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		7505	REMOVAL OF SEDIMENT & GRAVEL FROM BOTTOM OF WELL AT BLDG. 186	3-1-54	3-31-54	44	99	20	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
IRENE	A-29	EWO 3382	SUBMARINE TERMINAL 3.4	1-6-54	2-1-54	100	97	97	LACKS BACKFILL & FINAL CLEANUP.
MARY 1 of 5	A-27	3270	ELECT. DISTRIB. SYSTEM FOR SCIENT. PROGRAM	2-1-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
OLIVE 1 of 5		3270	ELECT. DISTRIB. SYSTEM FOR SCIENT. PROGRAM	1-25-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	"

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CONTRACT AT-(29-2)-20
JOB 884

CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS REPORT FOR WEEK ENDING 20 MARCH 1954 ENIWETOK JOB I PAGE 3 OF 5

SITE	PLAT. NO.	WORK ORDER NO.	JOB DESCRIPTION	ACTUAL STARTING DATE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	SCHED % COMPL.	ACTUAL % COMPL.	% LAST WEEK	REMARKS
ELMER		MWO 7317	MAINTENANCE WORK ORDERS - JOB III CENTRAL OIL SYSTEMS FOR DIST. UNITS	12-9-52	1-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		7501	SALT WATER SUPPLY, CMR & ASSY. AREA	-	INDEFINITE	-	00	00	TO BE DEFERRED UNTIL COMPLETION OF PRESENT OPERATION AS PIPING CHANGES REQUIRE POWER PLANT SHUTDOWN.
		7502	REPAIRS TO CARGO PIER	2-15-54	3-10-54	100	99	97	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		7506	NAVY GENERATOR REPLACEMENT, LST 762	-	3-24-54	-	-	-	EWO ISSUED THIS WEEK. SCHEDULED TO START APPROX. 3-22-54.
ENIWETOK ATOLL	A-29	EWO 3271	INST. SUBMARINE CABLE FOR SCIENT. PROGRAM	12-7-53	2-1-54	100	82	82	LACKS INSTALLATION OF 6 PAIR #19 CABLE.
ENIWETOK LAGOON		3634 & Amd.1&2	REPLACEMENT OF SUBMARINE CABLE	3-4-54	3-6-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
VARIOUS	A-70	3570	TASK GROUP 7.1 - RADIO EQUIPMENT	1-28-54	3-15-54	100	99	99	"
ENIWETOK ATOLL		3106	TEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION STRUCTURES PRODUCE AGGREGATE STOCKPILES	5-27-53	-	-	99	99	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
FRED	A-33	ECO 3806	INSTALL ACID HOUSE, ACID LINES & BLOW DOWN DRAINS, BLDG. 56	12-15-53	1-1-54	100	82	82	COMPLETED APPROX. 90% MECHANICALLY, 80% STRUCTURALLY & 12% ELECTRICALLY.
	A-37	EWO 3246	MODIF. TO BLDG. 56	10-8-53	1-25-54	100	98	98	LACKS POWER CHANGEOVER & FINAL CLEANUP.
		3267 & Amd.1	ELECTRICAL DISTRIB. INTERCONNECTION	11-17-53	1-25-54	100	98	98	LACKS PERMANENT CONNECTION OF STA. FF-135.
		3267 Amd.2	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION	1-28-54	2-15-54	100	93	93	LACKS COMPLETION OF FEEDER "J" & PRIMARY CROSS ARM CHANGE OUT.
		3326 & Amd.1	VOLTAGE REGULATOR STA.	10-1-53	12-15-53	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3397	SUBSTA. FF-630, FF-154, FF-607 ELECT. EQT. & SECONDARIES	12-14-53	1-25-54	100	98	96	LACKS FENCE FOR FF-630.
	A-40	3625	INSPECTION & REPAIR THREE GENERATORS, BLDG. 33	-	3-31-54	-	00	00	AWAITING ARRIVAL OF SWITCHES, METERS, ETC. FROM STATESIDE.
		3638 & Amd.1	TENTS FOR T.G. 7.4	3-8-54	3-18-54	100	99	90	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3645	TIE-DOWN RINGS FOR AIRCRAFT	3-15-54	3-31-54	40	99	-	"
		3645 Amd.1	ADDITIONAL SAFETY FACILITIES, DECONTAMINATION PAD	3-17-54	3-25-54	50	90	-	LACKS INSTALLATION OF CABLE.

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CONTRACT AT-(29-2)-20
JOB #84

CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS REPORT FOR WEEK ENDING 20 MARCH 1954 ENIWETOK JOB I

SITE	FEAT. NO.	WORK ORDER NO.	JOB DESCRIPTION	ACTUAL STARTING DATE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	SCHED % COMPL.	ACTUAL % COMPL.	% LAST WEEK	REMARKS
		EWO							
FRED	A-40	3645 Amd.2	FLOOD & OBSTRUCTION LIGHTS, DECONTAMINATION PAD	-	3-25-54	-	-	-	EWO ISSUED THIS WEEK. SCHEDULED TO START APPROX. 3-22-54.
	A-40.3	3373 Amd.1	NEW POL TANKS 28, 34 THRU 38 & 43	12-24-53	1-15-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
	A-44	3280 Amd.6	ADDITIONAL TENT REQUIREMENT (117 E)	2-8-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		3280 Amd.9	REFURBISH EXISTING STRUCTURE	2-22-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
	A-66	3493 Amd.1	MODIF. STERILIZING ROOM, BLDG. 24	3-9-54	3-15-54	100	99	99	"
		3553	MODIF. TO LAUNDRY, BLDG. 31	10-20-54	3-1-54		100		COMPLETED 3-18-54.
		3648	ELECT. MODIFICATIONS, BLDG. 3	-	3-23-54	-	-	-	EWO ISSUED THIS WEEK. SCHEDULED TO START APPROX. 3-22-54.
	A-67	3613 Amd.1	ADDITIONAL OBSTRUCTION LIGHTS	3-15-54	3-25-54	60	99	-	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		3643	ELECTRIC MOTOR REPAIRS	3-10-54	3-17-54	100	99	25	"
		3644	INST. OF EQUIPMENT IN BLDG. 155	3-15-54	3-18-54	100	99	-	"
	A-68	3346	MODIF. TO BLDG. 15 & CRYPTO VAULT	9-18-53	1-25-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3346 Amd.1&2	MODIF. TO BLDG. 15	11-27-53	1-1-54	100	99	99	"
		3646	ELECT. INSTALLATION FOR AIR COMPRESSOR BLDG. 64	-	3-25-54	-	-	-	EWO ISSUED THIS WEEK. SCHEDULED TO START APPROX. 3-22-53.
	A-68.12	3446 & Amd.1	PHOTO LAB - ARMY OWNED STEEL FRAME	10-22-53	1-5-54		100		COMPLETED 3-17-54.
	A468.25	3529 Amd.2	PAINTING OF BLDG. 640	3-10-54	3-11-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
			MAINTENANCE WORK ORDERS - JOB III						
		MWO 7317	CENTRAL OIL SYSTEMS FOR DIST. UNITS	12-9-52	12-31-53	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		7505	REMOVAL OF SEDIMENT & GRAVEL FROM BOTTOM OF WELL AT BLDG. 186	3-1-54	3-31-54	67	99	99	"

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JOB 884
CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS REPORT FOR WEEK ENDING 27 MARCH 1954 ENIWETOK JOB I PAGE 3 OF 5

SITE	FEAT. NO.	WORK ORDER NO.	JOB DESCRIPTION	ACTUAL STARTING DATE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	SCHED % COMPL.	ACTUAL % COMPL.	% LAST WEEK	REMARKS
ENIWETOK ATOLL	A-29	EWO 3271	INST. SUBMARINE CABLE FOR SCIENT. PROGRAM	12-7-53	2-1-54	100	95	82	LACKS COMPLETION OF TIX-YI CABLE.
ENIWETOK LAGOON		3634 & Amd.1&2	REPLACEMENT OF SUBMARINE CABLE	3-4-54	3-6-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS
VARIOUS	A-70	3570	TASK GROUP 7.1 - RADIO EQUIPMENT	1-28-54	3-15-54	100	99	99	"
E...WETOK ATOLL.		3106	TEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION STRUCTURES PRODUCE AGGREGATE STOCKPILES	5-27-53	-	-	99	99	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
FRED	A-33	ECO 3806	INSTALL ACID HOUSE, ACID LINES & BLOW DOWN DRAINS, BLDG. 56	12-15-53	1-1-54	100	82	82	COMPLETED APPROX. 90% MECHANICALLY, 80% STRUCTURALLY & 12% ELECTRICALLY.
	A-37	EWO 3246	MODIF. TO BLDG. 56	10-8-53	1-25-54	100	98	98	LACKS POWER CHANGEOVER AND FINAL CLEANUP.
		3267 & Amd.1	ELECTRICAL DISTRIB. INTERCONNECTION	11-17-53	1-25-54	100	98	98	LACKS PERMANENT CONNECTION OF STA. FF-135.
		3267 Amd.2	ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION	1-28-54	2-15-54	100	95	93	LACKS COMPLETION OF FEEDER "J".
		3326 & Amd.1	VOLTAGE REGULATOR STA.	10-1-53	12-15-53		100		COMPLETED 3-27-54.
		3397	SUBSTA. FF-630, FF-154, FF-607 ELECT. EXT. & SECONDARIES	12-14-53	1-25-54	100	99	98	LACKS INSTALLATION OF ONE GATE.
	A-40	3625	INSPECTION & REPAIR THREE GENERATORS BLDG. 33	-	3-31-54	-	00	00	AWAITING ARRIVAL OF SWITCHES, METERS, ETC. FROM STATESIDE.
		3638 & Amd.1	TENTS FOR T.G. 7.4	3-8-54	3-18-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3645	TIE-DOWN RINGS FOR AIRCRAFT	3-15-54	3-31-54		100		COMPLETED 3-20-54.
		3645 Amd.1	ADDITIONAL SAFETY FACILITIES, DECONTAMINATION PAD	3-17-54	3-25-54	100	99	90	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
		3645 Amd.2	FLOOD & OBSTRUCTION LIGHTS, DECON-TAMINATION PAD	3-22-54	3-25-54	100	99	-	"
	A-40.3	3373 Amd.1	NEW POL TANKS 28, 34 THRU 38 & 43	12-24-53	1-15-54		100		COMPLETED 3-22-54.
	A-40.26	3651	POWER SOURCE TO REFUELING BLDG. & HELICOPTER OPERATIONS	3-24-54	3-31-54	100	99	-	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
	A-44	3280 Amd.6	ADDITIONAL TENT REQUIREMENT (117 E)	2-8-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	"
		3280 Amd.9	REFURBISH EXISTING STRUCTURE	2-22-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.

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JOB 884

CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS REPORT FOR WEEK ENDING 27 MARCH 1954 ENIWETOK JOB I PAGE 4 OF 5

SITE	FEAT. NO.	WORK ORDER NO.	JOB DESCRIPTION	ACTUAL STARTING DATE	SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE	SCHED % COMPL.	ACTUAL % COMPL.	% LAST WEEK	REMARKS
FRED	A-47.1	EWO 3650	CONCRETE SEA WALL	3-25-54	7-1-54	04	01	-	EXCAVATION STARTED. DOWEL ANCHOR HOLES DRILLED & GROUTED IN. POURED 135 LIN. FT. OF FOOTING.
	A-66	3493 Amd.1	MODIF. STERILIZING ROOM, BLDG. 24	3-9-54	3-15-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3648	ELECT. MODIFICATIONS, BLDG. 3	-	4-15-54	-	00	-	SCHEDULED TO START APPROXIMATELY 4-1-54.
	A-67	3613 Amd.1	ADDITIONAL OBSTRUCTION LIGHTS	3-15-54	3-25-54		100		COMPLETED 3-25-54.
		3643	ELECTRIC MOTOR REPAIRS	3-10-54	3-17-54		100		COMPLETED 3-25-54.
		3644	INST. OF EQUIPMENT IN BLDG. 155	3-15-54	3-18-54		100		COMPLETED 3-25-54.
	A-68	3346	MODIF. TO BLDG. 15 & CRYPTO VAULT	9-18-53	1-25-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		3346 Amd.1&2	MODIF. TO BLDG. 15	11-27-53	1-1-54	100	99	99	"
		3646	ELECT. INST. FOR AIR COMPRESSOR, BLDG. 64	3-22-54	3-25-54	100	70	-	LACKS OVERHEAD SERVICE.
	A-68.25	3529 Amd.2	PAINTING OF BLDG. 640	3-10-54	3-11-54		100		COMPLETED 3-20-54.
		MWO 7317	MAINTENANCE WORK ORDERS - JOB III CENTRAL OIL SYSTEMS FOR DIST. UNITS	12-9-52	12-31-53	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
		7505	REMOVAL OF SEDIMENT & GRAVEL FROM BOTTOM OF WELL AT BLDG. 186	3-1-54	3-31-54		100		COMPLETED 3-23-54.
IRENE	A-29	EWO 3382	SUBMARINE TERMINAL 3,4	1-6-54	2-1-54	100	99	97	AWAITING COMPLETION NOTICE.
MARY 1 of 5	A-27	3270	ELECT. DISTRIB. SYSTEM FOR SCIENT. PROGRAM	2-1-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	COMPLETION NOTICE IN PROCESS.
OLIVE 1 of 5		3270	ELECT. DISTRIB. SYSTEM FOR SCIENT. PROGRAM	1-25-54	3-1-54	100	99	99	"

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CHAPTER 7

TEST SUPPORT UNIT

[redacted] HEADQUARTERS
TEST SUPPORT UNIT
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

HISTORICAL REPORT
MARCH 1954

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	Tabs	

DANIEL F. GAINEY
Captain, USAF
Historian

William G. Smith
M/Sgt, USAF
NCOIC

[redacted]

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I

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

The 4930th Test Support Group Personnel Officer, the 4932nd Test Support Squadron Adjutant, and the 4931st Test Support Squadron Adjutant conferred on 5 March 1954, with reference to personnel to be selected to fill Interim T/D requirements, personnel to be retained one to sixty days after operational phase to assist with "Roll-up", and personnel to be released immediately after the operational phase for reassignment to the zone of the interior.

On 11 March the 4930th Test Support Group Personnel Officer and the Squadron Adjutants met to complete interim T/D manning. A tentative decision was reached as to who would remain to fill Interim T/D positions, who would remain one to sixty days for roll-up and what AFSCs would have to be requisitioned to fill Interim T/D vacancies if not available at this station.

The Deputy Commander, Lt. Col. Atkins, and the Group Personnel Officer, WOJG Doyle, met with the Director of Personnel, Task Group 7.4 (Prov), Lt. Col. Forrest, on 15 March 1954 and obtained his approval on the Group Interim T/D.

On 16 March this section started final action to compile Interim T/D requirements for Headquarters 4930th Test Support Group, 4931st Test Support Squadron and 4932nd Test Support Squadron for submission to Headquarters Air Force Special Weapons Center through Headquarters Task Group 7.4 (Prov). Also a roster of airmen to be released one to sixty days after the operational phase showing each airman's geographical choice of assignment.

AFSWC/HO

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On 22 March the Group Personnel Officer again conferred with the Director of Personne, Headquarters Task Group 7.4 on Interim T/D and roll-up of CASTLE. Full agreement was reached and all data submitted to Headquarters Air Force Special Weapons Center.

The primary administration of APTs for the 43, 64, and 70 career fields was conducted during the week of 22-27 March 1954. Forty-three (43) airmen were tested during this period including twenty-three (23) airmen of the 4926th Test Squadron (Sampling).

Reassignment instructions for fifty-two (52) airmen, who are scheduled to rotate during the month of May 1954, were received from Headquarters Air Force Special Weapons Center on 29 March.

4930th Test Support Table of Distribution:

*Assigned		Authorized	
Officers	47	Officers	60
Airmen	530	Airmen	519

*As of 31 March 1954

PERSONNEL SERVICES

An "Information and Education Reading Table" was established in Building 135 for the purpose of placing latest Armed Forces Talks, News Maps and other informational material available for all personnel to read. Copies of this material are also distributed to the 4931st and 4932nd Test Support Squadrons.

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On 2 March 1954 the Air Force Softball and Volleyball Leagues got under way. A total of ten (10) softball and sixteen (16) volleyball teams were entered.

Due to work load and pressure from long hours and night work a full day of recreation and entertainment was planned for all Air Force units on 4 March 1954. Softball and volleyball games were worked up, a shell hunt and picnic was held at Japtan Island with about one hundred fifty in attendance and a shell hunt at Glenn Island with about seventy-five in attendance. Transportation to Glenn Island was by H-19 aircraft and to Japtan by M-boat.

Pocket novels were received from Special Services of Task Group 7.2. Twelve hundred and fifty of these books were distributed among Air Force Units.

A wide selection of magazines were purchased for Weather Island personnel using funds from the Central Post Fund. Movies seem to be the most effective morale factor on the Weather Islands and the supply and distribution of film to these islands is working out very satisfactorily. Several other items of recreational equipment were procured and distributed to Weather Island personnel during March.

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SECURITY

During this period Captain Morris, Security Officer, made a trip to Kwajalein for the purpose of briefing a Weather Detachment that had been moved from their operational site to Kwajalein and to clear one man for departure to the ZI. While at Kwajalein, Captain Morris also gave a security briefing to the Marine Detachment stationed there.

In order to expedite clearing personnel who are required to depart the island during non-duty hours it was contemplated leaving the "HAS NO BADGE" stamp with the 4930th Test Support Group Charge of Quarters. This plan was discarded inasmuch as the CQ has no way of knowing whether or not a man has been issued a permanent or temporary CASTLE badge. Since MATS will not accept a passenger unless his orders are stamped "HAS NO BADGE", the following procedure was decided upon to facilitate clearance of personnel during non-duty hours: One man from the Personnel Security Office will be designated for each twenty-four (24) hour period as being responsible for that day. It will be his duty to keep the 4930th Test Support Group CQ informed of his whereabouts in order that he may be easily located in event of emergency.

At the request of the Commander the Personnel Security Officer conducted a Security inspection of the Photographic Laboratory.

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The Lab meets security requirements as outlined in applicable regulations. A copy of the inspection was forwarded to the Commander and the officer in charge of the Lab.

At the request of the Personnel Security Officer, Task Group 7.4, all elements of this organization were requested to prepare rosters, by name, rank, and serial number, of men who have derogatory information in their service records. (Court martials, Article 15s, AWOL time) These rosters were also to contain the names of any men who were deemed unable or unqualified to perform their duties for any reason at all.

A request was received from Task Group 7.4 to investigate a vehicle accident that occurred approximately 0030 hours, 22 March 1954. S/A Joseph Cagle of the 26th District OSI was at this station at the time and the investigation was conducted by him. The complete file of the investigation was given to the Commander, 4930th Test Support Group for action.

Ninety-four (94) temporary badges and 33 limited area permits were issued to permit personnel of the Task Group to visit AEC Installations in the course of their official duties.

Forty (40) permanent CASTLE badges were obtained for personnel of this group from the AEC Security Office, Site Elmer.

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III

COMPTROLLER

1st Lt. Paul U. Craver, Comptroller of the Group, departed this station on PCS to Headquarters, Air Force Special Weapons Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico on 24 March 1954. It had been determined by the Group Commander that Lt. Craver's retention was no longer necessary due to the change in Comptroller functions and the Inventory Monetary and Accounting System for Supply to be placed in effect on 1 April 1954.

With the inception of the new Cost Reporting concept the 4930th Test Support Group would no longer (after 31 March 1954) make a cost report as previously required by AFL 177-4. In lieu of this procedure all vouchers or Form 446 and Form 447, personnel change sheets and any other data would be separated and forwarded to Headquarters Air Force Special Weapons Center in accordance with letter, Hq AFSWC dated 1st Feb 54 subject: "Expense Accounting."

In order to provide adequate and qualified personnel to the new Monetary Inventory and Accounting Section of AF 2272 SO it was decided, in a conference with the Group Commander, to place on duty in the new section two airmen from the previously required Comptroller Section and one Staff Sergeant from the Adjutant Section. The two airmen from the Comptroller Section were A/1C Robert A.

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Corum, Sr. Accounting Clerk, A/1C Cha rles W. Pratt, Sr. Clerk. S/Sgt Frank J. Jacobs, Sr. Clerk, was released from the Adjutant Section in order to provide experienced and qualified clerical and typing skill for the new section. Another factor on S/Sgt Jacobs' release w s that he had retainability overseas until 7 Sep 54 and could be released from the Adjutant Section without replacement.

To facilitate the organization of the new Monetary Inventory and Accounting Section and system, Major Harold R. Meadows, Comptroller of Task Group 7.4, made available the services of T/Sgt William E. White, from his office, on a part time basis.

Due to the major change in the Comptroller functions it was determined that Captain Daniel F. Gainey, presently Adjutant of the 4930th Test Support Group, would assume the remaining duties of Comptroller within the Group Headquarters. These consisted of Statistical Services, Graphic Illustration and Accounting and Control of Temporary Duty and Communications Appropriated Funds.

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IV

MATERIEL

Routine coordination was accomplished between Task Group 7.4 and the Test Support Unit concerning construction, rehabilitation, cleanup, and repair projects having to do with Air Base facilities. Preliminary plans for roll-up activities, which will be required of the Test Support Unit sections, were formulated.

On 11 March 1954 a meeting with the Task Group 7.4 Staff Supply Officer and all unit and element supply officers was held for the purpose of publicizing the general plan and requirements to be followed throughout the roll-up period. Supply officers were advised to assure that equipment issued to them from Test Support Unit sources was maintained in condition for immediate turn-in, so far as possible. The Army Supply Officer outlined procedures and requirements for turn-in of Army property during roll-up.

Aid and direction was given to supply personnel from Detachment 1 at Bikini in preparing for close-out of the account at that location. After inactivation of Detachment 1, the property was returned in a haphazard and disorganized manner because of conditions resulting from the first test shot at Bikini Atoll. Action to complete close-out of that plant account is continuing.

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V

OPERATIONS

Upon inactivation of Detachment 1, 4931st Test Support Squadron, Major Richard W. Rice was assigned as Group Operations Officer on 11 March 1954 replacing Major Vernon C. Markham.

Captain James McFadden, Group Flight Safety Officer, conducted a flight safety meeting for all rated personnel on the same date. Many pertinent subjects were discussed including proper use of hand signals used while parking and taxiing aircraft, written examinations to be given to personnel responsible for parking aircraft, proper operation of landing gear and wing flaps on C-47 aircraft, proper radio procedures used in this area, duties of instructor pilots and proper fitting of parachute harness.

1st Lt. Merlin A. Hawkes, Assistant Group Operations Officer, inspected the crash boat on 12 March to insure that the facilities and procedures were sufficient. The crash phone was found to be weak and only two stretchers were available where there should be four. A test run was made on the morning of 12 March which proved satisfactory and all other discrepancies were corrected.

Classes were conducted on the 9th and 10th of March for nine (9) officers who were appointed as stand-by Radiological Safety Monitors. The classes covered instrument indoctrination and the Radiological Safety Lecture.

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Inspections of runways and parking areas were made by Captain McFadden, Group Flight Safety Officer, three days prior to B-Day and three days prior to R-Day. Action was taken to correct all discrepancies.

Captain Austin L. Shamblin, Communications Officer, remains on TDY to Headquarters Task Group 7.4 assuming the duties of Assistant Communications Officer of that organization.

On 4 March 1954 one C-47, piloted by Captain Helterbran, proceeded from this station to Kwajalein Atoll in support of the Navy. Use of this C-47 was as result of Navy amphibious aircraft being loaned for use in airlift to and from Bikini. All landings at Bikini are now water landings. During this period of Navy support, thirteen flights were completed carrying 7700 pounds of cargo, 70 passengers and totalling 33:50 hours of flying time.

Annex "C" to Task Group 7.4 Operations Plan 2-54 was written by this office. This annex pertains to the responsibilities of the 4930th Test Support Group in the event of Natural Disaster.

TSG Regulation 60-7 "AF Form 1 Entries" was edited and approved. The purpose of this regulation is to establish standards and uniform symbols and entries in AF Forms 1.

The Photographic Laboratory is operating with continuing increase of ease and quality due to addition of facilities and equipment.

Increased production by 300% was noted as the laboratory be-

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came able, by virtue of completion of installation and receipt of equipment, to handle requests for work. However, photographic work was confined to a large extent, to copy work. This copy work will be decreased by arranging to perform that type of reproduction on the Ozalid machine. Reproduction by Ozalid process amounted to 2660 pieces for the month.

Increase in production entailed increased administrative detail but schedules were met and work accomplished due to the fact that an additional technician was added to the laboratory in the person of S/Sgt Elmer Anderson who is a skilled photographer and technician as a result of training and experience as a civilian.

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ADJUTANT

During March 1954 the Adjutant's Section culminated several of its projects which will, in effect, increase the job proficiency of individual airmen, allow for an immediate reduction of strength and provide for a minimum effective operating strength during the interim period. Specifically these projects are as follows:

Reassignment of duties whereby [redacted] became Group Sergeant Major and [redacted] became Assistant to the Adjutant. This change allowed [redacted] to begin On-the-Job training for the Group Sergeant Major's position under the instruction of [redacted] the Group Adjutant, and [redacted] the previous incumbent. This plan further provided for the career development of [redacted] who had previously been a Personnel Technician [redacted] and, further, would provide for continuity in the position during the transition from the operational into the interim period since [redacted] possesses a rotation date of 6 October 1954.

The change in positions also allowed [redacted] to enlarge on his experience by becoming proficient with such special projects as gathering and assembling historical data, supervision of records, Forms Management Programs, maintenance

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of Plant Account Records and implementation of Administrative training programs. M/Sgt Smith's background and previous experience in communications, mail control sections and as a chief clerk of a major segment of Headquarters Air Force Special Weapons Center especially fitted him for these tasks.

In the short span of two and one-third months these two non-commissioned officers have become fully proficient in their presently assigned tasks.

Consolidation of duties performed by two airmen assigned to duty as Mail and Distribution Clerks was completed. The entire function is now performed by one Airman Second Class who will remain with the Group until August 1954. The airman who became surplus was transferred to the newly organized Monetary Inventory and Accounting Section in the Supply Division.

Further cross training was completed on all other personnel. Therefore the position of T/Sgt Harold D. Neubauer as Chief Clerk will not need replacement on his return to the Zone of the Interior in early May 1954. Additional training in administrative work is continuing on a day by day basis.

These training efforts have been profitable in that the Adjutant's Section has been, and will be, able to effect a reduction in strength from eight airmen assigned on 1 January 1954 to a present strength of six airmen. Further, two airmen, M/Sgt Smith and T/Sgt Neubauer will be able to be released in

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July and May 1954 respectively (without replacement) or earlier depending on instructions from Headquarters Air Force Special Weapons Center. It is noted that this reduction in strength was accomplished while the work load increased between 1 January 1954 and 31 March 1954. (See TAB 1)

On 1 January 1954 the instructions and procedures outlined in AFM 181-4 "Maintenance of Current Records" dated 1 Sep 53, were placed in operation by this office. The manual was mailed to this office by Hq. AFSWC on request and arrived in sufficient time to allow study by personnel who were required to use it prior to 1 January 1954. This method was quickly and easily learned by personnel concerned and it appears evident that work in disposition of records will be materially decreased.

The use of DD Forms 278 and 278a "Mail Control Record" as directed in AFR 11-14 dated 22 Dec 52 had been established on 1 August 1953. However, use of these forms was necessarily altered from instructions as given in the regulation. Use of these forms appreciably decreased the numerous processes which had been in use by this section and staff sections in the Group.

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VII

COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

Early in March 1954, we received Task Group 7.4 Regulation 100-1 which made it mandatory that all electrically transmitted messages leaving this Group be prepared in draft form and actually be released by the appropriate staff section in Headquarters, Task Group 7.4. This regulation also required that all correspondence leaving this Group go through Headquarters Task Group 7.4 for indorsement. Exceptions in regard to electrical messages were made only for supply messages, RCS Reports and aircraft movement and load messages. This procedure was established as a result of certain messages being released the previous month by other organizations of the Task Group without the necessary coordination. The result of this procedure was to place a considerable additional workload on the staff of Headquarters Task Group 7.4, and to delay messages and correspondence by the time necessary to process it through that Headquarters. Since this Group has a considerable amount of correspondence dealing with manning, personnel records, and other routine administrative details, it is believed the procedure should be modified to permit direct communication with Air Force Special Weapons Center.

The first shot of the CASTLE Operation was fired on 1 March 1954. This shot resulted in several major changes in activity for this Group. Detachment #1, which had evacuated Bikini prior to BRAVO shot with the intention of returning within forty-eight (48) hours was not permitted to return at all because of radioactive contamination of Site TARE. Personnel of this detachment left most of their belongings in their tents at Site TARE, many of which were knocked down by the blast and the contents scattered. On the evening of 2 March 1954, the USS Rairoko

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and the USS Ainsworth steamed into Eniwetok lagoon and on 3 March 1954 unloaded all the personnel and the seven (7) H-19 Helicopters of Detachment #1. All these personnel had been subjected to radiation; however, only a few were equipped with film badges and the dosage of the majority of these personnel remains unknown. The radiation was received because the two (2) ships, which were steaming at sea after the shot, accidentally encountered an area of heavy radiation fall-out. In view of the mission of the helicopter detachment, it was unfortunate that these personnel received unnecessary radiation while aboard the ship, since this reduced the allowable dosage which the pilots could accept during the subsequent phases of the operation. On 5 March 1954, it was decided that Detachment #1 would not return to Site TARE but would be integrated into the Test Support Unit organization at FRED. This decision was reached due to the contamination of Site TARE and the decision that all helicopter operations at Bikini could be handled by the Marine helicopters operating from the USS Bairoko. On the afternoon of 3 March 1954, an H-19 aircraft, attempting to taxi between another H-19 and an SA-16, struck the tail of the SA-16 with one (1) rotor blade causing damage to the SA-16 and the rotor blade. The aircraft was operated by , who was preparing to take off and therefore was a minor aircraft accident. It is believed that the major cause factor of the accident was carelessness on the part of the pilot, coupled with a failure to appreciate the extremely crowded conditions existing at FRED. This pilot had been stationed at Bikini where there was plenty of operating space and apparently failed to realize the

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importance of the congested parking situation.

During the night of 1 March, word was received from the weather station at Rongerik that they suspected heavy radiological contamination at their Site. Captain Louis B. Chrestensen was dispatched to Rongerik Atoll to survey the situation. Upon arrival there, he discovered that the radiation was indeed serious, and in view of his inability to establish reliable communication with Eniwetok, made the decision to evacuate all personnel. This was accomplished expeditiously and his action alleviated what could have been a most serious hazard to the weather station personnel. A detailed report of Capt. Chrestensen's actions is attached as Tab "2". It is noteworthy that the accuracy of the first report received from Capt. Chrestensen was questioned by Radiological Safety personnel of the Task Force Headquarters since there had been no previous experience with such fall out at such a distance from shot point. (110 miles)

The test conducted on 1 March resulted in rather extensive damage to the effects B-36. This included numerous fairings damaged by blast and heat and severely buckled bomb bay doors. The base shops, operated by the 4932nd Test Support Squadron and augmented by personnel from the SAC Detachment, conducted the necessary repairs to place the damaged doors back in operating condition and to repair the damaged fairings. The scope of some of this work was considerably beyond what is normally expected of a field maintenance shop. Credit must be given to the shops personnel for a fine job.

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On 3 March, Lt. Col. Valin R. Woodward was made available to this unit and was assigned to command the 4932nd Test Support Squadron. Major Hubbs, whom Lt. Col. Woodward relieved, was assigned primary duty as Group Materiel Officer. This assignment permitted considerably more supervision in the functions of the Group Materiel Office and enabled Major Hubbs to begin detailed planning for the balance of the operational phase and for roll-up. Lt. Col. Woodward picked up the reins of the 4932nd and was soon well versed in the operating activities. Although he had no previous experience in a supply and maintenance job, he took to it quite readily and the Squadron is operating in an excellent manner.

With the deactivation of Detachment 1, Major Richard W. Rice was designated Group Operations Officer, relieving Major Vernon C. Markham who had been doing the job on an additional duty basis. This change was welcome, in that Major Markham's full time and attention were needed to supervise the personnel and operating activities of the 4931st Test Support Squadron.

The original Task Group 7.4 Operations Order (1-53) assigned this unit the mission of aircraft decontamination, as well as several other radiological functions. This unit, however, had only a small portion of the personnel and equipment with which to accomplish this task. As a result (and as the Bravo mission clearly demonstrated), there was a split responsibility in the decontamination field. A meeting

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was, therefore, held with the Commander of the Test Aircraft Unit to recommend a course of action. A new radiological annex was drafted which gives to the Test Aircraft Unit the full responsibility for all radiological safety activities for Task Group 7.4. This proposal was "bought" by General Estes and the staff and published as a change to Operations Order 1-53. This annex had the effect of taking the Test Support Unit completely out of the radiological business, except for furnishing personnel for decontamination duty. In order to keep down the radiation dosage on maintenance personnel of the Test Aircraft Unit, the Test Support Unit formed fifteen teams of fifteen men each from all sources available in order to carry on decontamination around the clock. These teams were detailed to duty with the Test Aircraft Unit as required and worked under the supervision of Captain George E. Lewis. On the Romeo shot, which was fired on 27 March, this system worked very well and all aircraft decontamination was completed by the afternoon of R+3.

On 11 March it was decided that a re-entry team would be sent to Bikini Atoll to assist Holmes and Narver personnel in recovering Air Force property which had been left behind at the time of the Bravo evacuation. The team was manned by Major Rice, Captain Bonnie, and M/Sgt Gomez. Upon their arrival, they found the Air Force property in a condition of chaos, since the unexpectedly great blast of Bravo had seriously damaged the buildings and tents in which it was housed.

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Through diligent efforts, they were able to recover a large percentage of Air Force property which was then packed, loaded on ships, and transported to Eniwetok by H&N. Captain Bennie was the responsible officer for the property. Much of the property was contaminated and several weeks were required to get it all moved to Eniwetok and cleared by Radiological Safety so that an inventory and adjustment of the losses could be started. A sizeable report of survey will result when the inventory is completed.

Throughout the month of March, the Test Support Unit continued to perform its support mission in all respects. March was a particularly heavy month for C-47 airlift operations; the total C-47 flying time amounted to 321 hours. At the same time, the plans for Echo and other shots at Eniwetok resulted in a heavy requirement for liaison and helicopter aircraft at Eniwetok Atoll. During the month, liaison aircraft flew 370 hours, carried 1947 passengers, and made 1753 landings. During this same period, helicopters flew 239 hours, carried 737 passengers, and made 1183 landings. Throughout this period, it was necessary to work maintenance personnel of the liaison and helicopter flights many hours of overtime. The workday for these personnel started at approximately 0630 and ended long after dark. This workload was accepted by the personnel involved without complaint and all requirements were willingly accomplished, due to the excellent leadership within the maintenance squadron, and due to the appreciation by all personnel of the great contribution they were making to the success of

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the mission. During this month, two SA 16 aircraft were placed under the operational control of this unit for amphibious-type operations in the event that the TAIE airstrip should be unusable. These SA 16's were in addition to the two Navy PBM's previously under our control. These aircraft are not particularly good for airlift operations, since their carrying capacity is small; however, they will enable essential personnel to be moved at times when the airstrip is not usable. Operation and maintenance of these aircraft is the responsibility of the Test Support Unit. Administration of the personnel is the responsibility of the Test Services Unit, since they belong to the Air Rescue Service. During the month of March, the campaign to improve the looks of the island was vigorously continued. A considerable amount of grading, rolling, rock and debris removal, fence building, and general clean-up was accomplished. The man hours to accomplish these tasks were necessarily taken from the productive man hours intended for aircraft maintenance, supply activity, etc. This was made necessary because labor troops, or personnel who could be so considered, were not part of the manning of this unit. It should be noted that, as stated in the History of the 4932nd Test Support Squadron (attached hereto), 7121 man hours were spent on clean-up projects. This amounted to approximately one-seventh 1/7 of the man hours available to the 4932nd for all its supply and maintenance functions.

On 24 March, a production line was established for corrosion control and painting of Army-owned vehicles in use by this Task Group.

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This production line was to perform what is normally considered first-echelon or driver maintenance, but which, in this climate, amounts to practically a complete paint job. Vehicles were processed through this line at the rate of approximately two per day, which will permit all 64 vehicles of the Task Group to be processed in a little over a month.

On 27 March, Romeo shot, which was the second of the CASTLE series, was fired. The entire operation of this organization in connection with Romeo shot was very smooth and uneventful. All support activities completed this required jobs in connection with the shot mission, on schedule. C-47 airlift into Site TARE was reestablished the afternoon after the shot, upon determination by the scientific Task Group that the TARE strip was not contaminated. C-47 missions on this date were flown to bring back scientific and technical personnel from the command ship on completion of the shot mission.

In conclusion, the month of March was characterized, insofar as the Test Support Unit was concerned, by the culmination of nine months of planning and hard work. It was apparent that the planning conducted during previous months was sound, since all support functions were carried out with no difficulties whatsoever. All commitments, as far as transportation, liasion, and helicopter airlift are concerned, were fully met. Base Supply and Base Maintenance were able to handle all requirements placed on them by the Test organizations. It is my opinion that the operations during the month of March proved the ability of the Test Support Unit to complete its mission in a most satisfactory manner.

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HEADQUARTERS
4931ST TEST SUPPORT SQUADRON
APO 187 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

HISTORICAL REPORT
(Period 25 February to 25 March 1954)

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

The 4931st Test Support Squadron decreased from two hundred and ninety (290) airmen assigned on 25 February 1954 to two hundred and eighty five (285) airmen assigned on 25 March 1954. Officer personnel decreased from twenty eight (28) to twenty six (26) for the same reporting period. Decrease in officer strength was due to the reassignment of Major Richard W. Rice to the 4930th Test Support Group, and Captain Miles B. Drawhorn to the 4901st Support Wing (ATOMIC), Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico.

Thirty eight (38) airmen and twelve (12) officers were evacuated from Site TARE on 28 February 1954. Due to excessive fall out Detachment 1 was discontinued and personnel were returned to Site FRED, and assigned duties on 3 March 1954. Helicopter Mechanics were assigned to the maintenance section, 4932nd Test Support Squadron, and firefighters were assigned duties with the fire crash section. All other airmen were assigned to sections commensurate with duties they had performed at Site TARE.

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BASE OPERATIONS

Administrative Section:

During the month of March 1954 the required reports were prepared and submitted as usual to the Comptroller, 4930th Test Support Group.

An aircraft utilization of thirty one percent and 70:30 was achieved for the regular scheduled transport runs in the first three (3) weeks of the month. Four (4) flights were cancelled for lack of lift during this period. Forty four (44) percent of pilot hours flown was accomplished by personnel on TDY status attached this organization for flying.

Flight Records Section:

As of 21 March, the pilots assigned and attached had completed 62.2% of the instrument and 62.5% of the night portions of their 60-2 requirements for the second half fiscal year 54.

Considerable difficulty has arisen in obtaining Form 1 extracts on personnel flying with other organizations. The reluctance of attached pilots to acquire sufficient flying time for pay purposes within the scheduled cut-off dates, when flying time is available, has caused an unnecessary expenditure of man hours on flight pay certificate preparation.

Air Freight Section:

A total of 1206 passengers and 17,815 pounds of cargo was

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Processed by this section during this reporting period on C-47, PBY, and SA-16 Aircraft.

Liaison Operations Section:

A total of 2,200 passengers and 200 pounds of cargo was airlifted by L-13 Aircraft on 1,013 flights. An aircraft utilization of 72% was accomplished.

Helicopter Operations Section:

Major Henderson replaced Captain Patterson as OIC. This section lost two (2) pilots, one (1) Air Force and one (1) Army.

An aircraft utilization of forty one percent was accomplished. Twenty five percent of pilot hours flown was accomplished by pilots assigned this section while on TDY status.

Dispatch Section:

This section gained one (1) aircraft dispatcher, cleared four hundred and eighty two (482) local flights, and processed six hundred and seven (607) flight plans.

Alert Crew Section:

New parking spots were painted at the west end of MATS Ramp, establishing a parking area for VIP Aircraft with minimum clearance to insure full utilization of parking area. A line was also painted on the MATS Ramp to insure safe wing clearance during the loading and unloading of aircraft.

The Alert Shack was rearranged and painted. Room was made for one (1) more bed, which is on loan from Fire-Crash Section.

A Work order was initiated to have sleeves of Alert Jackets cut to summer length. White baseball caps were made standard head gear for Alert Crew.

Fire-Crash Section:

The crash crew responded to three (3) fires on the Base at which there was no damage, and to a total of twenty seven (27) emergency landings. There was one (1) crash landing in which an F4U-5 landed with the right main gear up. No fire was involved in this landing. There was a total of nine hundred and sixty four (964) normal take-offs and landings during this period. The crash crew stood one hundred and sixty six (166) fire guards on gas drains, engine starts, fuel spills and refuelings.

Training has been held to a minimum during the past month due to the flying activity. A training film was shown to all fire fighting personnel by Major Hall covering fires involving high explosives.

The crash fire chief called upon the personnel for volunteers to assist in manning equipment during heavy traffic periods. Ninety percent (90%) of the off duty men responded. These men are given compensatory time off during slack periods. By off duty men answering the call to duty during the heavy traffic

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periods, crash crews are able to fully man all available crash equipment during said period.

Personal Equipment Section:

During the month of March this section briefed passengers on all C-47, PBM, and SA-16 flights. In addition a man is assigned to Liaison Operations on Parry Island during normal working hours to brief passengers participating in L-13 flights.

Six man rafts have been furnished for landings at different islands in the Marshall group. Fifteen (15) C2A one man rafts were received from supply. Mae Wests have been issued to the L-13 aircraft. All inspections are up to date and indicated on a newly installed status board.

Equipment from SA-16 Aircraft is at present being stored in this section.

DETACHMENT 1, 4931ST TEST SUPPORT SQUADRON

Air Force Strength as of 25 February 1954 at Site TARE was sixty five (65) PCS; none TDY.

On 26 February 1954 final plans for BRAVO Shot evacuation were completed. All Detachment 1 aircraft were flown aboard the USS BAIROKO and secured on 27 February 1954. On Sunday, 28 February 1954, all personnel were evacuated from Site TARE to the USS AINSWORTH and USS BAIROKO in preparation for the forthcoming

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operation.

Personnel from the USS BAIROKO debarked to Eniwetok Island on 2 March 1954, and personnel aboard the USS AINSWORTH debarked to Eniwetok Island on 3 March 1954.

General Order 2, Headquarters 4930th Test Support Group, dated 5 March 1954, discontinued Detachment 1, as of that date. All personnel concerned were absorbed into the Test Support Unit for duty at Eniwetok. This action was necessary due to unacceptable blast and radiation effects on the Detachment 1 billeting and working areas.

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HEADQUARTERS
4932ND TEST SUPPORT SQUADRON
4930TH TEST SUPPORT GROUP
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Squadron History for period of 1 March thru 31 March 1954

On 6 March 1954, Lt Colonel Valin R. Woodward, attached, assumed command of the squadron per Special Order No. 4, this Headquarters, dated 6 March 1954. Major Edgar H. Hubbs, former commander, was reassigned 5 March 1954 to Headquarters 4930th Test Support Group, per paragraph 3, Special Order No. 38, Headquarters 4930th Test Support Group, dated 5 March 1954, to assume full time duties as Material Officer. The change in command was effected with no confusion.

The squadron workload has been heavy, but all requirements have been satisfied. Analysis of the manhours available to the unit for accomplishment of the mission shows that 40,170 man hours were spent in accomplishing the primary mission and 7,121 man hours were spent accomplishing various beautification projects which would normally fall under an air installations responsibility. Based on a 48 hour week, 47,848 man hours were considered to be available for use. Total man hours worked was 47,291 hours. The difference of 571 man hours were spent on administrative matters, pay call, record checks, etc.

All Divisions of the squadron functioned well during the month. Morale was high despite the heavy workload. A concentrated effort was made by all sections to reduce the number of minor accidents. This ground safety campaign was effective. During the reporting period there

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were only two (2) minor accidents as compared with six (6) during the month of February.

During the month the bulk of the workload of the Maintenance Division was spent in maintaining organizational aircraft in a ready status to support flying commitments of the Group. Assigned aircraft flew a total of 934:00 hours. The breakdown of this time shows that four (4) C-47 aircraft flew 321 hours and ten (10) minutes, nine (9) L-13 aircraft flew 369 hours and thirty (30) minutes and seven (7) H-19 aircraft flew 235 hours and twenty (20) minutes. In meeting these commitments the Organizational Maintenance Section spent a total of 3810 hours in maintaining the C-47 and L-13's, figures are not available for the H-19 flight. All flying commitments were met.

The workload in the Field Maintenance Shops has decreased, allowing reduction of much of the backload that has accumulated during the months of January and February. As of 31 March 1954 the work backload was approximately 1100 manhours which is not excessive under present operating conditions.

On 26 March 1954 Captain William H. Delchamps, OIC Production Control Branch, departed on emergency leave and Major James Wheeler, OIC Maintenance Division, assumed his duties. was stricken with a heart attack on 31 March 1954. Due to his serious illness he was relieved of all duties as Technical Supply Officer and Captain James McFadden was assigned to the squadron to replace him, per Special Order 56,

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Headquarters 4930th Test Support Group, dated 2 April 1954. Lt John T. Patterson was appointed as disinterested officer to inventory the Technical Supply Account. This inventory has not been completed.

Despite the change, the Production Control Section functioned well during the month. A total of 276 aircraft work orders and 269 non-aircraft work orders were issued. The work order control system is working well. The Technical Supply Unit processed 375 issue slips of which 100 were emergency issues for aircraft parts. A total of 210 turn-in slips were also processed during the month. Supply support was excellent.

Activity in the Maintenance Shops was routine during the month. In addition to working on the aircraft and various beautification projects, improvement of shop facilities was effected. This improvement included manufacture and installation of a paint booth in the paint shop, installation of a new sheet metal storage rack and the fabrication of a sand blasting machine to facilitate corrosion control on items of equipment which require painting. A continuing effort is being made to process as much equipment as possible in order to facilitate roll up plans. The Engine Build-Up Section, Aero Repair Section and Auxiliary Equipment Section carried out routine duties.

The Electronics Section had no difficulty in accomplishing routine line maintenance and inspection. The four (4) radio and radar repairmen that were reassigned to the 4931st Test Support Squadron in Janusry as part of Army Augmentation were reassigned to this squadron between the

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8th and 22nd of March. The reassignments of these airman eliminated the personnel shortage within the section. Two (2) additional airmen from the 4931st Test Support Squadron were assigned to the section for duty only. Routine maintenance included rewiring one radio compass in C-47 No. 953. Many of the cables were deterioratedand in some cases the cables were destroyed. The operational checkout of the system was successful. However, it has been determined the radio compass loops are becoming faulty on all C-47's, . This is the result of wear and tear through extended use. Gears, motors, and bearings are showing signs of considerable wear. New motors, gaar trains and four (4) complete new loops have been ordered on emergency requisition. When received, all loops on the C-47 aircraft will be completely reworked to prevent future breakdown.

On 22 March 1954, supervisory responsibility for the Refueling Section was transferred to the Supply Division. The Refueling Section has experienced a great deal of trouble in keeping up routine maintenance on refueling vehicles because of the shortage of personnel. This shortage is due to the demands for numerous work details for beautification projects. It is believed that closer supervision and control can be maintained with the refueling section under the Supply Division.

The workload of the Supply Division has continued to be heavy. Delays in Operation Castle have increased complexity of the supply support due to the consumption of previously planned stock levels.

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Necessary reordering has been accomplished.

A major project undertaken by Base Supply during this period was the establishment of the Monetary Accounting Section. Word was received from Headquarters AFSWC that the requirements of AF Manual 67-Tentative would be met effective 1 April 1954.

The Monetary Accounting Unit was organized and became operational in accordance with AFM 67-Tentative, during this period. The new unit was set up in Building No. 77 (Base Supply Office) and is directly responsible to the Accountable Officer.

Personnel problems were discussed by the Test Support Unit Commander and Staff and it was decided that the unit would be made up of personnel assigned to the 4930th Test Support Group and the 4932nd Test Support Squadron. The following persons were assigned:

, was given an additional duty as Monetary Accounting Officer.

s was assigned as Senior Clerk / from the 4930th Test Support Group Adjutant Section.

was assigned as Accounting Supervisor from the Comptroller Section.

was assigned as a clerk also from the Comptroller Section.

already assigned to Supply was transferred to the unit as a coding and posting clerk.

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T/Sgt White, Accounting Technician from Headquarters Task Group 7.4, Comptroller's Office was placed in the unit on loan per request of the Test Support Unit Commander, to assist in the organization of the Accounting Unit.

The Accounting Unit was operational by 31 March. All blank forms, ledgers, furniture, and other equipment required had been obtained, and the Tentative AFM was studied by all personnel assigned. Approximately 104 manhours have been expended during this period setting up the Accounting Unit.

At 1200 hours 31 March 1954 all Vouchers were posted to the Stock Record Cards in preparation to take the "Initial Monetary Inventory" required to determine the dollar value of all property in stock by sub-property class. It was planned to perform the inventory at night to prevent interference with normal supply operations.

A cycle inventory proceeded on schedule with approximately 67% of all line items completed. One thousand three hundred eighty five (1385) line items were inventoried during the month with an average accuracy of 85%. One hundred ten (110) inventory adjustment vouchers were processed.

During the reporting period five thousand six hundred sixty (5660) vouchers were processed involving eight thousand nine hundred sixteen (8916) line items. Three thousand one hundred ninety three (3193) items were issued and one hundred eight (108) partially back ordered

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for a supply effectiveness of 62%. The continuing low effectiveness is caused by the large quanity of requisitions by AACS for operational spares not previously forecast.

Only one (1) cargo ship arrived during the month of March 1954. Six thousand eighty three (6083) measurement tons of serviceable excess and repairable cargo was backloaded on this ship in a continuing effort to return excess material to the Zone of Interior. Class 17B property shipped from AF 769 SO was received leaving only Class 43 of the Kwajalein property outstanding.

The activities of the Administrative and Squadron Supply Division were restricted to routine housekeeping functions. On 11 March 1954 reallocation of tents were made and personnel living in tents I-8 and J-1 moved into two new temporary tents which were constructed by Holmes and Narver in front of Building No. 48. The volley ball court which was next to building No. 122 was removed to make room for the walkways, and twenty-five feet of additional walkway was constructed to service the new tents.

Adminstrative activities were limited to routine functions of posting personnel records, changing allotments, filing, etc. A new records disposition schedule was submitted for approval. This squadron has now been operating for seven months with no approved records disposition schedule.

Turnover of personnel remained low, one (1) officer and five (5)

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airmen were assigned to the squadron for duty and one (1) officer and three (3) airmen were reassigned from the squadron. Two (2) of these airmen were reassigned to the Zone of Interior. The squadron strength as of 31 March 1954 was ten (10) officers and two hundred seven (207) Airmen.

Plant Account M-16 from AF 2272-SO and Plant Account M-76 were inventoried in total. All property was accounted for; however, it was necessary to adjust the serial numbers of three carbines that were carried on the record in error because of typing mistakes. Both supply accounts were found in excellent condition.

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
Number of Copies
CORRESPONDENCE
Incoming and Outgoing
TELETYPES
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TAB #1

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SUBJECT: Island Evacuation

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

During the week of 15 February to 18 February 1954, I was asked by Lt McDaniel, Deputy Commander for WREP, what provisions should be made for Rad Safe services to the people on the various weather islands. I was unable to give him a positive answer, and told him I would have to make further inquiries. Colonel Houghton suggested I call Colonel House who would be able to give me JTF 7's opinion.

During telephone conversation with Colonel House on about 19 February, he said that nothing need be done about any of the islands except Rongerik, and that in his opinion, adequate dosimetry measures would be taken on Rongerik, if half a dozen or so film badges were exposed during each shot and for the day after the shot. He suggested that these badges be exposed in the living and working areas, and on one man in each representative group of individuals. He also suggested that a T-1B or similiar survey instrument be in place on each of the islands as organizational equipment and that individuals in each detachment use the instrument on shot and subsequent days to check for fall out.

I did not comply with the latter suggestion for three (3) reasons: 1. There are not enough survey instruments in our organization that we could spare four on a loan basis for any but urgent needs, and I did not consider this an urgent need. 2. If instruments had been available, my work-load would not have permitted me to make a trip to each of islands to train individuals in the proper use and maintenance of survey instruments.

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3. I was informed that the New York office (?) already had auto recording instruments in place which would serve the same purpose inasmuch as the weather people had been briefed to notify Mr. Brechin or one of his assistants whenever this particualr instrument recorded 100 mr/hr which would be nearly off scale.

In accordance with Colonel House's suggestions regarding film badges, I sent 12 badges to Rongerik on 25 February, with instructions for their storage and use. Mr Kapral has assured me that my instructions were followed, in that 6 badges were exposed during and after the first shot, and the other 6 left in storage for the second shot in case resupply of the island were delayed for any reason.

At about 2330, 1 March, Major Robinson, WREP, received an info copy of a message addressed to CJTF 7 from Rongerik to the effect that the auto monitoring instrument was reading "100 plus" and had gone off scale at 0250Z, and was still off scale. Inquiries made here and at Elmer failed to establish the exact nature of the auto monitoring instruent; thus it could not be established what exactly was meant by "100 plus". After conference between Colonel Houghton, Colonel Hammond, Colonel Watkins, Major Robinson and myself it was decided that we should take advantage of a scheduled MATS flight to Kwajalein and send a monitor - myself - on that flight to meet the regular weather island service flight departing Kwajalein on Tuesday (2 Mar) morning at 0830.

Upon arrival over Rongerik at about 0945, I requested the pilot to fly the length of the island at about 500' altitude. During this pass the average reading of 4 T-1B instruments was 200 mr/hr. Another pass across the island

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and at the same height gave the same reading. We circled the entire Atoll at 500' altitude and instrument readings were the same over each islet. Upon return to Rongerik island. We made another pass at 250' during which instruments recorded activity of 340 mr/hr.

Radio reception was poor at this low altitude so we climbed to 5000' in an attempt to establish contact with Fred tower or the USS Estes, direct. Neither attempt was successful, so further radio messages were relayed through Captain Hughes at Kwajalein. I was primarily concerned in getting an additional airplane -either a PBM or an SA-16 - in order to get the people off the island as quickly as possible. After about 30 minutes of intermittent and frequently garbled radio messages, I requested the pilot to return to Rongerik Island and prepare to evacuate as many as possible in our own aircraft, realizing that if other planes were not available, the Navy UF would have to make two trips. Since it was already approaching noon, this entailed getting the first trip over with as quickly as possible in order to avoid an after dark take off from the lagoon with the last load of evacuees.

While making our descent, the pilot received a message requesting information on the radiological situation. I asked him to reply that the only reading I had was 340 mr/hr at 250' altitude over the island. This message was garbled during transmission and was apparently received at TG 7.4 as "340 MR at 250'" which meant little or nothing.

At 1130 I landed on the island, and, after making a few readings at various places within the living areas, I briefed the men on what I knew of the situation and what was being done for them. It is appropriate here to remark that I consider the group to be an extremely well-disciplined one.

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There was no panic, nor apparent dismay, and all of the men were willing to do whatever was necessary to secure the island before evacuation and to do it in a much more cheerful than I expected. Commendation is due all of the men with special mention of Mr. Kapral and M/Sgt Pletsch for excellent leadership.

The following is a list of the various readings I obtained and the locations at which they were taken:

Inside building where the men spent most of their time - 0.6R. (This reading is low because the building was hosed down thoroughly early in the morning).

Outside the same building - waist height - 1.8R.

(This reading taken on the PSP platform in front of the building)

Beside the same building - sand surface - 2.4R.

Surface of a bed in a living tent - 1.2R.

All readings taken - and there were not as many as I should have taken fell along the same values.

Mr Kapral had decided to evacuate his people in alphabetical order - making it as impersonal as possible. As soon as all excess baggage had been cleared from the plane to the shore, the first 8 men were loaded aboard the UF and taken to Kwajalein.

As we departed the pilot informed me that he had received a request for further definition of the radiological situation. Unaware of the fact that my original message had been garbled, I concluded that someone was making the request who was unfamiliar with radiological procedures. Therefore, I instructed the pilot to say that I was getting a reading of 3.2R at

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1", since I wished to make it as impressive as possible in order to get action as quickly as possible. This was an error on my part.

However, the evacuation proceeded, unfortunately we heard on the way to Kwajalein that additional planes were not available, which meant that the 20 people remaining on Rongerik would not be moved as soon as I had given them to believe. Actually, the first group arrived at Kwajalein at about 1400, and the last group shortly after 1900. I requested that VP29 be alerted for our arrival with people who would need to be processed through their personnel decontamination center, We were met by monitors who handled all the ground procedures quite adequately.

The final message I sent was an urgent recommendation that Rongelap be surveyed as soon as possible with the exception that any habitants would very likely be subjected to the same degree of fall out that had occurred at Rongerik. This recommendation met with approval by CTG 7.4.

LOUIS B. CHRESTENSEN
Captain, USAF

A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

DANIEL F. GAINEY
Captain, USAF

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CHAPTER 8

TEST AIRCRAFT UNIT

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TEST AIRCRAFT UNIT

During the month of March two test shots were detonated - BRAVO and ROMEO. ROMEO was delayed for approximately two weeks due to adverse weather and wind conditions at altitude. During this period of delay normal operational training flights and test hops were flown. The chronological breakdown for the month follows.

On 1 March, the following aircraft participated in BRAVO and recorded the given times:

1. 14 F-84's - 31 hours and 40 minutes
2. 4 B-36's - 26 hours and 55 minutes
3. 1 B-47 - 3 hours and 55 minutes
4. 2 B-29's - 21 hours and 30 minutes
5. 3 B-50's - 12 hours and 30 minutes
6. 3 C-54's - 20 hours and 35 minutes
7. 2 SA-16's - 17 hours and 5 minutes
8. 1 P2V2 - 13 hours and 30 minutes
9. P4V - 5 hours and 20 minutes
10. C-47 - 6 hours and 35 minutes
11. 1 R-5D - Not available
12. 1 C-97 - Not available
13. 1 C-124 - Not available

No flying time was recorded on 2 March due to contamination of aircraft.

The general debriefing and critique was given by Task Group 7.4 on 3 March.

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A special debriefing was held for F-84 sampler pilots and a seminar including the scientific personnel of the Atomic Energy Commission and F-84 pilots was held on 3 March.

On 4 March, the B-47 aircraft logged a total of three hours and 15 minutes flying time.

Strength of the Test Aircraft Unit on 5 March follows:

Unit	Officers	Airmen	Civilians
4926th	42	110	1
SAC	50	140	13
Total	92	240	14

On 6 March radiation contamination had decreased sufficiently for safe flight on seven F-84 aircraft. These seven aircraft flew a total of 12 hours and 15 minutes.

F-84 aircraft 51-1043 had a right gun deck cover come off in flight. A canvas tip tank cover that was stored in the ammunition can was pulled free by the slip stream wrapping itself around the right horizontal stabilizer. The pilot executed a successful landing at Eniwetok.

On 8 March, F-84 sorties were flown (17) for a total of 31 hours and 30 minutes. One B-47 sortie was flown for a total of four hours and 15 minutes.

On 9 March, 19 F-84 sorties were flown for a total of 38 hours. The following day, seven F-84 sorties were flown for 14 hours and 15 minutes and the B-47 logged three hours and 55 minutes. Sixteen F-84 sorties on 11 March accounted for 30 hours and 40 minutes flying time.

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Strength figures as of 11 March were:

Unit	Officers	Airmen	Civilians
4926th	42	110	1
SAC	54	137	14
Total	96	247	15 - 358

On 12 March the general and specialized crew briefings for all participants concerned with ROMEO shot were held. Two F-84 test hops were flown for a total of two hours and 55 minutes.

Flying time on 14 March was 10 hours and 45 minutes for the F-84's and six hours for 15 March.

Strength figures on 17 March:

Unit	Officers	Airmen	Civilians
4926th	42	110	1
SAC	54	137	13
Total	96	247	14

Records on 17 March indicated that 10 officers and 14 airmen were not "Q" cleared.

On 18 March, F-84 flying time was 12 hours and 15 minutes and B-47 time was three hours and 10 minutes; on 19 March F-84 time was one hour; on 21 March F-84 time was two hours and B-36 time was four hours; on 22 March F-84 time was 15 hours and 30 minutes, B-36 time was seven hours and 30 minutes, and B-47 time was four hours; on 23 March B-36 time was one hour and 40 minutes; on 24 March F-84 time was 24 hours and 10 minutes.

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Test Aircraft strength figures for 24 March follow:

Unit	Officers	Airmen	Civilians
4926th	42	110	1
SAC	52	140	13
Total	94	250	14

Airmen proficiency tests were administered to 23 airmen in the 43, 64 and 70 career fields in late March. Results were unknown at the end of the March reporting period.

In order to meet AFR 60-2 requirements concerning night flying time, the Test Aircraft Unit scheduled night flying time for the F-84 pilots on 25 March. First take-off was at 0415 hours. Task Group 7.4 announced that night flying of F-84 aircraft be permitted no take-offs prior to 0615 hours. They also refused to waive AFR 60-2 requirements as requested by the Commander of the Test Aircraft Unit, Lt Colonel James Watkins. It had been impossible for F-84 pilots to meet AFR 60-2 requirements. Therefore, they were scheduled for flights in unfamiliar aircraft in order to meet the requirements. F-84 flying time for 25 March was 34 hours and 50 minutes, and B-47 time was four hours. On 26 March F-84 flying time was one hour and 50 minutes.

ROMEO shot was detonated on 27 March. The following times were logged:

Aircraft	Flying time
14 F-84's	37 hours and 45 minutes
3 B-36's	26 hours and 50 minutes
1 B-47	four hours

Debriefing and the critique for ROMEO were held on 30 March. The B-47 flew four hours and 30 minutes that date.

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On 31 March the F-84's flew six hours and 35 minutes. On that date tabulations revealed that total F-84 flying time for March was 325 hours and 35 minutes. Figures also showed that the B-36's flew 67 hours and five minutes and the B-47 38 hours and 30 minutes for March.

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PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

The mock-up for testing the headset, microphone, and oxygen mask of each pilot had been completed at the end of the reporting period. A schedule was posted with the date and time for each pilot to report for testing and cleaning of his equipment.

Every survival kit assigned to the F-84's was inspected and returned to each aircraft. The communications section repaired two faulty UCR4 radios.

Fifteen contoured seat cushions to be used with the modified A-1 survival kits were installed in each aircraft. These cushions were shipped from the Aero-Medical Laboratory, Wright Air Development Center, for service testing. The contoured cushions replaced the cushions in use.

Blueprints were drawn for construction of portable parachute bins and miscellaneous boxes. The boxes and bins were to be permanent traveling equipment.

COMMUNICATIONS

It appeared that the substitute cables for the IFF were breaking down. A VHF was installed in jeep no. 24 and a radio receiver was installed in building 135.

IFF cable on 033 was changed and checked out satisfactorily. The substitute cable was not dependable and was to be changed as soon as correct cabling arrived. Periodic inspections were pulled on 030 and 038, and 033 and 037.

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INSTRUMENTATION SECTION

Supply of all major end items was excellent. There was on hand approximately 95 percent of the requirements placed on Task Group 7.4. The supply of expendables was good. One item (the electron tube) was not received causing two radiac sets to be out of commission.

AUTO PILOT

The subject installation, immediately after the depickling process, was found to be inoperative in 90 percent of the aircraft. This condition was assumed to have been created by, or contributed to, by a minimum amount of salt spray encountered during the transport of the aircraft to the forward area, the methods employed in depickling; namely, high pressure streams of steam and also existent malfunctions left in the systems at Kirtland AFB for lack of adequate replacement component spares.

All installations were repaired and placed in operating condition. It was necessary to eliminate a portion of the system circuitry, and completely rewire numerous cable assemblies in other systems. The wire bundles were replaced due to their being completely saturated with water or in such a state that they were very susceptible to saturation or contamination due to their past exposures which deteriorated the wire coating. A continuous sequence of repair and replacement was necessary in order to retain a high percentage of operative autopilot systems. It was gratifying to note the service life of the autopilot components even though hindered by unsatisfactory installation.

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GENERAL

It was necessary that certain requirements of Task Group 7.4, Provisional, and the Air Force Office of Atomic Energy (AFOAT) be met before this section could be completely prepared for a mission. These requirements were that 14 aircraft be available with all equipment operative for each mission.

1. Two aircraft, not necessarily equipped with air sampling devices, had to be airborne prior to the time of detonation to observe the detonation of the nuclear device.

2. Twelve aircraft, equipped with radioactive air sampling devices, had to collect samples of the radioactive cloud created by the detonation of the nuclear device. The type of air sampling device installed in each aircraft is explained in inclosure 1. The 12 aircraft flew in pairs during each shot. The first pair was equipped with the Double Squeegee. One of the second, third and fourth pair was equipped with the special Double Squeegee and one with the Snap Bag. One of the fifth and sixth pairs was equipped with the Double Squeegee and one with the Snap Bag.

This section successfully participated in the operation of 1 March by meeting all requirements. There were no aborts at take-off and there were no inflight incidents reported. There were 14 landings and 31 hours and 40 minutes flown, of which one hour and 50 minutes was night time in the actual sampling mission of 1 March. The total flying time for the day was 35 hours and 35 minutes. There was a total of 5,338 gallons of JP-4 fuel issued.

The 12 aircraft which actually collected samples of the radioactive

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cloud were contaminated with an average of 2788 MR's and were out of commission as of 1200 hours. The highest degree of contamination was 4755 MR's and the lowest was 1135 MR's. The remaining three aircraft were out of commission for periodic inspections as of 1600 hours, 1 March.

It had been decided to polish the aircraft with Cleaning-Brightening Compound (Spec No. MIL-C-5410) to free the aircraft skin of dust, grease, and aluminum oxidation whenever necessary to prevent excessive contamination of the aircraft by radioactive material. It was also decided that the aircraft would be kept as clean as possible by washing whenever necessary as an additional preventive of excessive contamination and corrosion. The actual decontamination of the aircraft began 4 March and was completed on 6 March. Because of the shortage of Radiological Safety personnel, it was necessary for the Aircraft Maintenance Section to furnish personnel to operate decontamination equipment such as trucks and heaters as well as to wash the aircraft. After the aircraft were exposed in the Radiation Decay Area, where the radioactive material was expended as much as possible, they were brought to the Decontamination Area where they were decontaminated to the lowest possible degree by washing. When the aircraft no longer presented a safety hazard by being contaminated, they were returned to this section for maintenance.

To curtail the shortage of monitoring personnel, seven airmen of this section received instructions for the use and care of the IM-74/PDR-27C Radiac Meter to be used for monitoring aircraft for safe working conditions; for monitoring aircraft parts and to obtain information necessary to complete AF Form 218 (Danger Radiation) before turn-in to

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supply. These same airmen also received instructions for the use and care of the 2610A Radiac Meter to be used for monitoring personnel exposed to radioactive material while performing aircraft maintenance.

When a new system of numbering technical orders was implemented, and because of the mutilated condition of the historical records of the aircraft and engines (AF Form 60A and B), it was necessary to reaccomplish the historical records for all aircraft and engines. Reaccomplishment, authorized by Technical Order, 00-20A-1, Section IX, paragraph 4b, began on 3 March and was completed on 17 March.

A message was received 17 March from the prime depot for F-84 aircraft containing instructions to inspect Hydraulic Filter Elements as reports had been received that the elements were often found broken at the bottom end (See Inclosure 2). The message also amended Technical Order 1F-84E-6 to include inspection of the Hydraulic Filter Elements during periodic inspections. The post-flight inspections of the aircraft performed on 17 March revealed three filter elements broken and two swollen to the wall of the container. The depot was informed of the results of this inspection as requested (see Inclosure 3) on 18 March.

From 2 to 26 March, eight periodic inspections were accomplished, consuming approximately 2000 man-hours. There were three engines removed and new engines installed. Engine number A-508647 was removed from the aircraft 51-1033A with 109 hours operating time since manufacture and 108 hours since overhaul because of a cracked Nozzle Diaphragm. Engine number A-506148 was removed from aircraft 51-1045A with 346 hours operating time since manufacture and 118 hours and five minutes operating

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since overhaul, because of Turbine Wheel Bucket failure as was engine number J-505554 from aircraft 51-10221 with 199 hours operating time since manufacture and 46 hours operating time since overhaul.

The aircraft were determined to be in condition to successfully perform the sampling mission scheduled on 27 March after being proof-flown on 25 and 26 March. There was a total of 5,494 gallons of fuel issued and 37 hours and 45 minutes flown, of which one hour and 50 minutes was night time, on 27 March. As of 1400 hours, 14 of the 15 aircraft were out of commission. Twelve aircraft were contaminated with an approximate average of 3800 MR's, the highest reading being 7600 MR's and the lowest, 1590 MR's. One aircraft was in commission.

The decontamination process, unchanged from the method of decontamination after the operation of 1 March (BRAVO), began on 28 March and was completed on 30 March. When the aircraft were returned to this section on 30 March for maintenance, they were still contaminationed with an average of 120 MR's, which made it necessary that maintenance personnel exercised extreme caution while performing maintenance.

The 15 EF-84G-5RE aircraft were on hand 11,160 hours in March, of which 6,965 hours, or 63 percent, was in-commission time. The aircraft were NORP 22 hours, out for periodic inspections for 753 hours; out due to malfunctions 1,077 hours, and the remaining 2,343 hours of the time were out of commission due to the aircraft being contaminated with radioactive material. There were 180 landings and a total of 103,437 gallons of fuel issued in March. Night flying consumed a total of 10 hours and 15 minutes of the 325 hours and 35 minutes flying time for March. There were no changes in the personnel status in March for this section except that one airmen was augmented to Base Shops.

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INSTRUMENTATION OF OPERATION CASTLE

Organization and Personnel

April 1953 - May 1953: During this period the section was on TDY to Indian Springs, Nevada, for project "Upshot Knothole." The 4925th Test Group (Atomic) was its parent organization. The section was composed of two officers, 1st Lt Russel W Bollinger and 2nd Lt Richard S Numbers, and five airmen, S Sgt Clifford E. Welsh, A/1C James P Hodge, A/1C Arlynd D Myres, A/2C Robert T Barton, and A/2C Wallace S Brown. These months were spent in support of 'Upshot Knothole' and roll-up activities subsequent to it.

June 1953 - August 1953: Upon the section's return to Kirtland AFB, airmen and officers returned to various sections of the 4925th. The airmen formed the Radiological Section of the Laboratory Branch, 4925th Test Group, and Lts Bollinger and Numbers received PCS assignments. On 10 June 1953, 1st Lt Walfred J Larson was assigned to the 4926th Test Squadron (Sampling) as Instrumentation Officer. During the following months, much planning was done to support the operation that was planned for the Pacific Proving Grounds during the spring of 1954. It was determined that at least five skilled electronics men were required to perform the section's mission. These men were to be familiar with radiac instruments and have a good general knowledge of radiation problems. The requirements for this section as stated by Dr. Harold Plank, LASL, was to "include at least two, and preferably three, of the men that were in the section during Upshot Knothole." Although five men so qualified were assigned to the 4925th Test Group the 4926th's parent organization, none of them were ever assigned to the 4926th Test

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Squadron.

After the personnel problem had been outlined, supply requirement lists were begun. A UAL was proposed and changed a number of times before a final draft was forwarded for approval. Work started on preparation of a spare parts requirement list for all UAL radac and test equipment.

September 1953: After operating from June through August as a 'one man' section, three airmen were assigned to fill part of the TA authorizations. These men, and the dates they were assigned, were S Sgt Donald G Davis, 8 September, A/3C Jack B Spikes, 9 September, and A/2C Jerry W Davis, 15 September.

On 1 September a complete list of requirements for major end items was forwarded to Task Group 7.4. This material was programed to be in place at the Pacific Proving Grounds upon the section's arrival in the area. Work continued on the spare parts requirement list. The remainder of the time was spent in indoctrination and training of unit personnel. No laboratory space was available and all instruments and allied equipment that had been on hand in the section during Upshot Knothole were retained by the 4925th Test Group. This left the section under strength, working space, and without equipment.

October 1953: The section remained under strength during this month. The spare parts requirement was forwarded to Task Group 7.4 on the 15th. A requirement for an air conditioned dehumidified room with outlets for 28 volts DC, 60 and 40 cycle 115 volts AC was also submitted to the Task Group. This room was to be readied in the Forward Area as the Instrument Laboratory.

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Lt Larson and S Sgt Davis attended a four day Radiological Monitoring Course given by LASL at Mercury, Nevada. Indoctrination and training of Squadron personnel continued.

November 1953: The section was finally brought to strength with the assignment of T Sgt James J Petersen on 2 November, A/1C Joseph H Novak and A/2C Hugh W Clarke on 12 November. An organizational chart for the period is as follows:



Laboratory space was procured in the basement of Building 1015 and work benches and desks installed. This space was never used to any extent except for storage. The main effort during the month was directed toward repairing special sampling tanks received from LASL. Three complete sets were to be built up from fourteen reparable tanks.

Some UAL equipment was received.

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December 1953: Work was completed on the sampling tanks. All equipment was packed for shipment overseas and the movement itself was begun on 29 December. No changes in organization or personnel occurred.

January 1954: Upon completion of the overseas movement on 21 January, the section became part of the Test Aircraft Unit (Provisional). This unit was composed of the 4926th Test Squadron and various other SAC units. However, as the section was transferred as a whole, there was no change in the organizational structure or personnel.

The requirement for the air-conditioned dehumidified laboratory was not fulfilled. Nothing had been done to ready the alloted space, a typewriter storage room in Building 79. It wasn't until about the last two days in January that work was started on the laboratory.

February 1954: During the first two weeks in February the main effort was directed toward preparing the laboratory space. After Holmes and Narver had completed carpentry, sprayed the inside of the room with a plastic sealant, and placed insulating board on the outside, the section personnel painted the room. The air conditioning unit itself was not installed until after the room was painted. Electricians were the last of the H & N crews and completed their work on the afternoon of 13 February. This late completion date was a severe handicap. It delayed unpacking and preparation of instruments a full two weeks.

The remainder of the month was spent in unpacking supplies and preparing radiac instruments to support the first shot of the program.

Radiac Instrumentation

Airborne Equipment

a. Wing Tip Ion Chamber: From the beginning of July until the

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section arrived in the Forward Area, no work was done on the WTIC. All sets had been removed from the aircraft and returned to Tracer Lab to be completely overhauled. As a result, all the men in the section, except S Sgt Davis, were totally unfamiliar with the instrument until sixteen sets were unpacked on 11 February.

During the period July - September all A/C were returned to Ogden for complete check out of wing wiring for the WTIC. All connecters were to be waterproofed. Upon the A/C's return to Kirtland it was discovered that the depot had used an incorrect drawing to set up the pin continuity. The 4925th Test Group was given a work order in November to correct the continuity and in a few weeks they informed the section that all A/C had been repaired and checked to conform with specifications. However, upon installation in the A/C after their arrival in the Forward Area, the Wing Tip Ion Chambers did not operate. All the aircraft had to be carefully checked for continuity and wiring modified to conform to proper sequence of A-A, B-B, C-C, D-D, E-E, and F-F in the ten conductor cable, and similar straight pin to pin continuity in the seven conductor cable. The following are examples of errors found and corrected:

A-A, B-B, E-E, F-F, G-G, and I-I (ten pin connector)

A-A, B-B, C-G, D-I, E-E, and F-F (ten pin connector)

A-A - ground, B-B, C-C, etc. (seven pin connector)

A-A, B-B, C-G, D-D, E-E, F-F and C-C (seven pin connector)

Cold solder joint (seven and ten)

Broken joint, and open (seven and ten)

In some A/C as many as four connectors had to be corrected, in others only one. Fourteen aircraft had to be modified. The section worked from

AFWL/MO

[redacted]

[redacted]

13 February to 28 February, 12 to 15 hours a day. The last WTIC was installed and checked at 0230 on D-Day, four hours before the shot. The whole section was relieved and gratified to find that eleven of the twelve sets on sampling A/C worked perfectly during the first shot.

b. Integron: The Integron was an entirely new instrument to the section. It was stored at LASL during the April - December period and it wasn't until the section reached the Forward Area that the people responsible for its maintenance had an opportunity to become familiar with it.

Some difficulty was encountered during its installation in the A/C. The probe on the instrument had been enlarged, requiring a minor sheet metal modification to enlarge the fitted hole on top of the Radiac Instrument panel. In addition, the holes in the Integron mounting brackets had to be enlarged and recentered to fit studs on A/C mounting brackets.

c. Jasper: The Jasper, like the WTIC and Integron, was first given to the section upon arrival in the Forward Area. No special problems were encountered either with the instrument or with its installation in the A/C.

Ground Equipment

a. AN/PDR 39C (T1-B): No unusual problem arose in preparation of these instruments. However, the initial requirement placed on Task Group 7.4 for twenty five of these instruments was based on the needs of all sections of the Nuclear Applications Branch. Prior to the first shot an additional requirement was placed with the Instrumentation section to support the Flyaway projects. This reduced the stockage of the instrument to such a point that no spaces were available at the instrument laboratory. In some instances 27 C's had to be substituted for the 39 C's.

[redacted]

AFWL/NWD

[redacted]

b. 2510A, AN/PDR 27 C, and Thyac: No problems arose in the preparation of these Geiger-Mueller instruments. Stockage of fifteen of each of these instruments was sufficient to support all requirements.

Supply

UAL Equipment: Major items, except for instruments supplied by LASL, were received from two sources; the 4926th Tech Supply and Task Group 7.4. Originally it was planned to place the total requirements for both UAL and expendable items on the Task Group so that they would be in place at the Forward Area upon the section's arrival there. However, some of the major items were immediately available at Kirtland, so approximately 10% of our UAL requirements were requisitioned through normal Air Force channels. On 1 September 1953 the remaining requirements were placed on Task Group 7.4. Although these requirements were not completely filled in time for the first shot, enough of them were supplied to support the mission. By D+20 all requirements had been filled.

There were no problems with the LASL equipment except that the instruments were unavailable until such a late date. All instruments arrived as programed.

Spare Parts and Expendables: Three sources contributed to the stockage of spare parts and expendables, 4926th Test Squadron, Task Group 7.4, and LASL. The Squadron supplied connectors, a few resistors, capacitors, batteries, packing materials, paint, and tape. A 150 item requirement was placed on Task Group on 15 October for tubes, resistors, capacitors, batteries, meters, and other miscellaneous equipment. LASL supplied spare parts for all their instruments. In some cases these duplicated the requirements placed on Task Group and the Squadron.

[redacted]

All requirements placed on the 4926th and LASL were supplied without undue delay. The requirement placed on Task Group was about 70% filled by D-Day, the remainder being supplied periodically during the three weeks after the first shot.

A serious shortage of batteries for ground instruments developed prior to the first shot. Approximately thirty instruments were out of commission due to lack of batteries. Army sources supplied enough batteries on a one time basis to put half of these in commission in time for the shot. When the batteries supplied to fill the 7.4 requirements were received, the remaining instruments were placed in operation..

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

INCLOSURE 1

The EF-84G-5RE aircraft assigned this organization were equipped with the radioactive air sampling device indicated opposite the aircraft serial number:

Aircraft	Device
51-1028A	Double Squeegee
51-1030A	" "
51-1032A	Special Double Squeegee
51-1033A	" "
51-1037A	Double Squeegee
51-1038A	" "
51-1042A	" "
51-1043A	" "
51-1045A	" "
51-1046A	Special Double Squeegee
51-1049A	Snap Bag
51-1051A	" "
51-1053A	" "
51-1054A	" "
51-1055A	" "

The Double Squeegee is an air compressor installed in the nose of the aircraft and designed to collect radioactive samples from the air.

The Special Double Squeegee differs from the Double Squeegee only in that it has a different air inlet take off.

The Snap Bag is a large plastic bag mounted in the nose of the aircraft to collect radioactive air samples.

AFWLMD

INCLOSURE 1

[redacted]

C O P Y

[redacted]

FM COMDR AFSWC KIRTLAND AFB N MEX
TO COMDR 4926th TEST SQ/SAMPLING/ENIWETOK MI

SWMM-3-58. FOL MSG FR HQ ARDC DT 12 MAR 54 QUOTED FYI AND NEC ACTION. QUOTE RDSMM2B-3-461-E ATTN DCS/M THE FOL MSG FR MOMA, CITE MOMA-3-61-E IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO AND NEC ACTION. QUOTE REPTS HAVE BEEN RECD THAT HYDRAULIC FILTER ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN FOUND BREAKING AT THE BOTTOM END. REQ THAT ALL F-84 SERIES AIRCRAFT HYDRAULIC FILTER ELEMENTS BE REMOVED AND INSPECTED AT TIME OF NEXT POSTFLIGHT INSP PERIOD IAW THE APPLICABLE -2 AND -6 TECH ORDER AND THIS HQS BE INFORMED OF RESULTS. IT IS FURTHER REQD THAT THE HYD FILTER ELEMENTS BE REMOVED AND INSPECTED AT EACH WED PERIODIC INSP OR AT HYDRAULIC PUMP FAILURE WHICHEVER OCCURS FIRST. THE APPLICABLE -6 WILL BE REVISED ACCORDINGLY.

PAGE TWO JWFKD 96D

HYDRAULIC FILTER ELEMENTS P/N AN6234-3 INSTALLED ON THE F-84B, C, AND D P/N AN 6235-4A INSTALLED ON THE F-84E AND G AIRCRAFT P/N AN6234-4 INSTALLED ON THE F-84 ACFT. UNQUOTE THE DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH MOMA IS AUTHORIZED IN REGARD TO REPORTING FINDINGS OF INSP AS IS REQUESTED ABOVE SIGNED MAIN DIV UNQUOTE.

16/2358Z MARJWFKD

C O P Y

[redacted]

INCLOSURE 2

AFWL/INO

410

C O P Y

COMDR 4926TH TS (S) APO 187C/O PM SAN FRANCISCO 182200Z UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE ROUTINE

COMDR MCAMA BROOKLEY AFB ALA

MCMTA-3-61-E UNCLASSIFIED

COMDR AFSWC KIRTLAND AFB NMEX

SWMSS 3-52 / URMSG MCMTA-3-61-E, SUBJ: F-84 SERIES ACFT HYDRAULIC FILTER ELEMENTS.HYDRAULIC FILTER ELEMENTS, PART NO AN 6235-4A, WERE INSPECTED ON THE FIFTEEN F-84G-5RE ACFT ASGD THIS ORGN ON 18 MAR 54. ON THREE ACFT, THE BOTTOM END OF THE HYDRAULIC FILTER WAS FOUND BROKEN. TWO OTHER FILTERS WITH SERVICEABLE BOTTOM END WERE FOUND TO BE SWOLLEN TO THE WALLS OF THE ELEMENT CONTAINER FROM THE MID-SECTION DOWN. THE FILTERS ON REMAINING ACFT WERE FOUND TO BE IN SATISFACTORY CONDITION. -6 HAS BEEN AMND LTR URMSG CITED ABOVE. FOR COMDR, AFSWC, URMSG SWMM-3-58, 162325Z.

CLAIBORNE F. BICKHAM, Capt, USAF 1 of 1

SWMS CRW 3221

EARL R. CRAWLER
1st Lt, USAF
Adjutant

C O P Y

INCLOSURE 3

AFWL/MO

411/4

4925TH TEST GROUP (ATOMIC)



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SAC TEST DETACHMENT KEY PERSONNEL CHART



*Additional Duty

SAC TEST DETACHMENT OPERATIONS SECTION



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

A/3c Brown
DAFSC 43151H

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814

[redacted]

29 January 1954

OPERATIONS SECTION

Test Aircraft Unit (Provisional)



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
17 March 1954

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

* Denotes positions that should be filled by Base of Operation.
** Denotes personnel which are assigned by this Base of Operation.

427

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

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

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29 January 1954

OPERATIONS SECTION

Test Aircraft Unit (Provisional)



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4925TH TEST GROUP (ATOMIC)



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
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10
0
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
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HOURS
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
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Marine Sq. 70M San Diego - Total Time Flown This TDY 98145


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
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HOURS
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
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
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
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HOURS
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CHAPTER 9

TEST SERVICES UNIT

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF DOE/OSS
Ralph Cooper 4/30/96
REVIEWED BY DATE
AFSWA/DOE 7/10/85
** Pages 440-609 of the History of Task Group 7.4, Provisional, March 54, Castle
Collection 575[illegible]

~~342~~
RG ~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~
Location: Technical Library 4/17-2
Collection: AFWL
Folder: History of Task Group 7.4, Provisional March 1954-Operation Castle
NOTE: This is [illegible] 4 of 5
Contains Pages 440 thru 609

440

HISTORY
OF
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
FOR
MARCH 1954

PREPARED BY

MAJOR JAMES W. MONTGOMERY (Historical Officer)
T SGT JAMES H. WRIGHT, JR (Historical Technician)

TYPED BY

S SGT RICARDO A. MONTEMAYOR
A/1C FRANK E. BREWER
A/1C JOHN J. MCNALLY, JR

HQ, TASK GROUP 7.4 AND HQ, MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE

54090-2
TSUP SC

FOREWORD

It is the intent of this history to record the MATS participation during the first month of the operational phase of Castle.

This document serves as a reference of past experiences and should permit more realistic planning for future operations.

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Chapter I Organization and Mission - - - - - - - 1

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Chapter III Security - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11

Chapter IV Operations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14

Chapter V Materiel - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 21

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (TABS)

CHARTS

GLOSSARY

ATTACHMENTS

Element Histories

A. Communications Element

B. Documentary Photographic Element (Air)

C. Search and Rescue Element

D. Weather Central Element

E. Weather Reconnaissance Element

F. Weather Reporting Element

AFWL/NO

NARRATIVE

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

During March the actual operational phase of Castle commenced. All efforts until this time were directed toward preparation for the MATS mission in this test series.

On 1 March 1954 the first "shot" was detonated. All aspects of the Test Services Unit participation were successful.

The force of this first shot far exceeded expectations. An immediate effect on this unit was the unexpected radioactive fall out on Rongerik, one of the weather islands. This island was evacuated the day following the shot (2 March 1954). The problems and details concerning this incident are contained in the WREP History, Attachment F. Emergency procedures were established for weather and communications personnel to land at Rongerik for a short period immediately preceding each test to start navigational aids and obtain weather data. On 30 March a letter was sent to TG 7.4 requesting information concerning the future status of this island.[1]

The dual responsibilities of the SAR Element Commander as mentioned in the January and February History were resolved during March. On 10 March this situation was brought to the attention of General DuBose, Commander, Air Rescue Service, by a message from General Estes.[2]

A meeting was held at Kwajalein on 17 March to discuss the SAR responsibilities for Castle. Attending were General DuBose, Col Disana,

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1. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Ops of Rongerik", dtd 30 Mar 54 (TAB #1)
2. Hq TG 7.4 Msg TGG 3-118, dtd 10 Mar 54 (TAB #2)

representing TG 7.4 and the Test Services Unit, Major Hagerty, SAR Element and 78th Air Rescue Squadron Commander, and representatives of the Navy at Kwajalein. The requirements for aircraft and SAR coverage as established by TG 7.4 Operation Order 1-53 and confirmed in a letter from Headquarters, Air Rescue Service on 25 September 1953, were discussed.[3] The requirement for two (2) SA-16's at all times plus one (1) additional SA-16 on shot and rehearsal days was reiterated. For the first shot this requirement was not met. It was believed that one reason for this was the dual responsibility of the 78th Air Rescue Squadron to provide area SAR coverage as well as meeting the requirements of this project. Task Group 7.4 wanted assurance that the three (3) aircraft required on shot and rehearsal days would be available. The dual command responsibilities of Major Hagerty as Commander of the SAR Element of the Test Services Unit and of the 78th Air Rescue Squadron were discussed.

General DuBose decided that Major Hagerty would return to Kwajalein as full time Commander of the 78th Air Rescue Squadron and another officer would be provided to command the SAR Element. The requirement for this project would be met by aircraft from Kwajalein and if necessary Major Hagerty had authority to request additional aircraft from Guam.

Later in the month Lt Col Harold F. Cline arrived at Eniwetok to replace Major Hagerty and assumed command of the SAR Element on 29 March.

Also during this month a requirement for two (2) additional SA-16's

3. See (TAB #57) of TSUP History, (1 August - 31 December 1953)

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was made to Air Rescue Service to provide airlift to Bikini. This in no way changed the SAR requirement but was a result of the airstrip at Bikini becoming radioactive, thereby making it necessary to provide amphibious type aircraft. Aircraft from the 76th Air Rescue Squadron at Hickam AFB were provided for this purpose. These aircraft were assigned to the Test Support Unit for operational control and would receive administrative support from the SAR Element of the Test Services Unit.

Lt Col Disana, the Deputy Commander of Test Services Unit, returned to the ZI during March. Originally Col Disana was released by Headquarters MATS for duty with this headquarters until after the second test in this series. After the continued delays prior to the second shot, he was released from duty with this headquarters and departed Eniwetok on 22 March 1954.

On 24 March a list of questions and answers regarding MATS participation in Castle were forwarded to TG 7.4 for possible use in making radio transcriptions.[4]

MISSION

Mission of the Test Services Unit remained unchanged throughout the month.

4. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Questions & Answers Regarding MATS Participation in Castle", dtd 24 Mar 54 (TAB #3)

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

ELEMENT COMMANDERS AS OF 31 MARCH

Communications Element
Documentary Photographic Element
Search and Rescue Element
Weather Reconnaissance Element
Weather Reporting Element
Weather Central Element

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL STAFF, 31 MARCH 1954

Commander

Executive Section

Executive Officer
Sergeant Major
Historical Technician
Senior Clerk

Personnel and Administration Section

Personnel Officer
Personnel Supervisor
Statistical Technician
Senior Clerk
Personnel Specialist

Operations Section

Operations Officer
Operations Supervisor

Materiel Section

Materiel Officer
Unit Supply Officer
Supply Supervisor
Supply Clerk

[redacted]

CHAPTER II

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION

A roster of Test Services Unit personnel was submitted to TG 7.4 for the emergency evacuation of Eniwetok. This roster was in three parts: Part One - Air crews; Part Two - Passengers for air evacuation; Part Three - Passengers for evacuation by water transportation.

On the 2nd of March another roster of air crews and maintenance personnel for emergency evacuation was submitted to TG 7.4.

On 8 March still another roster of Test Services Unit personnel who are located on Eniwetok was submitted to TG 7.4. This roster was broken down as follows: (a) Air Crews and maintenance personnel; (b) Personnel who are expected to receive 3.5 roentgens; (c) Personnel to be evacuated by surface vessel.

Effective 15 March the normal working hours were established as 0730 to 1600 Monday through Saturday.

Upon the receipt of Granite or other personal messages of an emergency nature each unit commander or his representative will contact the local Red Cross Director, since the Field Director may have further information on file or provide assistance which his organization can offer.

PERSONNEL ACTIONS

A letter was forwarded to TG 7.4 requesting that Lt Col Disana be released to return to Headquarters, MATS. Col Disana was made available by Headquarters, MATS for duty with this unit with the understanding that he would return upon completion of the second shot in this series. This

request was approved by TG 7.4 and a Special Order was published returning Col Disana to the ZI.[5]

Major Hagerty, Commander of the Search and Rescue Element, requested authority to return to Kwajalein to be on hand when General DuBose visited the 78th Air Rescue Squadron. Task Group 7.4 approved this request and Major Hagerty met with General DuBose at Kwajalein to discuss the SAR responsibilities for Castle. On 29 March Lt Col Harold F. Cline arrived to assume command of the SAR Element on Eniwetok and Major Hagerty was returned to Kwajalein to resume command of the 78th Air Rescue Squadron.

AIRMEN PROFICIENCY TESTS

All elements were requested to submit a list of personnel who are eligible and desire to take airmen proficiency tests. These tests were administered during the week of 22-27 March. Make-up testing will be conducted during the period 19-24 April.

Due to the difficulties in transportation, the airmen stationed at the various isolated weather islands were not tested during the regular or make-up testing period. Therefore, a letter was initiated by the Weather Reporting Element requesting a waiver be granted these airmen.

The Weather Reconnaissance Element requested a waiver of airmen proficiency tests be granted for two of their airmen. This waiver was requested due to the airmen being in transit status, during the testing period. This letter was forwarded through TG 7.4 to Headquarters, MATS for their action.

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5. Hq TSUP SO #12, par 1, dtd 12 Mar 54 (TAB #4)

APPOINTMENT OF SUMMARY COURT MARTIAL OFFICERS

General Order #6, Headquarters, TG 7.4, 3 February 1954 placed the responsibility of Court Martial jurisdiction over all Air Force personnel at the Pacific Proving Grounds upon the Commander, 4930th Test Support Group. The Test Services Unit was requested to submit the names of two officers who would assist in discharging the duties of Summary Court Officers.

Major Robinson of the Weather Reporting Element and Captain Moeller of the Weather Reconnaissance Element were appointed to represent the Test Services Unit.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS

An administrative inspection of the Test Services Unit was conducted by an inspection team from Headquarters, TG 7.4 on 18-19 March.[6] The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the efficiency and prepardness of this organization to accomplish its assigned mission. Action was taken to correct minor discrepancies which were noted during the inspection. The overall maintenance of personnel records in all units was reported by the inspection team as excellent.

Headquarters, Test Services Unit conducted an inspection on 30 March, the purpose of which was to insure that minor discrepancies as outlined in Headquarters, TG 7.4's report were corrected or that appropriate action had been initiated.

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6. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Rept of Admin Insp of Hq TSUP & its Subor Elms", dtd 24 Mar 54 (TAB #5)

OFFICER EFFECTIVENESS RATINGS

Task Group 7.4 notified this headquarters that effective 1 April a mandatory statement would be made on Officer Effectiveness Reports. This statement will indicate the manner in which an officer carries out his civic responsibilities and represents the Air Force in his dealings with the public.

EVACUATION OFFICER

Captain Ozier was designated the Evacuation Officer for the Bikini Area by TG 7.4. In the future all elements sending or removing personnel from the Bikini area will notify Captain Ozier aboard the U.S.S. Bairoko by message.

PERSONAL CONFERENCE PERIOD

Major Montgomery will hold the monthly personal conference period for the Test Services Unit, replacing Col Disana.

RED CROSS DRIVE

A meeting was held of Red Cross Representatives in Lt Col Atkins' office to formulate plans for the forthcoming Red Cross Drive. Col Atkins of the Test Support Group was designated as chairman for the Air Force participation, in this drive. Captain Bogusz represented the Test Services Unit.

The drive got off to a fast start with Headquarters, Test Services Unit reporting 100% participation in the first week of the drive. The Documentary Photographic Element reported in with 85%, however, the other elements with larger number of personnel assigned needed more time to canvas their people.

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To stimulate interest in the drive, charts were designed to reflect the percent of participation and the total amount collected from the elements. These charts were posted in the housing area.

GROUND SAFETY PROGRAM

During a routine inspection of the area by Captain Bogusz, a ground safety hazard was discovered in the vicinity of Building #131. This hazard was reported in a letter to TG 7.4 requesting corrective action. Task Group 7.4 replied that a work order was submitted to Holmes & Narver for repair of this hazard.

The monthly Unit Ground Safety Council meeting was held 29 March 1954. Ground Safety Regulations were brought to the attention of all Ground Safety Supervisors. A discussion was held regarding existing ground safety hazards and recommendations were made to alleviate these conditions.[7]

POSTAL SERVICES

A recent postal inspection revealed that the Postal Officer, TG 7.2, had no record of all units using APO 187. Further, that units using APO 187 had not appointed certifying officers for custom tags and gift certificates. Action was taken by Headquarters, Test Services Unit, to publish Special Orders listing officers of the unit authorized to sign custom tags and gift certificates.[8] Also, a letter was sent to TG 7.4 listing all the elements, plus units attached to Test Services Unit for administration, utilizing the address of APO 187.

7. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Minutes of Grd Safety Meeting", dtd 5 Apr 54 (TAB #6)
8. Hq TSUP SO #13, par 2, dtd 29 Mar 54 (TAB #7)

APPEARANCE OF WORKING AREAS

To define policing responsibilities within working areas, the airfield was sub-divided and a map showing areas of responsibility was sent to the elements concerned.[9] They were requested to initiate an inspection system to insure a continuous state of police in their assigned area.

9. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Appearance of Working Areas", dtd 19 Mar 54 (TAB #8)

CHAPTER III

SECURITY

During this month final type clearances continued to be received. The lack of final clearances did not affect the overall mission of this unit, but it did hamper the operation of the Weather Reconnaissance Element. These difficulties are enumerated in Attachment E.

SECURITY TERMINATION PROCEDURES

A letter outlining the security termination procedures was sent to all elements on 1 March 1954.[10]

HANDLING OF MESSAGES

Task Group Regulation 100-1, 19 February 1954, established identification requirements for personnel authorized to pick up classified messages from the Communications Center. Necessary forms were forwarded to the elements on 1 March 1954.[11]

On 8 March Task Group 7.4 established special handling procedures for messages which pertain to the safety of personnel. This information was forwarded to all elements on 11 March.[12]

NEWS RELEASES

The first published news release in March was issued on 5 March by Task Group 7.4.[13]

On 19 March this headquarters sent to all elements the lastest information officially released concerning this project.[14]

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10. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Scty Term Pro", dtd 1 Mar 54 (TAB #9)
11. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Auth to Pick Up Msgs", dtd 1 Mar 54
12. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Handling of Msgs Pertaining to Safeguarding Pers", dtd 8 Mar 54 (TAB #10)
13. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Scty Ltr", dtd 5 Mar 54 (TAB #11)
14. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Press Releases", dtd 19 Mar 54 (TAB #12)

PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

An emergency destruction plan for classified material was prepared on 17 March 1954.[15] On the same date a fire control and evacuation plan for Building #135 was published by the Test Support Unit.[16]

DISCONTINUANCE OF CLEARANCE INVESTIGATIONS

Task Group 7.4 notified this unit on 13 March that "Q" clearance investigations on certain personnel of the Communications Element had been discontinued. This was a result of MATS commands having to submit an excessive number of requests for "Q" clearances during the planning phase. This was due to a lack of firm clearance requirements during that period. This problem is explained in more detail in the January history of this unit and was referred to in our comments and recommendations to TG 7.4.[17]

SECURITY OFFICER'S CHECK LIST

On 17 March a check list of security items was forwarded to all elements for their guidance.[18] The Test Services Unit Security Officer visited each element on 30-31 March to inspect all items included on this list.

CLEARANCE UNDER CINCPAC 020

As the result of a review of passengers moving into Eniwetok, a letter was submitted to TG 7.4 concerning re-entry clearance authority under CINCPAC 020.[19] Personnel leaving this area on leave or TDY should have this re-entry authority in their orders.

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15. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Emerg Destruction Plan", dtd 17 Mar 54 (TAB #13)
16. Test Spt Unit Ltr Subj "Fire Control & Evacuation Plan for Bldg 135, dtd 17 Mar 54
17. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Scty Program", dtd 26 Mar 54 (TAB #14)
18. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Off Check List", dtd 17 Mar 54 (TAB #15)
19. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Re-entry Clearance Status of Pers Returning to Eniwetok Area", dtd 26 Mar 54 (TAB #16)

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[redacted]

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE SECURITY PROGRAM

This headquarters submitted to Task Group 7.4 our comments and recommendations concerning the overall security program.[20] It is believed that if such recommendations are considered the security program for future exercises will operate more efficiently and effectively.

20. See (TAB #14)

CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONS

"BRAVO" MISSION

All MATS aircraft of this unit accomplished their part in the "Bravo" mission flown on 1 March 1954 perfectly. This required the finest coordination, as a variance of more than plus or minus one minute from scheduled take-off time constituted an abort.

AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AND TAXI AREAS AT BIKINI

On 2 March 1954, a conference was held at Base Operations, Eniwetok, to resolve the problem of getting into and out of the "TARE" area, which was highly contaminated, to recover certain classified equipment. In a memorandum to Col Hammond, the unit representative at the conference, stated there was a distinct possibility that the Search and Rescue Elements' SA-16's would be called upon to partake in the actual airlifting of materials from "TARE" to Eniwetok.[21] However, the procurement of two (2) Navy PBM's from the ZI and two (2) SA-16's from Hickam AFB, by TG 7.4, relieved us of any responsibility in that regard.

CURRENT MEDICAL FLYING CLEARANCES

On 3 March 1954, all elements of this unit were requested to screen their records to determine if any of their personnel were in need of a current medical flying clearance. Two persons, lacking this requirement, completed their physical examination and a negative report was submitted

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21. Memo fr Maj Meagher to Col Hammond, dtd 2 Mar 54 (TAB #17)

to the Office of the Flight Surgeon, TG 7.4, on 17 March.

AIRCRAFT MARSHALLING PLAN

On 5 March a critique of the aircraft marshalling plan for the first mission, was received from the WRECEP.[22] The deficiencies encountered in the marshalling of Test Services Unit aircraft were pointed out, and recommendations made to effect a smoother operation. At a meeting with TG 7.4 this plan was discussed and later adopted for use on "ROMEO" and subsequent missions.

PROJECT PARTICIPANTS

An information copy of a Programming Plan published by Headquarters, TG 7.4, was received by this headquarters on 6 March.[23] The plan outlined the implementation required to meet, greet, and show Project Participants the scope of the CASTLE activity. MATS terminal personnel were advised by this headquarters of their responsibility of advising the Adjutant, Headquarters, TG 7.4, prior to arrival of inbound Project Participants (VIP's).

PRE-POSITIONING OF AIRCRAFT

The possibility that westerly surface wind conditions might exist at this station during mission take-offs for test operations, prompted this headquarters to solicit ideas regarding the pre-positioning of aircraft on mission days. The WRECEP submitted recommendations covering east and west take-offs to this headquarters on 9 March 1954. This headquarters concurred in the proposals, and forwarded them to Headquarters, TG 7.4, recommending they be approved.[24]

22. WRECEP Ltr Subj "Critique of Acft Marshalling Plan", dtd 5 Mar 54 (TAB #18)
23. Hq TG 7.4 Programming Plan 2-54, dtd 6 Mar 54 (TAB #19)
24. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Pre-Positioning of Acft", dtd 10 Mar 54 (TAB #20)

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[redacted]

MISSION DEBRIEFING FORM

A letter, with a sample mission debriefing form attached, was sent to TG 7.4 on 10 March. To provide a common point of departure in our effort to insure the success of future missions, it was suggested that TG 7.4 consolidate the good points of all Debriefing Forms and publish and distribute one Debriefing Form for all units.

"ROMEO" MISSION

On 12 March 1954 a general briefing for the "Romeo" mission was given to all participating personnel. As was the case in the briefing for the first mission, all phases were thoroughly covered, and visual aids were utilized fully.

PBM SHUTTLE SCHEDULE

A PBM shuttle schedule for the inter atoll flight was sent to all elements of Test Services Unit on 13 March 1954.

CLARIFICATION OF RULES & PROCEDURES GOVERNING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES AND ICAO PROCEDURES

Only two (2) copies of the ICAO Manual are available on this base, and they are in the Control Tower. A letter was sent to all elements of this unit on 15 March, requesting that one officer from each element familiarize himself with the procedures necessary for this area.

OPERATIONS DUTY NCO

On mission days it was found necessary to have an Operations Duty NCO standby during off duty hours to answer the field telephone connecting Air Operations Center at Hq, TG 7.4 and this headquarters. A roster designating airmen to perform this duty was published on 15 March.

CREW, AND MAINTENANCE MAN OF THE MONTH

A letter outlining the procedure which will govern the submission of future nominations for crew, and maintenance man of the month, was sent to the three Test Services Unit Elements possessing aircraft, on 20 March.[25] Selections for the month of February for the Test Services Unit were forwarded to TG 7.4 on 22 March.[26] The selections were made by this headquarters from recommendations submitted by the elements possessing aircraft.

AIRCRAFT SCHEDULING

An Aircraft Take-Off Coordination Form is published daily by the AOC in order to provide adequate take-off separation of aircraft departing Eniwetok. Failure by the individual unit operations to furnish the AOC with take-off and mission data prior to 1600 hours each day tended to defeat the primary purpose of the take-off coordination form. The discrepancies noted in the operation of this scheduling system were called to the attention of our elements possessing aircraft, with a request that positive steps be taken to insure that they do not occur in the future.[27]

"ROMEO" MISSION

After several postponements due to unfavorable winds, "Romeo" mission was flown successfully on 27 March. For the second time, all participating MATS aircraft performed their part of the mission in a commendable manner.

Complete crew debriefings were conducted with crews of the Test Services Unit that participated in "Romeo" mission on 27 March. A summary of data obtained from these debriefings was forwarded to the Director of Operations, TG 7.4, on 28 March.[28]

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25. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Crew & Maint Man of Mo", dtd 20 Mar 54 (TAB #21)
26. See TABS 7 & 8 of SAR Elm History, Attachment C.
27. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Acft Scheduling", dtd 19 Mar 54 (TAB #22)
28. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Msn Debriefing", dtd 28 Mar 54 (TAB #23)

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APPROACH CONTROL SOP

An Approach Control Standard Operating Procedure for this base was sent to the elements of Test Services Unit possessing aircraft, on 13 March.

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

On 15 March, all elements were notified that certificates, stating that communications security will be observed, was to be signed by all personnel working with communications. These certificates were received by this headquarters and forwarded to the Communications Security Officer, Headquarters, TG 7.4, in accordance with the provisions of TG 7.4 Regulation 100-2.

AACS CIRCUITRY OUTAGES

A visit to the Communications Element on 16 March was made to determine the cause of reported lengthy AACS circuitry outages. The findings were submitted in a memorandum to the Commander, Test Services Unit, on 17 March.[29]

LOAD MESSAGES ON AIRCRAFT DEPARTING ENIWETOK FOR HICKAM

A survey was made on 24 March, of the composition, accuracy, handling and disposition of aircraft load messages by the 1500-3 Air Base Wing Detachment, PACD, and the handling and transmission of these messages by the Communications Center at Eniwetok. The result of the survey is contained in a memorandum for the Commander, Test Services Unit.[30]

29. Hq TSUP Memo to Comdr Subj "AACS Circuitry Outages and Allied Problems", dtd 17 Mar 54 (TAB #24)
30. Hq TSUP Memo to Comdr Subj "Load Msgs on Acft Departing Eniwetok for Hickam", dtd 24 Mar 54 (TAB #25)

UTILIZATION OF GCA AND VHF/DF

Element Commanders were requested to insure that all pilots are rebriefed on the contents of TG 7.4 Regulation 60-2, wherein full use of GCA and VHF/DF is required on all flights except those on mission days.[31] It was further requested the GCA Log, presently submitted with the Daily Report of Unit Operations, include any practice or actual VHF/DF steers.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION MEETING

On 1 March all elements were notified that a Unit Aircraft Accident Prevention Meeting would be conducted by Major Hagerty, SAR Commander, on 8 March. A make up meeting for personnel unable to attend this meeting was held on 23 March.

AIRCRAFT TAXI ACCIDENT

SA-16 Number 49-79 of the SAR Element was struck by the rotor blade of an H-19 on 3 March. The H-19, which was assigned and under operational control of the Test Support Unit, lacerated the trailing edge of the left elevator and crumpled the elevator hinge fairing, necessitating replacement of the elevator. The accident was classified as minor and attributed to pilot error on the part of the H-19 pilot. At the time of the accident the SA-16 was on the ramp, wheels chocked, left propellor removed for replacement, and was unoccupied.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PREVENTION MEETING

All elements were notified on 12 March that a Task Group Aircraft Accident Prevention Meeting would be conducted on 16 March.

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31. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Utilization of GCA & VHF/DF", dtd 30 Mar 54 (TAB #26)

FLIGHT SAFETY ACTIVITIES

A memorandum listing flight safety activities for the week ending 21 March 1954 was forwarded to Flight Safety Officer, TG 7.4.[32] Subsequent memoranda will be forwarded weekly to TG 7.4 for informational purposes. A report of Flight Safety Activities of the Test Services Unit for the week ending 28 March was forwarded to Commander, Test Services Unit on 29 March.[33]

32. Memo to Comdr TSUP Subj "Flight Safety Activities", dtd 22 & 29 Mar 54 (TAB #27)
33. See (TAB #27)

CHAPTER V

MATERIEL

UNIT SUPPLY

The workload for the Consolidated Unit Supply leveled off during this month.

An average of 1000 sheets and 500 pillow cases are taken to the Base Laundry each week. Airmen laundry bundles average around 260 per week. Racks were constructed on the Unit Supply Building to hold bundles until picked-up. Originally the bundles were placed outside on the ground. This was unsatisfactory because of the sudden rain showers.

TRIP REPORT

T/Sgt William E. Owens returned from his visit to the 1500th Air Base Wing for the purpose of coordinating materiel matters. Problems discussed were outlined in Sergeant Owens' trip report.[34]

ROLL-UP PLANS

A general concept for handling the roll-up of supplies and equipment was received from TG 7.4 on 8 March.[35] This letter established 10 April as the deadline for submission of the unit roll-up plans.

On 11 March a conference was held by TG 7.4 to brief supply personnel on roll-up requirements and procedures. Written minutes of this meeting were not published.

Early in March this unit submitted a list of questions to TG 7.4. The answers to these questions were required for guidance in preparing for roll-up. This information was received and forwarded to all elements

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34. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Fld Trip Rept", dtd 8 Apr 54 (TAB #28)
35. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Roll-Up of Sup and Equip", dtd 8 Mar 54 (TAB #29)

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on 31 March.[36]

The Roll-Up Plan for this unit was prepared in draft form and coordinated with all elements. This plan will be issued early in April, well ahead of the 10 April deadline established by TG 7.4.

BILLETING

Problems concerning billeting continued. An example was the hurry-up preparation required to house the personnel evacuated from Rongerik. Since all billeting spaces allotted to the Test Services Unit was being fully utilized, it was necessary to have Holmes and Narver (Civilian Contractors) build up tent floors and super-structure for more tents. However, since these personnel were placed in the hospital for observation, this space was not required immediately.

WORK ORDERS

Task Group 7.4 was requested to approve a number of work orders for the various elements of this unit. Those forwarded included a request to have the patio of the MATS Terminal resealed. This request was promptly taken care of, however, there are still some leaks which will require a second treatment. Another request was to have the front of the Terminal, on the loading ramp side, painted with silver paint to improve the appearance. This request was disapproved as the cost would have been prohibitive.

UTILITIES

During this month the failure of the main power cable created a shortage of water and electrical power for a few days. Drastic conservation measures were required during this period.[37]

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36. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Roll-Up Planning", dtd 31 Mar 54 (TAB #30)
37. Hq TG 7.2 Ltr Subj "Consv of Water and Electricity", dtd 16 Mar 54 (TAB #31)

TRANSPORTATION

On 9 March instructions were received from TG 7.4 that only critical items of excess property would be shipped via air transportation. This information was forwarded to all elements.[38]

All elements were again advised that military personnel must have a valid drivers license prior to operating vehicles on Eniwetok.

General information concerning shipment of personnel and baggage to the Zone of Interior was received from TG 7.4 on 29 March. This information was forwarded to all elements.[39]

COMMUNICATIONS SUPPLY

The TG 7.4 follow-up inspection of the Communications Supply was conducted on 25 March 1954.[40] This inspection revealed a marked improvement in this section.

General Estes and Colonel Hawley, D/Materiel, TG 7.4, informally inspected this supply section during March and were well satisfied.

WEATHER ISLANDS

Commander, Weather Reporting Element, advised that a requirement existed for one hundred and fifty (150) cylinders of helium at Majuro, one of the weather island locations. Task Group 7.4 was advised of this requirement and requested to airlift the cylinders. This request was granted and arrangements were made to start shipping them on/about 15 March 1954. The above was not a result of mis-calculation of requirements but due to the Base Supply Officer at Hickam inadvertently counting empty cylinders for full ones. This was discovered by Lt McDaniel,

38. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Shpmt of Sup by Air", dtd 9 Mar 54 (TAB #32)
39. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Pers & Baggage Rot to ZI", dtd 29 Mar 54 (TAB #33)
40. Hq TG 7.4 D/F Subj "Unit Sup Insp", dtd 25 Mar 54 (TAB #34)

Weather Reporting Element Supply Officer, who then made sure that the other locations were given a full supply. Majuro was purposely shorted, since it was known that a usable landing strip existed there.

The Commander, Weather Reporting Element, requested a team of Supply Inspectors to inspect and close out weather island UPREALS. The request was forwarded to Task Group 7.4.[41]

Personnel were requested to prepare ocean manifests on equipment and supplies being shipped from the weather islands to the ZI. This request was forwarded to Task Group 7.4.[42]

The Roll-Up Plan for the weather islands was completed on 13 March, approved by this headquarters, and forwarded to TG 7.4.[43]

On 13 March a letter was received from the Weather Reporting Element requesting a monitor to survey the property remaining at Rongerik to establish the degree of radioactive contamination. This request was forwarded to TG 7.4. The forwarding indorsement also requested information concerning procedures for processing claims for clothing and personal effects which became radioactive when personnel were evacuated. This information was received from TG 7.4 and forwarded to Weather Reporting Element.[44]

MAINTENANCE

Aircraft maintenance activity of the Weather Reconnaissance Element worked around the clock during the month of March. Eleven engine changes were made, along with routine maintenance and inspections, which permitted

41. WREP Ltr Subj "Insp of UPREALS", dtd 9 Mar 54 (TAB #35)
42. WREP Ltr Subj "Pers to Prep Ocean Manifest", dtd 9 Mar 54 (TAB #36)
43. 3rd and 4th Inds to B/L, TAB #77 of TSUP History for February 1954 (TAB #37)
44. WREP Ltr Subj "Condemnation of Radioactive Material", dtd 13 Mar 54 (TAB #38)

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this organization to pile up 869 flying hours during this period. The average life of an engine on this operation is running between 400 and 500 hours. One engine has gone over 700 hours.

SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS

ANEXO

T A B L I S T

(SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS)

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

1. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Ops of Rongerik", dtd 30 Mar 54.
2. Hq TG 7.4 Msg TGG 3-118, dtd 10 Mar 54.
3. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Questions & Answers Regarding MATS Participation in Castle", dtd 24 Mar 54.

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

4. Hq TSUP SO #12, par 1, dtd 12 Mar 54.
5. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Rept of Admin Insp of Hq TSUP & its Subor Elms", dtd 24 Mar 54.
6. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Minutes of Grd Safety Meeting", dtd 5 Apr 54.
7. Hq TSUP SO #15, par 2, dtd 29 Mar 54.
8. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Appearance of Working Areas", dtd 19 Mar 54.

SECURITY

9. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Scty Term Pro", dtd 1 Mar 54.
10. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Handling of Msgs Pertaining to Safeguarding Pers", dtd 8 Mar 54.
11. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Scty Ltr", dtd 5 Mar 54.
12. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Press Releases", dtd 19 Mar 54.
13. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Emerg Destruction Plan", dtd 17 Mar 54.
14. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Scty Program", dtd 26 Mar 54.
15. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Off Check List", dtd 17 Mar 54.
16. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Re-Entry Clearance Status of Pers Returning to Eniwetok Area", dtd 26 Mar 54.

OPERATIONS

17. Memo fr Maj Meagher to Col Hammond, dtd 2 Mar 54.
18. WRECEP Ltr Subj "Critique of Acft Marshalling Plan", dtd 5 Mar 54.
19. Hq TG 7.4 Programming Plan 2-54, dtd 6 Mar 54.
20. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Pre-Positioning of Acft", dtd 10 Mar 54.
21. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Crew & Maint Man of Mo", dtd 20 Mar 54.
22. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Acft Scheduling", dtd 19 Mar 54.
23. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Msn Debriefing", dtd 28 Mar 54.
24. Hq TSUP Memo to Comdr Subj "AACS Circuitry Outages and Allied Problems", dtd 17 Mar 54.
25. Hq TSUP Memo to Comdr Subj "Load Msgs on Acft Departing Eniwetok for Hickam", dtd 24 Mar 54.

26. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Utilization of GCA & VHF/DF", dtd 30 Mar 54.
27. Memo to Comdr TSUP Subj "Flight Safety Activities", dtd 22 & 27 Mar 54.

MATERIEL

28. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Fld Trip Rept", dtd 8 Apr 54.
29. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Roll-Up of Sup and Equip", dtd 8 Mar 54.
30. Hq TSUP Ltr Subj "Roll-Up Planning", dtd 31 Mar 54.
31. Hq TG 7.2 Ltr Subj "Consv of Water and Electricity", dtd 16 Mar 54.
32. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Shpmt of Sup by Air", dtd 9 Mar 54.
33. Hq TG 7.4 Ltr Subj "Pers & Baggage Ret to ZI", dtd 29 Mar 54.
34. Hq TG 7.4 D/F Subj "Unit Sup Insp", dtd 25 Mar 54.
35. WREP Ltr Subj "Insp of UPREALS", dtd 9 Mar 54.
36. WREP Ltr Subj "Pers to Prep Ocean Manifest", dtd 9 Mar 54.
37. 3rd and 4th Inds to B/L, TAB #77 of TSUP Hist for February 1954.
38. WREP Ltr Subj "Condemnation of Radioactive Material", dtd 13 Mar 54.

APPROVED

RENEWED

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

30 March 1954

SUBJECT: Operations at Rongerik Atoll

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Reference is made to letter Headquarters, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional, Subject: Rongerik Incident, dated 27 March 1954 with 1st Indorsement by this headquarters.

2. The Test Services Unit has been unable to obtain any definite word on when we can expect the Rongerik people to be released from the hospital at Kwajalein. If any information on this matter is available at your level, request we be advised accordingly. Further we need to know, as soon as possible, if these people will be made available to us for added duty during Castle or if they are to be returned to the ZI prior to the end of the operation. The personnel from Eniwetok, being used to make the rawinsonde runs at Rongerik on the days preceding each shot, are approaching the maximum radiation level. Several trips have been made to the island since 2 March. Radiological readings have been taken each time in addition to the rawinsonde soundings, communications maintenance, etc. In order to continue this service at Rongerik it will be necessary to send the ex-Rongerik men to one of the other weather islands (probably Majuro) in order to make personnel with little or no radiation exposure available for these missions. Otherwise additional personnel will be required.

3. Informal information from Red-Safe authorities indicates that we will be unable to use Rongerik on a full time basis for the duration of this project. In view of this we now plan operations, when absolutely essential, on a eight (8) hour basis. Request you advise if this informal information is correct and if our planning is in consonance with your desires.

/s/Mahlon B. Hammond
/t/MAHLON B. HAMMOND
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

AFWL/HO

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7.4 ENIWETOK MI

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COMDR ARS ANDREWS AFB MD

PRIORITY

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TGG 3.118 X FR ESTES TO DUBOSE X PREVIOUSLY STATED SAR RQMTS FOR OPR CASTLE ARE TWO SIERR ALPHA DASH ONE SIX ACFT IN COM DAILY AT ENIWETOK ON OTHER THAN SHOT DAYS AND THREE IN COM AT ENIWETOK ON SHOT DAYS X SO FAR CMA SEVEN EIGHT ARS HAS BEEN UNABLE TO MEET THESE RQMTS X ONLY TWO SIERRA ALPHA DASH ONE SIX ACFT WERE AVAL ON FIRST SHOT AND FOR PAST TWO WK THE DAILY IN COM AVG HAS BEEN ONLY ONE X IN ADD TO PROV CASTLE SPT CMA SEVEN EIGHT ARS HAS NORMAL ALERT AND SAR ELM RESP AT KWAJALEIN X MAJ HAGERTY IS SQ COMDR AT KWAJALEIN AND ALSO COMDR OF RDQ ELM OF TEST SV UNIT X IT APPEARS THAT THIS DUEL RESP IS BEYOND SQ MAINT CAPABILITY AND GREATER THAN ONE MAN CAN EFF SUPERVISE X ANY ACTION WHICH YOU CAN TAKE TO ALLEVIATE THIS PRES UNSAT COND WILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED X AND X

[redacted]

HOWELL M. ESTES, JR., BRIG GEN, USAF

A. J. AMERSON, CAPT, USAF

ADJUTANT

10/16552/Mar 54 TGG 4207

54 050-6

AFWAMD

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HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

24 March 1954

SUBJECT: Questions and Answers Regarding MATS Participation in Castle

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

In accordance with verbal request from Lt Col Fackler on 23 March 1954, attached are questions and answers regarding MATS participation in Castle. They are submitted in the order of their priority for use in transcriptions.

/s/Mahlon B. Hammond
/t/MAHLON B. HAMMOND
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

1 Incl
a/s

[redacted]

AFRWL/HO

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1. QUESTION: I understand General, that one of the Major Commands participating in Castle is the Military Air Transport Service. What does that organization provide?

ANSWER: The Military Air Transport Service, commonly known as MATS, has weather, rescue and communications responsibilities in addition to that of Air Transportation. All of these services are vital to this operation. MATS functions, except Air Transport, are provided by the Test Services Unit. This unit has 15 aircraft and approximately 750 people. The Pacific Division of MATS, with headquarters in Hawaii, provides airlift for the movement of high priority cargo and personnel between the U.S., Hawaii and the Pacific Proving Ground.

2. QUESTION: I understand that accurate weather information is very important in tests of this type. How do you obtain this data in an isolated location such as the Pacific Proving Ground?

ANSWER: The Test Services Unit has six (6) subordinate elements. Three of these elements are concerned directly with the collection and evaluation of weather information. We have established weather reporting stations on several islands within a 400 mile radius of Eniwetok. Daily weather reconnaissance missions are performed by WB-29 aircraft. Weather data collected by the aircraft, the weather islands and permanently established stations is funneled into a weather central. The Weather Central then evaluates the information received and provides the weather forecasts.

3. QUESTION: You have Weather Reporting, Weather Reconnaissance, and Weather Central Elements in the Test Services Unit. What are the other three elements?

ANSWER: There is the Communications Element which provides aids to air navigation such as the control tower, radio and radar beacons, the radar approach control system, etc., and Air Force circuits for the transmission and reception of radio messages. The Air Rescue function is performed by an element equipped with amphibious aircraft. We have a Documentary Photographic Element with transport type aircraft which are utilized to obtain necessary pictorial coverage of our operations. The actual photography is accomplished by personnel of the Scientific Task Group.

4. QUESTION: Are there any unusual airlift requirements on MATS in this operation?

ANSWER: Yes there are. One of the most important is that of returning the samples to the U.S. This, MATS does as expeditiously as possible. Special flights are set up to depart the proving ground after each shot and spare aircraft and crews are stationed at the enroute stops to preclude delays. We are able to move the samples from Eniwetok to Albuquerque, New Mexico, for example, in about 23 hours.

AFWL/HO

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. QUESTION: I understand that some of your people had to be evacuated from one of the outlying weather islands due to fall out from the Atomic Cloud. If so, how many men were involved and were they exposed to a dangerous amount of radioactivity?

ANSWER: We evacuated 24 men from Rongerik Atoll, which is approximately 160 nautical miles east of Bikini. During all tests particular attention is paid to safety of personnel. These individuals were removed within a few hours after it became apparent that the cloud was moving in their direction. The evacuation was accomplished in good time and no personnel were ever in any danger of receiving an over exposure to radioactivity. WB-29 aircraft of the Test Services Unit follow and record the movement of the atomic cloud in addition to performing their mission of weather reconnaissance. This tracking mission continues until the cloud dissipates or we are assured that no further danger from radioactivity exists.

[redacted]

AFWCMD

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 12)

12 March 1954

1. [illegible] is reld fr dy w/this orgn and will return to Hq MATS, Andrews AFB, Wash 25, D.C. WP o/a 13 Mar 54 via MATS a/PR No US KWX-2DX-166[illegible]-3 TEMA. NATS. Tvl via coml air, bus and/or rail auth w/i CLUS, CIPAP. TDN 5743400 465-4731 P458-02-C3 S49-608. When tvl by acft, a total of 115 lbs bag, inc excess is auth. AUTH: Ltr this hq, dated 11 Mar 54, Subject: Termination of TDY and 1st Ind, Task Group 7.4, dated 11 Mar 54.

2. Fol amn, atch this orgn, are awarded the Good Conduct Medal Clasp w/No loops indicated for their demonstration of hon, effcy and fidelity during period indicated:

GRADE	NAME	AFSN	FOR PD (DT INC)	NO LOOP
M/SGT			6 Jan 50 - 5 Jan 53	w/3 lp
T/SGT		S	4 Feb 51 - 3 Feb 54	w/2 lp
T/SGT			2 Mar 51 - 1 Mar 54	w/1 lp
T/SGT		JR	9 Feb 50 - 8 Feb 53	w/1 lp

3. [illegible] atch this orgn, is awarded the Good Conduct Medal for his demonstration of hon, effcy and fidelity during the period 27 Jun 50 to 26 June 53.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

[signature]

LEONARD E. BOGUSZ
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

LEONARD E. BOGUSZ
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
Hq MATS DCS/PL (1)
Hq TG 7.4 (2)
Hq TG 7.4 Compt (2)
Indiv Par 1 (20)
Indiv Par 2 & 3 (2)
201 File ea Indiv (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGA 333 Mar 24 1954

SUBJECT: Report of Administrative Inspection of Hq Test Services Unit and Its Subordinate Elements

THRU: Commander
Test Services Unit
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

I. GENERAL

1. This inspection (administrative) was conducted by an Inspection Team from Hq Task Group 7.4 on 18-19 March 1954 under the provisions of AFR 123-1 (See Incl. #1 for list of personnel performing the inspection).

2. The purpose of this administrative inspection was to evaluate the efficiency, economy, adequacy, and prepardness of the organization to accomplish its assigned mission.

3. This was the initial inspection of the Test Services Unit since arrival in the forward area.

4. The OIC and/or NCOIC of each Section was contacted during the inspection and is shown in Inclosure #2.

II. GENERAL COMMENTS

1. The general appearance of the overall area is considered excellent.

2. The administrative procedures observed by the inspectors are considered adequate. Personnel appeared to be well trained and showed an excellent knowledge of their duties. It was noted that some personnel in the lower units did not have sufficient work to keep them busy during the present slack period.

AFWL/HO

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Ltr Hq TG 7.4, APO 187, subj: "Rept of Adm Insp of Hq Test Svs Unit & Sub Elms"

3. The Security Officers for Hq Test Services Unit and its subordinate elements carried communications security as an additional duty. It was noted that they are aware of the fundamentals of communications security and had properly briefed the personnel assigned their units.

4. The overall maintenance of personnel records in all units is excellent.

4. Security officers of the Test Services Unit are considered fully qualified to perform their assigned duties. Major James W. Montgomery is assigned as Unit Executive Officer in Hq Test Services Unit with the additional duty of Test Services Unit Security Officer.

6. The military courtesy and physical appearance of individuals is considered excellent.

III. IRREGULARITIES AND/OR DEFICIENCIES

See Inclosure #3.

IV. ROUTING

Request this report be indorsed to Commander, Task Group 7.4, ATTN: Administrative Inspector, in sufficient copies so that the original and one copy, including inclosures, will reach the office of the Administrative Inspector on or before 5 April 1954. Request that action taken and/or to be taken be indicated on the discrepancy sheet in the appropriate column. Action taken should be specific, stating the steps taken to correct the discrepancy, the date correction was made or will be completed, and the steps initiated to prevent recurrence when the discrepancy warrants such action.

/s/ Herschel D. Mahon
/t/ HERSCHEL D. MAHON
Colonel, USAF
Air Inspector

3 Incls:
1-Adm Insp Team (6 cys)
2-Pers Contacted (6 cys)
3-Sec III of B/L (6 cys)

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Hq, TG 7.4 Prov, TGA 333, Subj: Report of Administrative Inspection of Hq Test Services Unit and Its Subordinate Elements, dtd 24 Mar 54

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California 3 Apr 1954

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, ATTN: Administrative Inspector, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Basic correspondence has been noted.

2. Reference paragraph II. 2., the majority of the functions performed by elements of this unit are of a continuing nature. Weather, communications, rescue, and terminal functions decrease very slightly between actual test operations. The Documentary Photographic Element is the only one in the Test Services Unit whose work load is lessened to any great extent by delays. Every effort is made to keep those people occupied.

3. Inclosure 3 has been completed to reflect the corrective action taken on the minor irregularities and/or deficiencies. This headquarters had conducted a follow-up inspection of all our elements to insure appropriate action on these items.

/s/ Mahlon B. Hammond
/t/ MAHLON B. HAMMOND
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

3 Incls:
1. 2 cys w/d
2. 2 cys w/d
3. 2 cys w/d

AFMDHQ

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

5 Apr 1954

SUBJECT: Minutes of Ground Safety Meeting

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. In accordance with Group Regulation 31-1, dated 19 February 1954, the monthly meeting of the Unit Ground Safety Council was held at the I & E Classroom at 1000 hours, 29 March 1954.

2. The purpose of this meeting was to study, propose, and recommend ground safety measures as it affects our unit; to insure wide dissemination of the ground safety program.

3. Members in attendance were:

4. The following member was absent:

SAR

5. Ground Safety Regulations AF-32-2, dated 24 June 1953, Task Group Regulation 32-1, dated 19 February 1954 and Headquarters, Test Services Unit Provisional Policy Letter 1-6, dated 20 February 1954, were brought to the attention of all ground safety supervisors.

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6. Ground Safety Hazards which were reported and corrected:

a. Ramp lighting in Weather Reconnaissance area.

b. Planking in front of building 131.

7. A discussion of the Ground Safety accident that occurred to Staff Sergeant McCarley was held. The council concurred with the recommendation of the supervisors in discontinuing three wheel hand carts for heavy loads.

8. The following Ground Safety hazards were discussed:

a. Fire extinguishers (water type) are unsatisfactory; handles are either frozen or difficult to operate (majority of these are in the tent area).

b. Crew Chief stands are corroded and hand rails are missing on some of them.

c. Dispensary reports are slow in returning to the unit.

9. Recommendations:

a. A survey be made by Task Group 7.2 fire department, and all unsatisfactory fire extinguishers be replaced.

b. A survey be made by the Maintenance Officer of each element to discover any crew chief stands that are unsafe for operation. This is being accomplished within this unit by a letter to all Maintenance Officers apprising them of this hazard and requesting corrective action.

c. Insure compliance with Policy Letter Headquarters, Test Services Unit, Provisional, 1-6, dated 20 February 1954 which states that in minor injuries the AFSWC Form 20 will be hand carried by the individual involved to his immediate supervisor, who will forward it to the Unit Ground Safety Officer.

10. The meeting was adjourned at 1030 hours.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ James W. Montgomery
/t/ JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

Hq TSUP - Headquarters, Test Services Unit, Provisional
Doc Photo - Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)
SAR - Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
WREP - Weather Reporting Element, Provisional
WCEP - Weather Central Element, Provisional
WRECEP - Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
COMM - Communications Element, Provisional

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

29 March 1954

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 15)

1. Par 2, SO 14, cs is hereby revoked.

2. The fol offs, are designated Certifying Officers for the purpose of Certifying Custom Tags and Gift Certificates for units indicated.

NAME	AFSN	ORGN
		Hq TSUP
		Hq TSUP
		Doc Photo
		SAR
		WREP
		WREP
		COMM
		COMM
		WRECEP
		WRECEP
		WRECEP
	AS	WRECEP
		WRECEP
		WCEP
		WCEP

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

Leonard E. Bogusz

LEONARD E. BOGUSZ
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

LEONARD E. BOGUSZ
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
Hq MATS DCS/PL (1) Postal Off, APO 187 Ea Orgn (2)
Hq TG 7.4 (2) Ea Indiv Concerned (2)
AFMLPO Hq TG 7.4 Compt (2) Ea Indiv 201 (1)

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HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Appearance of Working Areas

TO: Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Communications Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional
Commander, 1500-3 Air Base Wing Detachment PACD
Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional

1. Reference is made to letter, Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, Subject: Appearance of Living and Working Areas, dated 15 February 1954, and 1st Indorsement, this headquarters, dated 17 February 1954.

2. To facilitate and define policing responsibilities within the working areas, the airfield area has been sub-divided. The attached drawing will indicate your area(s) of responsibility. You are requested to initiate an inspection system to insure a continueous state of police in your assigned areas.

3. Any police or improvement job which you consider to be beyond your capability, or that you think should be accomplished, will be reported to this headquarters.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

James W. Montgomery

1 Incl
Map of Airfield

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

AFMLANG


VHF
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MATS TERM
WEA RECON
DOC PHOTO

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Security Termination Procedures

TO: Commander, Communications Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Central Element, Provisional
Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)
Commander, 1500-3 Air Base Wing Detachment PACD

1. Prior to departure from the forward area, all personnel of your element will be given a Security Termination Lecture. The necessity for continued security of classified information relative to this project will be strongly emphasized.

2. Each individual will be required to sign the appropriate Security Termination Statement(s) as indicated below before departing the forward area.

a. All personnel will sign a Departure Statement. (Inclosure 1)

b. Personnel having a "Q" clearance will sign an additional statement as follows:

(1) Type "A" (See Inclosure 2): If the individual has no document or other thing containing or incorporating Restricted Data, or other matter classified Confidential or higher pertaining to JTF 7 activities.

(2) Type "B" (See Inclosure 3): If the individual is authorized and required, in order to accomplish continuing duties with the AEC or DOD Atomic Programs, to retain custody, or control certain documents and/or other things containing or incorporating Restricted Data and/or other matter classified Confidential or higher, pertaining to JTF 7 activities.

3. Completed statements will be forwarded to this headquarters.

4. All Security Badges will be turned in prior to personnel departing the forward area. Security Officers of each element have been informed of personnel issued badges.

AFWL/HO

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5. Copies of the Security Termination Statements are available from the Personnel Security Officer of this headquarters.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

James W. Montgomery

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

3 Incls:
1. Departure Statement
2. Scty Term Statement - Type "A"
3. Scty Term Statement - Type "B"

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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
Washington 25, D. C.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT

FOR USE OF ALL PERSONNEL UPON DEPARTURE FROM THE FORWARD AREA

I hereby agree that I will disclose no information whatever to any unauthorized person regarding the nature, time, success, failure, or other details of tests held or to be held by the Joint Task Force. After a news release by the AEC has been made I will disclose no information other than that contained in the official release. I understand that non-disclosure of details of these tests is important and to the continued success of the nuclear research program, and has a definite bearing on our national security.

Signature of Witness	Signature of Departee
Agency or Project	Agency or Project
Date	Date

AFWL/HO

Reproduced by 4930th Test Spt Gp

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JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
SECURITY TERMINATION STATEMENT
TYPE "A"

I, _____, make the following statement to the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, with the understanding and intent that my statement will be used by the proper authority in carrying out its duty to protect the security of restricted data. I have read and am familiar with the penal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and of the Espionage Act (50 U.S. Code, Sec. 31 and 32). I understand that the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prescribe penalties for the disclosure of resricted data to unauthorized persons, and the provisions of U.S. Code, Title 18, "Crimes and Criminal Procedures", approved June 25, 1948, and of "Internal Security Act of 1950" prescribe penalties for the disclosure to unauthorized persons of information respecting the national defense, and for loss, destruction or compromise of such information through gross negligence.

1. I do not now have in my possession or custody or control any document or other thing containing or incorporating restricted data, or other matter classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher, pertaining to Joint Task Force SEVEN activities, to which I obtained access during my assignment with Joint Task Force SEVEN.

2. I am not retaining or taking away with me from my place of employment any document or thing containing or incorporating restricted data, or other matter classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher, pertaining to Joint Task Force SEVEN activities, to which I obtained access during my assignment with Joint Task Force SEVEN.

3. I shall not hereafter in any manner reveal or divulge to any person any restricted data, pertaining to Joint Task Force SEVEN activities, of which I have gained knowledge during my assignment with Joint Task Force SEVEN, except as may be hereafter authorized by officials of the United States Atomic Energy Commission empowered to grant such authority.

Each of the above statements is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

WITNESS	NAME
AGENCY or PROJECT	AGENCY or PROJECT
TITLE or RANK	TITLE or RANK
DATE OF WITNESSING	DATE OF DEPARTURE

AFWL/HO

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JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
SECURITY TERMINATION STATEMENT
TYPE "B"

I, _____, make the following statement to the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN with the understanding and intent that my statement will be used by the proper authority in carrying out its duty to protect the security of restricted data. I have read and am familiar with the penal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and of the Espionage Act (50 U.S. Code, Sec. 31 and 32). I understand that the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prescribe penalties for the disclosure of restricted data to unauthorized persons, and the provisions of U.S. Code, Title 18, "Crimes and Criminal Procedures", approved June 25, 1948, and of "Internal Security of 1950" prescribe penalties for the disclosure to unauthorized persons of information respecting the national defense, and for loss, destruction or compromise of such information through gross negligence.

1. I certify that I am currently authorized and required in order to accomplish my continuing duties with the AEC or DOD Atomic Programs to retain in my possession or custody, or control certain documents and other things containing or incorporating restricted data and other material classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher, pertaining to Joint Task Force SEVEN activities, to which I obtained access during my assignment with Joint Task Force SEVEN.

2. I shall not hereafter in any manner reveal or divulge to any person any restricted data, pertaining to Joint Task Force SEVEN activities of which I have gained knowledge during my assignment with Joint Task Force SEVEN, except as is necessary and authorized in the conduct of my work for the AEC or DOD Atomic Programs.

Each of the above statements is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

WITNESS	NAME
TITLE or RANK: AFSN:	TITLE or RANK: AFSN:
AGENCY or PROJECT	AGENCY or PROJECT
DATE OF WITNESSING	DATE OF DEPARTURE

[redacted]

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGOC 311 March 8 1954

SUBJECT: Handling of Messages Pertaining to Safeguarding Personnel

TO: Commander, Test Support Unit
Commander, Test Services Unit
Commander, Test Aircraft Unit
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Messages pertaining to the safeguarding of life must be coordinated and released as rapidly as possible.

2. The following procedure will apply for coordination and release of unclassified messages:

a. The originator will handcarry one (1) copy of a written message (may be in long hand as long as it is legible).

b. Coordinate with Security Officer, Task Group 7.4, or his representative, who will sign full name.

c. Coordinate with the Chief of Staff, or the Deputy Commander, Task Group 7.4, who will instruct the Adjutant or Assistant Adjutant during normal duty hours and the Staff Duty Officer after normal duty hours to release the message by signing.

d. The Air Force Communications Center (Eniwetok) after transmitting and properly logging the message, will return it to the originator who will be responsible for preparing message in proper form and re-coordinating. After this is accomplished, the originator will handcarry the original to the Air Force Communications Center for their file copy.

3. Classified messages pertaining to the subject above will be handled as indicated in paragraph 2 above except that the coordination with the Security Officer is not required.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Earl W. Kesling
/t/ EARL W. KESLING
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander

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B/L fm Hqs, TG 7.4, Prov., APO 187, c/o PM, San Francisco, California,
Subj: Handling of Messages Pertaining to Safeguarding Personnel,
TGOC 311, dated 8 Mar 54

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster,
San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Communications Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Central Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)
Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
Commander, 1500-3 Air Base Wing Detachment PACD

Forwarded for your information and necessary action.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

5 March 1954

SUBJECT: Security Letter

TO: All Personnel

1. Information concerning the detonation of the first in a series of tests is classified CONFIDENTIAL, except for that which has been officially announced in the two (2) AEC releases, dated 9 January 1954 and 1 March 1954 as quoted below:

1st Release - 9 January 1954

"During this month men and material will begin moving to the Pacific Proving Grounds of the Atomic Energy Commission to carry out a further phase of a continuing series of weapons tests of all categories. These tests are part of the Atomic Energy Commission research program for the improvement of weapons, pursuant to its responsibility under the AEC Act. These tests will be conducted by Joint Task Force Seven (JTF 7), commanded by Major General Percy W. Clarkson, USA. There will be no observers other than US officials."

2nd Release - 1 March 1954

"Louis E. Strauss, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission announced today that Joint Task Force SEVEN has detonated an atomic device at the Atomic Energy Commission's Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. This detonation was the first in a series of tests."

2. The fact that an official release was made regarding the "First detonation in a series of tests," automatically downgrades that portion of information to unclassified. HOWEVER, it is desired that no reference be made to this first detonation in letters home.

3. Let the folks back home gain their information through the newspapers, radio and TV, regarding our work here in the Pacific Proving Grounds. By doing this, there is no possibility of you becoming involved in a security leak through misinterpretation of what is classified and what is not classified.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

W. R. HANNA
Lt Colonel, USAF
Personnel Security Officer

APPROVED

THE BIGGEST GAP IN

SECURITY IS AN OPEN MOUTH

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HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Press Release

TO: Commander, Communications Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Central Element, Provisional
Commander, 1500-3 Air Base Wing Detachment PACD
Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional
Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)

1. The following official press release was made by the Atomic Energy Commission 11 March 1954, Washington time:

"During the course of routine atomic tests in the Marshall Islands, 28 U.S. personnel and 236 residents were transported from neighboring atolls to Kwajalein Island according to plan as a precautionary measure. These individuals were unexpectedly exposed to some radioactivity. There were no burns. All were reported well. After the completion of the atomic tests, they will be returned to their homes."

2. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific has wired the following self explanatory message which is being distributed to all personnel with the repeated precaution that no information beyond the content of the official releases is to be made public by statements, letters, interviews or conversations.

"Honolulu Star Bulletin 12 March 1954 carries offer '$25.00 offered for best report on impending "H" Bomb blast' also 'The offer is open to Congressmen who will witness the test as well as service personnel.'"
"Requirements for special precautions to all possible witnesses to protect security information is imperative."

3. All personnel will be reminded of their responsibility concerning the release of classified information. The success of this operation depends directly upon the individual efforts of every participant.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

James W. Montgomery

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

AFWL/HO

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Emergency Destruction Plan

TO: Security Officer
Headquarters, Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. This is an emergency destruction plan for Headquarters, Test Services Unit, Provisional, to be used in case of fire, enemy attack, or any other emergency that will jeopardize the security of classified material.

2. All classified material is stored in Safe Number 1 of this headquarters and will receive priority #1 for destruction in such an emergency.

3. When such an emergency arises, personnel will, by my order or in my absence by the order of Major James W. Montgomery, Headquarters Security Officer, report to Headquarters, Test Services Unit, Provisional, Building #135, for the destruction of classified material. Responsibility for destruction of classified materials in this Headquarters is delegated, but not limited, to personnel listed below:

Major James W. Montgomery
M Sgt Paul J. Dorsie
A/1C Frank E. Brewer

4. During an emergency, destruction of classified material will be accomplished by burning in an empty barrel, trash can, or other metal receptacle outside of Building #135.

[redacted]
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

APTU/mc

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

26 MAR 1954

SUBJECT: Security Program

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
ATTN: Personal Security Officer
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Reference verbal request of Lt Colonel Hanna, your headquarters, on 19 March 1954, attached are comments and recommendations concerning the Task Group Security Program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

James W. Montgomery

1 Incl:
1-Cmts & Recommendations

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

AFWL/HO

COMMENTS AND RECOM ENDATIONS
CONCERNING
TASK GROUP SECURITY PROGRAM

1. Adequate information concerning the overall security program was unavailable during the early planning phase of the operation. The scattered location of elements of the Test Services Unit, combined with the confusion during the early phases of organization, created a problem in making distribution of publications and directives. Distribution to the elements was made direct by various headquarters, using different channels. This headquarters had no control or knowledge of what publications had been forwarded to subordinate elements.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That all directives and publications concerning Joint Task Force matters be distributed thru provisional channels and not direct to participating organizations.

2. Exact security clearance requirements were not known, either by position or area. For example, the requirement for three (3) "Q" cleared pilots from the Weather Reconnaissance Element was not received until 2 December 1953. During the operational period this resulted in necessary briefings by TG 7.1, to the aircraft commanders for special missions, being very restrictive due to the lack of proper clearances. Exact clearances required for communications personnel were not known during the planning phase. Originally it was established that thirty seven (37) positions would require "Q" clearances. A position survey upon arrival in the forward area revealed that only six (6) "Q" clearances were necessary. These clearances were for access to a specific area rather than a job position requirement. As late as 20 January 1954, this headquarters was not aware of exact clearance requirements for the U.S.S. Estes and aircraft pilots flying in this area.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That exact security clearance requirements be established and desiminated to all units in sufficient time to enable procurement of proper clearances. In the event special missions or requirements are imposed later, special considerations must be given to the time element involved in procuring proper clearances. Definite channels for submission of clearance requests should be established during the planing phase to enable proper monitoring and follow-up of all requests.

3. The security program in the forward area is considered very good. It is mandatory that personnel be continually reminded of their individual responsibilities concerning release of classified information.

AFWL/HO

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This is accomplished effectively through movies, news items, posters, lectures, etc. The only comment or suggestion we have to offer is that released news be distributed to all personnel as soon as possible. News items contained in Hawaii and U.S. newspapers often contain more complete information than is released from local sources. Although the news may be conjecture to some extent, it gives personnel the impression that local security measures concerning personal letters may be overemphasized.

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HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Security Officer's Check List

TO: Commander, Communications Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Central Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional
Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)
Commander, 1500-3 Air Base Wing Detachment PACD

Attached as Inclosure 1 is a Security Officer's Check Sheet. This listing is for guidance and should not be considered as all inclusive.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Check List

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

APWL/HO

SECURITY OFFICERS CHECK SHEET

1. Have Unit Security Officers been designated in each basic unit or element?

2. Are chronological logs of security measures being maintained?

3. Have badge request forms been submitted and/or personnel badged as required?

4. Has action been taken to insure that all personnel hold at least a Secret clearance?

5. Has the examination as set forth in Security Memorandum No. 2, subject "Basic Security Responsibility", (TG 7.4 205-1) been given to all applicable personnel?

6. Have you as Unit Security Officers made yourselves available to members of your units to assist in security problems?

7. Do you have a Security Poster Program and are controlled rotation and changes made weekly or simi-monthly?

8. Is classified waste being properly burned or secured at the end of each day?

9. Are you making periodical security inspections to detect security violations?

10. Have pyrotechnic devices been placed under proper control to prevent misuse?

11. Have controls been established to prevent excessive reproduction and distribution of classified information?

12. Were the following topics included in your security indoctrination program:

a. To emphasize self-censorship in personal correspondence.
b. To caution against loose talk or repeating rumors as a preventive measure against disaffection or low morale.
c. To emphasize that furnishing classified information for publication is expressly prohibited.
d. To avoid repeating news-paper unofficial speculative reports of Operation CASTLE as a preventive measure against spreading of rumors.

13. Have you disseminated information to all members of your unit that information concerning the shot(s) is classified CONFIDENTIAL, except what has been announced in official AEC releases.

AFWL/HO

14. Have you disseminated information to all members of your unit (who need to know) that mere association of "CASTLE" or 'Operation CASTLE' with JTF 7 (that is its use on stationery using JTF 7 or TG 7.4 letterhead) is Unclassified. Reference amendment No. 1 to classification guide, dated 9 March 1954.

15. Are all safes marked for emergency removal in case of fire, enemy attach, or any other emergency evacuation?

16. Is there a priority emergency destruction plan as required by Task Group Regulation? Reference: TG 7.4 Gp Reg 205-2, par 11.

17. Do all safes have a security check sheet, and are they being maintained daily?

18. Do all of the safes have a RED sign to be placed on the door to show when it is OPEN?

19. Are all of the safe combinations changed as required by regulations, handled and maintained in the Adjutant's Office?
Reference: TG 7.4 Reg. 205-2 par 8a, c and d.

20. Is a form containing the custodial information, placed inside of each drawer of all combination type safes and single drawer of bar type?
Reference: TG 7.4 Reg 205-2 par 8f.

21. Are all personnel who are required to handle Top Secret and Secret matter properly cleared? Reference: TG 7.4 Reg 205-6, par 8.

22. Is Secret and Confidential matter properly stored? Reference: AFR 205-1 and TG 7.4 Group Reg 205-2, par 7b.

23. Is Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and all Registered matter properly prepared, handled and transmitted in accordance with existing Regulations? Reference: AFR 205-1 and AF Bulletin 23 Sec 7.

24. What type of receipt system is being used for transmission of Secret matter within and outside a headquarters? Reference: AFR 205-1 par 30e.

NOTE:

Are members of your unit aware: "Never has such a group with so much to talk about, been able to say so little." - and that "The biggest GAP in security is an open mouth".

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

26 Mar 1954

SUBJECT: Re-entry Clearance Status of Personnel Returning to The Eniwetok Area

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. In accordance with a verbal request from Colonel Mahon, this Headquarters conducted a review of several matters pertaining to the movement of passengers in and out of Eniwetok by air.

2. In some cases, personnel returning to the forward area from TDY in the ZI or at Hickam, have no evidence in their possession showing they are properly cleared for re-entry. Under the provisions of CINCPAC letter 020, dated 1 April 1952, this evidence is required before embarking such personnel at any intermediate point of travel beyond the continental limits of the United States.

3. The MATS Terminal at the ZI PAE is responsible for sending messages, in accordance with the above letter, to appropriate agencies in the forward area. However, the MATS Terminal here has no authority or responsibility to check orders on personnel returning to Hickam or the ZI on TDY, to see that they are written correctly for personnel to return to the Proving Ground.

4. To prevent future occurrences of this nature, it is suggested that a letter be disseminated to all Task Groups comprising JTF-7, reminding them that re-entry clearance status of subject personnel should be included in their orders.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ James W. Montgomery
/t/ JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

AFWL/HO

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional

SUBJECT: Amphibious Landing and Taxi Areas at Bikini

1. This report is submitted for the record in accordance with your verbal instructions.

2. The undersigned attended a conference at Base Operations this date, presided over by Lt Col Packler, Headquarters, Task Group 7.4. Also present were the two (2) Navy PB' crews, and two (2) representatives from the Search and Rescue Element (Major Hagerty and Captain Long).

a. Primary subject of conversation was the fact that the runway at "TARE" is highly contaminated. The scientific people (7.1) have some instrumentation in a tower and bunker at this facility which they must have access to, to remove certain classified equipment.

b. The method of getting into and out of the "TARE" area is the problem which must be solved. Normally, and according to Headquarters Task Group 7.4 Operation Order 2-54, C-47 aircraft were supposed to enter "TARE" this date, and airlift the classified matter to Eniwetok - this is now impossible due to the high radiation level at the airstrip (the airstrip also appears to have been washed over by wave action).

c. The Navy has two (2) PBM aircraft at Eniwetok which are here for the purpose of performing inter-atoll airlift (passengers and cargo). Lt Col Packler briefed the PBM Commanding Officer to perform the following mission.

(1) Fly to "TARE" at 1300 hours this date, ascertain the best landing and taxi area in the vicinity of the following islands (with emphasis on "TARE"): "Able", "Fox", "How", "Charlie", and "Dare".

(2) Under no circumstances will a landing be attempted today. This is to be a survey mission, with the possible requirement for a landing tomorrow. Major Hagerty and Captain Long (from the Search and Rescue Element, "ATF") will accompany the Navy crew in the role of advisors to the crew on local phenomena regarding landing at atolls. (The Navy crews are fresh from the "States", and have never made a water landing in this area). The aircraft will also carry 7.1 advisors as well as a Radiafe monitor.

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d. There is a distinct possibility that the MATS Search and Rescue Elements' SA-16's will be called upon to partake in the actual mission (i.e. land and airlift 7.1 materials from "Tare" to Eniwetok). General Estes is drafting a letter to Headquarters, Test Services Unit advising this headquarters of subject requirements, and absolving the Search and Rescue Element from all rescue responsibilities on Castle. Presumably, this letter will also indicate that Headquarters, Task Group 7.4 will assume all responsibility for damage, etc., due to radiation, or operational factors.

3. A great deal of information is still lacking on the exact degree of MATS Search and Rescue aircraft participation in this mission. Evidently the results of today's survey flight will define our mission in greater detail.

JOHN F. MEAGHER
Major, USAF
Operations Officer

APWU/MO

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WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

LETTER 370 5 March 1954

SUBJECT: Critique of Aircraft Marshalling Plan for Mission, 1 March 1954

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit
Task Group 7.4
APO 187

1. The following deficiencies were encountered in the Marshalling plan for Test Services Unit aircraft:

a. Aborting B-50's and F-84's are required to taxi down the ramp between two rows of aircraft because the taxi strip is blocked by pre-positioned Wilson and Stable aircraft. This ramp is unlighted and is covered with small pieces of coral.

b. Stable aircraft are parked at too great a distance from their ready room to facilitate scramble take offs.

c. Parking of WB-29 aircraft in the B-50 area means that they must be returned to the WB-29 area during the height of landing operations.

2. Normal mission take offs for between shot operations are made by towing WB-29 aircraft on to the taxiway ten (10) minutes prior to the start engine time. SA-16 aircraft start engines and taxi out from their normal parking position. This allows the crews to pre-flight and board the aircraft adjacent to their operations and maintenance area and results in the taxiway being blocked for a minimum amount of time.

3. Although the present mission plan is workable and presents no major difficulties, it is felt that a smoother operation would result if the taxiway was blocked by WB-29 and SA-16 aircraft only while starting and pre-flighting engines. This can be done by placing three (3) WB-29's in the normal C-54 parking area and consolidating the remaining WB-29's at the west end of the [illegible] line. SA-16 aircraft would be located just east of the [illegible] ready room. There would be no changes in the Router C-54 pre-positioning.

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

PROGRAMMING PLAN NO. 2-54 6 March 1954

SUBJECT: Information for Project Participants

OBJECTIVE:

1. To meet, greet, and show Project Participants the scope of the CASTLE Activity to promote better understanding, in the various commands of the USAF, of the Task Group 7.4 mission. Also, to provide those participants, with a "need to know", the information required for them to better apply themselves toward fruitful goals in this field.

PRELIMINARY STAFF CONSIDERATION:

2. In each case, the day set for the mission will be properly disseminated to all.

3. Project Participants have been officially invited to attend this mission and have been requested to arrive at 0800 hours, M time three (3) days before the mission.

4. The responsibilities outlined herein are recurrent for each mission throughout the Operation.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM:

5. The participants may not arrive on their scheduled time.

6. A mission may be delayed after arrival of the participants.

7. A scheduled period may be cancelled due to unforseen circumstances.

8. A coordination problem exists between FRED and ELMER islands.

9. A coordination problem exists within the Task Group and with Task Group 7.2.

10. A determination must be made as to what Project Participants can be given the briefing and tour at FRED accorded the Official Observers.

11. A transportation problem exists.

12. Clothing, messing, and billeting must be arranged for.

13. All participants must be properly cleared and badged for access to areas of interest within their clearance limitations.

14. Briefings must be arranged according to a set schedule.

15. Some participants will require airborne transportation on mission day.

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Programming Plan 2-54, "Info for Project Participants", dtd 6 Mar 54

AGREED COURSES OF ACTION:

16. Definite responsibilities will be placed with the staff.

17. Wide distribution of the participant list and schedule of events will permit rapid coordination of changes to be effected.

18. In case of mission delay after participants have arrived, the three day schedule will be adhered to and extra curricular activities such as boating, swimming, fishing, or sleeping will be instituted to interest the participants during hours not scheduled.

19. Provided participants arrive after their schedule time, they will be given the Security and General Briefing at Bldg. 90 and will take up the outlined schedule from that time.

IMPLEMENTATION REQUIRED:

20. The Director of Operations will:

a. Make up a Project Participants Schedule to include 0800 hours on mission day minus three to the time aircraft carrying these participants are airborne on mission day. This schedule will include the names of the individual responsible for each portion thereof to include travelling by bus, boat, or aircraft, and for all briefings.

b. Coordinate this schedule with JTF SEVEN to assure tie-in with the Official Observer and Senior Project Participant Schedule.

c. Furnish this schedule five (5) days before mission day to the Adjutant, Task Group 7.4, for distribution as outlined herein.

d. After receiving a list of participants, from the Deputy Commander, who will require a space aboard an aircraft on mission day and who do not have previously scheduled transportation, make arrangements for this airlift and inform Protocol by Disposition Form of the arrangements made. Further, they will present this information to the participants in the VIP aircrew briefing.

e. Be completely responsible for the VIP aircrew briefing.

f. Make all arrangements with Test Support Unit for H-19 or L-13 airlift required for lift between ELMER and FRED and for lift required in pursuit of the participants schedule.

g. Inform Protocol when the above arrangements have been made and the substance of the arrangements.

h. Arrange for setting up briefings and tours not otherwise the responsibility of a staff agency of the Headquarters as defined herein. Be responsible to designate individuals to give briefings or tours and will be responsible to assure the briefings are conducted properly.

i. Assure coordination at FRED of Official Observer tour.

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Programming Plan 2-54, "Info for Project Participants", dtd 6 Mar 54

j. Assure that the Senior Project Participants visit to FRED for 1400 briefing on mission day minus three is coordinated with JTF SEVEN.

k. Assure that Protocol is informed at all times as to the status of arrangements made as regards briefing of, or tours for, participants.

l. Coordinate original planning of schedule with Protocol to obtain protocol list of personnel to be in charge of participants from place to place and from time to time.

m. Assure that Base Operations, the AOC, and the MATS Terminal are briefed on advising the TG 7.4 Adjutant upon the arrival of any Project Participants.

n. Accept full responsibility in assuring that the Senior Controller in the CIC is positively and completely briefed, by means to include mimeographed patterns, on actions to be taken by aircraft before H-hour and for fifteen (15) minutes after H-hour. This is particularly required for all VIKING aircraft.

21. The Director of Materiel will:

a. Arrange for all transportation other than air in accordance with the schedule for participants provided by the Director of Operations.

b. Make arrangements with subordinate agencies for clothing to be provided the Project Participants during their stay.

c. Inform Protocol by Disposition Form when arrangements have been made in accordance with the schedule. This report must be available prior to closing hours on mission day minus four.

d. Assure that transportation is available as arranged and stand by from mission day minus three until after mission day to rearrange transportation if required due to a change of schedule.

e. Accept changes in the schedule only from the Director of Operations, Protocol, or the Headquarters Command Section.

22. The Commander of Deputy Commander will:

a. Upon receipt of the list of Project Participants, contact appropriate agency in JTF SEVEN to ascertain which of the Q cleared people will be allowed access to exclusion areas on IVER on a "need to know" basis. This information will then be given to Protocol and to Director of Operations.

b. Prepare and give a briefing to the Project Participants as scheduled. This will normally be approximately 1400 hours on mission day minus three. It will be given to both Senior Project Participants from IVER and the Project Participants at the same time and will be tailored to fit the "need to know" of the people involved.

Programming Plan 2-54, "Info for Project Participants", dtd 6 Mar 54

c. Notify Director of Operations of those participants who will require airlift on assigned aircraft on mission day.

23. The Personnel Security Officer will:

a. Upon receiving the list of project personnel from Protocol, check the official list and process clearance cards for same.

b. When receiving the list from Protocol, of the Project Participants who may join the Official Observers at ELMER in the tour of exclusion area, make arrangements with Security at ELMER to card and ready badge said personnel. This may include obtaining direct permission from DMA for these people.

c. Prepare and distribute proper clearance badges to the participants as shown in the schedule prepared by Director of Operations.

d. Coordinate with JTF SEVEN personnel to assure proper badges are available for Senior Project Participants upon their arrival at FRED.

e. Notify Protocol by Disposition Form when the security portion of this plan is ready.

24. The Adjutant will:

a. Distribute the Project Participant list and the Project Participant schedule, when received from Protocol and Director of Operations, as follows:

(1) Five copies - Director of Operations
(2) Five copies - Director of Material
(3) Two copies - Director of Personnel
(4) Two copies - Personnel Security Officer
(5) Three copies - Adjutant
(6) One copy - Chief of Staff
(7) One copy - Historian
(8) One copy - Deputy Commander
(9) One copy - Commander
(10) Two copies - Comptroller
(11) Thirty copies - Protocol
(12) Five copies - TG 7.2 (with letter of transmittal)
(13) Ten copies - JTF SEVEN (with letter of transmittal)
(14) Eight copies - Test Support Unit (with letter of transmittal)
(15) Fifteen copies - Test Aircraft Unit (with letter of transmittal)
(16) Two copies - Test Services Unit (with letter of transmittal)

b. Distribute these documents by hand-carry method to expedite delivery.

c. Assure that all incoming messages concerning Project Participants are delivered to the Protocol Section.

Programming Plan 2-54, "Info for Project Participants", dtd 6 Mar 54

25. The Chief of Staff will:

a. Upon receipt of the Project Participant Schedule, stand by to assist Protocol on meeting or billeting arrangements which fall outside of Protocol responsibilities as outlined in TG 7.4 HOI 900-1, dated 20 February 1954.

b. Arrange with TG 7.2 the opening of the Post Exchange as indicated on the schedule.

c. Monitor progress of the schedule to keep the Commander informed of delays or malfunction of procedure.

26. The Director of Personnel Will:

a. When furnished a copy of orders of the Project Participants, take care of signing the participants in and out according to governing regulations.

27. The Protocol Section will:

a. Pursue duties as outlined in TG 7.4 HOI 900-1, dated 20 February 1954.

b. Receive messages concerning incoming participants, compile complete list for publication and distribution by the Adjutant. Pass original messages to Security after this compilation.

c. Request the Deputy Commander give the Director of Operations a list of those participants who will need airborne lift on mission days so that Operations may make arrangements for them.

d. In coordination with Director of Operations furnish protocol list to be included in the schedule as person in charge from place to place and time to time.

e. Coordinate issue of Class X clothing to Project Participants and coordinate return of same.

f. Give Security the list of personnel who are to be granted access to the briefing and tour with the Official Observers.

/s/ Earl W. Kesling
Deputy Commander or Commander

/s/ Ray M. Hawley
Director of Materiel

/s/ Paul H. Fackler
Director of Operations

/s/ B. L. Forrest
Director of Personnel

/s/ W. R. Hanna
Personnel Security Officer

/s/ Wayne Laki
Protocol Officer

/s/ A. J. Amerson
Adjutant

/s/ H. D. Mahon
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Pre-Positioning of Aircraft

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
ATTN: Colonel Kesling
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

In accordance with your desires, the Test Services Unit Recommendations for the pre-positioning of aircraft on mission days have been put in writing. They are presented as Inclosures 1 and 2 and cover east and west takeoffs respectively. Although these recommendations were prepared by the Weather Reconnaissance Element, the ideas of the three (3) Test Services Unit Elements with aircraft were solicited. This headquarters concurs in the proposals. They are forwarded for your consideration and approval is recommended.

/s/Mahlon B. Hammond
/t/MAHLON B. HAMMOND
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

3 Incls:
1. Ltr Wea Recon Elm, dtd 5 Mar 54
2. Ltr Wea Recon Elm, dtd 9 Mar 54
3. Map - Eniwetok

AFWLRMD

WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

CPH: 370 9 March 1954

SUBJECT: Aircraft Pre-Positioning and Take Off Order for Westerly Surface Wind Conditions

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit
Task Group 7.4
APO 187

1. There is a possibility that westerly surface wind conditions may exist at this station during mission take offs for test operations.

2. The breaking down or resumption of the predominately easterly trades in this area is very difficult to forecast for periods in excess of eight (8) hours. As a consequence, any westerly take off plan should be made as flexible as possible, require a minimum of aircraft re-positioning, and should not require a decision to execute more than one (1) hour prior to the first scheduled take off. Also, it should not place any aircraft on the west run-up pad while aircraft are taking off.

3. The following changes in the present easterly take off plan would satisfy the conditions stated in the preceding paragraph:

a. Thirteen (13) Baby Food would start engines at 0125 hours and take off at 0140 hours. The take off order for Elaine One (1) and Wilson One (1) would be reversed. Elaine One (1) would pre-position on the west turn around area at 0045 hours, start engines at 0115 hours and take off at 0145 hours. Wilson One (1) would pre-position facing west at the extreme east end of the taxi strip at 0100 hours, start engines at 0135 hours and take off at 0205 hours.

b. The take off order for Elaine Two (2) and Cassidy would be reversed. Cassidy would be towed to the eastern turn around area at 0[illegible] hours and be positioned on a southerly heading with the tail [illegible] as possible. Start engine time would be 0320 hours, take off time 0350 hours. Pre-positioning of Elaine Two (2) would not change, start engine time would be 0345 hours and at 0355 hours, Elaine Two (2) would taxi to the east end of the runway for a 0400 hours take off.

c. All other mission aircraft should remain as scheduled by take offs with no change in their present pre-positioning areas if possible.

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SUBJECT: Aircraft Pre-Positioning and Take Off Order for Westerly Surface Wind Conditions (Cont'd)

4. Recommend that:

a. The decision to place a westerly take off plan into effect be made at 0030 hours on mission days.

b. That the take off order changes cited in paragraph two (2) also be made in the easterly take off schedule to permit more flexibility in the event of a surface wind shift.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/Joseph L. Jones
/t/JOSEPH L. JONES
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

AFRC/HQ

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HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Crew, and Maintenance Man of the Month

TO: Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)
APO 187

1. Reference is made to the following documents:

a. Letter this headquarters, subject as above, dated 25 February 1954.

b. Task Group 7.4 Regulation number 62-11 and 62-13.

2. Letter referred to in paragraph 1 a, above, is hereby rescinded and should be removed from your active files.

3. The following procedure will govern the submission of future nominations for crew, and maintenance man of the month:

a. Each Element Commander will screen his Element nominations, and forward his choice, together with complete justification for each category, to this headquarters.

b. This headquarters will evaluate the individual element commander's recommendations, and select this Unit's crew, and maintenance man of the month.

4. Element nominations for the month of March must be in this headquarters by 1 April. Nominations for the month of April, and subsequent months, must be in this headquarters by the 24th day of the month covered by the nomination.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

James W. Montgomery

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

AFWDHQ

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGO 452

19 March 1954

SUBJECT: Aircraft Scheduling

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit. Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. In order to provide adequate take-off separation of aircraft departing Eniwetok, the AOC has been charged with publishing an "Aircraft Take-Off Coordination Form" daily. In accordance with Task Group Regulation 55-8, this form is to be published by 1700 hours each day, outlining the proposed aircraft operations for the following day. The Senior Controller of the AOC relies on the individual unit operations to furnish him with take-off and mission data prior to 1600 hours each day.

2. Three universal discrepancies have been noted in the operation of this scheduling system. They are:

a. Unit operations have not met the 1600 hours suspense. This results in the late distribution of the coordination forms.

b. Information on all proposed flights has not been forwarded to the AOC. This defeats the primary purpose of the take-off coordination form.

c. Information on Monday flights has not been called in until Monday morning. This denies the AOC information on the early proposed Monday operations until they have already occured.

3. It is desired that each unit operations examine their scheduling procedures and provide the AOC, each day, with a comprehensive, complete and timely list of proposed flights.

TGO 452, Subj: Aircraft Scheduling

4. With the newly announced work schedule it is desired that all scheduling information be given to the AOC by 1500 hours daily to allow publication of the aircraft take-off coordination form by 1600 hours.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

/s/A. J. Amerson
/t/A. J. AMERSON
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Reference is made to basic letter.

2. It is requested that each Element take positive steps to insure that the discrepancies reported in paragraph 2 of basic letter do not occur in the future.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

James W. Montgomery

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

MFWL/HO

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

28 MAR 1954

SUBJECT: Mission Debriefing

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
ATTN: Director of Operations
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. The following summary of data obtained from Crew Debriefings is forwarded in accordance with Task Group 7.4 Regulation No. 55-4.

a. Stable II, Pilot Captain M. Klein, reports he had to orbit South of position because of "Gilda".

b. Pewter III, Pilot Lieutenant J. Burnett, reports that he picked up interference on channel "C" Charlie from Navy A/C No. 8424 calling Kwajalein.

c. Wilson I, Pilot Captain John R. Diepenbrock reports the following:

(1) Boundary Tare: Good. Occasionally faded out, but other than that was good.

(2) Cassidy 2: VHF very good. Had difficulty picking up IFF at first. After switching modes and having Boundary Tare give them a bearing, no more difficulty was encountered. Believe Wilson I IFF was weak.

(3) HF (J-410, 411): Could not raise anyone on J-411. On J-410 ground station had difficulty reading aircraft on "A". "A" was only channel used. Worked both Boundary Tare and Dirty Face on "A".

(4) REMARKS: Loran Station 1L1 was 30 miles off at a position 60 miles east of Fred. This was determined by radar, which was known to be accurate.

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d. Wilson II, Pilot Homer C. Daniel reports the following:

(1) Boundary Tare: VHF was weak but clear. Worked on "A" channel instead of "F" as briefed.

(2) IN-FLIGHT PROCEDURES: 100 miles weather observations should be omitted when areas of radiation are encountered. Difficulty was encountered because several Radiological reports were necessary about the same time the 100 mile weather observations were due.

(3) REMARKS: Crew encountered radiation between race track pattern and ground zero. Recommend briefing cover the procedure to be followed.

c. Wilson III, Pilot Jack R. Packwood reports the following:

(1) Boundary Tare: On northern part of race track pattern Boundary Tare was too far away at 5000 feet. "F" channel was assigned originally but had to use "A" channel because too many aircraft were using "F".

2. Remainder of Test Services Unit Aircraft had nothing unusual to report.

3. Special Remarks:

a. At approximately 0315 hours (M), the AOC called Test Services operations and informed Major Meagher that one of the Pewter Aircraft had violated radio security. According to the AOC, certain information went out over "C" channel when the speaker thought he was on interphone. Each Pewter crew was questioned upon landing and each Aircraft Commander disavows any knowledge of the incident. The AOC also stated that the Pewter Aircraft were the only aircraft on "C" channel at the time. However, Lt. J. Burnett, pilot of Pewter III states that a Viking Aircraft was on "C" channel, while the Pewter Aircraft were on that channel. It therefore appears possible that it was the Viking Aircraft which made the breach of security, and not necessarily the Pewter Aircraft.

/s/ John P. Meagher
/t/ JOHN P. MEAGHER
Major, USAF
Operations Officer

AFWOA/HQ

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional

SUBJECT: AACS Circuitry Outages and Allied Problems

1. Reference is made to your "suggestion" list, dated 16 March 1954. The following questions and answers pertain to subject document, all answers are based on:

a. Personal visit by the undersigned to the Communications Element on 16 March 1954.

b. Personal conversation with Major Brady, Commander, Communications Element.

(1) What about "Outages" on AACS circuits?

ANSWER

According to Major Brady, and the latest available outages reports, the following data applies to the MUX circuits between Eniwetok, Kwajalein and U.S.S. Estes.

(Primary Circuit Outage) for period 6 May thru

Kwajalein		U.S.S. Estes	
Send	Receive	Send	Receive
28:00	40:15	48:00	85:10

The above figures are not as bad as they look. Actually the Communications Center can pass messages to the Estes or Kwajalein over 80% of the time by substitution channel one for channel three on the MUX circuit.

(2) What are we doing to lessen "Outages"?

The following steps are being taken:

(a) Maintenance has been improved.

(b) Communications Element people have been placed on the Estes, and communications with that facility are much better as a result.

Memorandum for: Comdr, Test Sv Unit, Prov, from Major Meagher

(c) Major Brady's people are resurveying the transmitter - antenna hook-ups, trying to match each transmitter with the antenna which gives best results.

(d) Two (2) new antennas are being erected at this time.

(3) Are we changing frequencies?

ANSWER

We may have to do so, not so much because of "outages" but because several of our transmitting frequencies are interfering with the Loran station here. Major Brady is to discuss this with Lt Col Nugent this afternoon (16 March). It should also be borne in mind that several of our "missions" (rehearsal and the real thing) have been conducted at periods when propagation was forecasted to be poor - or conversely better than average (when propagation is better than average - our stations pull in everybody in the Pacific.)

(4) What (else) are we doing to improve our service?

ANSWER

Major Brady believes that the key to our problem lies in moving the power of our transmitters up to one full kilowatt - of course, transmitters with this power out - but are not available from AACS stocks - nor do I know where suitable equipment could be found. We now have just crystalised three (3) back-up transmitters for our "Wates" circuit, and one for our Kwajalein circuit.

2. This report is fragmentary, in that it only treats one part (Communications Element) of your "suggestion" list. I will get the rest of the data on the other items, as soon as I can.

JOHN P. MEAGHER
Major, USAF
Operations Officer

AFW/mn

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HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

24 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional

SUBJECT: Load Messages on Aircraft Departing Eniwetok for Hickam

1. The following is the result of a survey made by the undersigned, this date, of the composition, accuracy, handling and disposition of subject load messages by the 1500-3 Air Base Wing Detachment, PACD, and the handling and transmission of these messages by the Communication Center of the Communications Element, Provisional.

2. Load Messages:

a. Load messages are drafted using the sample Load Message Form in MATS Manual 55-1.

b. Information contained in the load message is obtained directly from the weight & balance "Form F" which is on file at Base Operations with the aircraft clearance.

(1) A check was made covering a period of twelve (12) days, by comparing information listed on the"Form F" and the information transmitted in the load message. No discrepancies were found.

c. Immediately after an aircraft departs, the load message is handcarried to the Communications Center.

(1) The communications router logs in the message and enters time of receipt and his initials on file copy of message retained by MATS traffic.

d. An on the spot check of load messages from the 7th thru the 19th of March was made and is listed below: (Actual time of departure of aircraft obtained from Base Operations Aircraft Departure Log)

ATD OF A/C	TIME RECEIVED BY COMM. CENTER	TIME DISPATCHED BY COMM. CENTER	DELAY BETWEEN A/C DEPT & MSG DISPATCH
070158Z	070201Z	070222Z	24 Min.
082035Z	082057Z	082142Z	1 Hr. 07 Min.
092043Z	092046Z	092122Z	39 Min.
101824Z	101836Z	101840Z	16 Min.
102017Z	102026Z	102028Z	11 Min.
110242Z	110256Z	110309Z	27 Min.
112048Z	112051Z	112059Z	11 Min.
120732Z	120742Z	120833Z	1 Hr. 01 Min.
141947Z	141951Z	142003Z	16 Min.
142354Z	150001Z	150008Z	14 Min.
152045Z	152055Z	152101Z	16 Min.
160503Z	160522Z	160532Z	29 Min.
162034Z	162045Z	162050Z	16 Min.
172003Z	172011Z	172016Z	13 Min.
181053Z	181050Z	181107Z	14 Min.
181425Z	181436Z	181441Z	16 Min.
192000Z	192001Z	192029Z	29 Min.

e. Longest delay was 1 hour and 7 minutes for the period covered. Reason given was that work load at times made it impossible to dispatch message any sooner.

f. All messages are relayed through Kwajalein by teletype.

(1) Load messages are given a precedence of "operations immediate".

(2) In the event of a circuit outage, all "operations immediate" messages are transmitted to Kwajalein by CW.

g. Holmes and Narver load messages:

(1) Information was received that Holmes and Narver load messages were being received promptly at Hickam whereas our load messages were delayed.

(2) No reason for this could be determined from this facility, however, it should be noted that H & N messages are transmitted through the communications facilities at JTF-7 on "ELMER".

h. Conclusions:

(1) Communications traffic is being conducted in accordance with current regulations and directives.

(2) Messages are being handled expeditiously.

AFMLMO

(3) System of logging messages in and out minimizes the possibility of a message getting lost.

(4) Cause for load message delay may exist at the relay station at Kwajalein due to their enormous work load, or at the Communications Center at Hickam.

i. Recommendations:

(1) A letter be sent by TG 7.4 to the JTF-7 Liaison office at Hickam suggesting that future discrepancies or delays in load messages be brought to the attention of the 1810th AACS Group at Hickam, citing specific instances and requesting them to trace the cause. The letter should mention that a survey was conducted at this end and no causes for delay were found.

(a) Recommended Action:

1. Same as (1) above.

(2) At present, messages that are sent by CW (due to circuitry outage) are not retransmitted by teletype when circuit outage ceases. A back-up message should be sent over teletype, if the time interval of outage is not too great to make it impractical.

(a) Action Taken:

1. This has been coordinated with Major Brady Commander, Communications Element, Prov., and in future back-up messages will be transmitted by teletype whenever the circuit outage does not exceed two (2) hours.

3. Manifesting of Passengers:

a. Information has been received that some passengers whose final destination is listed as Hickam on the passenger manifest, are actually going to Travis. Col Stanley, JTF-7 liaison officer is desirous of receiving a message listing passengers whose final destination is Travis, and a suggestion was made that this information be contained in the load message.

b. Investigation revealed the following:

(1) Load message shows immediate destination only, i.e. Hickam.

(2) Passenger manifest which accompanies aircraft shows final destination, i.e. Travis.

AFWL/HO

(3) Passenger information cards from which passenger manifests are made up, and which show final destination of passenger, are filled in by the passengers personally, or by their respective organizations. (Subject cards are on file at the MATS Traffic Terminal)

(4) On a recent trip to Hickam, Captain Ferrante, MATS traffic director at Eniwetok, was in the JTF-7 liaison office when Col Stanley noted three "errors" in final destination listings on an Eniwetok passenger manifest. Captain Ferrante introduced himself, obtained the names of the three passengers involved, and upon return to Eniwetok checked their particular passenger information cards on file at the traffic terminal. In each case the final destination listed on subject cards tallied with the passenger manifest.

(5) Passenger must re-book out of Hickam regardless of destination shown on manifest.

c. Conclusion:

(1) The MATS Traffic Terminal at Eniwetok is performing its mission in an excellent manner.

(2) Passengers and/or their organizations are not listing proper final destination on the passenger information cards.

(3) It is believed that some passengers who possess the perogative of enjoying a short stay in Hickam, do so instead of proceeding directly to Travis as shown on the passenger manifest. In other cases, passengers bound for Travis, are listing their final destination as Hickam.

(4) In all cases where difficulties regarding final destination occurred, the passengers were TG 7.1 personnel. These persons were traveling on CIPAP orders which listed Hickam as immediate destination with return to their organizations; upon their arrival they found it necessary to proceed to Travis, in order to accomplish their mission.

d. Recommendations:

(1) Coordination on these matters should be effected with MATS Traffic at Hickam and the JTF-7 Liaison Office.

(a) Action to be Taken:

1. This will be accomplished by the MATS Traffic Director Eniwetok or his representative, on their next visit to Hickam.

(2) A more thorough screening of travel orders and information listed on passenger information cards.

(a) Action Taken:

1. Positive steps will be taken by MATS Traffic personnel, Eniwetok, to insure this is accomplished.

4. Re-entry clearance of personnel into the Eniwetok Area, who are returning to the ZI on TDY or Emergency Leave:

a. It was suggested that load messages include a statement to the effect that these persons are cleared for re-entry into the Eniwetok Area under CINPAC letter 020.

(1) It is impractical to include this information in load messages. This would defeat the main purpose of load messages which is expediency.

(2) Re-entry clearance is required on orders placing personnel on such TDY or emergency leave.

(3) All persons must clear through JTF-7 Liaison Hickam therefore, if their orders state they are cleared for re-entry (as they should) JTF-7 is aware of it.

(4) In addition, when personnel depart this area a message listing their clearance status, is sent to the Liaison office at Hickam, by the following:

(a) AEC

(b) JTF-7 Headquarters (ELMER)

(c) Task Group 7.2

b. Conclusions:

(1) Organizations are omitting re-entry clearance statu on TDY or emergency orders.

(2) In view of paragraph 4a. (4) above, there should be no question of clearance status on personnel re-entering this area.

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c. Recommendations:

(1) Travis should send a message to JTF-7 liaison office Hickam regarding re-entry clearance status when personnel depart their station.

(a) Recommended Action:

1. It is suggested that this is a matter for JTF-7 to coordinate with PACD.

(2) Suggest letter be sent by TG 7.4 to all Task Groups of Joint Task Force SEVEN, requesting that re-entry status of subject personnel be included on their orders.

(a) Recommended Action:

1. A letter be sent by this Headquarters to TG 7.4 suggesting that such action be taken.

Joseph F. Moore

JOSEPH F. MOORE
M/SGT USAF
Operations NCOIC

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HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Utilization of GCA and VHF/DF

TO: Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. This headquarters has been notified by Headquarters, Task Group 7.4 that:

a. Many aircraft are making a normal pattern and landing with no utilization of GCA.

b. VHF/DF reports indicate that many aircraft do not contact the DF facility for practice steers.

2. It is requested that Element Commanders insure that all pilots are rebriefed on the contents of Task Group Regulation 60-2, wherein full use of GCA and VHF/DF is required on all flights except those on mission days.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

James W Montgomery

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

AFWL/ND

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HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

22 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional

SUBJECT: Flight Safety Activities for Week Ending 21 March 54

1. The following is a report of Flight Safety Activities in the Test Services Unit for the week ending 21 March 1954.

2. The Flight Safety Survey of Test Services Unit by Major Hall, Task Group 7.4 Flight Safety Officer, was completed and his report is forthcoming.

3. A Flight Safety Committee Meeting was held at 1000 hours, 15 March 1954, in the Task Group 7.4 conference room. General Estes presided and Lt Col Hammond, Major Hagerty, Captain Bowles, and Captain Sharar, represented Test Services Unit. The following are the results of the meeting: Recommended improvements in the Flying Safety Program; outlined areas of responsibility; and appointed committees to determine "Maintenance Man of the Month" and "Crew of the Month".

4. An Aircraft Accident Prevention Meeting was held at 1000 hours, 16 March 1954, in Building 79. Major Hall presided and aircrew personnel from Test Services Unit attended. The following subjects were covered: S-4 high altitude suit; two incident reports; H-19, SA-16 accident report; GCA capability, VHF/DF utilization; Wake Control Area; and landing short of runway.

5. On 16 March 1954, notice was distributed to all elements announcing Test Services Unit Monthly Make-Up Aircraft Accident Prevention Meeting to be held at 1330 hours, 23 March 1954.

6. Prepared rough draft of "Get-home-itis" skit to be presented during the regular monthly Aircraft Accident Prevention Meeting for April.

7. Coordinated subject material for March Make-Up Aircraft Accident Prevention Meeting with Major Hagerty.

8. Conducted routine daily flight safety inspections of ramp, maintenance practices, operations procedures, and personal equipment.

for WILLIAM J. SCHLOTTERBECK
Captain, USAF
Flight Safety Officer

AFWL/HO

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Flight Safety Activities

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. The following is a report of Flight Safety Activities in the Test Services Unit for the week ending 28 March 1954.

2. The Test Services Unit monthly make-up Aircraft Accident Prevention Meeting was held at 1330 hours, 23 March 1954 in Building 135. Captain Schlotterbeck presided and covered the following items: incident reporting; take off and landing charts; required reading; GCA capabilities; H-19, SA-16 taxi accident; B-29 engine fire; and ground handling of aircraft. Major (Destroyed and Substantial) and Minor Accidents, Incidents, and Exceptions were also covered in detail. Total attendance for March regular and make-up meetings: Maximum possible 162, actual 131, absent 31.

3. Reviewed 7.4 Flight Safety Survey Report of Test Services Unit. No action necessary.

4. Distributed the following flight safety publications: OIG posters "Maintain to Sustain" and "Minus Oxygen Equals X"; and 7.4 poster "Aircraft Crowded, Near Taxi Strip, Wing Walkers Missing, A Bent Wing Tip".

5. "Get-home-itis" skit for the April Aircraft Accident Prevention Meeting has been written in its final form and mimeographed.

6. Conducted routine daily flight safety inspections of ramp, maintenance practices, operations procedures, and personal equipment.

WILLIAM J. SCHLOTTERBECK
Captain, USAF
Flight Safety Officer

AFWL/HO

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
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PRIVACY MATERIAL REMOVED

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Field Trip Report, Headquarters, 1500th Air Base Wing and AF 714 SO

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. The purpose of this trip was to discuss lack of Tech Order compliance on SA-16 aircraft of the 78th Air Rescue Squadron, painting of the C-54 aircraft of the Documentary Photographic Element, AOCP procedures of AF 714 SO, in-flight feeding, and publication distribution.

2. Organizations visited: Headquarters, 1500th Air Base Wing, 1500th Air Transport Group, Headquarters, 1500th Food Service Squadron, 11th Air Rescue Group, and 1500th Supply Squadron.

3. Authority: Paragraph 1, Special Orders 9, Headquarters, Test Services Unit, Provisional, APO 187, dated 26 February 1954. T/Sgt William E. Owens, AF 19321569.

4. Travel performed by Government Plane.

5. Personnel contacted:

a. Headquarters, 1500th Air Base Wing, Hickam AFB, T. H.:

ıce

ım AFB, T.H.:

b

c. Headquarters, 1500th Supply Squadron, Hickam AFB, T.H.:

nmander

d. Headquarters, 1500th Food Service Squadron, Hickam AFB, T.H.:

CWO Jess Gibbson Inflight Feeding Officer

e. Headquarters, 11th Air Rescue Group, Hickam AFB, T. H.:

Captain Jacobsen — Director of Materiel

f. 1500th Supply Squadron, Base Supply, AF 714 SO, Hickam AFB, T.H.:

CWO Dunn — Property Accounting Officer

6. Discussion:

a. Reported to Lt Colonel Keys and discussed the TOC problem encountered by the 78th Air Rescue Squadron, explaining Lt Colonel Hammond's position as having operational control of these aircraft during this project. Further discussed the painting of the C-54 aircraft and the publication distribution. I was referred to Mrs Grover as my initial starting point.

b. Mrs Grover explained that they realized there had been many problems on distribution of publications, however, this section had been transferred to the Supply Squadron as their responsibility. I was informed that the 11th Air Rescue Group, undergoing deactivation, had been responsible for screening requirements and making distribution to their squadrons. Immediately upon notice of deactivation of the 11th Air Rescue Group, requirement tables had been forwarded to the 78th Air Rescue Squadron at Kwajalein for their action. Upon receipt by Mrs Grover many mistakes were evident, presumed to be from the hasty action required. A letter of transmittal dated 8 February 1954 was on file indicating two (2) tables had been returned for the 78th Air Rescue Squadron to review, as snow removal equipment and desert equipment publications had been requested. No reply had been received at the time of my visit. A telephone check with Base Supply Publications Branch indicated distribution posting on all but the two referred to above had been posted.

c. Mrs Grover introduced me to Major Sawtell and we discussed the TOC problems of the 78th Air Rescue Squadron to some length. I was informed that there was no reason to concern ourselves inasmuch as the aircraft assigned to the project could perform the mission for which they were assigned. Further a new TO-00-25-4 was coming through distribution which specifies that Field Maintenance TO's not complied with could be done on "IRAN". The organization should write through command channels to the depot concerned far enough in advance for proper scheduling of the aircraft and material. Also, the technical orders were through distribution channels in many cases months before the procurement of parts and material. I was informed the Director of Materiel had forwarded many "UR's" and a "Case Report" to Headquarters, Military Air Transport Service on this undesirable condition. Major Sawtell had been informed that AMC was now holding up all TOC's until 80% of required kits were available for issue. He again asked, "why do we concern ourselves?"

SECRET

d. Having difficulties contacting Captain Jacobsen, I contacted Lt Colonel Hansen and informed him the purpose of my visit. After some difficulties he was able to arrange a meeting. We first talked about how the priority request for parts was to be handled for the 78th Air Rescue Squadron, now that the 11th Air Rescue Group had deactivated. Lt Col Hansen explained that his AOCP and priority unit at Base Supply was on a 24 hour basis. Further, they had a working agreement with the Air Traffic Section to send priority items out on the first available aircraft, regardless of Command. Captain Jacobsen informed me that the only previous assistance given to AF 714 SO was interchangability information that was not readily available to Base Supply. Col Hansen at this point assured me that the very best possible action was given to priority requests with a delivery time of 15 to 30 hours for completed action in most cases to the 78th Air Rescue Squadron, however, he would check to make sure there is no let down. Also the 76th Air Rescue Squadron at Hickam AFB, would now furnish any technical assistance required. At this point I asked Captain Jacobsen about the lack of TO compliance on the 78th Air Rescue Squadron aircraft. Again came the negative attitude and why do we concern ourselves. I asked about the letter written to them by the 78th Air Rescue Squadron requesting information on the many letters and follow-ups to AF 908 CSD, Mobile Alabama. He advised that it had been indorsed to Headquarters, Air Rescue Service for further action, however, no request had been made at any time for supply assistance by the 78th Air Rescue Squadron. When asked if field maintenance TOC's could be accomplished through "IRAN" he said no! He explained as Major Sawtell had, about the difficulties in procuring the Kits. In regard to the PRT's, he had personally helped prepare the tables and said that the previous system was very unsatisfactory. Col Hansen advised that due to this situation he had taken over the technical order distribution and all deficiencies had now been resolved. Col Hansen called Major Middlebrooks to advise him of my desires to discuss painting of the C-54 aircraft and "IRAN".

e. On arrival at Major Middlebrooks office I advised him of our desires to paint the three C-54 aircraft on the project. Major Middlebrooks could see no reason to paint them as the red is for artic rescue only and further the C-54 aircraft were being phased out of the Pacific Division. There was also a new Technical Order 07-1-1 which completely changed all former marking and painting procedures. I explained we would still like to paint them and Lt Colonel McKinley at this point said "Let them paint the aircraft if they wish". The Major then provided me with a copy of the new marking and painting procedures and arranged for me to enter the "Restricted" area where the paint shop was located to obtain paint Stock Number and paint. My second subject was "IRAN". I asked that he explain how it operates and if they would handle field maintenance TOC's. He informed that all aircraft are scheduled every two years for "IRAN" and that normally field maintenance would not be done. It was strictly depot maintenance. However, it was possible to have other work done, depending on the circumstances and for arrangements a letter through channels to the depot concerned was required. The letter to be far enough in advance for procurement of materials and time planning. I thanked Lt Col McKinley and Major Middlebrooks and proceeded to obtain the paint stock numbers.

AFWL/HO

f. Requested Lt Colonel Hansen to approve my visit to Base Supply to obtain paint and a few assorted items, required by Headquarters, Test Services Unit, which were expendable. Col Hansen phoned CWO Dunn and requested he check availability.

g. Contacted CWO Dunn who immediately checked availability of the items I required. The items were processed for shipment to AF 2272 SO, M/F Headquarters, Test Services Unit. No paint was on hand for painting the three C-54 aircraft and I told CWO Dunn to take no procurement action on material not on hand. Thanked CWO Dunn.

h. Reported to 1500th Food Service Squadron to see CWO Gibbson, Inflight Feeding Officer. Requested sample menus and advice on procurement. CWO Dunn presented me with an assortment of menus and invited me to visit the Inflight Kitchen.

i. Miscellaneous: Requested the Red Cross and Fleet Service to send magazines and books to APO 187, c/o Captain Cunningham for distribution to the Weather Islands.

j. My business completed, reported to JTF-7 Liaison Office for transportation to APO 187.

7. Recommendation: A letter through Task Group 7.4 to Headquarters, Air Rescue Service should be written listing TOC discrepancies of the 78th Air Rescue Squadron, and requesting this headquarters be furnished a waiver of non-compliance.

William E. Owens

WILLIAM E. OWENS
T/Sgt., USAF
Supply NCOIC

APPROVED

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGMS 400.2 8 March 1954

SUBJECT: Roll-up of Supplies and Equipment

TO: Commanders, all Units and Elements
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. The following general concept for handling roll-up of supplies and equipment is for your information and guidance. Each Element and Unit Supply Officer with an appropriate number of personnel will remain after the completion of this operation until all supplies and equipment have been properly treated for corrosion control and turned-in to supply agencies or custodial responsibility transferred. All Unit Commanders are responsible that this policy is carried out effectively.

2. Items peculiar to TDY aircraft will be returned to the ZI as TAT when feasible. In those instances where the items cannot accompany the unit to its home station due to type of transportation available, weight and cube, etc., the items will be packed and crated and turned over to the Base Supply Officer for transportation purposes only to be shipped back on a space available basis. Where packing and crating is required, maximum utilization will be made by each unit of boxes and containers which were used in shipping the items to the forward area.

3. Office furniture: Base Maintenance will establish a furniture processing line in building #118 where each item will be inspected and necessary corrosion control performed prior to storage by Base Supply. This unit will function as a joint Maintenance and Supply activity for vouchering, inspection, painting, etc.

4. Office machines: will be cleaned and all metal parts subject to corrosion will be coated with a light oil prior to turn-in to Base Supply.

5. Hot lockers: will be cleaned, light bulbs removed and turned-in, electric cords carefully folded and all metal parts treated to prevent corrosion.

6. Tools: all hand tools and special tools will be carefully cleaned and coated with an appropriate corrosion preventative prior to turn-in to Base Supply.

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7. Tents: will remain in place and custodial responsibility transferred to an officer designated by the Commander, Test Support Unit.

8. Maintenance Stands, Power Units and Aircraft Jacks: these items will be cleaned and painted and custodial responsibility transferred to the officer appointed by Commander, Test Support Unit, for storage, corrosion surveillance and maintenance.

9. Cots, folding, steel: maximum repair will be effected by each unit and all cots which had been renovated prior to issue will be carefully cleaned and spot painted prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. Those cots which were received by the various units without renovation will be segregated and turned-in as is to the Depot Supply Officer.

10. Mattresses and pillows: will be carefully brushed and dusted prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer.

11. Sheets, pillow cases and mattress covers: will be laundered and neatly folded prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. The Commander, Task Group 7.4, has requested the Army Depot Supply Officer to report any instances wherein it appears serviceable sheets have been ripped up in an effort to make up shortages.

12. Class "X" clothing: will be laundered and sized (waist size for trousers and collar size for shirts) prior to turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. The Laundry Officer, Task Group 7.2, has agreed to giving laundry service priority involving roll-up items. He estimates approximately three (3) days service.

13. Miscellaneous items: for instructions on the turn-in of any items which are drawn from the Air Force Supply Officer or the Army Depot Supply Officer and are not covered in this letter, contact the appropriate supply agency direct. All turn-ins will be scheduled by the appropriate supply agency in accordance with priorities established by this Headquarters. It is requested that each unit use this document as a guide in evolving their roll-up plan. The roll-up plan should include the name of the officer designated as Project Officer for their unit roll-up, the name of the Unit Supply Officer and number of personnel to be retained to accomplish the necessary work. It is further requested that each unit estimate the date (K/____) they will be ready to turn their property into supply. This information will aid in establishing turn-in schedules.

14. In order that TDY units may close out Memorandum Receipt and Plant Accounts, appropriate action will be taken by Commander, Test

Support Unit, to house roll-up crews from the time the main unit departs until the roll-up crew has completed its job. This will include furnishing bedding and processing the remaining class "X" clothing of these personnel, through the laundry for turn-in to the Depot Supply Officer. It is requested the roll-up plan for each unit be forwarded so as to reach this Headquarters not later than 10 April 1954.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

A. J. AMERSON
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

NFLD/D

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SUBJECT: Roll-Up Planning

TO: Commander, Communications Element, Provisional
Commander, 1500-3 Air Base Wing Detachment PACD
Commander, Weather Central Element, Provisional
Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)

Attached as Inclosure 1 is a copy of questions regarding Roll-Up and the answers given by Headquarters, Task Group 7.4.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

James W. Montgomery

1 Incl
a/s

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

5-4062

QUESTIONS REGARDING ROLL-UP

1. Will there be another operation following, similiar to "Castle", which will require certain Test Services Unit support? When is another operation expected?

ANSWER: Present planning provides that the operational phase of Castle (Uncl) will end with completion of the recovery period of the last shot (L-Day: Last Shot Day, for planning purposes). The next operation is scheduled for the Pacific Proving Ground in the Fall of 1955. Because of the long interval between tests, the Task Force will revert to its interim strength upon completion of the operational phase of Castle (Uncl).

2. There seems to be a difference of opinion regarding the condition of Army equipment upon Turn-In. Has any official information been received?

ANSWER: Your attention is directed to letter, Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, TGMS 400.2, Subject: "Roll-Up of Supplies and Equipment", dated 8 March 1954, and conference on roll-up conducted 11 March 1954 which a representative of your headquarters attended.

3. Air Force Base Supply was considering the establishment of a production line in Base Maintenance to prepare Air Force office equipment for storage. Is there anything firm on this?

ANSWER: Base Maintenance will establish a furniture processing line in the hanger in accordance with procedures outlined by the Director of Materiel, Test Support Unit, at the roll-up conference 11 March 1954.

4. When will proposed water and airlift schedules be available so that we may have an idea of dates to shoot for?

ANSWER: The USNS AINSWORTH is presently scheduled for departure on or about L plus 5. Airlift for the month of May will average one (1) aircraft per day to support the total airlift requirements of Joint Task Force SEVEN and its five (5) task groups. Firm schedules will be furnished your headquarters upon receipt.

5. What is the target date for completion of roll-up at this location?

ANSWER: Approximate date is L/15, depending upon the date of completion of this operation.

6. When will a departure schedule of organizational aircraft be available? This is required for determining relief of TDY Weather Forecasters from Base Weather Station.

ANSWER: It is the general policy of this Headquarters that aircraft, with their crews and required enroute maintenance personnel, will deploy from the forward area as early as possible, but consistent with the completion of their required missions. Commanders concerned will prepare proposed departure schedules for their own organizational aircraft.

7. Who will be responsible for striking tents?

ANSWER: See paragraph 7, letter, Task Group 7.4, Subject: "Roll-Up of Supplies and Equipment", dated 8 March 1954.

8. It is presumed that Air Force and Army supply activities will accept property being turned-in on a six (6) day basis. Is this assumption correct?

ANSWER: Both Army and Air Force Supply activities will accept turn-ins six (6) days per week during the actual roll-up operation. Reference briefing received at roll-up conference 11 March 1954.

9. What will be the cut-off date for unit and element histories? When will final report be due in Headquarters, Task Group 7.4?

ANSWER: April histories will be planned so that they can be in this Headquarters not later than 1600 hours, 30 April. Actual cut-off date will be the date of departure of the unit or element from the forward area. The period of the history from 30 April to departure date will be forwarded to the Historian at Kirtland Air Force Base, to arrive not later than 20 May 1954. In event the operation is delayed beyond the presently scheduled date of completion, the 20 May 1954 date will be advanced by the same number of days. The date for submission of unit final reports to this Headquarters will be disseminated to Unit Commanders in the near future.

10. The proposed phase out of personnel is needed to enable definite plans to secure security termination statements, collect security badges, and forward base clearance forms to the Test Support Unit. Is this data available?

ANSWER: Plans for obtaining security termination statements as well as giving the security termination lectures can be accomplished at the discretion of the Unit Commanders and their Security Officers during the period L-15 (L - Last Operational Day) and L/5. L-15 might vary as much as three (3) to five (5) days, due to unforeseen delays; however, the lectures and execution of the termination statements will be effective and binding to preclude "loose talk" about this operation. Collection of Security Identification Badges by the Unit Security Officers can be effected at any time the requirement of the individual for such badge no longer exists. The actual turn-in of badges should be accomplished by the individual the same day he receives his orders for departure, allowing the orders to be properly stamped "HAS NO BADGE" by the Test Support Unit Security Office (issuing agent) at the time the badge is relinquished.

11. Will release of personnel be at the discretion of the Unit Commander? How soon may personnel be released?

ANSWER: Your attention is directed to the provisions of paragraph 3a, Telegraphic DA and DAF Movement Directive and Warning Order, AFOOP-OC-C, 1091M, 16 November 1953, copy of which was forwarded to your headquarters by Headquarters USAF. For planning purposes, final roll-up commences on L-Day plus one (1) day. Your roll-up plan will insure that the phase out of personnel has given full consideration to mandatory requirements for the disposition of materiel, policing, and all other post-operational activities of a residual nature. Supply, accountable and clean-up personnel will be phased out last; personnel required to deploy aircraft will leave first; all other personnel will be phased out consistent with the unit's primary and residual mission. Plans for the phase out of personnel will be submitted to this Headquarters for approval.

12. May some aircraft be released before the last shot? (For example the Weather Reconnaissance B-29's)

ANSWER: It is contemplated that no aircraft of the Test Services Unit will redeploy prior to L-Day.

13. Will we roll-up as elements, units, or as the whole Task Group?

ANSWER: Insofar as is practicable, roll-up will be accomplished from the element level upward to dispostion of the unit, i.e., all elements should be redeployed before departure of the unit commander concerned.

14. When will Field Maintenance Personnel be released by Test Support Unit?

ANSWER: Field maintenance personnel may be released upon completion of the roll-up of the parent unit from which the personnel were drawn, provided this date is not prior to the departure of all participating aircraft.

15. Will there be any further operational missions required of this organization, other than standby Search and Rescue Aircraft until all aircraft have departed, after the completion of Koon-Day phase?

ANSWER: Search and rescue facilities must remain operational until all aircraft to be redeployed have departed from the forward area. Communications activities must remain operational until the last weather island installation is evacuated. It is contemplated by Joint Task Force SEVEN that immediately following the last shot, one (1) LST will be designated to roll-up the Weather stations. It is to be noted that KOON may or may not constitute the final operational event in the current series; hence reference shoudl be made only to the "L" factor which represents last shot day.

16. Will crew chief stands, etc., have to be painted prior to turn-in? Is disassembly and packing required?

ANSWER: Review paragraph 8, letter, Task Group 7.4, Subject: "Roll-Up of Supplies and Equipment", dated 8 March 1954.

AFWAL/HO

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

REGARDING ROLL-UP

Reference paragraph 2 - Referenced letter was forwarded to all elements by 1st Indorsement, this headquarters, dated 15 March 1954. Personnel from the elements having property accounts attended the roll-up conference on 11 March 1954.

Reference paragraph 4 - Informal information is to the effect that the bulk of Test Services Unit personnel will travel by air upon their departure from Eniwetok.

Reference paragraph 6 - A proposed departure schedule of organizational aircraft is included in Annex ABLE, TSUF Operation Plan 1-54 to be issued shortly. This plan will be submitted to Task Group 7.4 for approval.

Reference paragraph 8 - Latest information indicates that the turn-in period will be in the afternoons. Morning periods will be reserved for Parry Island Units.

Reference paragraph 9 - Each element will submit a final history to Headquarters, Test Services Unit prior to departure from Eniwetok or by L/5, whichever is earlier. The final history for Test Services Unit will be forwarded to Task Group 7.4 by L/7.

Reference paragraph 11 - A proposed departure schedule of Test Services Unit personnel is included in Annex BAKER, Test Services Unit Operation Plan 1-54 to be issued shortly. This plan will be submitted to Task Group 7.4 for approval.

AFWL/NO

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HEADQUARTERS TASK GROUP 7.2
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
APO 187 c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.

16 March 1954

SUBJECT: Conservation of Water and Electricity

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4
APO 187, c/o PM
San Francisco, Calif.

1. In light of the recent failure of the main power cable from ELMER to FRED, drastic water and power conservation measures must necessarily be initiated at once on FRED. Authorities of the AEC Contractor have requested the cooperation of this Task Group in this matter. I understand such authorities have also contacted your Headquarters.

2. To assure coordinated, aggressive action so that the missions of our respective Task Groups will not be jeopardized, the actions outlined in attached letter are considered minimum requirements until the power situation clarifies. You are enjoined to cooperate in their implementation, as appropriate and applicable.

1 Incl:
Ltr CTG 7.2 (Conservation of Water and Electricity)

/s/t/ EDWARD H. LAHTI
Colonel, Infantry
Commander

TGM (16 Mar 54) 1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

TO: All Units and Elements of Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

It is desired that each Commander take immediate action to comply with the letter and spirit of the inclosed conservation directive during the period of this emergency.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

EARL W. KESLING
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander

1 Incl:
n/c

AFWDD

HEADQUARTERS TASK GROUP 7.2
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
APO 187 c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.

330.14 16 March 1954

SUBJECT: Conservation of Water and Electricity

TO: See distribution

1. Due to the failure of the normal electric power supply for ENIWETOK Island it is necessary to curtail the use of electrical power and the consumption of fresh water until further notice, pending the completion of repairs to the electrical system.

2. All Unit Commanders and Officers in charge of activities on ENIWETOK Island will take immediate action to reduce consumption of electric power as follows:

a. Lights in all hot lockers located in billets will be disconnected.

b. Lights in billets will be limited to:
(1) One (1) light per tent
(2) One (1) light per room in Pacific type buildings

c. Personal radio receivers will be disconnected when not being utilized.

d. All outside lights including street lights will be shut off, except those electric lights required for security purposes.

3. As electric power is required to distill fresh water, Unit Commanders and Responsible Officer's of activities will take immediate action to reduce consumption of fresh water to the minimum as follows:

a. All fresh water showers will be closed, except during the hours of 1700 to 1830 hours daily and then only the minimum quantity of water will be used for sanitary purposes.

b. The use of fresh water used in washing personal clothing by individuals will be rigidly controlled.

c. The use of fresh water to clean or wash equipment such as vehicles, airplanes, etc. will be limited only to operational necessity.

d. QM Laundry will use brackish water in lieu of fresh water for the processing of all laundry.

AFWL/HRD

330.14
SUBJECT: Conservation of Water and Electricity

4. The procedures enumerated above constitute only a few of the controls which may assist in alleviating the current power shortage. All personnel by initiative and vision are enjoined to assist in conservation of electrical power by such means as are at their disposal so that the operational efficiency and the health of the command are maintained at the current high level.

5. All personnel on ENIWETOK Island will be informed of the contents of this directive and a copy of it will be posted on all unit bulletin boards until further notice.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LAHTI:

RICHARD L. CALLAHAN
1st LT AGC
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
"C"

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

TGMT 523 9 March 1954

SUBJECT: Shipment of Supplies by Air

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that attempts are being made to ship excess supplies back to the ZI by air when surface transportation is available. For example, on 3 March 1954, at MATS Terminal, three (3) boxes were found waiting air shipment. They had a total weight of seven hundred and sixty (760) pounds and a cube of one hundred and seventy-nine (179) feet. It was learned that these same boxes had come in on a C-97 aircraft three (3) weeks previous. This equipment was never uncrated and apparently was excess to the operation and was being shipped back to the ZI.

2. Supplies are not to be shipped by air that are declared excess to the operation. Only critical items will be shipped back to the ZI by air. It is not the intent of t is letter to discourage the turn-in and shipment of excess supplies by surface transportation.

3. Unit Commanders are requested to caution their personnel in order that there will be no recurrence of the cited example. All air shipments will require justification if so requested.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

/s/Earl W. Kesling
/t/EARL W. KESLING
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander

AFRC/HO

Hq TG 7.4, Prov, Subj: Shipment of Supplies by Air, dated 9 Mar 54

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Communications Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Central Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional
Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional (Air)
Commander, 1500-3 Air Base Wing Detachment PACD

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGMT 510 29 March 1954

SUBJECT: Personnel and Baggage Returning to the Zone of Interior

TO: Commanders, All Units and Elements
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. The following is general information and guidance for Unit Commanders and individuals in shipping personnel and baggage to the Zone of Interior.

2. Personal Baggage: Footlockers, trunks and baggage will be shipped from San Francisco Port of Embarkation to destination on the Standard Form 116. Forms 116 can be obtained from Task Group 7.2, Transportation Section, building 15. The Unit Orderly Rooms will aid the individual in preparing Form 116. Individuals concerned will certify the customs declaration (inclosure #1). The individual with his baggage (footlockers, etc.) six (6) copies of his orders, four (4) customs declarations, six (6) copies of Form 116 (made out) will go to building 98. At building 98 the baggage will be stenciled, banded and the 104B's made out for shipment. The individual will then take his baggage and documents to Task Group 7.2, building 61. At building 61 the baggage will be accepted and shipped. One (1) document will be receipted and given to the individual. Unit Commanders are requested to send a responsible representative with the personnel shipping baggage to insure that baggage and documents arrive at building 61, simultaneously. It is suggested that the units send the personnel in groups to building 98 (Packing and Crating) to facilitate matters. At the present time the only scheduled vessel for shipping baggage is the USNS AINSWORTH. The AINSWORTH is scheduled to depart approximately five (5) days after the operation. It is requested that unit commanders ship all baggage on the AINSWORTH and submit to AF Supply a minimum of two weeks in advance (L-10. L=last operation) the names and destination of the personnel shipping footlockers in order that supply can prepare the stencils and expedite the shipment.

3. Personnel returning to the Zone of Interior will fall into three (3) categories:

AFWDMHQ

a. Personnel on PCS or TDY returning as casuals on MATS.

b. Special airlift.

c. Organization aircraft and surface transportation.

Air movement designators will be necessary for personnel falling in category A & B. None will be required for category C. Personnel in category A will require one designator per individual. Category B will require one designator for the entire shipment. Personnel who are PCS will have the air movement designator inserted in their orders. TDY personnel will have the movement designator inserted in the indorsement on their orders. All designators will be obtained prior to booking with MATS. Air priority designators can be obtained by calling Task Group 7.4, Transportation Section, phone 4237 (FRED).

4. It is desired that Commanders include the processing of personnel and baggage as a check list item in their roll-up plan.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

A. J. AMERSON
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

1 Incl
Customs Declaration

C U S T O M S D E C L A R A T I O N

I declare that all items contained in the baggage listed below, consist of personal and household effects either taken abroad by me or acquired abroad for my personal use (including bona fide gifts, etc.) with the exception of the following:

_____
Date

_____
Signature

No of pieces of baggage	Type of Container
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

_____
Rank Comp Sv No

_____
Civilian Identification

Baggage for loading aboard the

_____

As ACCOMPANIED HOLD
UNACCOMPANIED HOLD
Cross out portion not applicable

Tag Number_____

C U S T O M S D E C L A R A T I O N

I declare that all items contained in the baggage listed below, consist of personal and household effects either taken abroad by me or acquired abroad for my personal use (including bona fide gifts, etc.) with the exception of the following:

_____
Date

_____
Signature

No of pieces of baggage	Type of Container
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

_____
Rank Comp Sv No

_____
Civilian Identification

Baggage for loading aboard the

_____

As ACCOMPANIED HOLD
UNACCOMPANIED HOLD
Cross out portion not applicable

Tag Number_____

AEMLMQ

Incl 1

DISPOSITION FORM

SUBJECT: Unit Supply Inspection
COMMENT NO. 1

TO: Col Hawley FROM: Major McKoy 25 March 1954

1. I performed a follow-up inspection of the Communications Element Supply this date. Reference inspections performed 3 February and 5 March, copies attached for your reference.

2. Persons contacted:

Lt Col Hammond, Commander, Test Services Unit.
Major Brady, Commander, Communications Element.
Captain Cunningham, Materiel Officer, Test Services Unit.
Captain Neher, OIC, Communications Element Supply.
T/Sgt Lynch, NCOIC, Plant Account Records.
S/Sgt Martin, NCOIC, Expendables.

3. General Observations: Every phase of the operation of the Communications Element Supply has made, what I consider, outstanding progress since the initial inspection 3 February. My first impression on this particular inspection was extremely favorable in view of the very excellent appearance of the facility. I checked primarily into three (3) major classes of the operation:

a. Publications: Captain Neher indicated that Tech Orders, Stock Lists, catalogues and other necessary publications are now coming through Base facilities in an excellent manner. About the only exception to this appeared to be the various volumes of AF Manual 67-1. I am referring this to the Base Supply Officer for assistance.

b. Expendable supplies: My initial inspection of this facility on 3 February, was primarily in the interest of determining the percentage of completion of ordering the necessarh spares for the communications equipment. This project has now been completed and those items received appear to be accounted for properly. I ran a spot check on five (5) line items taken at random from the various card trays primarily for the purpose of checking location to determine the efficiency of the storage set up. This spot check revealed 100% accuracy in the locations and, considering the space and type of bins available, I considered the storage satisfactory. Ordering of expendables is now a matter of maintaining the necessary stock levels and adjusting the stock levels as consumption dictates. Each stock card reveals the necessary data on that particular line item such as stock number, nomenclature, and storage location, in addition it shows the population of the end item to which this spare applies. These cards are screeded periodically for the purpose of adjusting stock levels up or down depending upon consumption and reordering to bring the balance on hand up to the current stock level. Issues are made from this supply on a recapitulation sheet and posted to the stock record cards daily in order that the balance on hand remains current.

AFWLMO

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c. Plant Account Property: Incidental to my inspection of 3 February, regarding expendables, it was noted that the Plant Account records appeared to be inadequate. Since that time additional personnel have been assigned as indicated in paragraph 3d of the inclosed inspection report, dated 5 March. One additional airman, S/Sgt Heesh, 64151, arrived on or about 8 March from Johnston Island for duty with this section. With this increase in qualified people, Captain Neher has been able to screen his Plant Account records, bring his forms 90A up to date, prepare a consolidated from his own records, compare that to the consolidated, prepared by Base Supply and furnished him 24 March, and accomplish an inventory of this property. This inventory has just been completed and the necessary research to clear up the various discrepancies has not been accomplished. When this has been done, accurate hand receipts will be accomplished for the signature of the various sections which draw supplies and equipment from the Communications Element. Information available indicates that the Commander, 1808th AACS Wing, Tokyo, arranged for the transfer of a Supply Officer for the Communications Element, scheduled to arrive shortly after 1 April. Upon his arrival, he can work with Captain Neher in the final rechecks of the property, to assume responsibility for this account. Since indications are that this account has never been given the shake down it is now receiving, there will undoubtedly be a number of adjustments in the records which may require Report of Survey action. At the time it is believed that a tremendous quantity of supplies in dollar value will be picked up as overages and brought back to appropriate supply records. It is estimated that this process will be completed in about thirty (30) days.

4. Conclusions and Recommendations:

a. That Captain Neher and his personnel are worthy of special recognition for the outstanding job they have accomplished in a short time.

b. That Lt Col Hammond, Commander, Test Services Unit, and Major Brady, Commander, Communications Element, are completely aware of the status of this accound and have acted in an aggressive and cooperative manner in bringing the account to acceptable standards.

c. That an interim project be established to procure, either by local manufacture or otherwise, adequate, uniform bins for more effective utilization of the limited space.

d. That building #640 be retained as a dehumidified storage facility for use by the Communications Element and/or AACS people for storage of those items of communications equipment, subject to deterioration from the climatic conditions.

/s/Wendell G. McKoy
/t/WENDELL G. MCKOY
Major, USAF
Staff Supply Officer

1 Incl
Insp Rept for 3 Feb and
5 Mar 54

585

585


35

HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

9 Mar 1954

SUBJECT: Inspection of UPREALS

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187

1. Request an inspector be furnished by Task Group 7.4 to inspect the weather island UPREALS for completeness. The inspector should have authority to make the final audit so that the UPREALS can be closed out as complete.

2. The inspection should be accomplished by one day prior to loading the equipment aboard the LST which will carry the load to Hawaii and possibly to Oakland Army Port.

3. This headquarters will initiate action to provide air transportation for the inspector as follows:

ARRIVE	PLACE	DEPART
K plus 13	Rongerik	K plus 16
K plus 18	Ponape	K plus 21
K plus 21	Kusaie	K plus 24
K plus 25	Majuro	K plus 28

/s/ Fellie F. Robinson
/t/ FELLIE F. ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

APWLTWO

587

Hq Wea Reporting Elm, Prov, Subj: Inspection of UPREALS, dated 9 Mar 54
1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California Mar 10 1954

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Forwarded for necessary action.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ James W. Montgomery
/t/ JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

588

Hq Wea Rept Elm, Prov., File 333, Subj: Inspection of UPREALS

TGMS 333 (9 Mar 54) 2nd Ind Mar 17 1954

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. The Commander, PACDIVMATS, has been requested to furnish a team composed of personnel qualified in maintenance, communications, weather island instruments and supply records to inspect the equipment at each weather island during the month of April. In the event PACDIVMATS approves the request, you will be advised of the arrival date of the inspection team in order that necessary transportation may be arranged.

2. Further consideration will be given to an inspection of the records as outlined in your basic letter and if deemed necessary will probably be furnished from this Headquarters.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

/s/ A. J. Amerson
/t/ A. J. AMERSON
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

3rd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

JWM

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HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

9 Mar 1954

SUBJECT: Personnel to prepare Ocean Manifest

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187

1. Request personnel be provided to accomplish an Ocean Shipping Manifest for all cargo departing the weather islands.

2. The manifests may be drawn up approximately three days prior to loading the equipment aboard the LST. All cargo will be manifested to NSC, Oakland, California.

3. This headquarters will initiate action to provide air transportation for required personnel to the weather islands as follows:

ARRIVE	PLACE	DEPART
K plus 13	Rongerik	K plus 16
K plus 18	Ponape	K plus 21
K plus 21	Kusaie	K plus 24
K plus 25	Majuro	K plus 28

/s/t/ FELLIE F ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

AFWL/MC

591

B/L fr Wea Reptg Elm Prov, Subj: Personnel to prepare Ocean Manifest, dated 9 March 1954

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California Mar 15 1954

TO: Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. It is the opinion of this headquarters that 60-75 percent of the manifesting could be accomplished as much as sixty (60) days in advance by your organization. This is predicated on known items to be returned and the reusing of the original containers.

2. If action is initiated based on the above procedures, no additional personnel would be required.

3. In the event further consideration is desired, request full justification.

/s/t/ MAHLON B. HAMMOND
Lt Col, USAF
Commander

AFSWP-0

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[redacted]

B/Ltr fr TG 7.4, Prov., File TGMS 400.2, Subj: Roll-up of Weather Islands, dtd 17 Feb 54

WREP-- (17 Feb 54) 2nd Ind

HQ WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187 13 Mar 1954

TO: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional, APO 187

1. Per verbal agreement between Major McKay, Staff Supply Officer TG 7.4, and Major Robinson, Commander, WREP, this report was delayed to the present date.

2. Weather Reporting Element, Provisional Operations Plan Number 1-54 is submitted for approval.

3. Of particular importance are assumptions listed in paragraph 1b of the plan. A discussion of the assumptions follow:

a. Considerable operational equipment for the weather islands has been used for two operations. During the interim period, it was stored at Hickam AFB. During the entire period, it has been subject to tropical maritime corrosion and maintenance and corrosion control has been only of low order. Much of the operating equipment is now beginning to fail with the result that even the best of the remaining operating equipment cannot be considered reliable for subsequent operations. Non-operating equipment is in various stages of corrosion which can be corrected only be depot reconditioning. In addition some of the equipment is outdated and some unsatisfactory or inconvenient substituted equipment is in the weather island packages. Other equipment has been damaged by repeated movement and loading and unloading operations. In general, depot reconditioning of all weather island equipment should be undertaken at the conclusion of this operation. All of this equipment should be returned to stock and reordered for the next operation. Experience gained on this and past operations show a definite need for preparation for a new requirements list for the weather islands. This list will be accomplished carefully considering the exact needs of each island prior to the conclusion of this operation.

b. The next question is the method of handling the equipment. This, I believe, could be best accomplished by sending all the equipment to SMAMA, the nearest ZI depot. A request should be made to SMAMA to provide a team to inspect, segregate and reship different classes of equipment to the appropriate zonal depots for rehabilitation and return to stock. A good portion of the equipment would be retained at SMAMA eliminating unnecessary transportation costs which would be incurred if any other depot handled such action. Segregation cannot be accomplished at the weather islands as personnel are not qualified for such action.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

WREP :Subj: Roll-up of Weather Islands

c. Roll-up and transportation of the equipment back to the ZI are two more major problems which I recommend to be solved in the following manner: Due to LST landing difficulties at Rongerik, a LCU should accompany the LST to Rongerik. The LCU is able to beach and pick up loads of equipment and transfer the loads to the LST anchored in the lagoon. This is admittedly a slow method but beaching the LST is too hazardous an operation. An alternate method would be to send some other type craft to Rongerik, smaller than an LST, but large enough to handle approximately 180,000 pounds 13,000 cube of equipment, returning to Eniwetok and transferring the equipment to the LST at that point. The LST then would proceed to Ponapo, Kusaie and Majuro picking up the weather island equipment at each point. No expected difficulty will be encountered at any of these islands in loading. The LST should then proceed to Pearl Harbor to off-load special equipment previously installed on LST (No. 551) at that location to assist in loading and unloading operations and preservation of food products for the weather islands. The LST would then be free to transport the equipment to the Oakland Army Port. The LST (No. 551) Commander has orders to return to the ZI upon completion of this operation and his orders were for approximately six months. Therefore I assume the LST would be returning to the ZI and would be available to transport the equipment. Since unloading and reloading of the equipment would be an unnecessary expense, the cargo should not be unloaded at Pearl Harbor for reshipment aboard another surface craft. By the most careful computation of available figures the total cargo load for all four weather islands is 607,734 pounds or 271.3 long tons and 40,656 cube. This I believe is approximately the capacity of the LST considering the extra equipment presently aboard to be removed at Pearl Harbor. If this load is not sufficient for efficient utilization of the LST, five trailers of fixed helium cylinders could be added at the Eniwetok stop. This helium is for the 1110th Air Support Detachment assigned to WREP for administrative and logistical support. The trailers are to be returned to NAS Moffet Field, California.

/s/ Fellie F. Robinson
/t/ FELLIE F. ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

1 Incl:
WREP Opns Plan 1-54
(Proposed)

[redacted]

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[redacted]

B/L fr TG 7.4, Prov, TGMS 400.2, Subj: Roll-up of Weather Islands, dtd 17 Feb 54

3rd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California Mar 13 1954

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

An operations plan covering the roll-up of all elements of this unit will also be forwarded upon completion of coordination.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ James W. Montgomery
/t/ JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

1 Incl:
n/c

[redacted]

[redacted]

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

HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

13 Mar 1954

SUBJECT: Condemnation of Radioactive Materiel

THRU: Commander, Test Services Unit, Prov.
APO 187

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Prov.
APO 187

1. Request a qualified monitor be furnished to determine radioactivity of all types of materiel at Rongerik in order that equipment which is considered contaminated may be condemned and not returned to the Zone of the Interior.

2. The monitor should be prepared to appropriately mark the equipment not to be returned.

3. The monitoring should be accomplished immediately subsequent to the last shot of this operation.

4. The equipment at Majuro, Jusaie, and Ponape is considered to be too remote to be contaminated. However, a spot check monitor should be performed at these islands. It is recommended that this check be accomplished during the roll-up period.

5. Transportation of monitoring personnel to and from the weather islands may be effected through this headquarters.

/s/t/ FELLIE F ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

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B/L fr Wea Reptg Elm, Prov, Subj: Condemnation of Radioactive Materiel, dated 19 March 1954

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California Mar 15 1954

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Your attention is invited to basic letter.

2. In addition, request this headquarters be advised of the procedure to be used in processing claims of clothing and personal items belonging to the officer and airmen evacuated from Rongerik which were destroyed or abandoned because of radioactivity contamination.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/t/ JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

599

B/L fr Wea Reptg Elm, Prov, Subj: Condemnation of Radioactive Materiel, dated 13 March 1954

TGMS 702 (13 Mar 54) 2nd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California 22 Mar 1954

TO: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Radiological Safety monitoring is a responsibility of the Commander, Test Support Unit. Requests of this nature should be referred to that organization for scheduling a monitor.

2. Recommend consideration be given to checking the equipment at Majuro, Kusaie and Ponape by the Weather Reporting Element, Provisional personnel. The loan of equipment could be arranged through the Test Support Unit.

3. Claims for sales store items of clothing should be processed in accordance with Section 7, Volume X, AFM 67-1. Claims for personal property should be referred to Major Thomas McMahon, Legal Officer, located in building 135, telephone 4233.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

/s/ A. J. Amerson
/t/ A. J. AMERSON
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

600

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B/L fr Wea Reptg Elm, Prov, Subj: Condemnation of Radioactive Material, dtd 13 Mar 54

3rd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California Mar 23 1954

TO: Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

JWM

AFWL/MD

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CHARTS

HQ TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROV. ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

CORRESPONDENCE & MESSAGES
INCOMING VS OUTGOING



AIRCRAFT STATUS

INVENTORY

9 . . . . . WB - 29

3 . . . . . C-54

3 . . . . . SA - 16

TOTAL FLYING TIME



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PERCENT OF UTILIZATION
IN COMM & OUT OF COMM



HRS FLOWN_ = % OF UTILIZATION
HRS IN COMM

HRS IN _ = % IN COMM

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FUEL & LUBE CONSUMPTION



GLOSSARY

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GLOSSARY

AACS	Airways and Air Communications Service
AFB	Air Force Base
AFR	Air Force Regulation
AFSWC	Air Force Special Weapons Command
AMC	Air Materiel Command
AOC	Air Operation Center
APCS	Air Photographic and Charting Service
ARDC	Air Research and Development Command
ARS	Air Rescue Service
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
D/M	Director of Materiel
D/O	Director of Operations
D/P	Director of Personnel
DPEP	Documentary Photographic Element, Provisional
GO	General Order
JTF	Joint Task Force
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
NAS	Naval Air Station
NCOIC	Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge
PACD, MATS	Pacific Division, MATS
PBM	Patrol Reconnaissance Flying Boat
POM	Preparation for Overseas Movement
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAR	Search and Rescue
SMAMA	Sacramento Air Materiel Area
SO	Special Order
TAT	To Accompany Troops
T/D	Table of Distribution
TDY	Temporary Duty
TSUP	Test Services Unit, Provisional
WCEP	Weather Central Element, Provisional
WREP	Weather Reporting Element, Provisional
WRECEP	Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
WX	Weather Transmitter
ZI	Zone of Interior

AFHRA/RHD

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HISTORY OF THE WEATHER CENTRAL ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL

AND

THE TASK FORCE WEATHER CENTRAL

BOOK II "OPERATIONAL PHASE"

Installment No. 2, 1 March 1954 to 31 March 1954

Prepared for the Historical Office

Test Services Unit, Provisional
by Capt Charles W. Wise, Historical Officer, WCEP
30 April 1954

Test Services Unit, Provisional, Task Group 7.4,
Joint Task Force SEVEN, Department of Defense

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RG [redacted]
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Location Library / A-2
Collection AFWL
Folder History of Task Group 7.4 Provisional,
March 1954-OPERATION CASTLE

NOTE: This is Folder 5 of 5
containing pages ~~608~~ 610 Thru ~~780~~ 782

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF DOE/OS
Ray G. Cogen 4/30/96
REVIEWED BY DATE
FRANKLIN/DOE 7/10/95
Pages 608-780 of the History of Task Group 7.4, Provisional, March 54, Capt Wise 5784

[redacted]

APPROVED

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Shot BRAVO was detonated at 0615M, 1 March 1954. The first weather forecast made specifically for that test was issued at 0455M, 27 February. Five succeeding forecasts were issued at scheduled intervals; the last at 0207 M, 1 March, "H" minus six hours. The forecast cloud and weather conditions remained essentially unchanged through all six forecasts. The forecast of upper winds was changed as an increasing westerly component became apparent in the levels between 10,000 and 50,000 feet. The final forecast (news releases to the contrary) verified extremely well.[1] Weather and cloud conditions fell within the limits of observational error. The upper winds approched the limits of accuracy imposed by the wind measuring equipment and random variations in the atmosphere.

The fact that there were no delays due to weather on this shot appears to be very fortunate coincidence. Though scheduled months ahead, the day selected fell within a four-day period which was the only period with suitable upper winds between 28 January 1954 and 26 March 1954. Colonel B. G. Holzman, weather officer on Operation SANDSTONE, had recommended against use of the Marshall Islands for future tests because of wind and cloud conditions in this area.[2]

The forecasting group returned to Eniwetok 3 March 1954, leaving the Weather Central aboard the ship in the hands of the aerographers mates under Stanley G. Snyder, AG1.

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1. Ltr to Colonel Nicholas Chavasse fr Lt Colonel Slater, 20 Mar 54, and reply, 14 April 54.
2. Ltr fr Colonel B. G. Holzman to Lt Colonel Slater, 22 April 54.

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With Shot ROMEO scheduled for 13 March, six forecasters (Slater, Masterson, Stopinski, Winchester, Wise, Stempson) boarded the USS Estes 10 March, via C-47 from Eniwetok to Bikini and open Motor Launch from Bikini to the ship. That night radioteletype circuit J-401, between Eniwetok and the command ship, was out for 15 hours. Reception of the Guam Blind weather broadcast aboard the ship was also out nine hours during the same period. Responsibility for the 1600 M, 11 March basic weather forecast was therefore passed back to the Eniwetok Weather Central. Col Francis Bowen, J-5 (Communications) JTF SEVEN and 1st Lt Leroy Young, Communications Element, TSUP, attributed these outages primarily to poor radio propagation.

On the evening of 11 March a conference attended by Dr. Alvin Graves, Scientific Director, JTF SEVEN; Dr. William Ogle, Commander, TG 7.1; Col Bowen, Lt Col Bonnot and Lt Col Slater was held aboard the Command Ship. Lt Col Slater presented the problem of preparing weather forecasts with unsatisfactory communications. He proposed that four of the forecasters return to Eniwetok to prepare the forecasts where data was available. The forecasts could then be passed to the USS Estes via radioteletype circuit J-401, voice curcuits J-407 and J-408 or radio CW. Two forecasters would remain aboard to maintain continuity on the weather charts, interpret forecasts received from Eniwetok, prepare briefing aids for Lt Col Bonnot and to prepare necessary weather forecast in the event that communications between the ship and Eniwetok went out completely. Col Bowen stated that the radio propagation forecast called for fair conditions on 13 March and poor on 14, 15, 16 March.

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He could not guarantee that communications would stay in. Dr. Graves then approved Lt Col Slater's proposal.

A request for an aircraft to return the forecasters to Eniwetok was approved by Major General Clarkson, CJTF SEVEN. It was essential that personnel spend as little time as possible on Tare Island, Bikini. To insure this, Col Phil Hooper, J-3, JTF SEVEN, worked out a procedure which sounded like something from a pulp magazine adventure story. "M" Boar No. 27 would be alongside the USS Estes at 0630 M to take the four forecasters to Tare Island, where they would be met by a yellow Jeep No. 78, which would take them to the airstrip. In the meantime the C-47 dispatched from Eniwetok would be circling overhead and would land when the jeep approached the airstrip. Everything worked amazingly well, except that "M" Boat No. 27 was not equipped with hand rails. Waves were heaving the stern of the M Boat from four feet below to four feet above the lower end of the ships gangway. At times the lower end of the gangway was in several feet of water. This made the transfer from the ship to the boat a very hazardous and a very damp process.

Operational weather forecasts for a possible ROMEO shot were issued twice daily by the Eniwetok weather central for 16 days; until satisfactory upper winds occurred on 27 March 1954. The final computed air particle trajectories for this shot were issued at 0345 M, 28 March 1954. The forecast verified very well, allowing the event to take place on the first of two favorable days following a period of twenty-six unfavorable days.

The procedure whereby all forecasts were prepared at the Eniwetok weather central proved completely satisfactory. It was decided to

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follow this procedure for the remainder of the operation even though weather communications aboard the command ship had been satisfactorily improved. LCDR Masterson and Lt Winchester would go aboard the command ship several days prior to each and return to Eniwetok when the Commander, JTF SEVEN moved his command back to Parry Island.

During the long delay prior to the ROMEO Event the Commander, Task Group 7.4 expressed the need for weather forecasts farther in advance than the forty-eight hour forecasts normally issued. Because of maintenance problems it was necessary that the aircraft assigned to units under his command be flown frequently until two days prior to the shot. In order to schedule these flights it was necessary to know more than two days in advance which day was likely to be favorable for the shot. To fulfill this need a seventy-two hour outlook was made a part of the daily weather briefings presented to Brigadier General Estes; although, the forecasters had very little confidence in their ability to predict the upper level winds that far in advance.

On 13 March 1954 Lt Col Slater presented a briefing to a group of VIPs, including Senator Pastore, Representative Hollifiend, General Rawlins, and Lt. General Powers. They were given the latest forecast for the ROMEO Event, followed by a discussion of the forecast for BRAVO and the verification of that forecast. It was also explained to the group that for future shots at Bikini only winds aloft with a definite component from the south would be acceptable.

On 21 March Dr. Edward Teller, of UCRL and Lt Col V. Smith, J-3, JTF SEVEN, visited the Task Force Weather Central. Major Stopinski gave them a complete briefing on the methods of weather forecasting in

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the tropics, the seasonal trend of t. weather in this area, and the outlook for the following Monday.

The fact that Task Force SEVEN was well satisfied with the weather forecasts was expressed in a message from Lt Col Bonnot, Staff Weather Officer, JTF SEVEN, to Lt Col Slater, dated 16 March 1954; quote:

> ". . . Reference BRAVO forecast, it is considered as an excellent repeat excellent forecast by all concerned. . . . You and the other forecasters should feel quite proud of your achievements to date. Dr. Graves stated this and suggests the following poem as appropriate to the present situation; quote:
>
> What night is this?
> We wish we know
> We think it is a minus two,
> But since it could be minus four,
> or, heaven help us minus more,
> We guess there's nothing we can do
> But sit and wait the long nights through
> Until some dawn, with brilliant light,
> Our ROMEO doth end the night.
> Then we will know, come what may come,
> The night before was minus one."

[redacted]

AFRMD/MD

Supporting Documents

Section E

Book II, March Installment

APPROVED

WEATHER CENTRAL ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

20 March 1954

Col Nicholas Chavasse
Hq Air Weather Service
Andrews Air Force Base
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Col Chavasse:

When I learned AEC had released a statement to the effect that some natives and military personnel had been evacuated from atolls near the Pacific Proving Ground, I know the General and you would be much interested in the quality of the concerned. I prepared a report to Headquarters, Air Weather Service giving the forecast and observed weather in detail. However, I was requested by higher authority not to submit it. But I can state without fear of contradiction that the forecast was a good one. The Weather Central Element did their part in maintaining the high standards we desire in AWS.

We are working long hours and have plenty of pressure on us. But the training under Dr Palmer is really paying off. Under no circumstances should a group of forecasters under take a job like this without a course of instruction such as the one we had.

I am proud of the group I have, including Capt Thorpe's detachment. All of you recognize the ability of Stopinski, Wise and Stempsen, but Capt James Burgess, my briefing officer, is a real find. I have heard nothing but praise for his work.

Major Robinson's boys are really pushing the balloons up there. Although it is costing a high percentage of second releases, they have come through better than I personally thought they could. Col Cometh's unit is impressing everyone by their ability to get aircraft off on a one minute schedule and their general airmanship. The weather data they get is indispensable to the WCEP.

Lt Col Bonnot has given us a tremendous amount of support and assistance. He is doing a fine job with the AEC and Hq Joint Task Force personnel.

My best to General Senter (if he still drops in), General Moorman, Col Atwell, Col Jones and the rest.

Sincerely,

HERSCHEL H. SLATER
Lt Col., USAF
Commander

cc: Lt Col Bonnot

TAB 1

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Air Weather Service
MATS, USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

14 April 1954

Lt Colonel Herschel H. Slater
Commander
Weather Central Element, Provisional
APO #187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear Herschel:

Thanks for your very interesting and informative letter of 20 March. It came while I was away at jet school. I have just returned and feel a little bit more qualified to wear my wings now that I can fly something that isn't quite so antiquated.

Of course, General Moorman saw your letter immediately after its arrival and I am sure that it must have answered some of the questions in his mind. Incidentally, he has since been assured by other sources that you all have been doing a fine job. Naturally, we all had questions in our minds when the news first broke so it is reassuring to know that the Air Weather Service is maintaining its usual high standards. I have just this morning passed the information in your letter on to the staff.

We are all interested so if you get an opportunity write us again, and in the meantime keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

NICHOLAS H. CHAVASSE
Colonel, USAF

AFWP/WD

TAB 1

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HEADQUARTERS
AIR FORCE SPECIAL WEAPONS CENTER
Kirtland Air Force Base
New Mexico

SWD

Apr 22 1954

Lt. Colonel Herschel H. Slater, USAF
Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, Prov
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear Colonel Slater:

Thanks very much for the weather information that you passed to Colonel Houghton who, in turn, sent the data on to me. The information is more than we needed, but I was very happy to get the additional weather data from the point of view of my own interest in the meteorology of the Marshalls. Actually all that was required was the observed wind and trajectory information for shot time.

Let me sympathize with you for your horribly difficult wind problem. When I was weather officer at the Sandstone Test, I recommended against use of the Marshall Islands for further tests from the wind and cloud standpoint. But, then I suppose if one waits long enough there are occasional situations when the winds are suitable.

Best regards, and thanks again for your cooperation in giving me the necessary weather data.

Sincerely,

B. G. HOLZMAN
Colonel, USAF
Acting Chief of Staff

NEWLAND

LB 2 619

HISTORY

OF

WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL

1 through 31 March 1954

HISTORIAN:

A/1C Robert C. Mulligan

Test Services Unit, Provisional

Task Group 7.4, Provisional

Joint Task Force SEVEN

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NARRATIVE

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CHAPTER I

ADMINISTRATION

The first nuclear device of the present test series was detonated Sunday, 1 March. This action was to affect Weather Reporting Element far more than anticipated.

Also on this date, this Headquarters distributed Weather Reporting Element Operations Plan 1-54.[1] Recalling problems encountered during the roll-up of Weather Reporting Element 132.4.3.2 in 1952, and rehabilitation problems in the preparation for OPERATION CASTLE, provision was made in this plan for shipment of weather island equipment to Sacramento Air Materiel Area instead of Hickam Air Force Base for rehabilitation and reshipment to the appropriate zonal depot. The GMD-1A equipment was to be returned as TAT baggage to 6th Weather Squadron (Mobile). POL products and perishables were to be transferred to the Trust Territories representative at the various islands in partial payment for services rendered; a procedure that proved satisfactory after OPERATION IVY.

About 2100 hours, 1 March, Major Robinson received the following message:[2]

" FOR JTF SEVEN ENIWETOK SMCLN PASS TO MR BRESLIN
PD AUTO MONITOR PRESENT READING IS ONE ZERO ZERO
PLUS REPEAT ONE ZERO ZERO PLUS CMA PEN OFF CHART
AND HAS BEEN IN THIS POSITION SINCE 0250 ZEBRA

1. See Supporting Document "A".
2. See Supporting Document "B".

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REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT FROM BRESLIN

SIGNED COMDR."

Major Robinson, having had radiological safety training in 1949, realized the seriousness of this message and arranged through Lieutenant Colonel Hammond, Test Services Unit Commander, for a monitor to proceed to Rongerik. A reply to the message was sent about midnight cautioning the personnel to remain indoors and cease all operation except monitoring the radio for further instructions.

Lieutenant McDaniel, who was at Kwajalein completing a routine weekly island supply visit, was met the next morning by Lieutenant Colonel Joe V. Disana, Deputy Commander, Test Services Unit, and Captain L. B. Chrestensen, Radiological-Safety Officer, 4931st Test Support Squadron, and was briefed on the situation existing at Rongerik.[3] Little difficulty was encountered in procuring transportation as the weekly supply trip to Rongerik was scheduled to depart that morning. Readings obtained by Captain Chrestensen's instruments, after arrival later that morning, were serious to the extent that evacuation of personnel was considered imperative by the Captain. Eight men were chosen to accompany the aircraft on its return to Kwajalein. Captain Chrestensen expected to secure permission to evacuate the other twenty personnel as soon as the aircraft could be sent on a return mission. The entire complement of twenty-eight men was at Kwajalein by 1830 hours that evening. The entire party, including the aircraft crew and Lieutenant McDaniel and Sergeant

3. See Supporting Document "B", Incl #1.

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Neal, was processed through a decontamination center and had blood counts taken. Lieutenant McDaniel and Sergeant Neal were released the next afternoon and returned to Eniwetok on 4 March.

It was decided by higher headquarters to bring the twenty-eight personnel to Eniwetok for further physical examination and to relieve the Kwajalein Hospital, whose facilities were limited in the field of radiological medicine, of the responsibility of these men. The first group arrived 8 March with the remainder following the next day, and all were quartered in Eniwetok Post Infirmary where daily blood counts and physical checks were instituted.

Higher in the chain of command, it was decided to have these men examined by specialists in radiological medicine in a location more remote from the possibility of future contamination. On the morning of 17 March, General Estes, accompanied by Colonel Carl H. Houghton, (USAF(MC)), Technical Advisor to General Estes, and Lieutenant Colonel Hammond addressed the personnel of Detachment 1 in the MATS Terminal. He told them that they would proceed to Kwajalein where they were to be examined by specialists and that the Atomic Energy Commission was also interested in effects caused by the radiation as they were the first humans to come in direct contact with contamination from this type of nuclear device.[4] The group then flew to Kwajalein in General Clarkson's C-54 accompanied by Colonel Houghton who was to coordinate matters with the Naval

4. Eyewitness account by M/Sgt Hickman of this Hq.

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authorities and brief the specialists.

Lieutenant McDaniel re-entered Rongerik on 10 March aboard the destroyer, USS NICHOLAS to assist in monitoring the situation there. He submitted a survey of the situation to this Headquarters.[5]

During late January, it was discovered that some Rawinsonde balloons were not of the type ordered with the specific written request that no substitutions be made at the depot. To be certain that this substitution was general at all weather islands and that height results desired could not be obtained with the substituted type, a survey was conducted. The results became conclusive during this period. The balloons were not obtaining the heights which the requested balloons had obtained on a previous project. The fact of the substituted balloons was pointed out in a letter to Task Group 7.4 through Test Services Unit.[6] It was suggested that higher height averages of perhaps ten thousand feet might be obtained with the originally requested balloons, but no promise could be made as some conditions exist in this tropical region which might prevent higher heights from being attained. Since there were questions of economy and feasibility of immediate procurement to be considered, no recommendations were submitted by this Headquarters. In an indorsement to this letter, Task Group 7.4 replied that action was being taken to procure these extra balloons.

Also on 13 March, Chief Warrant Officer Kapral (Commander, Detachment 1) and Staff Sergeant Billie F. Andrews (25171) pro-

5. See Supporting Document "F", Incl #2.
6. See Supporting Document "C".

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deeded to Kwajalein to assist in repairing the U.S. Navy GMD-1A. Their assistance had been requested a few days earlier by the Aerological Station at that Base. This has been done several times by personnel of this Element as a general policy of keeping all Rawinsonde equipment operational in this area. Such a mutual aid policy was established by Major Robinson and Lieutenant Junior Grade Moore, Aerology Officer at Kwajalein, prior to the start of this operation. Mister Moore has assisted several times by supplying this organization with some vital Rawinsonde part when needed. From Kwajalein, Mister Kapral proceeded to Majuro on 17 March to assist in repairing that station's GMD-1A.

Detachment 3 at Kusaie had difficulty repairing its radio facilities which had ceased to operate on 17 March. The following day, an AACS mechanic was flown to that island and the Kusaie SCR-399 returned to operation on 19 March.

Headquarters, USAF informed this Element on 20 March that (Element Personnel Specialist) was to return to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on top urgent emergency leave.[7] departed Eniwetok at 0830 the next morning with a "Priority 1" for the Zone of Interior. His duties were divided between this Element's First Sergeant and Senior Clerk with assistance from the Test Services Unit Personnel Specialist. anticipated early return to this organization would relieve the inconvenience.

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7. See Supporting Document "D".

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During early March, plans were laid to man Rongerik on a temporary basis. Arrangements were made to send a team of three men to the island via aircraft and use the existing equipment for soundings on the day previous to "Shot Day".[8] Three of these missions were sent during March, using personnel from Eniwetok Base Rawinsonde Section.

Major Robinson requested of Task Group 7.4, that Rongerik again be monitored subsequent to the last detonation of this series to insure the safety of personnel dismantling this station.[9]

Kusaie was not visited during the week of 14-20 March. Because of low clouds and unfavorable weather conditions, the aircraft was unable to land at that station.

A Troop Deployment Schedule to return all personnel assigned to this Element to their permanent stations was submitted on 24 March. This schedule followed deployment plans laid out in Weather Reporting Element Operations Plan 1-54.

Captain Bagwell, previously mentioned Special Services Officer, presented this organization with book kits on 13 March. Books and magazines were then distributed to the weather islands.

It was decided to publish an official document at this Headquarters weekly to keep the Detachments posted on events concerning this organization. It was to be in the form of a bulletin and was given the name, "The Weekly Word". It was hoped that this publica-

8. See Supporting Documents "E" and "F".
9. See Supporting Document "G".

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tion would effect more rapid coordination among the units of the Element.[10]

A second in this series of nuclear devices was detonated on 27 March with little immediate effect on Weather Reporting Element facilities.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS

Detachment 2 was plagued with luck of a devious nature during this period. The drive motor of the pylon assembly of the GMD-1A located at Majuro became inoperative on 8 March, and as no spare pylon assembly (or its components) was available, this station was forced to operate the equipment manually. Literally pushing and pulling the antenna to remain on target, these men managed to average 75,596 (Raob) and 49,936 (Rawin) feet which is considered remarkable under the circumstances. A pylon assembly rushed to Majuro from Kwajalein proved inoperative also, making necessary, the repair of the GMD-1A by improvision. A small electric motor was procured from the Trust Territories electrician and adapted to the pylon assembly, which proved to work quite well; as was evident when Detachment 2 averaged soundings of 92,233 feet for the following week. The previously mentioned difficulties caused Detachment 2 to miss the 0300 Zebra sounding, 15 March, which was the first obligated observation missed during this Element's operational phase, however,

10. See Supporting Document "H".

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a pibal ascension was made, keeping the sounding from being a total loss.

For reasons mentioned in Chapter I of this History, alternate operational procedures had to be initiated at Rongerik. Teams consisting of one Weather Equipment Technician and two Rawinsonde Operators were sent to this island one day prior to planned "Shot Days" and made one Rawinsonde observation in the proximity of 1200 LST, followed by a special Rawin at 1500LST. Teams were sent on 12 March, (consisting of

. Personnel for these missions were drawn from Detachment 2, 57th Weather Reconnaisance Squadron on a temporary basis until final plans could be made.

An anticipated halt in the upward trend of height averages of this Element was encountered during March and was attributed to the fact that the altitude maximums of the balloons used were being reached and the fact that the project termination date was approaching. These averages were expected to rise, however, as the originally ordered (but not received) balloons were forthcoming.

All detachments of this Element have encountered difficulty in the guise of defective instruments. On occasion, reference and temperature traces will print erratically. The cause for this is at-

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tributed to two possibilities: oxidation or corrosion of the instrument commutator bar, causing the pen arm to stick; and the possibility that the pen arm catches on the wire leading to the humidity element within the instrument. It was hoped that careful pre-release inspection of the instruments would allay this problem.

CHAPTER III

SUPPLY

Roll-up supplies in the form of banding seals, shipping document forms, and tags were sent to the weather islands. Most items needed for roll-up were included in the island packages.

Lettuce, potatoes, celery, and other perishable foods were procured and distributed to the weather islands. This move was important for moralle as well as health reasons.

Sergeant Neal, having proceeded to Majuro on 6 March and Ponape on 17 March, accomplished a great deal along lines of coordination. He arranged for uniformity in the preparation of all documents and instructed the island personnel in preparing the shipping documents and the control register in such a manner as to provide a double-check against the UPREAL if the need should arrise.

Realizing the necessity of complete identification of supplies and equipment, he assisted the island supply men in identifying items that had not been readily identifiable.

Boxes and crates to be re-used were inspected by Sergeant Neal and necessary repairs to the equipment were estimated so that these

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packages might be returned to stock in the best possible condition. Roll-up supplies included in these packages were surveyed and checked against physical need and all doubts concerning roll-up were clarified.

Having accomplished all possible coordination on these matters, Sergeant Neal returned to Eniwetok on 26 March and proceeded to expedite the acquisition of critical items such as spare pylon assemblies and additional roll-up supplies. By this time, the handling of supply matters had become quite a task as this Element's Senior Organizational Supply Specialist was among those exposed to radiation at Rongerik, leaving Sergeant Neal as the only airman supply representative in this organization.

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

27 March 1954

SUBJECT: Rongerik Incident

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187

Inclosed is a report of personnel of this element on events which occurred 1 March 1954 through 3 March 1954 concerning radioactive contamination of personnel at Eniwetak Island, Rongerik Atoll M.I.

3 Incls:
1. Rept (Rongerik Incident) by Maj Robinson
2. Ltr fr Lt McDaniel to Maj Robinson, Subj: Evac of Rongerik Pers
3. Extract fr WOJG Kapral's Diary

FELLIE F ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

ASTM/HQ

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RONGERIK INCIDENT

I had no indications of any but usual operations from any of my detachments. Weather reports were coming a little late but considered excellent under the conditions. Example: Rongerik - 1 hour late, Ponape - 42 minutes, Kusaie - 1:05 late and Majuro - 11 minutes late.

About 2300 that night I received a message from my detachment at Rongerik DTG 010300Z as follows: "FOR JTF SEVEN ENIWETOK SMCLN PASS TO MR. BRESLIN PD AUTO MONITOR PRESENT READING IS ONE ZERO ZERO PLUS REPEAT ONE ZERO ZERO PLUS CMA PEN OFF CHART AND HAS BEEN IN THIS POSITION SINCE 0250 ZEBRA REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT FROM BRESLIN SIGNED COMMDR". Since I attended a Radiological-Safety course at Keesler AFB in February-March 1949, I realized that serious fall-out might have occured. I awakened Col. Hammond, Test Services Unit Commander, whose quarters are in the next room to mine, and explained the possibilities. The communications center personnel had explained that they were unable to contact Mr. Breslin at Parry Island and had called me since they were unable to obtain the desired acknowledgement of the message. Since I did not know the relationship of the monitor reading to the radiation value (Roentgens) I could not evaluate the seriousness of the situation. However, to preclude any serious effects and to minimize the danger of exposure, I prepared a message to WOJG Kapral, my Officer in Charge at Rongerik as follows: "CEASE ALL OPERATIONS IMMED AND ALL PERS REMAIN INSIDE METAL BUILDINGS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE PD MAINTAIN ROTATING SHIFT RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WITH 1DR FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS PD ROBINSON SENDS". Major Montgomery, Executive for Test Services Unit was awakened and sent to the communications center to send out the message and wait there for further instructions from Col. Hammond. In the meantime we had called Col. Crosby and Col. Houghton of TG 7.4 and Captain Chrestenson of the 4930th Test

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Support Group, all concerned with radiological safety, and asked them to come over to my quarters for a conference. They arrived about the time Major Montgomery departed for the communications center. I also called Col. Miller of Task Group 7.1 to see if we could learn anything more definite on the seriousness of the situation. He informed me that Mr. Breslin was aboard the USS Estes and could not be contacted immediately. I requested that he make further efforts to evaluate the situation and let me know. Col. Hammond phoned Major Montgomery and asked him to relay the information in the original TWX to the USS Estes and this was accomplished. Since I had a weather island resupply flight going to Rongerik the next morning, I requested that a monitor be sent along with the flight to Rongerik. All agreed that this could and should be done and Captain Chrestenson said he would furnish one. Col. Miller called back and was unable to furnish additional information except that he believed the auto-monitor to be able to record a maximum on the order of one hundred milli-roentgens. After discussing the situation at length, we all agreed that since we were now certain that the information was in the hands of the radiological safety people on the USS Estes, a monitor would go into Rongerik the next day, and since my people were under cover, we had accomplished all we could possibly do that night. It was now about 0200. All departed and I remained up to take care of details concerning the monitor going by MATS to Kwajalein. About 0220, Captain Chrestenson returned to my room and said that he would go. However, he was PCS at Eniwetok and had no orders. We contacted the MATS Terminal people and found he had to be there before 0300 for departure. To expedite matters I decided to cut orders myself. This was done at

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Captain Chrestenson's office while he was obtaining his gear for the trip. Concerned with only the short time available to get Captain Chrestenson off I neglected to contact Col. Starkey, Commander, Test Support Unit. I saw him the next day and apologized for the oversight. However, Captain Chrestenson did get aboard the aircraft and arrived in plenty of time to go on our resupply flight. I returned to my quarters and went to bed it now being about 0330.

The next day about noon I heard rumors that Rongerik was being evacuated but exact details of this should be prepared by others since I do not have any definite information on it. I did coordinate with Test Service Unit and Task Group 7.4 personnel on and prepare the message sent to Comdr NAVSTA KWAJ requesting evacuation of personnel from Rongerik but understand that evacuation was already in process prior to the message reaching Kwajale

The next day Col. Hammond at my request and upon coordination with Task Group 7.4 arranged for a C-47 flight to Kwajalein and return for Major Langford, Task Group 7.4 Flight Surgeon, and I. At Kwajalein, Major Langford talked to the Navy Flight Surgeon who had been in charge of our Rongeri evacuated personnel and obtained radioactivity information pertaining to them I talked to the personnel.

Captain Chrestenson and Lt. McDaniel, from my headquarters, and Naval authorities had all indoctrinated my men on security precautions to be adhered to. In addition I gave orders that no one evacuated from Rongerik would talk to anyone concerning the incident or conditions at Rongerik regardless of rank, without express permission from Mr. Kapral. Mr Kapral in turn would not give his permission without express orders from Captain Zacheo, JTF SEVEN Liason Officer at Kwajalein. I discussed this at some

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length with Captain Zacheo and was satisfied that the security of the situation was well in hand.

My men were not alarmed by their situation and were enjoying their rest.

I found that upon arrival of our men at Kwajalein, a decontamination center had been immediately established and all personnel carefully monitored for radioactivity. Decontamination by numerous shower rinses had been effected and new clothes issued from the Naval stores. Our people were segregated and placed in quarters with proper radiological safety precaution signs. I believe the Commander of Naval Station at Kwajalein accomplished most effective emergency measures. In behalf of my personnel I am most appreciative of this action.

I made a copy of Mr. Kapral's diary for the period which is inclosed.

I also asked Lt. McDaniel to prepare a summary of the situation as he saw it during the period. He was at Kwajalein and went on the first flight to Rongerik. A copy of this will be forwarded as soon as possible. Lt. McDaniel is at present on a monitoring and equipment check assignment at Rongerik.

FELLIE F ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander, Wea. Rept. Eln, Prov.

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HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

SUBJECT: Evacuation of Rongerik Personnel

TO: Commander
Weather Reporting Element, Prov.
APO 187

1. The following paragraphs contain a brief summary of events that I have knowledge of relative to evacuation of personnel on Rongerik Atoll.

2. I departed Eniwetok on 28 February by military aircraft and arrived at Kwajalein same date.

3. On 1 March I made plans with Commander McDaniel, Air Department Officer, Kwajalein NAS for visits to the weather islands including a visit to Rongerik on 2 March.

4. On 2 March I was awakened by my alarm clock at 0530 hours. When I left my room in the Air Force BOQ to proceed to the latrine I saw Lt Col DiSana and Captain Christensen approaching the latrine. Captain Christensen stated that he had come to Kwajalein to accompany me to Rongerik to make a survey of the conditions on the atoll. Up until this time I was not aware of certain events that had occurred at Rongerik during the preceding 24 hours.

5. After a short discussion of the matter at the BOQ we proceeded to the MATS Terminal for breakfast. After eating breakfast we loaded all supplies consigned to Rongerik on the UF-1 Seaplane. Captain Christensen issued a film badge to each individual going on the trip to Rongerik. We got aboard the aircraft and departed at 0800 arriving over Rongerik Atoll approximately 0930. Captain Christensen had the pilot of the aircraft fly at various fly at various altitudes to enable him to record readings prior to landing and going ashore on Eniwetak Island. The readings on his instruments indicated that the atoll had experienced events that had not been anticipated. He tried to contact Eniwetok Atoll by aircraft radio but was unable to do same. He then contacted Kwajalein and requested that a message relative to conditions at Rongerik be relayed to Eniwetok. After flying around the atoll for approximately 2 hours, we landed in the lagoon at 1130 hours. Captain Christensen stated he would go ashore on Eniwetak Island to make a gereral survey of all areas. Upon

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going ashore he immediately began taking readings with his instrument in the Air Force living area. The survey results indicated events had occurred that made it imperative that all personnel be evacuated as soon as possible.

6. Captain Christensen had WOJG Kapral select 8 men to depart on the return flight to Kwajalein. We departed from the Rongerik lagoon at 1230 hours and arrived at Kwajalein at 1400 hours.

7. Upon my arrival at Kwajalein, Admiral Clarke, Commander McDaniel, Captain Zacheo and many other people met the aircraft. A general discussion took place relative to evacuation of 20 personnel still on Rongerik. After several minutes had elapsed, I requested of Admiral Clarke that he send an aircraft to Rongerik to airlift the remaining personnel. The pilot of the aircraft stated that he would return and airlift the remaining personnel after he had time to get a brief lunch. Admiral Clarke concurred in this procedure and the aircraft departed at approximately 1500 hours for Rongerik. The 20 personnel arrived at Kwajalein at approximately 1830 hours.

8. All personnel that were stationed on Rongerik and all passengers that went to Rongerik on the first flight had to be processed through the decontamination center at Kwajalein. Upon completion of same, personnel were then taken to the base hospital for a blood count test.

9. After completion of the blood count test, all enlisted personnel were assigned to Building 1150 for quarters pending further medical observation. The officer personnel were assigned quarters in Building 1141 pending further observation.

10. At approximately 1500 hours, 3 March, Major Langford and Major Robinson arrived from Eniwetok. Major Langford proceeded to the base hospital and held a conference with the base surgeon, Commander Hall. After completion of same, Major Langford gave a short briefing to all Rongerik personnel relative to their welfare.

11. T Sgt Neal and I were released from further medical observation so we departed at 1930 hours by aircraft for Eniwetok Atoll. All other personnel were retained at Kwajalein for further medical observation.

JOSEPH W McDANIEL
1st Lt, USAF

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Extract from WOJG Kapral's Diary

1 Mar 54 - Monday:

Had a restful sleep, ear condition seemingly better. At 0645L, the western sky was brilliantly illuminated, almost requiring shading of the eyes. Illumination lasted for 55-60 seconds before it returned to normal. The top of the mushroom cloud was seen. About 11 minutes later the sound came through, rattling the buildings. The time it took the sound to reach here indicates the flash was about 136 miles away. The radiological "auto Monitor" indicated its maximum reading at and stayed there to midnight end of the day. Hq WREP was notified at and first answer was received at . "Conditions beyond our control, no reply expected before tomorrow". Normal operating until midnight.

2 Mar 54 - Tuesday:

Auto Monitor at max from midnight. Second message received at 0030L. "Cease all operations immediately and all personnel remain inside metal buildings until further notice. Maintain rotating shift radio communications with 1DR for further instructions." At monitor still at max personnel had been exposed to for 18 hours & Project total is 39 hours. At 1000 received MSG that a PBM was enroute to 1DR4 and due in at Arrived at & landed at after cruising around. Capt Chrestenson, rad-safe off ordered evacuation of all personnel after coming ashore and taking readings in living area. 8 men in alphabetical order were taken off at Same A/C returned at and removed the rest of the detachment (20 men) took off a Monitor stayed at maximum until removed from oper at

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HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

13 March 1954

SUBJECT: Weather Balloons

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. This element has a requirement in its mission to provide rawinsonde observations to an average of 90,000 feet.

2. Despite the fact that personnel assigned to this unit have produced most exceptional results in the zone of interior, averaging approximately 20,000 feet higher than personnel of other organizations, they have been unable to obtain the required 90,000 foot average here. Careful monitoring of their methods and spirit has shown that under the circumstances, the best possible heights are being obtained. A typical example of spirit instilled in the men is shown by the Eniwetok rawinsonde section over which I have operational control. For several months this particular station has held top honors in the 2143d Air Weather Wing which is comprised of all stations in the Asiatic-Pacific area. Their heights averaged 62,000 feet but with improved methods and infusion of spirit for higher observations, they increased their average height to over 80,000 feet in about one month. The Weather Reporting Element overall height averages for January are 74,797 feet and for February (incomplete totals) 83,039 feet. With complete results, the February average can be expected to change only slightly.

3. The primary reason for failure to obtain the desired heights is that specific balloons ordered were not obtained as requested. ML-391 C balloons were substituted for ML-391 B balloons requested for daytime soundings. A 500 gram neoprene balloon was substituted for a 500 gram neoprene night flight Kaysam 5SN balloon requested for night time soundings. It is not known at this headquarters who authorized the substitutions. Recent specifications received indicate that heights of 80,000 feet may be expected sixty per cent of the time, with the ML-443 A, which is a backup balloon.

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B/Ltr fr Hqs, WREP, APO 187, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif., Subj: Weather Balloons, dtd 13 Mar 54

Other balloons received are admittedly of the poorer types available. The operators making the observations have done extremely well with the materiel at their disposal.

4. The secondary reason for failure to obtain the desired heights is the very low temperature encountered at the tropopause in this region which is much lower than in the United States. In general the balloons become hard and brittle losing their ability to expand or to retain their internal pressure as they rise and thus burst at a comparatively low altitude.

5. The third reason for failure to obtain the desired heights is moisture incountered, especially at Majuro, Kusaie and Ponape. Perhaps the ice crystals formed weaken the balloon, but this is a technical matter which I am not qualified or prepared to evaluate. The results are consistent. When excessive moisture is present, comparatively low heights are obtained and no amount of re-releases will produce increased heights.

6. If new balloons are procured, the most expeditious supply action would require two and a half weeks to place them in the hands of the operating personnel. Thus 375 of each type would be necessary to complete the operation if Rongerik can be returned to operation by the end of this month or 300 of each type necessary if Rongerik is not returned to full operation but used only one or two days prior to shot days.

8. Factors to be considered im making the decision on ordering additional balloons are as follows:

a. New balloons may attain average heights of 10.000 feet greater than present balloons. Many individual heights may be expected to 100,000 feet and above. This may or may not be at critical times.

b. New balloons would probably not be received prior to 27 March.

c. Additional expense will be required to obtain the balloons. The 500 gram night balloons will cost $900.00 if Rongerik is not returned to full operation and $1050.00 if Rongerik is in full operation during April I understand that some $5000.00 originally set aside by Task Group 7.4 for the purchase of the original 500 gram balloon was not used, if so, this money should be available for that purpose. The other balloon is a standard Air Force item and should entail no additional expense. Other costs would be for transportation and handling which I have no means of estimating.

d. The highest possible heights are desired by weather forecasters and radiological safety people. It has been learned that serious fall-out may occur from heights above those attained by rawinsonde observations at present. Definite information at higher levels than presently obtainable may prove to be of vital importance in radiological safety considerations to be made affecting the final order for firing each shot. Peculiar winds at these higher levels may indicate serious fall-out over such populated locations as Eniwetok or Kwajalein which would not be suspected without this information.

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B/Ltr fr Hqs, WREP, APO 187, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif., Subj: Weather Balloons, dtd 13 Mar 54

e. Better results may not be obtained with the new balloons, but if they are obtained, and there are good indications that they could be, the information received may be of sufficient importance to warrant the expense.

FELLIE F. ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

In view of the lack of certain required information at this level it is impractical to make a definite recommendation regarding the adviseability of securing different type balloons for this operation. Although we are not obtaining the rawinsonde heights desired by JTF-7, the factors mentioned in paragraph 9 of basic correspondence, plus any others which may have a bearing on the problem, should be weighed against each other to arrive at a decision. It is suggested that coordination between your Headquarters and JTF-7 may be advisable. Request this Headquarters be notified of the decision reached.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

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Hq, Wea Rept Elm, Prov., Subj: Weather Balloons

TGMS 702 (13 Mar 54) 2nd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California 20 Mar 1954

TO: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

The Base Supply Officer has been requested to submit an emergency requisition for three hundred (300) each of the ML 443, ML 391-B and the 5SN Night Flight Balloons. Recommend direct coordination with AF 2272 SO for further information on availability.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

A. J. AMERSON
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

3rd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

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HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/ Postmaster
San Francisco, California

6 March 1954

SUBJECT: Radiation Monitoring and Operational Readiness Plan for Rongerik Atoll.

THRU: Commander, Test Services Unit, Prov.
APO 187

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Prov.
APO 187

1. Rongerik Atoll, site of Weather Reporting Element, Provisional Detachment Number 1, having been rendered untenable by excessive radiation, must be monitored to determine the time when it can again become operational and all operating equipment checked and maintenance performed to retain its usefulness.

2. To perform the mission as stated in paragraph 1, it is proposed that a team be sent to Rongerik twice a week composed of the following:

a. An Officer in Charge to be furnished by WREP.

b. A Radiological Safety Monitor to be furnished by Headquarters, Task Group 7.4.

c. A Radio Mechanic to be furnished by the Communications Element, Provisional.

d. A Motor Mechanic to be furnished by the Communications Element, Provisional.

e. A DUKW operator and mechanic to be obtained from Task Group 7.2 by Headquarters, Task Group 7.4.

3. Transportation for the mission, as stated in paragraph 1, should be by amphibious aircraft and furnished by the Commander, Naval Station, Kwajalein. Request for the transportation will be made by Commander, Weather Reporting Element as a routine flight through established channels.

4. It is estimated that two hours ashore will be required to accomplish the following duties:

a. Rad-Safe Monitor:

(1) Determine feasibility of the party going ashore for one or two hours.

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(2) Obtain samples of soil as follows:

(a) Four from living area.

(b) Two from weather site.

(c) Two from Army site.

(3) Obtain sample of sea water.

(4) Obtain sample of water from distillation unit

(5) Obtain sample of water from storage tank

(6) Obtain samples of non-perishable food.

(7) Take radiation readings on varied food products.

(8) Record information for plotting iso-dose lines in living and working areas and along the roads on the island.

(9) Take radiation readings on operational equipment.

b. Motor Mechanic:

(1) Check all power units for operation.

(2) Check operation of motor vehicle.

(3) Check operation of refrigerator units both gasoline powered and electric.

(4) Check power supply of water distillation unit.

c. Radio Mechanic:

(1) Check operation of SCR-399 and homer.

(2) Assist with evacuation of perishable cold storage foods.

d. DUKW Operator and Mechanic:

(1) Check operation of DUKW.

(2) Evacuate perishable cold storage foods.

5. To provide maximum precautions against radiation exposure, Task Group 7.4 Radiological Safety Officer will furnish the following:

a. Six fatigue type suits sizes:

b. Six pair heavy sox sizes:

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e. Six pair shoes sizes:

d. Six pair protective gloves sizes:

e. Six fatigue type caps sizes:

f. Six pair shoe protective covers.

g. Four T-1B monitors.

h. Six film badges.

i. Six pocket dosimeters.

j. Twenty bottles or other containers for water, food and soil samples.

6. Access to the Island: The surf boat was left tied to the seaplane mooring buoy. This may have shipped water, in which case, the oars may have been lost. Two oars (8 foot) will be taken to provide for this contigency and for initial access to the beach. Once ashore, the DUKW may be used for further operation. Upon completion of the mission, gear to be returned will be brought out on the DUKW, transferred from the DUKW to the amphibious airplane with the surf boat, then the DUKW returned to the island and the final party returned to the seaplane by the surf boat which will be securely tied to the seaplane buoy. In the event that the surf boat has broken loose from the buoy and lost, a six-man liferaft will be used in its place.

7. Miscellaneous: The frozen food refrigerators were turned off prior to evacuation of personnel from the island. All this food is perishable and must be removed from the refigerators if they are ever to be used again. This food should be loaded aboard the DUKW and dumped overboard about two miles west of the island in the lagoon. Two gas masks or suitable substitute may be necessary for men accomplishing this task since these foods have been exposed to normal temperatures for a week.

All personnel checking equipment should be highly qualified so that little time will be lost if the equipment fails to perform normally. These personnel should also determine what spare or repair parts should be brought in on the following maintenance trip.

A rough map of the island as attached will be provided each person going ashore to readily locate equipment and areas.

All protective clothing will be donned prior to initial handling of the surf boat. During all activities ashore, clothing will be fastened at the neck, wrists and ankles. Protective sox will cover the lower extremeties of the trouser legs.

upon returning to the seaplane, all clothing will be immediately removed and clean clothing put on.

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Immediately upon arrival on the island all electronic gear will be turned on and remain on all the time the party is ashore. This will provide maximum protection for the equipment against the elements.

FELLIE F ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

6 March 1954

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

Forwarded for your consideration. This headquarters concurs in actions proposed in basic letter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
n/c

JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

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Hq Wea Rept Elm Subj: Radiation Monitoring and Operational Readiness Plan for Rongerik Atoll

TGOR 702 (6 Mar 54) 2nd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California, 19 Mar 1954

TO: Commander, Test Services Unit, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. This headquarters concurs in the general plan outlined in basic correspondence for the re-entry of RONGERIK.

2. Provided below are certain additional coordinative and implemention requirements to guide the planning effort of your headquarters for the periodic re-entry into RONGERIK and the eventual re-establishment of its weather reporting facilities to normal operating condition. The completion of these actions will aid in accomplishing the objective of this important mission.

a. The Test Services Unit has conducted the first in a series of re-entry missions to RONGERIK to inspect, service, maintain and operate the equipment installed thereat. Secceeding re-entry missions for this purpose will be conducted approximately five (5) days to one (1) week apart and the period any team remains on RONGERIK will not exceed rad-safe limits. The initial re-entry team was transported to RONGERIK via surface vessel. It is contemplated that amphibious aircraft will be used for subsequent trips and that the team will consist of five (5) to seven (7) personnel.

b. The Commander, Test Services Unit, is authorized to make arrangements to secure necessary transportation for subsequent re-entry missions, in accordance with procedures which already exist for normal logistical support of the weather islands. In the event that transportation for future re-entry missions can not be obtained from this source, the Commander, Test Services Unit, is authorized to coordinate his requirement with the Commander, Test Support Unit, who will make every effort to provide airlift support for this project with available amphibious aircraft. The Commander, Test Support Unit, has been advised concerning this contingency.

c. A qualified DUKW operator, who is also a qualified DUKW maintenance and repair mechanic, will accompany each re-entry team, to restore the RONGERIK DUKW to a full operational condition and to operate the vehicle for the team on each re-entry mission to RONGERIK. The Test Services Unit will coordinate this requirement with the Director of Personnel, this headquarters, who is initiating appropriate action.

d. A Radiological Safety Monitor will accompany, and be a member of, each re-entry team; and it is the responsibility of the oper-

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ating unit to insure that this requirement is fulfilled.

e. The Commander, Test Aircraft Unit, will provide the Test Services Unit with a fully qualified Radiological Safety Monitor who will accompany, and become a member of each re-entry team, until such time as the radiation level on RONGERIK does not constitute a hazard to personnel. The Commander, Test Aircraft Unit, has knowledge of this requirement and will be contacted directly in further coordination to be effected by the Commander, Test Services Unit.

f. As part of his specific duties, the Rad/Safety monitor will:

(1) Insure that no member of the re-entry team is unduly exposed to excessive radiation.

(2) Brief the team prior to take-off concerning the radiation hazards which they are likely to encounter.

(3) Determine the radiation hazard at each location on RONGERIK scheduled for re-entry during a mission, this function to be completed before an individual enters the particular location.

(4) Coordinate the issue of film badges, dosimeters, etc. to all members of the re-entry party, supervise the use and handling of the equipment and insure its proper post-mission disposition.

g. On each re-entry mission, radiation intensities, as indicated by detection instruments, will be recorded and forwarded to the Director of Operations, this headquarters, ATTN: Technical Projects Division, upon return of the team to ENIWETOK. In addition, samples of coral and other contaminated debris, found in the vicinity of working areas at RONGERIK, will be obtained under the direct supervision of the Rad/Safety monitor, who will convey the samples to a representative of Task Group 7.1 upon return of the team to ENIWETOK. The Rad/Safety member of the team also will record on a map or sketch the approximate physical location on the island at which each sample was collected. To assist in recording this important data, there are attached hereto, as Inclosure #1 forty (40) copies of a hand-drawn map of RONGERIK (not drawn to scale). Details concerning the foregoing rad/safety requirements first should be obtained from Lt Colonel James E. Crosby, Directorate of Operations, this headquarters.

h. The Commander, Test Aircraft Unit, has been requested to provide the Test Services Unit with the following items of equipment to support at least six (6) personnel who will constitute the re-entry team:

(1) Fatigue type suits

(2) Heavy socks

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(3) Shoes

(4) Protective gloves

(5) Fatigue type caps

(6) Shoe protective covers

(7) T-1B monitors (approximately four (4))

(8) Film badges

(9) Pocket dosimeters

(10) Bottles or other adequate containers for water, food, and soil samples.

The exact quantities, types and sizes as appropriate, of the above items, which are required for this operation, will be transmitted to the Test Aircraft Unit through direct coordinative action by the Commander, Test Services Unit. The Rad/Safety member of each re-entry team must insure that the protective devices and equipment are properly worn and/or used at all times.

i. The Commander, Test Services Unit, will be responsible for organizing the re-entry team and insuring that necessary material, particularly emergency and protective equipment adequate to meet the requirements of the operation, accompanies each re-entry party. He will insure that all personnel, including the aircraft crew, possess required film badges, dosimeters, etc., this latter function to be coordinated with the Rad-Safety monitor. He will insure that the entire re-entry party are thoroughly briefed on all aspects of their mission and that the re-entry plan is appropriately coordinated with all agencies providing support for his mission.

j. Within two (2) days subsequent to the return of a re-entry team, an over-all report covering the entire mission will be submitted in triplicate to this headquarters, ATTN: Director of Operations. This report will include, but not be limited to, coverage of the following important topics:

(1) Conditions of equipment and its operational status in general.

(2) Any unusual condition affecting special equipment which indicates excessive maintenance or replacement requirements.

(3) Any abnormal condition of utilities and related facilities which may adversely affect living conditions when RONGERIK is re-occupied for normal operations.

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(4) Any observation which indicates damage to or deterioration of equipment, housing and working areas or impairment of supplies.

(5) Any other pertinent observation which the Commander, Test Services Unit, considers significant to the re-establishment of the weather reporting capability on RONGERIK ISLAND.

k. With reference to personnel who were evacuated from RONGERIK, the Commander, Test Services Unit, will submit a report which will reflect the movement of each evacuee for whom he is responsible, to include dates and locations, from the time the individual was evacuated until he reaches his ultimate duty destination in the forward area. Thereafter, a report will be submitted on the individual whenever he is transferred within the area and until he departs from the forward area in a permanent status. These reports will be submitted to the Director of Personnel, this headquarters.

l. Provided that radiological contamination has dissipated safely, the Commander, Test Services Unit, will re-establish the weather reporting facilities to normal operation subsequent to 18 March 1954. Only personnel who previously have not been exposed to radiation intensities considered excessive, will be assigned to man the weather reporting installation on RONGERIK ISLAND.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:
Map of Rongerik (40 cys)

A. J. AMERSON
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

3rd Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Weather Reporting Element, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Reference is made to 2nd Indorsement.

a. You are requested to comply with all provisions of subject indorsement.

b. It is desired that this headquarters be furnished copies of reports required by sub-paragraphs 2. d, g, and j.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

AFWL/HQ

1 Incl
n/c

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JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

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HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

3 April 1954

SUBJECT: Report on Rongerik Special Mission Trips

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, subject: Radiation Monitoring and Operational Readiness Plan for Rongerik Atoll, dated 6 March 1954, and indorsements thereto by Headquarters, Test Services Unit and Headquarters, Task Group 7.4.

2. After this plan was submitted on 6 March, I was informed that Lt. Colonel Nugent had been placed in charge of preparing missions to Rongerik Atoll. His main concern was to maintain and turn on the radio beacon located on Rongerik. Lt. Colonel Fackler informed me that Colonel Nugent would take care of my rawinsonde personnel in addition to the AACS and rad-safe monitor personnel. I jotted down some notes concerning the visits to Rongerik, and the events of this day which lead up to the new planning on the trips. These notes were furnished Lt. Colonel Fackler and substantially became the operating agreement upon which all subsequent flights to Rongerik have been based. These notes are attached as inclosure #1.

3. Airborne trips to Rongerik were performed 12 March, 19 March, and 26 March. Rawinsonde observations were made with the following results:

12 March - Two observations to 87,159 and 85,000 feet.
19 March - Two observations to 76,968 and 78,000 feet.
26 March - Two observations to 82,284 and 58,000 feet.

4. On 7 March 1954 a party of scientists headed by Dr. Schoville of Task Group 7.1 prepared to visit Rongerik and other islands to determine radiation measurements. This group was to fly to Kwajalein on 7 March, then fly to Rongelap Atoll on 8 March for a rendezvous with a destroyer which would take the party ashore at the various islands. Upon learning of this mission I immediately sought to combine our own maintenance requirements, as listed in the letter noted in paragraph 1, with those of the Task Group 7.1 Party. This was accomplished with approval of intermediate headquarters. The weather personnel were heade by Lieutenant McDaniel of this organization and the AACS personnel by Lieutenant Herbig of the Communications Element. A copy of Lieutenant McDaniel's report is enclosed for your information.

AFWL/HQ

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5. Until the letter mentioned in paragraph 1 was endorsed back to this headquarters, this element had no responsibility toward obtaining radiation readings at Rongerik though much assistance was given to all concerned in the planning of the visits. As a result all readings of radiation have been sent to the radiological safety people and to the medical officers in the various headquarters. If these readings are desired, they may be obtained from JTF SEVEN J-3.

6. Request relief from the instructions contained in 2nd Indorsement of the letter cited in paragraph 1. It appears that the WREP has been operating under two sets of instructions. The instructions contained in the cited letter have been fulfilled substantially by the destroyer survey party with additional information obtained on subsequent amphibious aircraft trips. The trips to Rongerik are being performed in a very excellent manner under the working agreement submitted as inclosure #1. To change the present working arrangement would only lead to confusion.

2 Incls:
1. Notes on Working Agreement (Major Robinson)
2. Report on Visit to Rongerik Atoll (Lt. McDaniel)

FELLIE F ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

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AFWL/HQ

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED [redacted]

10 March 1954 - Major Robinson

I talked to Colonel House, JTF Seven, about 1150LST concerning the possibility of returning personnel to Rongerik. He felt that this could be accomplished for a short period of time (8 hours) by 12 March with the personnel receiving only a dosage of maximum . This would allow for two rawinsonde observations during that period. These rawinsonde observations are considered most valuable as a forecasting tool by the weather forecasters. Lt. Colonel Bonnot, JTF Seven, also got on the line and felt that this should be done if at all possible. At this time, I believed that the people would have to come from Majuro as the personnel formerly at Rongerik had received too great a dosage to permit them to return to Rongerik at any time. I also found that Lt Col Nugent had a requirement to send two people to Rongerik on 12 March to turn on the homer. I then sought to combine the two requirements with one airlift, presumably to be made from Kwajalein. Talking to Col Nugent later, I found that the airlift was planned from Eniwetok with the PEM's stationed here. I then changed my plans from using Majuro personnel to that of using Eniwetok rawinsonde personnel who are under my operational control. I also talked to Lt Col Slater, WCEP Commander, concerning the requirement for observations from Rongerik. He stated that any observations from Rongerik would be extremely important to him as a basis for his forecasts but that if it would jeopardize having more extensive observations later for other shots he would prefer to not have them at the present time. I told him that results from the radiation survey party had not come in to Col House as yet - Col House had told me this; however Col House is going to let me know the results as soon as he can. Now, using Eniwetok personnel would save Majuro personnel for more extensive

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operation on Rongerik later. The only question remaining is that of providing transportation to Rongerik which is to be arranged through Major McLeroy, Base Operations Officer. Also, I am to furnish replacement personnel (from the Rongerik personnel now at Eniwetok) for the Eniwetok rawinsonde section. Captain Thorpe and I have worked out a plan to accomplish this.

Summed up, the requirement is now: Col Nugent will furnish the names, ranks and serial numbers of the two people to set up the homer to Major McLeroy as soon as possible. I will do the same of the five rawinsonde people whom I am sending. Major McLeroy will do his best to provide PBM airlift on the 12th, the PBM to remain afloat there for approximately six hours while the home is set up and the two rawinsonde observations are made. The rawinsonde observations may be sent to Kwajalein or Eniwetok, ATTN: Weather Central, via PBM. This should be done to eliminate unnecessary time spent on Rongerik. Also, dependent upon the radioactivity at the island, two R/S observations, one R/S observation or none will be made. This will be decided as soon as the results of the survey trip are known. One additional problem exists: that of getting ashore at Rongerik from the PBM. A six-man life raft should be taken for this purpose if the surf boat tied to the mooring buoy (aircraft) is not usable. Two extra oars should be carried aboard the PBM in case the surf boat's oars have floated away. And of course, the life raft used in case the surf boat has shipped any great quantity of water.

All personnel going ashore (Seven) should be provided with clothing, shoes, gloves, pocket dosimeters, film badges, etc., by Task Group 7.4. Monitoring equipment TIB's should also be provided by Task Group 7.4.

In case the shot is postponed a requirement would be made to reaccomplish the same mission the following day or the day before the postponed shot.

AFWL/HO

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HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

SUBJECT: Report on Visit to Rongerik Atoll

TO: Commander
Weather Reporting Element, Prov.
APO 187

1. I departed Eniwetok Atoll on 7 March 1954 for a visit to Eniwetak Island, Rongerik Atoll. Dr. Scoville, TG 7.1 and several other personnel accompanied me on the visit. Visits were made to four (4) atolls in addition to Rongerik.

2. Purpose of visit was to make a scientific survey of some islands in each atoll.

3. We arrived at Eniwetak Island, Rongerik Atoll at 0800 hours and departed at 1030 hours 10 March 1954. During time spent on island the following was accomplished:

a. All power units were checked for serviceability. One unit had not been uncrated so it is assumed that item is serviceable. Five units operated satisfactorily and three units can possibly be placed in serviceability status by completion of minor repairs. Two units are in need of major overhaul so repair of these items at location is not recommended.

b. The weapons carrier operated satisfactorily with exception of hydraulic brake system. Parts to repair the hydraulic brake system have been requisitioned.

c. The Army DUKW did not operate satisfactorily as the clutch will not engage the gears. Also, the oil lines connected to the oil filter are in need of replacement as they are broken and/or worn appreciably.

d. A check of the gasoline engine of the water distillation unit revealed same operates satisfactorily.

e. An operational check of the Homer Beacon indicated item is serviceable.

f. Radio Set SCR-399 was given a check and operated satisfactorily.

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h. Wind Equipment AN/GMD-1 was checked and operated satisfactorily.

i. The food in the chill and freeze walk-in type refrigerators was disposed of by dumping in the ocean.

4. The 17 ft Navy Surf Boat has disappeared. Item was attached by a rope to the buoy in the lagoon when personnel were evacuated on 2 March 1954. It is believed that item has sunk to bottom of lagoon or has washed out to sea.

5. A survey of the areas indicates that personnel were evacuated in such a manner that sufficient time was not available for properly storing or securing many items.

JOSEPH W McDANIEL
1st Lt, USAF
Deputy Commander

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AEC, LVD

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HEADQUARTERS
WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

13 March 1954

SUBJECT: Condemnation of Radioactive Materiel

THRU: Commander, Test Services Unit, Prov.
APO 187

TO: Commander, Task Group 7.4, Prov.
APO 187

1. Request a qualified monitor be furnished to determine radioactivity of all types of materiel at Rongerik in order that equipment which is considered contaminated may be condemned and not returned to the Zone of the Interior.

2. The monitor should be prepared to appropriately mark the equipment not to be returned..

3. The monitoring should be accomplished immediately subsequent to the last shot of this operation.

4. The equipment at Majuro, Kusaie and Ponape is considered to be too remote to be contaminated. However, a spot check monitor should be performed at these islands. It is recommended that this check be accomplished during the roll-up period.

5. Transportation of monitoring personnel to and from the weather islands may be effected through this headquarters.

FELLIE F ROBINSON
Major, USAF
Commander

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WEEKLY WORD

from

HEADQUARTERS

WEATHER REPORTING ELEMENT, PROV.



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COMMANDER COMMENTS

During the past two months, the need for a standard recurring "poop sheet" for the Weather Reporting Element has become apparent. This is the first of the weekly series and I hope that some of your questions are answered in this or subsequent issues.

Airman Oakley was good enough to design the cover.

This organization paper will be as good as you make it. You are interested in what the other detachments are doing and they are interested in what you are doing operationally and otherwise. All personnel in this headquarters will be required to contribute something for each issue. Facts or comments on any subject of general interest are most welcome from anyone in the element. Occasionally I expect to have some comments by some of the higher authorities for you.

This paper will be unclassified but is not intended for general distribution outside the service. Many of my comments to you will be sent via this media. This will not only save paperwork but will consolidate most matters so that they are readily available for all personnel to read and understand. On these subject this paper will be official. One such matter is that of security. You have al been briefed a number of times on security matters and taken several tests on the same subject but it is a most elementary matter to unwittingly commit a security violation. We have had several violations charged to WREP some of which were very minor but one was serious enough that the security officer had to take special action. I must personally answer any charges of security violation. In turn I may require a complete explanation from the individual responsible for the violation. There can be no compromises in security matters. Radio security in particular must be reemphasized by each detachment commander. Your by-words must be "When in doubt, classify". This is not the last you will hear on the subject of security. Upon receipt of this message, each detachment commander

will call a meeting of all detachment personnel and discuss security matters. This should be a group discussion in which every member voices a few of his concepts of the subject. Perhaps the man with the least to say should be required to prepare a lengthly summation of the group discussion.

On the matter of roll-up. Unused equipment should be prepared for final shipment at this time so that only operational equipment remains at the time of final roll-up. You all have the roll-up plan. Follow the directions carefully and there will be little confusion later on. An order will be published later on but will contain essentially the same information as the plan. In general, do everything now that you can. You will have more than enough to do during the final roll-up.

We have new balloons coming - the ones we originally requested. I have told higher authorities that we may expect 90,000 foot averages at all stations with these new balloons. You have accomplished an outstanding job in attaining your high averages of the last three months but we have been slipping during the last several weeks. Remember the new balloons will not "go" by themselves. You men must continue to use the utmost care and your most skilled procedures to obtain the highest possible heights of which the balloons are capable. I noted that the Eniwetok Rawinsonde Section has gone into the lead during the past several weeks. Congratulations to T/Sgt Hawley, T/Sgt McGroty and all the rawinsonde operators here. The month isn't over yet but I think you are assured of first place in the WREP standing and I am certain that this means first place throughout Air Weather Service. Your efforts have produced better than a 20,000 foot increase over your average before you joined our operation. It demonstrates good teamwork, competitive spirit, high morale, and excellent will to produce the best on the part of every man in the section. Other detachments, though still producing outstanding results, have slipped in obtaining their maximum height averages. It was expected that such would happen. But now is the time for each

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detachment commander to reaffirm the mission of his unit to his men and attempt to push the competitive spirit back up to the limit. You all know what we must have in heights. The detachment will not be much stronger than the weakest man. Every man must give his best or the whole detachment fails to produce its best.

I further noted that our standing in the 6th Weather Squadron is being threatened. During January and February we were definitely a way out in front in height averages in all Air Weather Service. Now that the season is warming up back in the ZI, the heights there will be increasing rapidly. We will not maintain our place even with the new balloons without expending a little more effort and care than used presently.

In reviewing records, I find that re-releases are producing higher heights but I am firmly convinced that the same heights could have been produced on the first release if proper care had been exercised throughout all preliminary preparations. Hereafter, I will expect that detachment commanders insure that not more than 20% extra re-releases are made. This is 20% of obligated observations and is the absolute maximum. Normally it should be considerably less.

A/1C Chapman has prepared a section on rawinsonde errors. We cannot consider any error level as being satisfactory but we know errors will be made so perhaps an error rate of 1.0 per observation might be our goal at present. All detachments are well above that. Reduction of errors will result only from constant review of errors and possible errors by NCO's with their operators. We are getting the error information to you now so take advantage of it for your own benefit.

Action will be taken this month to obtain several trophies to be awarded to detachments and shifts for outstanding achievement in obtaining heights, low errors and other efforts. This will be on overall operation results and the base rawinsonde section will be in the competition.

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RAWINSONDE - A/1C Chapman

The runs from Rongerik for both January and February were available for checking purposes at the first of the second week in March. Their tallies for January were 77,293 and 77,293, ranking them second in average height. Majuro, M SGT McKAY'S detachment, took the honors for January by a wide margin with a 85,984 and 85,744 average. However, Rongerik did walk off with top honors errorwise, having a 1.4 for January. This brought the error average for WREP detachments down to a 3.5, which is still more than twice what it should be. February shows an improvement, but errors due to carelessness, that can easily be caught at the station, continue to mount up.

It is interesting to note that 6th Weather Squadron took a run on the 3rd of February reaching 125,502 feet, however it is more interesting to note that on the 1st of March the shift of A/1C Fontana and A/2C Kitteringham took a run reaching 125,952 feet at Majuro. WREP heights compare favorably with Tornado Alleys, but we cannot continue to beat them unless we continue to improve. It must be remembered that they are experiencing winter in the Z.I., and although we have torrential rains, the advantage is on our side.

All five detachments had a 100 per cent score for the successful completion of all obligated observations for the month of February. Since the detachments have been required to take as many as seven observations in a 24 hour period, releasing every 3 hours, the 100% score is definitely a noteworthy accomplishment. M SGT McKAY and detachment deserve praise for maintaining a 92,421 foot RAOB and RAWIN average for one such period.

WPC 9-21 charts have been shipped to all detachments. AWSM 105-125 should be thoroughly read and understood by all personnel before usage. The chart, AWS WPC 9-21, which is an extended sector of plotting board ML-122, eliminates the division and replotting of HDO's. When all personnel are thoroughly acquainted with the 9-21 it will prove to be a speedier method of wind computation.

RAWINSONDE HEIGHT AVERAGES

Weekly Heights (For period 1 thru 7 March)

STATION	RAOB	RAWIN
ENIWETOK	88,589	88,589
PONAPE	84,504	84,504
MAJURO	83,597	83,597
KUSAIE	74,550	74,550
RONGERIK	(Temporarily out of operation)	

Highest Shift Averages (For period 1 thru 7 March)

ENIWETOK *A/3C Salmen A/3C Daugherty A/2C Ingram	92,300	92,300
MAJURO *A/1C Fontana A/2C Kitteringham	91,611	91,611
PONAPE *T/Sgt Patin S/Sgt Keiger A/1C Amann	91,133	91,133
KUSAIE *A/1C Caron A/3C Gerth A/3C Wittman	77,409	77,409

* Denotes Shift Chief.

SURFACE OBSERVATIONS

The Surface Observation Checking Section is still somewhat behind. The main reason for this was that nearly all of the first WBAN's were returned for corrections on form. An individual error record is being kept and will more accurately give a picture of the observers later. Rongerik is the only island which is up to date and checked. Their averages will be included in this publication, but hereafter will not appear. All the WBAN's (10a & 10b) show a steady trend of improvement as time passes.

AFWL/HO

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~~1604~~

Here's how observers stand at the present time (not considering the number of observations taken or corrected):

Pall	- 0.054	Hendrickson	- 0.164
Bertolino	- 0.062	Erwin	- 0.355
Azbill	- 0.081	Casper	- 1.167
Midgett	- 0.142	Elliott	- 1.333

Only six (6) WBAN's have been checked on Majuro, while 43 were finished on Kusaie. You can see that the above error average is not a very good picture as yet.

HISTORY

It is requested that all detachments send monthly Historical Reports, including anything of historical note, i.e., dates of visits, relations with civilians (not necessarily conduct), incidents that happen in operations, suggestions to remedy operational or administrative problems; problems that appeared in setting up, problems concerned with roll-up; unofficial systems used to repair equipment (that may aid later projects), and get results operationally.

MAIL

The following information should be brought to the attention of all weather island personnel: Custom slips will be filled out on the front side only. All packages coming through APO 187 must have tags completed and securely attached to packages before forwarding to this headquarters. Outgoing film (undeveloped) cannot be sent through APO 187. Limit size and weight of packages as much as possible.

SUPPLY

AFWLMO

Your Good Humor Supply Man Speaks!!!

After returning from my visit to Majuro and Ponape it is hard to get back in the ole' grind of Wetok.

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I would like to thank the two detachments again for the very pleasant week I spent at each detachment.

We expect to send out more roll-up supplies with the next trip. I have now some silca-jel (dehydrating agent) and I hope to get some grease proof paper and slick paper before the next trip. The grease proof paper will be used for wrapping tools etc., that will be covered by a thin coat of oil, and the slick paper will be used for running off the 1048 shipping documents.

I would like to know if any problems exist about supply. Especially the questions you have about maintenance of your files, or about roll-up. I would appreciate it if you would drop me a line and I will let you know the answer by mail the following week.

From observing Majuro and Ponape I think the supply men are doing a good job, and that we will have very little trouble at roll-up time.

This Issue caught me short. I haven't fully recuperated from my trip, but I found out by visiting the detachments that as long as there is lettuce, morale will be high.

MAINTENANCE

Information received at this headquarters indicates that a team of inspectors from Hickam AFB may possibly visit our detachments during April to conduct an inspection of supplies and supply records. Action should be taken to have all supplies and equipment in a high state of maintenance so as to reflect favorably upon WREP.

Majuro has experienced some maintenance difficulties with the Pylon Assembly of GMD-1A, but everything seems to be performing satisfactorily at present. Two Pylon Assemblies have been requested by message from SMAMA for back-up support of WREP. Detachments will be advised of receipt of items.

Ordnance supplies needed for maintenance of power units and weapons carriers have been delivered to detachments. It is expected that same will be sufficient to accomplish our mission in the forward area.

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MISCELLANEOUS

T/Sgt Garnett of Hqs was called back to Oklahoma City on emergency leave due to the critical condition of his wife, and the death of their newly born child.

TDY of S/Sgt Campbell, Det 1, was terminated and he was returned to the ZI. We all wish that our TDY was terminated and we could return to the ZI, but not under the same conditions as was his.

NEW MEMBERS

Our regards go out to A/1C Nathan G. Elliott, his wife, and their new son, Eric Nathan, born 19 March 1954. Father, Mother, and child are all reported as doing fine.

NEWS HIGHLIGHTS

Our prodigy, Sergeant Neal, has just arrived from an extended vacation to the various locations. We also want to extend our congratulations to Sgt McKay and his amphibious jeep. We hear it is quite the THING!!!

We also learned that M/Sgt Jones is quite the softball player, in as much as he was playing short stop against the local team. (Caught your breath yet Jones?)

The boys of Hqs have been playing with the Test Services Unit softball team. They finally lucked out on winning three games out of six. (All three games won by the big margin of one run).

Congratulations to Mr. Kapral. Orders were just received from Hqs USAF promoting him to Chief Warrant Officer. News via the grapevine has it that Lt McDaniel is next on the list for promotion. However, he still blushes when you call him Captain, but we are expecting his promotion orders any day now.

BIRTHDAYS

There may not have been any cakes and candles on these dates, but we wish each of you a "Happy Birthday and many more of the same":

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Edward F. Blick . . . . . 9 Mar

I. J. Daubenspeck . . . . . 14 Mar

Clifford F. Jones, Jr. . . . . 16 Mar

Chester L. Ray, Sr. . . . . 27 Mar

RED CROSS DRIVE

The Red Cross has given this unit quite a bit of assistance since we have been in this area. Let us show them that we appreciate the things that they have done for us by giving a little bit more to the Red Cross Drive come Payday.

SECURITY

Security violations are like a sore thumb; they hurt.

* *

This is the first issue of the "Weekly Word" to be published. This weekly bulletin is published by and for the members of the Weather Reporting Element, Provisional. The mission of this bulletin is to keep personnel of this element informed on current events within the element, and other events which affect the operation of the element. Your cooperation in helping us to achieve this mission will be greatly appreciated.

SECURITY CHECKED -

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

HOW DO YOU WANT YOUR EGGS TODAY, BURT.....BURT!!

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APPENDIX

AFWL/HO



LEGEND

R/S RADIO SONDE
PSP STEEL MATTING
BARRACKS TYPE BUILDING
TENTS
SAND DUNE
1. QUARTERS
2. QUARTERS
3. DISP. & SUPPLY
4. MESS & KITCHEN
5. R/S BLDG.

ATWELLMO

[redacted]

MONTHLY HISTORY

OF

WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENT
PROVISIONAL

1 MARCH THRU 31 MARCH

TASK GROUP 7.4 (PROV)
TEST SERVICES UNIT (PROV)

FLOYD G. HIMES
CAPT., USAF
HISTORIAN

AFRWMD

[redacted]

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[redacted]

ADMINISTRATION

Administration activities for this period were routine. Several pre-roll up conferences were held and details firmed up for the final plan.[1]

The Element lost a total of seven men through hardship and emergencies. These men were not considered critical and because the TDY period was drawing to a close, replacements were not requested. A prop-specialist (42350) was requested however, due to a heavy increase in work-load in that area.

SECURITY

Seven of the eight "Q" Clearances previously requested were granted this month. The Element had been operational for 40 days with only the Element Commander being "Q" cleared. It should be noted here that the period of time required to gain these clearances varied from 80 to 161 days. Receipt of these clearances eased, but did not eliminate, the impeded process of briefing referred to in the previous months History.

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Maintenance activities during the month consisted primarily of engine changes. A total of eleven engines were changed (through 27 March) for an average engine life of 432 hours (Chart facing page). The physical number of engine changes is a little high however the average life compares very favorably with the past yearly average of 410 hours.[2]

Other maintenance activities were routine. An average "in commission" rate of 75% was maintained with 09% out for inspection and post

1. Complete roll up history will be submitted under separate cover after completion of Project.
2. Yearly average for 1953. See records on file with 57th Weather Recon Sq, Maintenance.

[redacted]

flight, 11% for unscheduled maintenance and 05% for AOCP (See chart facing page). Overall utilization for March was 3.12 hours per day.[3] Attention is called to the fact that 59% of the figure for unscheduled maintenance was due to radiological contamination.

A program of aircraft corrosion control was instituted in which one man was assigned the full responsibility as Corrosion Control Agent. His duties consisted of inspection and preventative maintenance of all types of corrosion on the aircraft. He also established and maintained a detailed record of corrosion areas on each aircraft and filed these with the aircraft historical records.

Decontamination procedures were undertaken on two occasions to clean radiological dust from shot day mission aircraft. These procedures consisted of thoroughly washing each aircraft with "gunk", then Tide and a finish rinse of fresh water. A decontamination period of five days was required for the most heavily contaminated aircraft. Seventeen aircraft days were lost because of this requirement.

A preliminary roll up plan was drawn and submitted to the Materiel Officer for planning purposes. An effort was also made to eliminate all surplus equipment and supplies through turn-ins, and packaging for return to the Element's home station (Hickam AFB) via the unit C-54 on 1 April.

A total of 36 Unsatisfactory Reports have been submitted to date (17 for March) however no chronic recurring difficulties have developed.

SUPPLY

Supply activities for this period were directed toward obtaining a complete inventory and forecasting the needs of the Element through

3. See Stat Section for Utilization Chart.

[redacted]

1 June 1954. This extended period of need was caused by continued postponements of "Romeo" shot.[4]

Efforts directed toward the above goal were hampered by several poor situations which existed. These situations are listed below with the appropriate corrective action undertaken:

1. Careless and indifferent work methods resulted in the loss of two cold cylinder analyzers and 24 rocker arm covers within two days. Maintenance was notified of this condition and requested to stiffen their supervision to insure an adequate supply of parts and tools for the duration of the Project.

2. This Element was called on several times to furnish support to other Elements. This support ranged all the way from emergency TWX requisitions to ZI depots (for a control assembly and prop assembly for an SA-16) to the furnishing of small parts and hand tools to many other Elements. This situation made it doubly difficult to anticipate future needs and no solution has yet been found for this problem.

3. It was found that base maintenance had again cannibalized parts from a spare C-54 engine which was stored in the engine build-up area. (second incident). TSUP was notified and requested to put a stop to this practice.

Other problems were minor in nature. Due to the excessive number of engine changes, rapid supply action was requested, and obtained, through Hickam AFB. At months end the Element had four spare engines on hand.

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4. See the Operations Section of this report for details on this problem.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

OPERATIONS

Operational procedures consisted primarily of flying routine weather reconnaissance missions in support of the Project. Training was continued resulting in upgrading two pilots to 1324C. A Navigational study program was initiated, directed toward completion of the study guide for the Senior Observers Exams. Flying Safety was re-emphasised thru two meetings for all aircrew personnel. To date the Element's accident record is spotless.

The month's activities were highlighted by the detonation of two nuclear devices; "Bravo" shot at 0645 hours on 1 March, and "Romeo" shot at 0630 hours on 27 March. WRECEP participated in these missions in accordance with TG 7.4 Operations Order 2-54, Annex M.

All briefings and preparations for WRECEP flight crews were completed on the day preceding the shot. Primary and stand-by flight crews were briefed; aircraft loaded and pre-flighted; and the pre-take-off positioning plan executed.[5]

"Wilson #1" mission for the "Bravo" shot, performed a heavy element sampling mission. This required the penetration of the radio-active cloud shortly after H Hour.

The "Wilson #2" mission for the Bravo shot performed the combined duties of radiological safety monitoring and cloud tracking in areas and at altitudes designated by JTF 7 Radiological Safety Officer. This mission utilized a race track pattern, at 10,000, situated 50 miles from ground zero and positioned in such a manner so as to facilitate early detection of any radio-active cloud, or fall-out, approaching Eniwetok or Ujelang Atolls. This would then permit sufficient time for evacuation

5. See Appendix A for mission flimsies.

[redacted]

[redacted]

of these atolls. This race track pattern was flown until H+5 hours, at which time an "E" type search pattern was initiated, upwind from ground zero, to determine future requirements for possible evacuation.[6]

"Wilson #3" and "Wilson #4" missions were briefed to take-off at H+12 hours and H+24 hours respectively. These missions were also to fly the upwind, "E" type search pattern. The "Wilson #3" mission was completed. The data collected on this mission indicated that no need existed for "Wilson #4" and it was cancelled. Normal weather reconnaissance missions were resumed on 3 March.

The Weather reporting procedures through out the missions were virtually the same as on the normal weather tracks. Reports were rendered every 100 miles on the standard report form. The only change was made when radiation was encountered. At this time a dummy weather report was sent, labeled as "position extra". It was preceded by four five-numbered code groups which indicated the strength of the radiation field.

On 3 March, a weather recon aircraft in the vicinity of Rongelap Atoll was diverted to check suspected high intensity radiation in this area. The aircraft was directed to pass over this Atoll at 200 feet and report the radiation readings. An intensity of 2.5 Roentgens per hour was found thus confirming earlier reports and all atolls in this area were evacuated.

The missions for "Romeo" shot on 27 March were essentially the same as those for "Bravo". "Wilson #1", heavy sampler, was positioned at 25,000 feet and sampled at that altitude instead of 15,000 feet as on "Bravo".

6. See Appendix B for Mission Reports.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

An additional mission, designated "Wilson #3", was established to fly the protective race-track pattern at 5,000 feet in conjunction with "Wilson #2" at 10,000 feet. "Wilson #3" was to hold in the race-track until recalled to Eniwetok by the JTF 7 Radsafe Officer. "Wilson #4" and "Wilson #5" were set up for take-off as before, H+12 hours and H+24 hours respectively. "Wilson #5" was cancelled and weather reconnaissance missions were resumed on 28 March.

Early in the period TG 7.4 requested that WRECEP initiate a visual reconnaissance program to detect surface and undersea vessels. All sightings were to be reported to them via the normal weather report forms. Reports were to include location type, track and speed of each vessel. It should be noted here that photo, as well as visual reconnaissance is part of the stated mission of WRECEP's parent organization and it was recommended, early in the planning phase, that K-20 type cameras be made available so that WRECEP could include this function in its mission. This subject was never pursued however, with the result that photo reconnaissance was not available for Castle operations. It is recommended that future planning make this photo equipment available to WRECEP so that this essential function of reconnaissance can be accomplished.

Another problem encountered was the heavy contamination of aircraft participating in shot day missions. These aircraft were out of commission for periods up to five days due to contamination (a total loss of seventeen aircraft days). This resulted in an overload of flying time being placed on the remaining aircraft. To alleviate this condition it was determined to initiate an earlier "turn-out" procedure for all cloud trackers.

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Seventy four missions were flown for a total of 869:05 hours.[7] There were five aborted missions, three of which were made-up by the stand-by crews. The remaining aborts were not made up because the Weather Central Element felt that further information was unnecessary.

Commanders Comments

The Post Office, being open a minimum of time during the day, is a cause of many lost man hours due to the tremendously long lines. It was also noted that one window has 95% of the business while the other window was virtually idle. It is recommended that both windows be set up to handle all types of Post Office business. It is further recommended that the Post Office remain open for two hours every evening in addition to present hours.

7. See Stat Section for full operational summary.

[redacted]

AFWL/MD

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

*LATE TAKE-off
#ABORT OR STAND-DOWN

MONTHLY SUMMARY OF TRACKS
FOR MONTH OF MARCH 1954

DATE:	TRACK AND NUMBER:	ACFT NUMBER	AIRCRAFT COMMANDER:	T.O. TIME:	COMPL TIME:	REMARKS: Late take-off's, aborts, etc.
1 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #15	7335	MAJOR MILLS	0155	7:30	
1 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #16	7271	CAPT LYKINS	0750	13:50	
1 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #17	1819	CAPT DANIEL	1845	13:20	
2 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #36	7343	CAPT DIEPENBROCK	0700	11:30	
2 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #37	7269	CAPT HOPSON	0715	13:05	
3 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #38	2202	CAPT PACKWOOD	0700	11:45	
3 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #39	7740	CAPT AUTREY	0730	12:00	
4 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #40	2220	MAJOR HESS	0730	11:30	
4 Mar	PETREL KILO #3	2195	CAPT SHARAR	0700	11:30	
5 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #41	7343	MAJOR MILLS	0500	12:00	
5 Mar	PETREL KILO #4	7269	MAJOR FAZLOLLAH	0700	12:20	
6 Mar	PETREL KILO #5	7335	CAPT DANIEL	0700	11:40	
6 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #42	1819	CAPT DIEPENBROCK	0730	11:50	
7 Mar	PETREL KILO #6	2202	CAPT HOPSON	0700	12:10	
7 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #43	2220	CAPT PACKWOOD	0730	12:15	
8 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #44	7343	CAPT DAVIS	0730	11:40	
8 Mar	PETREL KILO #7	7269	CAPT AUTREY	0700	11:20	
9 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #45	7335	CAPT NICKELL	0630	12:00	
*9 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #46	1819	CAPT MOELLER	0720	11:40	Late take-off due low oil pressure #2 eng.
9 Mar	PETREL KILO #8	2202	CAPT LYKINS	0730	11:25	
10 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #47	2220	CAPT DANIEL	0630	11:50	
10 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #48	7342	CAPT DIEPENBROCK	0700	11:00	
10 Mar	PETREL KILO #9	7740	CAPT AUTREY	0730	10:40	
11 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #49	7335	CAPT LYKINS	0700	11:30	
11 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #18	2202	CAPT PACKWOOD	0630	11:30	
11 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #50	1819	CAPT HOPSON	0730	10:00	
12 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #51	2220	CAPT AUTREY	0630	12:00	
12 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #52	7740	CAPT SHARAR	0700	11:00	
12 Mar	PETREL LIMA #2	1819	CAPT NICKELL	0730	8:40	
13 Mar	PETREL LIMA #3	7740	CAPT HOPSON	0730	8:55	
13 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #53	7269	MAJOR MILLS	0630	12:00	
13 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #54	1819	CAPT LYKINS	0700	10:50	
14 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #55	2195	CAPT AUTREY	0700	10:30	
14 Mar	PETREL KILO #10	7271	CAPT SHARAR	0730	11:30	
15 Mar	PETREL KILO #11	7740	CAPT NICKELL	0630	11:30	
15 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #56	7269	CAPT PACKWOOD	0700	12:30	

MONTHLY SUMMARY OF TRACKS (CONT'D)

DATE:	TRACK AND NUMBER:	ACFT NUMBER	AIRCRAFT COMMANDER:	T.O. TIME	COMPL TIME:	REMARKS: Late take-off's, aborts, etc.
16 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #57	1819	CAPT LYKINS	0630	12:15	
16 Mar	PETREL KILO #12	2195	CAPT HOPSON	0700	11:30	
17 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #19	2202	CAPT SHARAR	0630	12:00	
17 Mar	PETREL KILO #13	7335	CAPT AUTREY	0700	10:50	
18 Mar	PETREL KILO #14	7343	CAPT DANIEL	0630	10:35	
18 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #58	1819	CAPT DIEPENBROCK	0700	11:20	
19 Mar	PETREL KILO #15	2220	MAJOR MILLS	0630	10:00	
19 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #59	7271	CAPT PACKWOOD	0700	11:15	
20 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #60	2195	CAPT DIEPENBROCK	0630	10:40	
*20 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #61	2202	CAPT DANIEL	0720	10:40	Master Control Fail #4 Engine.
#20 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #62	7740	CAPT NICKELL	0730	7:00	Abort due #2 eng Prop Contactor Failure.
20 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #62	2220	CAPT HOPSON	1335	10:00	Make-Up Flight
21 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #63	7343	CAPT LYKINS	0630	10:55	
21 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #64	7335	MAJOR MILLS	0700	10:15	
21 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #65	7271	CAPT AUTREY	0730	10:40	
22 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #66	7740	CAPT DIEPENBROCK	0630	10:30	
22 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #67	2195	CAPT NICKELL	0700	10:20	
22 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #68	2202	CAPT DANIEL	0730	10:25	
#23 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #69	2220	CAPT SHARAR	0630	12:30	Abort Psn 14 due Fail of Eng Nose Sect RDN Gear
23 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #70	7272	CAPT PACKWOOD	0700	10:45	
#23 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #71	7343	CAPT HOPSON	0730	6:30	Abort Psn 6 due internal fail #3 eng.
24 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #72	7335	MAJOR MILLS	0630	12:05	
24 Mar	PETREL KILO #16	7740	CAPT DIEPENBROCK	0700	14:10	
25 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #73	2202	CAPT DANIELS	0630	9:15	
25 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #74	2195	CAPT PACKWOOD	0700	12:00	
26 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #75	7269	CAPT LYKINS	0500	13:35	
26 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #76	2202	CAPT NICKELL	0700	9:55	
26 Mar	PETREL LIMA #4	7271	CAPT SHARAR	0640	8:40	
27 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #20	2195	CAPT DIEPENBROCK	0140	8:20	
27 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #21	1819	CAPT DANIEL	0735	14:00	
27 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #22	7740	CAPT PACKWOOD	0725	8:45	
27 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #23	2202	CAPT AUTREY	1830	12:50	
28 Mar	PETREL SPECIAL #24	7269	CAPT NICKELL	0630	11:00	
29 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #77	7271	CAPT LYKINS	0630	11:30	

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MONTHLY SUMMARY OF TRACKS (CONT'D)

DATE:	TRACK AND NUMBER	ACFT NUMBER	AIRCRAFT COMMANDER:	T.O. TIME:	COMPL TIME:	REMARKS: Late take-off's, aborts, etc.
30 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #78	2220	MAJOR MILLS	0630	11:00	
30 Mar	PETREL KILO #17	7269	CAPT DIEPENBROCK	0700	9:40	
#31 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #79	7271	CAPT HOPSON	0630	:05	(Abort due #1 eng rear oil pressure low.)
31 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #79	7271	CAPT HOPSON	0710	12:50	Makeup
#31 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #80	2202	CAPT SHARAR	0700	1:40	(Abort pan #2 due malfunction #2 outboard eng.)
31 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #80	1819	CAPT SHARAR	1000	9:40	Make-up
31 Mar	PETREL JULIETT #81	7740	1 LT WILSON	0730	12:00	

ABORTS THIS MONTH: 5 JULIETTS LATE TAKE-OFF'S THIS MONTH: 2 JULIETTS

FLYING TIME BREAKDOWN:

	MARCH TOTALS	MARCH MSNS	WRECAP TOTALS	TOTAL MSNS
Petrel Juliett	526:00	46	929:20	81
Petrel Kilo	166:50	15	190:40	17
Petrel Lima	26:15	3	35:45	4
Petrel Item	0:00	0	114:55	9
Petrel Special	113:05	10	211:45	24
Maintenance (Test)	34:35		45:55	
Transmition	2:20		56:35	
TOTAL:	869:05	74	1584:55	135

/s/ M. J. Fazlollah
M. J. FAZLOLLAH
Major, USAF
Operations Officer

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PRE-DEPARTURE PROCEDURES

Wilson #1 and Wilson #2*

Wilson #1 - Heavy Sampler

1.	Briefing and loading	D-day minus 1 day
2.	Pressure check	H-hour minus 10:45 hours
3.	Preflight	H-hour minus 06:20 hours
4.	Start engines	H-hour minus 05:20 hours
5.	Taxi to T.O. Position	H-hour minus 05:00 hours
6.	Take off (on tower signal)	H-hour minus 04:50 hours

Wilson #2 - Cloud Tracker

1.	Briefing and loading	D-day minus 1 day
2.	Pressure check	H-hour minus 05:45 hours
3.	Preflight	H-hour minus 00:25 hours
4.	Start engines	H-hour plus 00:35 hours
5.	Taxi to T.O. Position	H-hour plus 00:55 hours
6.	Take off (one tower signal)	H-hour plus 01:05 hours

*NOTE:

1. All functions except numbers 5 and 6 will also be performed by the stand-by crews. Stand-by crews will hold position, with engines running, and monitor the primary chew on VHF radio. If the primary crew should abort, the stand-by crew will be prepared to take over and complete the mission.

2. Messing facilities will be available to flight crews on a 24 hour basis preceding shot day.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Wilson #1

1. Fred Tower - Channel "B".

2. ACC - Eniwetok area (Dirty Face) Channel "C" (J-410).

3. Immediately after take-off, check 3295 KCs with Dirty Face.

4. Report weather to ACC Channel "C" or 3295.

5. Ninety (90) miles out switch to Boundary Tare control Channel "F" (J-410).

6. Weather reports Bikini area - enroute - upwind to CIC Channel "F" (J-410).

7. After H hour on direct Boundary Tare switch to Channel "A".

8. Boundary Tare will instruct contact with Cassidy on Channel "E".

9. Rad Director will have separate mike and jack box for contacting Cassidy "E".

Wilson #2

1. Fred Tower - Channel "B".

2. Dirty Face within 90 miles from Eniwetok Channel "C" (J-410).

3. Weather reports on J-411 4415, 7685, 14450.

4. Ninety (90) miles out Dirty Face will instruct W-2 to contact Boundary Tare for clearance to orbit position Channel "F" (J-410).

NOTE: For area navigational aids and emergency facilities, see TG 7.4 Pilots Handbook.

AFWL/HO

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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Summary For Special Mission For Bravo Shot

MISSION: Wilson Three
DATE: 1 March 1954

CREW: A/C
P
N
N
WF
ET
R
R
CE

1. BRIEFING:

a. A special briefing conducted by our own Element Operations was held at 1530 hours, 28 Feb 54. All details of the Wilson Three mission was covered.

2. PREPARATION:

a. The aircraft was preflighted, except for pressure check, the afternoon prior to shot day. Personal Equipment was loaded at this time. The crew Radiological Safety Officer received the special equipment and film badges for the crew at 1200 hours, 28 Feb 54.

3. PRE-MISSION ACTIVITIES:

a. Take off was scheduled for 1845 hours. The aircraft was pressure checked at 1700 hours. Crew was briefed by the Aircraft Commander at 1800 hours and boarded the aircraft at 1810 hours. Aircraft was towed to engine start position and engines started at 1815.

4. MISSION:

Take off was made on schedule. Dirty Face was contacted on channel "C". We were cleared to climb to 10,000' on course. Boundary Tare (VHF) was inoperative, so all radio contact, including weather reports, were made on CW to AGD 20. Mission was flown as briefed. Landed at 0805 hours, 2 March 1954.

5. PROBLEMS OF THE MISSION:

There were no major problems encountered.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

None.

HOMER C. DANIEL JR.
Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

AFWL/NQ

[redacted]

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PRIOR MATERIAL REMOVED [redacted]

Summary of Special Mission

MISSION: Wilson 1, "ROMEO" Shot Sampler

DATE: 27 March 1954

CREW:
A/
IP
P
CP
N
N
WF
ET
R
CE

1. BRIEFING:

a. Crew attended T.G. 7.4 general briefing at 1100 hours, 26 March 1954. The WRECEP specialized briefing followed at 1330 hours. All details of the mission were covered.

2. PRE-MISSION ACTIVITIES:

a. Aircraft 2195 was pre-flighted and personal equipment loaded immediately after the 0730 roll call. Pressure check was performed at 2000 hours. The aircraft was loaded with 5400 gallons of fuel, since it was estimated that 4590 gallons would be required for the estimated 8+40 total flight time. IF-4 in-flight lunches obtained from our Personal Equipment Section were also loaded aboard the aircraft in lieu of box or bulk lunches.

b. Take-off was scheduled for 0140 hours. This was our aircrew schedule:

(1) At Mess: 2220

(2) At Orderly Room: 2305

(3) Start Engines: 0110

c. Capt Rose distributed two (2) film badges to each crew member at the informal crew briefing.

d. The stand-by crew had the Coleman tractor attached to the stand-by aircraft; C-21A external power unit plugged in; before starting check-list completed; and were monitoring our VHF transmissions to Fred Tower before we started our engines. They remained in this status until our aircraft had leveled off at 10,000' cruising altitude, after which they left the aircraft to stand-by in the WRECEP headquarters building until H-1 hour (0530).

AFWL/NO [redacted]

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Summary of Special Mission (Cont'd)

3. MISSION ACTIVITIES:

a. Weather reconnaissance of the Eniwetok area, enroute to Bikini, and in the Bikini area was preformed at 10,000' true altitude with a CAS of 195, and in accordance with paragraph 3b (2)(a), Task Group 7.4 Operations Order NO 2-54. The winds (radar Winds) and the weather were reported every 15 minutes.

b. Weather reports during reconnaissance were relayed by the co-pilot via VHF to the AOC or to Boundary Tare, as applicable. When unable to transmit on VHF, voice reports were sent over HF circuit J-410.

c. Upwind weather run from Bikini area was made on outbound heading of 090° and at 10,000' altitude. Climb to H-hour altitude of 25,000' begun immediately after turning inbound so as to arrive over ground zero (GZ) at that altitude.

d. The Aerial Weather Forecaster completed his last report (0610) shortly before passing over GZ. The Rad Director and the Weather Forecaster exchanged positions over ground zero.

e. From GZ we flew an outbound track of 305° to our H-hour position 60 miles from GZ (tail aspect). Time hacks were received on VHF, followed by a voice count-down at H-15 seconds. At H-30 seconds all crew members were instructed to place their high density goggles over their eyes.

f. "Romeo" was detonated at 0630. An immediate turn was made and we observed the fireball as it ascended into the purple cloud above it. We flew in a counter-clockwise direction around the cloud observing its formation. The control ship (B-36), Cassidy 1, contacted us at 0640 and inquired as to our status. We gave our position and intention of observing the cloud. Cassidy requested we begin sampling at H ± 2 to 3 hours. Exactly 7 minutes after detonation, a light smack against the aircraft indicated the shock wave had reached us.

g. At H ± 45 minutes, the cloud top appeared to be at 70,000' - 80,000'. We flew a circular track northwest to northeast of ground zero, skirting the cloud to avoid contamination from "fall-out". At H ± 1 hour the Rad Director requested that crew members don their lead-lined vests.

h. "Romeo" cloud leaned in a northeast direction. The base of the cloud appeared to be about 23,000' at H ± 2 hours. A slight spattering of white verga (looked like moist powdered coral) appeared on the aircraft's nose section.

i. At H ± 2 hours at an indicated altitude of 27,300' a 2" loss of manifold pressure and a drop in RPM occured in # 4 engine and the engine began vibrating. Manifold pressure was reduced to 23" with 1800 RPM and a descent was made to 26,500'. This action virtually eliminated the vibration. The Rad Director notified Cassidy 1 of our condition and requested authorization to begin sampling. This was approved.

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Summary of Special Mission (Cont'd)

j. A descending sampling pass was made at an IAS of 205 MPH, passing through a light, thin area of cloud at 25,500'. A second sampling pass was made at 25,000', at an IAS of 180 (due to reduced power on # 4 engine), also through a light, thin area of cloud.

k. Heavy radiation readings on the Rad Directors instruments necessitated our return to Eniwetok upon completion of the second pass. Cassidy approved this decision.

l. There was no smoking, eating, or drinking, during or after the sampling. Oxygen masks were worn from the beginning of sampling until we had landed.

m. All personal equipment was left in the aircraft upon landing, and rubber gloves were worn when evacuating the aircraft. Crew members in the rear compartment proceded through the tunnel and exited through the nose wheel well. All windows, hatches, and bomb bay doors were left closed. The crew was taken to the decontamination area. None of the crew members received sufficient contamination to require a change of clothes or showering.

4. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED:

a. Had trouble contacting AOC on HF J-410 circuit when transmitting voice weather reports. Often had to switch to crowded VHF channel "C".

b. IFF was inoperative for some time in AOC control area, but eventually functioned normally.

c. Sustained flight at 27,300' resulted in loss of power on # 4 engine.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Recommend Wilson 1 remain at 20,000' until H+ 1/30 minutes, then climb to and sample at 25,000'.

b. Recommend installation of remote control at aircraft commanders station, to permit the aircraft commander to switch IFF to modes requested by controllers.

M. J. FAZLOLLAH
Major, USAF

AFWL/NTO

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

SUMMARY OF SPECIAL MISSION FOR ROMEO

MISSION: Wilson #2

DATE: 27 March 1954

CREW:
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P
*WF
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N
ET
R
R
DO
CE

* Also served as Rad-Safe Monitor

1. BRIEFING:

a. General briefing was at 0900 hours, 26 March 1954. There was a specialized briefing at 0945 hours, 26 March 1954. The briefings covered general and special information for all aircrews participating in "Romeo" mission.

b. A specialized briefing was conducted by WRECEP at 1430 hours, 26 March 1954. All phases of the flight were covered with each section head in the Element briefing in his particular field. Rad-Safe was covered in detail by the Element Rad-Safe Officer.

2. PREPARATION:

a. The aircraft was loaded and preflighted on 26 March 1954 and was pressure checked at 0150 hours, 27 March 1954. The pressure check was completed six hours before take-off time to give maintenance time to correct possible discrepancies.

3. PRE-MISSION ACTIVITIES: Take-off was scheduled for 0735 hours, 27 March 1954. The crew ate breakfast at 0500 hours and was picked up at the orderly room at 0540 hours, arriving at the flight line at 0550 hours. The aircraft was again pre-flighted and the crew lined up for crew inspection 20 minutes before start engines time. Engines were started at 0705 and engine run-up completed before taxiing to take-off position. Take-off was made on time at 0735 hours.

4. MISSION:

a. We were to fly a race track pattern 15 miles wide, 70 miles long, 50 miles west of ground zero for an estimated 2 to 3 hours; proceed to ground zero making good time over ground zero at H + 5 hours; and to continue in a northeasterly direction to fly an "E" type search pattern. This track was to be flown to determine the presence of radiological activity originating by fall-out or incorporated in air currents.

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Summary of special mission for Romeo (Cont'd)

All activity encountered in the race track pattern, and strength up to 1000 MR in the "E" type pattern was to be reported. Entire mission was to be flown at 10,000 feet.

b. We departed Eniwetok at 0735 hours, climbed on course to 10,000 feet, and entered the race track pattern at 0830 hours. This pattern was flown for 2 1/2 hours with no radiological activity encountered.

c. At 1100 hours we departed the race track pattern and at 1115 hours we had encountered up to 600 MR, which increased to 1000 MR to ground zero, when it began to drop off. We departed Ground Zero at H + 5 hours when instructions were received to return to the race track and continue in it for one hour. After entering the pattern further instructions were received to hold at the extreme southern point until advised. Radiological activity reports were to be made each 30 minutes. We held in this pattern until the background reading decreased to 350 MR. Instructions were then received to continue from this point to the "E" pattern as originally planned. Further modification of the "E" pattern was permitted if fuel remaining did not allow complete coverage of track and safe return to base.

d. The "E" pattern was flown without encountering any radiological activity. Aircraft background was 250 MR while flying the "E" pattern. The track was modified by cutting 400 miles from the briefed track. We landed at 2135 hours.

5. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED: None

6. RECOMMENDATIONS: That weather reports be made only at the north and south points of race track so that the weather observer will not be tied-up with sending weather observations when encountering areas of radiation.

HOMER C. DANIEL JR.
Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

AFWL/HO

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED [redacted] Summary of Special Mission fro Ro. 5

MISSION: Wilson # 3

DATE: 27 March 1954

CREW:

* Also served as Rad Director.

1. BRIEFING:

a. A general briefing was held by T.G. 7.4 at 0900, 26 March 1954, followed by a specialized briefing at 0945. These briefings covered general and specialized information for all air crews participating in "Romeo" mission.

b. WRECEP briefing for Wilson #2, Wilson #3, and the Wilson #2 & #3 standby crews was held at 1430, 26 March 1954, in the Elmont Briefing Room. Additional briefing was given by the Operations Officer and each Section Head.

2. PREPARATION: The aircraft was loaded and preflighted the afternoon of 26 March 1954 and pressure checked at 0130, 27 March 1954. This was done six (6) hours in advance to give maintenance time to correct possible discrepancies.

3. PRE-MISSION ACTIVITIES: The following time schedule was adhered to with no difficulty. The engines were started and take-off made on the second.

AT MESS HALL	0455	
AT ORDERLY ROOM	0540	
AT FLIGHT LINE	0550	
CREW INSPECTION	0635	
BOARD AIRCRAFT	0645	
START ENGINES	0655	
TAKE OFF	0725	(H/55 min)

Notification was given by the tower 30 seconds before take-off time, followed by a count down at 15 seconds before take-off time. Fifteen (15) seconds before take-off time throttles were advanced to 35 inches. One (1) second before take-off time the brakes were released and the take-off roll started at 0725.

4. MISSION:

a. The purpose of the mission was to fly a north-south oriented rectangle seventh five miles by fifteen miles, the eastern edge being fifty nautical miles west of ground zero. (Ground zero being in the Bikini Atoll area). The rectangle was located at a 90° angle to a bisector heading of two lines between Bikini and Eniwetok and Bikini and Ujelang Atoll.

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The altitude to be flown was not above 5,000'. We were to report to the Radiological Monitor aboard the USS Estes, by VHF or HF voice, any radiation encountered in the track. The purpose of this was to keep a close surveillance on any radiation that might drift over Eniwetok or Ujelang Atoll, resulting in necessitating an emergency evacuation of personnel on these atolls. This track could be varied slightly to the north, south, or west at the discretion of the Aircraft Commander in order to accurately report any radiation. The track was to be followed quite accurately until an indication of 3 roentgens was encountered.

b. Synoptic weather observations were taken at the north and south end of the track and sent by CW to the CIC and the AOC. A radiological report was given to the radiological team at the CIC, on the USS Estes every time radiation was encountered, by VHF or HF voice, or at any time requested by the CIC controller.

c. The Radiological Monitor could direct Wilson #3 to deviate from this track in any way within the operational limits of the aircraft. This mission would be terminated when released by the Radiological Monitor in the CIC and be directed to return to base.

5. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT:

a. After take-off a climb to 5,000' was started and a heading flown to intercept the southwest corner of the track. After take-off we were cleared by the tower to AOC (Dirty Face) control. We were directed by Dirty Face to proceed on course. A level off was made at 5,000'. When 90 miles outbound we were directed by Dirty Face to switch control to the CIC, Boundary Tare. The first weather observation was made at this time.

b. Upon reaching the southwest corner of the track another weather observation was made, a check-in was made to Boundary Tare, and the track was begun in a clockwise direction.

c. The race track was flown from 0818 until 1345. During this time radiation was encountered five times varying in strength from 50 MR to 150 MR. At 1218 an area was entered at the northeast corner of the track where a radiation reading of 2 1/4 R was encountered. At this time a substance resembling light frost or snow flakes gathered on the nose and surface of the aircraft. This condition lasted about five minutes. The flight crew went on 100% oxygen when this radiation was encountered. (At no time during this mission was the aircraft ventilation system used.) For one hour the radiation reading held at between 1500 and 1000 MR. At 1320 a small rain cloud was flown through and washed the aircraft off, resulting in a background reading of 250 MR. At 1345 we were directed by Boundary Tare to hold on the south end of the track, and to continue sending reports. Weather reports were sent every 30 minutes for the duration of the flight, and no more radiation was detected.

d. At 1450 we were directed by Boundary Tare to proceed to a point about 75 miles north northeast of Eniwetok, then to proceed to Eniwetok and land. These instructions were carried out.

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Summary of Special Mission for Romeo (Cont'd)

e. After landing, the ship was taxied directly to the parking area and the engines cut. Bomb bay doors were left closed. The crew brought their own personal equipment out of the aircraft with them. All equipment checked-out of the Element Personal Equipment Section was left aboard the aircraft. (Garbage, food, septic cans, parachutes, Mae Wests, etc, were left on the aircraft.) The aircraft was checked and found to have 500 to 800 MR on the nose section and engine areas. The crew left the aircraft through normal exits. The crew was taken to the decontamination center in a decontamination center vehicle. Only two crew members were contaminated and they had only a few MRs.

6. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED:

a. We were assigned "F" channel for communications with Boundary Tare. This frequency was over-worked by F-84s and the control ship (Cassidy). We were later assigned "A" channel in-flight which worked out satisfactorily.

b. VHF communication was difficult at times on the north end of the track because of the distance and low altitude of the aircraft.

c. Two scintometers and one 39C (T1B) were taken on the flight. One scintometer became inoperative inflight.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

JACK R. PACKWOOD
Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

AFWL/NQ

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Summary of Special Mission for ROMEO Shot

MISSION: Wilson 4

DATE: 27 March 1954

1. Briefing: A special briefing conducted by Element Operations was held at 1445, 26 March 1954. All details of the Wilson 4 mission were covered.

2. Preparation: Personal Equipment was loaded at 1300, 27 March 1954. The aircraft was preflighted, pressure checked, and made ready for the mission at this time. The crew Radiological Safety Officer acquired instruments and issued film badges to crew members at completion of preflight.

3. Pre-Mission Activities: Crew reported to aircraft at 1705 to complete last minute details. Crew was briefed by aircraft commander at 1750 and boarded aircraft. Aircraft was towed to starting position and engines were started at 1805.

4. Mission:

a. Purpose of the mission was to determine whether radiation caused by "fall-out" from radioactive clouds or material presented an immediate hazard to the islands east-southeast of Ground Zero. A secondary purpose was to determine, if possible, the leading edge of the radioactive cloud or material, if encountered.

b. Take-off was made on schedule at 1830. E pattern type tracking was accomplished at 10,000'. No significant radiation was encountered during the flight. No deviations from the track were necessary and the mission was completed successfully at 0720, 28 March 1954.

5. Problems of the Mission: No problems were encountered.

6. Recommendations: No recommendations.

Marius M. Autrey

MARIUS M. AUTREY
Captain, USAF
Aircraft Commander

AFWL/NO [redacted]

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HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATIONS ELEMENT PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o PM, San Francisco, California

5 April 1954

SUBJECT: Historical Report

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit
APO 187

Transmitted herewith is the Historical Report for the Communications Element (Provisional) covering the period from 1 March 1954 thru 31 March 1954.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Hist Rept

ALTON R POPE
1st Lt, USAF
Acting Adj

Upon withdrawal of Inclosure
this correspondence becomes
Unclassified

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I. INTRODUCTION

The mission of the Communications Element during March was to support the shot operations conducted twice in the month. Post-operation critiques by Headquarters, Task Group 7.4 established that in general communications facilities operated satisfactorily during both tests. Emphasis was placed by all sections on readying equipment and facilities for best performance possible at critical periods, and to a large degree this was successfully accomplished. Improvements were made in equipment at the transmitter site and the control tower, facilitating operation and minimizing outage caused by equipment malfunction or propogation disturbances.

Command inspections were conducted by representatives of Headquarters Task Group 7.4, of the Supply Section and the Personnel & Administration Section during March. Only minor discrepancies were noted.

Manning requirements remained fairly constant, with a slight increase in personnel present for duty on Eniwetok caused by the deactivation of communications facilities at Bikini. Numerous trips were made by personnel of the Element to off-island sites, and are reported in appropriate sections of this report.

The sections of the report continue to correspond to the five sections of the Element: Personnel and Administration, Communications, Flight Facilities, Maintenance, and Supply.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Personnel Strength. Following the first test operation early in March, twelve personnel of the Communications Element returned from duty stations at Bikini to supplement the sections at Eniwetok. No immediate action was taken to arrange for early release of these men, as it was not definitely known that operations in the Bikini area would be suspended. The radio operators and maintenance technicians were integrated into normal operations of their sections, while the control tower operators were assigned for cross training as outlined in the Flight Facilities section of this report. In addition, one supply specialist arrived for 45 days TDY from the 1959th AACS Squadron. Early in the month Mr. Vernon A Maynard, contractor technician, returned to the 1810th AACS Group.

Numerous short trips were undertaken by officers and airmen of the Element during March, primarily to check on communications facilities at Sites Tare and Nan of Bikini Atoll, and on Rongerik Island. These are reported in the Maintenance section of this report. The Communications Officer spent several days aboard the USS Estes, coordinating communications matters and working to improve circuit efficiency between the two stations. Late in the month two radio operators were assigned a week's duty for cross-training aboard the Estes, joining the teletype operators and tech controllers stationed on the ship. During this time, two Navy radio operators performed duty with the Communications Element on Eniwetok.

The announcements of promotion were received in March for Captain Clifford D Young and 1st Lt Donald H Herbig.

2. Staff Visits. During the month of March there were numer-

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ous staff visits paid to the Element by officers of the theater AACS organizations. On March 2, Lt Col Kent and M/Sgt Alvin J Williams of the 1808th AACS Wing visited the Communications Center. Other Wing visitors were Maj Raymond A Lowe and T/Sgt Joseph B McLemore in mid March; Maj Leslie C Robertson and Captain Wilson R Winbigler (5th AACS I&M Squadron) from 17-21 March; and Major Robert V Brown, who was at Eniwetok on 27 March accompanied by Major Donald J Crocker of the 1810th AACS Group. M/Sgt Williams returned for several days in mid March following his earlier visit.

From the 1810th AACS Group a party of staff visitors arrived on 7 March, consisting of Major Crocker, Capt Harold E Nance, and four airmen. Early in the month Major Sidney A Goldman and three of his staff officers paid short visits to Eniwetok. On 9 March the Communications Element Commander sent a TWX to the theater AACS organizations requesting advance notice and reasons for proposed visits in order that housing and other facilities could be made available.[1]

3. Administrative and Reporting Procedures. The reports required by higher headquarters remained essentially the same as throughout February, with the addition of a weekly Unit Supply Report calling for a spot check of non-expendables. On 23 March a Deployment Roster was submitted to the Supply Officer, Test Services Unit, indicating the number of personnel that could be released to return to the ZI at times after the final shot of plus two, plus five, plus ten, and plus twenty days. These figures represent the best available estimate based on a breakdown and cor-

[1]TG 7.4 Msg Cite TGP 3-104, DTG 092200Z Mar. Attached as Exhibit A.

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sideration of each sections requirements. Coincident with preparation of this roster, data was gathered from Element personnel relative to individual cases of pregnancy, family hardship, etc. to insure that men with hardships would be among the first to be returned to parent units.

Also during March the personnel section prepared and forwarded to parent units letters of recommendation for promotion on 52 TDY airmen. In addition, promotion evaluations were submitted to the 1960th AACS Squadron on 14 airmen of the tenant AACS detachment.

Two administrative inspections of the section were conducted during the month. The first, on 19 March, was by the Director of Personnel, Task Group 7.4. No discrepancies were found. On 30 March the Personnel Officer, Test Services Unit, inspected the personnel records of officers and airmen. Minor discrepancies were noted.

As a matter of interest, records have been maintained within the Element pertaining to the amount of time involved in securing release for outgoing TWX's since the procedures specified in Task Group 7.4 Regulation 100-1, dated 19 February 1954, and 11-1, dated 23 February 1954, were put into effect. The following tabulation summarizes the results to date:

Hours Req'd for Release	Precedence		
	Priority	Routine	Deferred
0 - 5	2	6	
5 - 10	1	1	3
10 - 15			
15 - 20		2	
20 - 30		10	3
30 - 40			
40 - 50		1	1
50 - 60			
Over 60		3	

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4. Morale and Living Conditions. Weekly meetings of Element personnel were held four times during March. Topics discussed included work detail policies, the Red Cross drive, plans for projected rollup, power conservation, and unit security. At one meeting the Protestant Chaplain of Task Group 7.4 gave a character guidance lecture.

Several factors contributed to higher morale among airmen personnel. Effective 15 March, working hours were shortened to 0730 - 1600, thus allowing an extra hour in the afternoon for recreational activities. Interest remained high in the various sports leagues, with Element teams ranking high in the standings of the basketball and volleyball leagues. In addition, it was possible to release three airmen for early return to the ZI. Two of these were hardship cases, while one man was released as excess to organizational needs. At the end of the month requests were submitted to the Headquarters Commandant, Task Group 7.2, for two Element parties to be held at convenient dates in April.

Work detail requirements for March were largely confined to Element activities, with the exception of the permanent requirement for a one-man detail to Test Services Unit Supply and a period of 22 March - 4 April when Element personnel were assigned the daily clean-up detail for the Terrace Theatre. For this latter detail, one NCO and six airmen were assigned each day. Within the Element, details were necessary for CQ, Latrine Orderly, and clean-up of AACS Supply. Throughout most of the month, only A/1C were assigned CQ, as the CQ was in reality a runner for the Weather Recon CQ. Effective 28 March his duties as runner were revoked. Subsequently staff sergeants were assigned to the CQ detail. Latrine Orderly continue to be assigned to A/2C and A/3C.

[redacted]

903

[redacted]

5. Element Security. Three security lectures were given during March by the Element Security Officer, and new posters were distributed on the 7th and 25th of the month. To further insure that personnel are kept aware of the security regulations of Task Group 7.4, all personnel were required to re-read and initial Task Group 7.4 Security Memorandum No. 2, dated 11 February 1954. The Communications Element Commander spoke at a regular weekly meeting on 23 March, cautioning everyone on personal correspondence home and what constitutes a breach of security in this regard.

All voice radio operators were given a detailed briefing on communications security and required to sign a statement acknowledging that they had been briefed and understand their responsibilities.[2] It is herein noted that each man assigned to the Communications Element will have signed at least four security statements by the time he leaves the forward area.

No security violations were cited against the Element during March.

[2]Comm Scty Statement, Attachment 1 to Task Group 7.4 Reg 100-2, dated 9 Mar 54

[redacted]

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[redacted]

B. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Personnel. The personnel situation remained essentially the same throughout the month of March in the Communications Section. There were no gains or losses in either the tech control or radio operator sections, although a shift occurred in personnel utilization when four radio operators returned from Bikini. This was the result of closing down the Bikini termination of Circuit J 405. With the increased personnel at Eniwetok, it was possible to operate the section on a normal four-shift basis, thus giving the men a greater amount of time off than resulted from the previous six-on, twelve-off schedule. In the teletype section, three operators arrived PCS as replacements for three men rotating in April, creating a temporary overage. A breakdown of personnel in the Communications Section is as follows:

Facility	Assigned Personnel
Communications Center	35*
CW/PP and Voice Facility	36
Tech Control	5#

* includes four men aboard the USS Estes
\# includes two men aboard the USS Estes

Personnel on hand are deemed adequate for operation on a four shift per position basis. In the case of the CW/PP and Voice Facility, however, the assigned personnel represent a bare operating minimum. Two or three additional operators should be provided to allow for temporary sickness or emergency return of personnel.

2. Operations. The Communications Section operated smoothly throughout the month of March. Two operations occurred during March,

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one on the 1st and one on the 26th. Communications-wise, both were successful. Two men, one tech controller and one multiplex maintenance technician, were assigned duty on the USS Estes for the period 12 - 27 March. They did much to reduce the outage on Circuit J 401. Because of their success, it is now contemplated that two men will be stationed on the Estes during all shot periods. Assignment of personnel to this duty will be handled on a rotating basis, with a change after each shot.[3]

Message traffic handling in the Communications Center has remained fairly constant, as indicated by the following breakdown, by circuit, of messages sent and received:

Circuit	Msgs Sent	Msgs Rec'd
J 400	2300	6818
J 401	9635	839
J 403	None	9021
J 405	1051	1080
J 406	142	1790
J 411	57	1589
Army Landline	2544	3399

Circuit Outage was slightly higher than for the month of February, as evidenced by the following outage chart, showing hours outage on the receive side of circuits operated:

Circuit	Channel	Outage on Receive Side
J 400	2	147:15
J 401	2	283:35
J 403	N/A	41:35
J 405	N/A	7:39
J 406	N/A	15:53
J 411	N/A	None

3. Staff Visit on Coordination. For the period 16 - 21 March,

[3]Ltr, Comm Off to Comdr, Comm Elm, Subj: Trip Report to the Estes (Lt Young), dated 26 Mar 54 (Confidential). Attached as Exhibit C.

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[redacted]

M/Sgt Alvin J Williams was present at Eniwetok on a staff visit from the 1808th AACS Wing. The purpose of his visit was to correct minor discrepancies in the operations of JHK,UHPJ and JHKQR/UHPJB communications centers. Specifically he coordinated with UHPJ to establish the method now used for channel checks, and to clarify traffic routing procedures. M/Sgt Williams accomplished a great deal towards providing closer operating coordination between UHPJ and JHK. Provisions were adopted to insure moving a greater volume of traffic, through substitution of the Tape Relay Procedure in place of the slower SIG-TOT Procedure at JHKCR. M/Sgt Williams also dispelled the idea that if the Samson circuit was marginal, traffic could be passed in only one direction. This alone does much to speed up traffic, as it returns the circuit to full duplex operation.

4. Assigned Circuits and Frequencies. The circuits and frequencies operated by the Communications Section remained the same as for February, with the exception of one frequency substitution on Circuit J 406. On this circuit, 6350 kcs. replaced 6495 kcs. The substitution eliminated the interference noted in the Historical Reports of January and February.

[redacted]

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C. FLIGHT FACILITIES

1. Control Tower. Several personnel transfers occurred during March, with a net increase resulting in the number of tower operators available for duty at Eniwetok. Two PCS personnel rotated to the ZI, and one additional tower operator was assigned PCS to this station. Early in the month, following the closing down of the Tare Control Tower, five operators returned for duty at Eniwetok. Of the five, three began cross-training in GCA, one was loaned temporarily to the Supply Section, and one assigned NCO duties directly under the Communications Element Commander. These duties were all deemed temporary, pending a final decision by Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, as to whether these personnel can be released from TDY or if their services will be required for future operations at Bikini.

From the standpoint of operations, numerous improvements were effected. A new switch panel, traffic light switch, and two new B-3 type light guns were installed and are operating satisfactorily. The light guns now available function either on Island power or on storage battery. The flare gun and all flares were removed from the tower cab. HF, VHF, and UHF loudspeakers were consolidated into two compact mountings located for better reception. In addition, all interphone lines were consolidated into one convenient location for more satisfactory operation.

The Control Tower Standing Operating Procedure was returned to this organization for minor revision and subsequently resubmitted to Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, for final approval and signature.

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

[redacted]

In the line of training, twelve PCS control tower operators, , received classroom instruction in Radio Aids to Navigation through lecture and testing periods. Operators were also required to study and turn in answers to parts 1-3 of the Airways Operation Specialist Study Guide. All operators participated in a familiarization program by visiting and observing operational procedures in the Approach Control and GCA facilities.

2. Approach Control. The Approach Control Standing Operating Procedure was signed and returned, and has been mimeographed in sufficient copies for all agencies involved. However, the Letter of Agreement was returned for rewording, pending publication of a Task Group Regulation which will cover a recommendation made in the Letter of Transmittal to the Letter of Agreement.

One approach controller, was returned from TDY to his parent unit on the basis of a family hardship caused by the impending birth of a child. The airman thus released was the NCOIC of the facility. Since procedures of operation were well established, it was considered feasible to release him without requiring a replacement. In the line of training, all operators participated in the familiarization program, visiting and observing procedures at the Control Tower and GCA facilities.

3. GCA. The GCA unit operated successfully throughout the month, with a total of 252 runs logged. The unit was moved once to prevent any possible damage that might have been caused by an aircraft landing on the runway with one wheel retracted. A modification of the starting circuit was completed which eliminated the automatic protective features for remote starting, a procedure not

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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in use here.

All GCA operators participated in the familiarization program of the Section, visiting and observing procedures in the Control Tower and Approach Control facilities. Three control tower operators, [redacted] received several weeks of cross-training in operation of the AN/CPN-4.

4. Navigational Aids - Eniwetok. The VHF/DF unit, an AN/URD-2, was satisfactorily flight-checked on 5 March and was Notamed as operational with the following remark: "Unreliable below 2000 ft beyond 50 miles in all quadrants." A total of 462 steers was furnished to aircraft during the month. All control tower operators have been instructed in the use of the equipment. However, only three have been officially flight-checked.

The AN/CPN-6 and the low frequency Homing Beacon were both operational as of 31 March.

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

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D. MAINTENANCE

1. Personnel Strength. There was no significant change in the personnel assigned to the Maintenance Section during March. Two men were released from TDY and returned to the ZI, with no replacements required. One of these, a ground radio repairman,), was returned on the basis of an acute family hardship; the other, a communications machine repairman, was released as excess to the needs of the section. Mr. Herbert L Mallicoat (Philco) and Mr. Alf A Jorgenson (Gillfillan) remained as the tech reps in the forward area, aiding the two maintenance officers in performance of maintenance functions. Accomplishments of the month are listed below, according to individual sites. An additional paragraph is presented summarizing off-island maintenance activity by members of the section.

2. Transmitter Maintenance. Early in the month a 12 pair cable was installed from the cable head to the FRT-15 controls, and new trolley wires were rigged for the BC 339 transmitter. The 5 mcs frequency on the Kwajalein multiplex circuit was changed from a 96D to the BC 339 transmitter, and the frequency 2815 kcs was changed from a 96C to a 96D. This latter move was at the direction of higher headquarters in hopes of reducing interference with the adjacent Loran Station. However, the interference continued as before.

The exciter units were relocated and changed from 220 v to 110 v operation. New coax cable was arranged for all frequencies in operation, and a patch panel was constructed for connection of cables

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between transmitters and exciters. Since the shift was completed and separate exciters were installed for each circuit, there has been negligible outage during periods of QSY.

Outside-plant activity during March consisted of installing doublet antennae for 4917.5 kcs and 3060 kcs working on BC 610's. In addition, a 166 ft antenna was installed for the 2815 kcs frequency.

Late in the month control units for the AN/FRT-15 were installed in a special rack, and a.c. lines connected thereto. On 30 March circuits J 407 and J 408 were put on the AN/FRT-15 transmitters. Back-ups exist for both circuits on BC 610's. The Kwajalein multiplex frequency of 5745 kcs was shifted to 5145 kcs in accordance with AACS directives.

3. Receivers and Control Tower Maintenance. Spare parts for the RD-92/UX Facsimile Recorder were received and installed, placing the recorders in full operation. The previously installed common ground system was connected to receivers in the point-to-point and AOC monitor positions, the VF and AN/FRR-3 bays, and the teletype machines.

A test circuit was initiated with the Army to check the Samson equipment in the 7.2 communications center. Two battery sources were installed in the BD-74 patch panel in Tech Control for multiplex equipment. Received complaints on the circuit to 7.2 as to "piping set" while at traffic using Samson equipment. Trouble was localized and corrected in the AN/FGC-5 distributor drive unit. The 450 cycles that the Samson equipment uses to synchronize itself

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with the AN/FGC-5 code converter was off frequency. Correction was made by adjusting the oscillator in the drive units using the 600 cycles from WWV to set up the proper frequency.

In the control tower, line amplifiers were installed on the output of the HF and VHF receivers to allow operation at a lower audio level, thus preventing crosstalk in the cable. A patch panel was constructed for control tower receivers; so that if a primary receiver goes out, a spare receiver can be immediately patched in with no resulting outage. An EE-8 telephone box was installed to replace the four separate phones. Previously tower personnel had no way of knowing which phone was ringing. Under the present system the operator uses only one phone for all four circuits. When the buzzer sounds, an indicating light flashes to identify the calling station. In addition, the old antenna frames for the RC-81 antennae were removed from control tower cab.

At the VHF transmitters site, two BC-640 VHF transmitters that were returned from Bikini were overhauled. Installation was completed of the AN/TRC and carrier terminals as back up for the land lines. Prescribed modifications were effected on the AN/GRT-3 transmitters, and routine preventive maintenance was performed on all equipment.

The LGA 600 power unit used to furnish emergency power to the AOC and Building 90 burned out, and was replaced by a spare GPC-F-3 power unit from the GCA site, pending generator repair for the LGA 600 in Honolulu.

4. Teletype Maintenance. An AN/TGC-1 bay was rewired to mon

[redacted]

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itor the Guam weather intercept, so that weather could be passed to the USS Estes in the event of missed weather information aboard the ship.

The AN/TGC-1 formerly on channel one of the spare multiplex was moved to channel one of the NMDE circuit, to be used for passing traffic in the event of a large backlog. A scope on the AN/FGC-5 multiplex was repaired, and a two channel repeater was installed to convert the AN/FGC-5 channels for two-path polar operation to the Army Communications Center. The polar relay circuit, together with an explanation of its operation, is included as Exhibit D to this report.

Routine maintenance was performed as necessary. One teletype maintenance technician was detailed as driver for the weapons carrier assigned to the Element.

5. Radar Maintenance. The supply situation remained good during March. The search antenna tilt motor was received and installed. Only the spare precision transmitter and two precision scopes are presently inoperative owing to lack of parts. The scopes may be operated as is, but are not considered to be operating satisfactorily. The AN/CPN-6 radar beacon functioned properly throughout the month.

The one radar maintenance technician who had been stationed at Site Nan returned to Eniwetok early in March, and made frequent trips back into the Bikini area as required throughout the remainder of the month. Other personnel of the section also are scheduled for short periods of TDY to perform necessary maintenance on the equipment at Site Nan.

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6. Maintenance at Sites Tare and Nan and Rongerik. Several off-island trips were made by personnel of the Maintenance Section during March to accomplish necessary work on equipments used in support of shot activities. A week after the first test, the Assistant Maintenance Officer and two airmen visited Rongerik to determine the operational status of equipment there. The generators, radio equipment, and motor vehicles were all found to be in generally good condition, with very little damage apparent. At four times subsequently in the month, a team consisting of a radio maintenance technician, a power equipment repairman, and a radio operator entered Rongerik to perform necessary functions prior to proposed testing periods.

For the period 7-11 March, the Maintenance Officer and two airmen visited and inspected the communications facilities at Sites Nan and Tare. Equipment at Nan was repaired as necessary, and all facilities were returned to operational status. Later in the month, prior to the second test operation, a team of two airmen returned to Site Nan to perform necessary checks on the AN/CPN-6 Radar Beacon and the AN/URN-5 Homing Beacon.

Subsequent trips to these sites are planned as required in the future. A close check is being maintained of total radiation picked up by personnel making the visits into contaminated areas to insure that no one is sent back in after the maximum dose has been received. Two airmen already have received the maximum quantity.

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E. SUPPLY

1. March Objectives. The principal objectives of the Supply Section for the month of March were as follows:

a. Adjust Expendables stock levels to correspond to estimated consumption based on number of equipments in use.

b. Rearrange the current AACS Forms 49 and 50.

c. Maintain stock levels of Expendables

d. Bin incoming supplies, including procurement of additional bins.

e. Accomplish a spot-check inventory of Expendables

f. Inventory the AACS Plant Account

g. Turn in excess Recoverables

h. Accomplish custody receipts for individuals holding property.

2. Accomplishments. In the main, all objectives for the month were attained. Eight additional bins were procured and are now in use to store the large influx of incoming supplies resulting from the previous month's requests to Base Supply. Housekeeping was improved by the construction of a modern issue counter, extensive painting, and a thorough cleaning of the Supply rooms and adjacent area.

3. Recapitulation of March Issues. The following is a recapitulation of supply action during March. Item totals are in units of issue as shown in USAF stock lists.

a. Expendables Summary

Line items reqn from BSO	713
Total items reqn from BSO	34418
Line items back-ordered by BSO	330
Total items back-ordered by BSO	2879
Line items received from BSO	202
Total items received from BSO	10718
Line items receiving no action at BSO	187
Total items receiving no action at BSO	20775

716

[redacted]

b. Non-expendables Summary

Line items reqn from BSO	20
Total items reqn from BSO	43
Line items back-ordered by BSO	3
Total items back-ordered by BSO	3
Line items received from BSO	16
Total items received from BSO	38

c. Items Issued to Facilities on Daily Recapitulation Sheets

Line items	585
Total items	9543

d. Unfilled Request by Facilities

Request slips pending	174
Total items represented	23298

4. Personnel Arrivals. On 6 March an additional supply specialist arrived for 45 days TDY from the 1959th AACS Squadron, bringing to eight men the total personnel of the Section. In mid March, requests were submitted to the parent units of the two supply specialists that arrived in February, asking that their TDY be extended until their date for rotation from overseas. This was done to insure the retention of qualified personnel familiar with local procedure after the bulk of the Supply Section returns on roll-up. The requests were approved, and as a result three supply men will remain after the completion of the tests, with rotation dates in May, June, and August, 1954.

5. Plant Account Considerations. The Plant Account inventory was completed on the basis of the old records. A new inventory and and adjustment of records is now in progress, based on a new Consolidated MR received from the Base Supply Officer, AF 2272 SO. The new PCS AACS Supply Officer is expected to arrive during the first week

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of April, and it is expected that the work already done will expedite the transfer of the account.

6. 7.4 Command Inspection. Personnel of Headquarters, Task Group 7.4, conducted a command inspection of the Supply Section on 25 March, during which the Commander, Task Group 7.4, reviewed the progress made. No discrepancies were noted, and the Section was verbally commended on the fine work done. The interest of the General and the satisfactory results of the inspection tended to raise morale to a high degree among the members of the section.

7. Future Plans. Next month's plans, in addition to routine duties, are to complete the necessary adjustment documents relative to the Plant Account, effect the transfer of the account to the incoming Supply Officer, and prepare long-term storage of those spare parts subject to corrosion.

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APPENDIX I

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

FOR

COMMUNICATIONS ELEMENT HISTORICAL REPORT

Period 1 - 31 March 1954

Exhibit A Headquarters Task Group 7.4 Msg Cite TGP 3-104

Exhibit B Communications Security Acknowledgment

Exhibit C Letter, Subj: Trip Report to the Estes (Lt Young)

Exhibit D Diagram and Explanation of Two-Channel Repeater

[redacted]

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[redacted]

EXHIBIT A

[redacted]

CTG 7.4 PROV
ENIWETOK MI

ROUTINE ROUTINE

COMDR 1808TH AACS WG TOKYO JAPAN
COMDR 1810TH AACS GP HICKAM AFB TH

092200Z Mar X

X

X

COMDR 1960 AACS SQ KWAJALEIN MI

CITE TANGO GOLF PAPA 3-104 PD DUE TO CRITICAL HOUSING SITUATION REQ THIS HQ BE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE OF TVL TO THIS STA BY PERS UR CMD GIVING ETD AND REASON FOR VISIT PD REQ TVL NOT COMMENCE UNTIL ASSURANCE IS FURN BY THIS HQ THAT FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE PD

[redacted] 1 1

B.E. FORREST, Lt Colonel, USAF
TGP

A J AMERSON
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

4213

[redacted]

AFWL/HO

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[redacted]

EXHIBIT B

I, _____ _____ _____
(NAME) (RANK) (ASN)

certify that I have been briefed in communications security and that I will not divulge classified information over any voice radio circuit.

Atchmt # 1

[redacted]

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HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATIONS ELEMENT PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o PM, San Francisco, California

26 March 1954

SUBJECT: Trip Report to the Estes (Lt Young)

TO: Commander
Communications Element
APO 187

1. M/Sgt Barber, S/Sgt Miller and myself prepared to leave Eniwetok the 11th of March 1954 at 0130Z by air. When we had reported at the flight terminal I noticed that all the other passengers except us were wearing badges. After asking questions it became apparent that some kind of badge or pass would be necessary before we could depart for TARE. I immediately tried to procure badges; however, as the aircraft was due to depart at 0130Z, I was only able to get a badge for myself, but I instructed Sgt Barber and Sgt Miller to get some kind of authority and follow me the next day.

2. I arrived at the Estes at approximately 0530Z on the 11th. After eating chow I inquired into the status of CKT J401. The CKT, at this time, was operational intermittently. I immediately gathered together some of the best Navy technicians and attempted to get the circuit in. Although we tried, it just wasn't possible to keep the circuit receive side in more than a few minutes at a time. The main trouble seemed to be interference. We also had trouble which is attributable, I believe, to P-1 or P-2. It was apparent, however, that the Navy personnel were not too well trained in the little things that keep a circuit in during marginal conditions. Specifically, I speak of maximum use of frequency diversity and shifting receivers to see if a better antenna can be found. The unstable circuit condition at that time however, was attributable mainly to interference and propagation, although I believe some of the outage could have been avoided by proper technical control procedures.

3. M/Sgt Barber and S/Sgt Miller arrived the 12th of March at 0530Z. They immediately started learning the circuit and trying to improve the circuit efficiency. Sgt Barber and Sgt Miller did much to improve the circuit efficiency. I believe the following figures speak for themselves:

Outage Circuit J-401 Mar 2 thru 12

Send 25:00 Receive 61:15

[redacted]

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[redacted]

Outage Circuit J-401 Mar 12 thru 22

Send 25:00 Receive 16:45

The period 2 March thru 12 March is the ten (10) day period prior to arrival of Air Force Technical Controller and Maintenance man. The period March 12 thru Mar 22 is the ten (10) day period when the CKT had an Air Force controller and an Air Force maintenance man operating the NWDE terminal of the circuit.

4. The evident circuit improvement is, I believe, also partly attributable to the difference in the Air Force and the Navy method of circuit control. Due to lack of space for housing, the Navy is restricted in the number of personnel they can have aboard the ship. This theory of operation means that each individual maintenance and control man aboard the ship is responsible for a great deal of equipment. Since the equipment is spread around aboard the ship the man responsible for equipment usually has work to do on several different decks. This of course means that he can not give all of his attention to one circuit or one piece of equipment. This, I believe, is the largest single factor in causing the difference between the number of hours outage when the Air Force controls the circuit and when the Navy controls the circuit.

5. In view of the above criteria, I recommend that we furnish personnel to control the Navy end of the circuit (NWDE termination) at all times. To accomplish this I propose that the Communications Element (Provisional), furnish one technical controller and one maintenance man. In order to keep up the morale of the personnel, I highly recommend that the personnel be rotated after each shot. I recommend this because all of the Air Force personnel who have been stationed aboard the Estes up to this violently dislike it. This is due to the lack of mail, separation from the parent unit, separation from the responsible finance office and a general dislike of sea duty.

CLIFFORD D YOUNG
1st Lt, USAF
Communications Officer

[redacted]

AFWL/HO

723

TWO CHANNEL REPEATER TO
CONTROL AN/FGC-5 CHANNELS
FOR TWO WAY OPERATION



Notes:

1. 120 to 130 volts DC Supply should be connected to terminals 23 and 25 with polarity as shown, capable of supplying 350 amperes

2. Equipment loops will require adjustment to .060 amps by the "Line Current" resistor on the associated code convertor panel of the AN/FGC-5.

[redacted]

The attached drawing is of the polar relay circuit which is mounted on an aluminum panel. This panel is located in the 7.4 communications center. The panel is marked, TWO CHANNEL REPEATER TO CONVERT AN/FGC-5 CHANNELS FOR TWO PATH POLAR OPERATION, TO ARMY COMMUNICATION CENTER.

Channel one send and receive circuit is as follows: Terminals one and two go to Army communication center receive lines. Terminals three and four go to Army communications center send lines. Terminals nine and ten go to channel two converter of the receive AN/FGC-5 equipment used for circuit J400. Terminals eleven and twelve go to channel two converter of the transmit AN/FGC-5 equipment used for circuit J400.

Channel two send and receive circuit is as follows: Terminals five and six go to Army communications center receive lines. Terminals seven and eight go to Army communications center send lines. Terminals thirteen and fourteen go to channel two converter of the receive AN/FGC-5 equipment used for circuit J401. Terminals fifteen and sixteen go to channel two converter of the transmit AN/FGC-5 equipment used for circuit J401.

Terminals twenty three and twenty five go to the battery supply in 7.4 communications center.

[redacted]

DOCUMENTARY PHOTOGRAPHIC ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL (AIR)

MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE

APO 187

HISTORICAL REPORT

1 March 1954 THROUGH 31 March 1954

RCS: TGA-H1

PREPARED BY:

EBEN D. SMITH
CAPTAIN, USAF
HISTORICAL OFFICER

ARCHIVES

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

CHAPTER I

a. ADMINISTRATION

During this period six officer crew members were given additional duties to aid in the operation of the element. These duties are as follows:

Assists the commander in the operation of the element; Supervises the administration of the element.

. Schedules flights involving aircraft assigned this element; Maintains, "Flight Time Accomplishments Chart", Completes passenger list of those personnel accompanying aircraft on mission days; and orders in-flights lunches.

Supervises maintenance personnel; Maintains, "Aircraft Status Chart".

Certifyies custom forms for the personnel of this element as required by regulations on all packages leaving APO 187.

Checks the parachutes and other items of emergency gear to insure that all are inspected when due and returned promptly to this element.

Supervises the athletic activities of the element.

The assigning of the above personnel to the duties indicated is not to be construed that in any future operation of this type that qualified personnel would be required to perform these funtions. The smallness and nature of operation of this element is such that it is believed that an efficient operation can be conducted utilizing the personnel on the crews to perform any of the jobs required to complete the mission.

AFWL/HO

b. SECURITY

Routine security precautions were observed during the period of this report.

c. - OPERATIONS

During March, the aircraft assigned this element participated in one actual mission, and all three Documentary Photographic Aircraft were at the required position at H Hour.

In addition to the above mission, the C-54 aircraft conducted six photographic missions as required by Task Unit Nine.

This element flew eighty-one hours during March of which eighty hours were in support of the Task Force[1]. One hour was required for the test flight after the periodic maintenance inspection.

d. MAINTENANCE

During this period there was a great deal of discussion pertaining to returning C-54 5561 to Hickam Air Force Base to pull the fifth Periodic Inspection. The maintenance officer of the 57th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, this station, inspected the above aircraft and stated that due to the condition of the aircraft and the parts situation at this station it would be more economical to pull the inspection at Hickam Air Force Base[2].

This point was brought out by the statement, that one of the wing flaps on the aircraft was loose. This station would be required to replace and back order the whole item, thus placing the aircraft in an AOCP status. If the plane was inspected at Hickam, more qualified maintenance personnel might be able to determine the defective part and replace it, instead of the whole flap, thus saving both time and money.

AFWL/MO 1. AF Form 110d
2. Memo from Commander WRECEP

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This discussion was resolved when the Commander Task Group 7.4 approved the return of the C-54 to Hickam. Aircraft 5561 departed this station 1450 27 March 1954 and returned to Eniwetok 1 April 1954.

The tails of the three C-54 aircraft were repainted red. In addition the "MATS" design on the nose of two of the aircraft was removed and, "US AIR FORCE" was painted on.

The aircraft assigned the Documentary Photographic Element were in commission two thousand fifty-one (2051:00) hours out of an available two thousand two hundred and thirty-two (2232:00) hours, during the period of this report[3]. This was made possible as only minor preventative maintenance was required on the aircraft, with the exception of the inspection pulled on aircraft 5561 at Hickam Air Force Base.

e. SUPPLY

The parts situation as pertains to C-54 aircraft on this base is such that when the C-54 belonging to the Commander of Task Force Seven or other VIP C-54's break down, this element is required to furnish parts out of the spare parts brought from Hickam Air Force Base to maintain the Documentary Photographic aircraft.

CHAPTER II

MORAL

The commander of this element has received many complaints about the movies shown each night. Some of the complaints are:

a. The movies are very old, and as a result most of the personnel have seen them in the Zone of Interior.

b. Many of the movies are of very low quality.

AFWL/HO 3. AF Form 110a

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The recommendation was made to the personnel services officer, Test Services Unit, that in future operations of this type that the movies shown be current, and of a higher quality.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

FOR

HISTORICAL REPORT

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[redacted]



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HISTORY OF THE SEARCH AND RESCUE ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL

1 MARCH 1954 TO 31 MARCH 1954

RCS: TGA-H1

PREPARED FOR THE HISTORICAL OFFICE, TEST SERVICES UNIT, APO 187, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA AND TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, BY CAPTAIN GERALD E. STORTS ON 5 APRIL 1954.

[redacted]S

AIR RESCUE SERVICE, MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE

[redacted]

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SAR ELEMENT, PROVISIONAL, HISTORY FOR MARCH

1954

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

ADMINISTRATION

Generally, after the initial confusion that existed starting a new operation in early February, the month of March saw the administrative section fairly well settled down into a routine operation. No new reports were required during the month.

On 10 March the initial increment of a detachment of SA-16 crews arrived from the 76th Air Rsq Sq at Hickam Air Force Base, TH.[1] These crews were put under the operational control of the 4930th Test Support Gp., and under the administrative control of the SAR Element (Prov). Their mission is to provide amphibious airlift support to JTF SEVEN.

T/S ., was recommended for the Maintenance Man of the Month of the Test Services Unit, for the month of February.[2]

crew was recommended for the Crew of The Month of the Test Services Unit,[3] for the month of February.

Messages were received from Sea Frontier, and Commander Naval Station Kwajalein, commending the manner in which members of Task Group 7.4 assisted in the search for the missing British Canberra jet during the last week of February as noted in the February history of the Element[4].

The SAR Element (Prov) administration section was inspected by a team of one officer and one airman from Task Group 7.4, Provisional, on 24 March. No major descrepancies were noted.

The SAR Element Security program was inspected by of the Test Services Unit, Provisional, with only two minor descrepancies being noted, these being corrected immediately.

1. Par # 3; S.O. # 45, Hq 78th Air Rsq Sq, dated 9 March 1954.
2. Ltr Hq Test Sv Unit, (Prov), Subj: Maint Man of the Month (TAB 7)
3. Ltr Hq Tset Sv Unit, (Prov), Subj: Crew of the Month (TAB 8)
4. Messages of Commendation (TAB 9)

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

During the month two rated officers of the SAR Element (Prov), received Annual Medical Evaluation by the Flight Surgeon.

As the outcome of a meeting held at Kwajalein on 17 March[5] I arrived at this station on the 29 March to assume command of the SAR Element (prov),[6] Vice v who returned to Kwajalein to resume command of the 78th Air Rsq Sq. assumed command of the SAR Element (Prov), effective 30 March.[7]

On 31 March I assumed the additional duty of Flying Safety Officer for the SAR Element (Prov).[8]

Generally the Administrative Section operated smoothly and efficiently during the month of March due to the personnel of the section becoming more familiar with the procedures and techniques peculiar to this type of operation.

5. Reference Command Section this history.
6. Par # 1, S.O.# 58, Hq 78th Air Rsq Sq, dtd 29 Mar 54 (TAB 11)
7. Par # 1, S.O.# 4, Hq SAR ELM (Prov), dated 30 Mar 54 (TAB 12)
8. Par # 2, S.O.# 6, Hq SAR ELM (Prov), dated 31 Mar 54

PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

COMMAND AND MORALE

SECTION

During the month of March it was definitely determined that the 78th Air Rescue Squadron at Kwajalein, Marshall Islands, would retain full Search and Rescue responsibilities for the Kwajalein area at least until 1 May, rather than become non-operational earlier in the year as originally planned.

As a result of a meeting held on 17 March at Kwajalein,[9] and a series of communications between Brigadier General DuBose and Brigadier General Estes subsequent to this meeting, Major Hagerty was directed to resume Command of the 78th Air Rescue Squadron at Kwajalein, and Lt. Colonel Harold F. Cline, 8598A, at the time Commander of the 32nd Air Rescue Squadron, 2nd Air Rescue Group was directed to proceed to Eniwetok and assume Command of the Search and Rescue Element, Provisional.[10]

Lt. Colonel Cline arrived at Eniwetok on 29 March.

On 30 March a conference was held to redefine the responsibilities and functions of the SAR Element (Prov), the 76th Air Rescue Squadron Detachment at Eniwetok, the 78th Air Rescue Squadron at Kwajalein, the 4930th Test Support Group at Eniwetok, and the Test Services Unit, Provisional. The following officers, organization as indicated attended the conference:

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9. Meeting [illegible] Col. Disana, representing Commander T.G. 7.4, (Prov) and Test Sv Unit (Prov); and Maj. Hagerty, Commander of the SAR Element (Prov).
10. Par # 1, S.O. # 58, Hq 78th Air Rsq Sq, dtd 29 Mar 54 (TAB 11)

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It was determined that the present organizational, functional and support procedures would remain unchanged, with the SAR Element (Prov) receiving personnel, supply and maintenance support from the 78th Air Rescue Squadron at Kwajalein; the 76th Air Rescue Squadron Detachment continuing under the operational control of the 4930th Test Support Group and under administrative control of the SAR Element (Prov), and the Test Services Unit, (Prov), supplies and parts coming from Navy Stock "E" at Kwajalein and indirectly from AF SO 714 at Hickam AFB, TH, and maintenance being accomplished by the 4930th Test Support Group and maintenance personnel assigned to the 76th Air Rescue Squadron Detachment.

The SAR Element (Prov) fulfilling the SAR function for Joint Task Force SEVEN, as provided in current Operations Orders;[11] the 76th Air Rescue Squadron Detachment fulfilling the amphibious airlift function for Joint Task Force SEVEN, as directed.

MORALE

The morale of the Element continued excellent during the month of March with no disciplinary action being necessary, of any kind.

11. Annex "F", T.G. 7.4 OPS ORDER 1-54, TAB 2 to February History of the SAR Element (Prov).

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OPERATIONS SECTION

Shot Bravo was scheduled for 1 March. Two days prior to the 1 March mission, SA-16 # 49-79 was test flown and developed a severe oil leak on the number 1 propeller, which would require a propeller change. Emergency requisitions were submitted for the neccessary parts, however they could not be received in sufficient time for this aircraft to participate in the mission for 1 March. As a result, a PBM was substituted, with Navy crew supplemented by a SAR Element (Prov) aircraft Commander, to assume airstrip alert and to act as back-up for the #1 and #2 SA-16's. The mission was flown without incident and the PBM was not scrambled

For this mission on 1 March the aircraft were positioned the same as for the practice and rehersal missions during the month of February. Requests had been initiated to change the crew mission assignment and also the aircaft positioning so as to faciliate the accomplishment of the SAR mission. However this was not approved by higher headquarters in sufficient time to include such changes for the 1 March mission.

On 1 March, the SAR Controller in the Air Operations Center submitted Critique Comments and recommendations,[12] which had been coordinated with and approved by the SAR Commander, to the Operations Section of Task Group 7.4, Provisional, that it was felt would faciliate the SAR Operation. Verbal approval was obtained and it was determined that the recommended changes would be incorporated in the mission planning for the next scheduled shot.

12. SAR Controller Critique Comments (TAB 10).

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Basically, the changes concerned parking all three (3) SAR aircraft in the immediate vicinity of the SAR Alert Shack, instead of parking the #1 SA-16 at the end of the runway near Base Operations, and having the #3 SA-16 and crew assume strip alert responsibilities from just prior to the first mission aircraft's take-off time until the mission was complete, rather than have the #1 SA-16 and crew responsible for strip alert until their take-off time, and then the #3 aircraft and crew assuming strip alert.

At 0420L on 1 March, the #1 SA-16 was airborne and proceeded to a position approximately sixty miles West of Ground Zero, for his H-hour orbit position. An orbit was established and maintained at this position under the control of the Combat Information Center (CIC) on the Command Ship until H-hour. Immediately after H-hour this aircraft was directed to a position approximately fifty (50) miles south of Ground Zero and approximately over the Command Ship. The #1 SA-16 orbited in this position during the jet cloud sampling operation, providing close-in SAR coverage for the Jet aircraft.

At approximately 0620L a B-50 called in that he had one engine out. He stated that he was going to complete his mission prior to returning to base and that SAR assistance was not required at that time.

At 0652L (H + :07) the #2 SA-16 was airborne and proceeded to the designated orbit point sixty (60) miles West of Ground Zero. This position was maintained until the completion of the sampling mission.

A total of eighteen (18) hours and five (5) minutes were flown on the Bravo mission by the #1 and #2 SA-16's. Only minor radiation was experienced by either aircraft and no noticeable turbulence at H-hour.

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The crew members were equipped with high density filter goggles, film badges and Radiac Instruments. It was a prerequisite that long-sleeved clothing be worn with sleeves rolled down and that gloves be worn. No incidents occured during the mission requiring SAR assistance.

On 2 March an emergency radiological survey flight was made to Rongelap Atoll to determine if radioactive fall-out had contaminated the Island.[13] Charts of the Lagoon at Rongelap Atoll were not available, however even though take-off was not made until 1637L, it was determined that the landing and take-off at Rongelap Atoll could be made during daylight hours. The conditions in the Lagoon were evaluated and landing was accomplished without incident. The radiological survey was completed and the take-off was accomplished prior to darkness and the flight returned to base without incident.

On 3 March the elevator on SA-16 #49-79 was damaged by a heliocopter that taxied into it while the aircraft was parked in the Maintenance area awaiting installation of a new propeller. A new elevator was obtained from Kwajalein and installed on the aircraft.

An intercept and escort was accomplished on a WB-29 on 4 March.[14] The WB-29 was approximately 350 nautical miles out of Eniwetok on a weather reconnaisance mission and had number three (3) engine feathered. The intercept was accomplished , and the WB-29 was escorted to base where it landed without further difficulty.

Preparations were completed on 10 March for the Romeo Shot scheduled for 13 March. The aircraft were Test Flown and determined to be operational.

13. SAR Element (Prov) Mission Rept 2-2 Mar 54 (TAB 1).
14. SAR Element (Prov) Mission Rept 3-4 Mar 54 (TAB 2).

[redacted]

The new parking and crew alert schedule was to be in effect for this mission. Details such as scheduling, aircraft positioning, arranging for early meals and in-flight lunches, and drawing of rad-safe equipment were completed. The mission, originally scheduled for the 13 March was postponed for 48 hours, due to unfavorable weather and winds, all three aircraft were retained at Eniwetok and during the next two weeks the Romeo Shot was postponed repeatedly for periods of from 24 to 48 hours due to unfavorable weather conditions.

SAR coverage orbit missions were flown on 13, 14 and 15 March for F-84 aircraft that were making weather reconnaissance flights in the Bikini area. The orbit was established and flown at a point approximately mid-way between Eniwetok and Bikini to provide immediate SAR assistance to the jets should they experience difficulty on their flights. These orbit missions averaged approximately two and one half hours per flight. During the period from the time that Romeo Shot was first scheduled and the time it was actually accomplished, all three aircraft were maintained in commission and flying was held to a minimum, flying only necessary test flights and actual intercept missions. On 20 March water transition was attempted, but was called off due to the sea conditions being unfavorable for satisfactory practice operations. On 22 March another water transition flight was scheduled and satisfactory flown. Since almost any rescue preformed in this area would necessiate a water landing, emphasis was placed on establishing and maintaining a high degree of proficiency in water operations.

23 March proved to be a record day for calls for assistance from the SAR Element (Prov). At 1025L the alert aircraft and crew were scrambled to intercept a P2V-6 sixty (60) miles out of Eniwetok.

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The P2V had one engine feathered and was at 500 feet altitude and able to maintain only 120-130 knots airspeed. The aircraft was intercepted promptly and was escorted back to base where a successful single-engine landing was made.[15]

Twenty-five (25) minutes after landing from the above intercept mission, the crew was again alerted to scramble for a WB-29 with #3 engine feathered that was approximately 600 miles southwest of Eniwetok on a weather reconnaissance flight. The intercept was accomplished satisfactorily and the distressed aircraft was escorted to the base where he landed without further difficulty.[16]

Again, twenty-five (25) minutes after landing from the second intercept mission the crew was alerted to intercept another WB-29 that was approximately 700 miles Northeast of Eniwetok, also on a weather reconnaissance mission, that had an engine feathered. Again the intercept was accomplished without difficulty and the distressed aircraft was escorted to a safe landing at 1940L.[17]

A water transition mission was scheduled on the 25 March and after the 4th water landing the right propeller went to the full feathered position during reversing procedure and would not unfeather. The aircraft was beached and the propeller was repaired. The tide had gone out while repairs were being made leaving the aircraft stuck on the sand. However, having waited for high tide the aircraft was floated sucessfully and returned to the airfield.

After a two week delay the Romeo Shot was accomplished on 27 March.

15. Mission Rept SAR Element (Prov)-4-23 March 1954, (TAB 3).
16. Mission Rept SAR Element (Prov)-5-23 March 1954, (TAB 4).
17. Mission Rept SAR Element (Prov)-6-23 March 1954, (TAB 5).

The new parking plan was put into effect with all three SA16's parked close by the alert shack and also the #3 SA-16 and crew assumed airstrip alert responsibility as of 0100L, leaving the #1 and #2 aircraft and crews unhampered with airstrip alert responsibilities and free to concentrate on effective accomplishment of their assigned orbit missions. The two changes aided considerably in facilitating the effective accomplishment of the SAR mission. The #1 SA-16 was airborne at 0405L and proceeded to his orbit position as for the previous mission. The #2 SA-16 was airborne at 0637L and proceede to his assigned orbit position. This mission was flown without a request for SAR assistance. No radiation or turbulence was encountered by either aircraft. A total of fifteen (15) hours and twenty (20) minutes was flown by the two aircraft on the Romeo mission.

Again on 30 and 31 March water transition flights were scheduled and sucessfully flown. On 31 March the crew was alerted to start engines and hold at the end of the runway for a WB-29 that was 100 miles out at 20,000 feet, returning with one engine feathered. The WB-29 landed safely. However it was agreed that in the future the rescue aircraft would actually take-off on all requests for SAR assistance, regardless of close proximity to the field.

Again on this day a WB-29 feathered #2 propeller approximately 500 miles Northeast of Eniwetok and the crew was scrambled for the intercept. The intercept. The intercept and escort was accomplished in a routine manner and the WB-29 landed safely at 1936L.[18]

The month of March saw many of the previous month's problems solved and operations in general were considered very satisfactory.

18. Mission Rept, SAR Element (Prov)-7-31 March 1954. (TAB 6)

SAR CONTROLLER

AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

SECTION

The first operational mission was preformed on the 1 March. The #1 SA-16 was airborne at 0420L and proceeded to his orbit position. At 0619L the Area Controller reported a B-50 had an oil leak, and the surface control ship in the forward area (CIC) was vectoring the #1 SA-16 to intercept. The Deputy Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, advised the SAR Controller to scramble the #2 SA-16 for intercept from Eniwetok, thus releasing the #1 SA-16 to continue his orbit position mission. At 0627L the CIC advised the AOC to hold the #2 SA-16 until his scheduled take-off time, since the B-50 had no emergency and was continuing with his mission. At 0653L shortly after H-hour, the Area Controller advised that the B-50 had completed his mission, feathered #1 propeller (due to the oil leak) and was returning to Eniwetok. The #2 SA-16 departed Eniwetok on schedule (0652L) and the Area Controller attempted to monitor the positions of the #2 SA-16 and the B-50, but the SA-16's IFF equipment was inoperative. The B-50 was over Eniwetok at 0727L and landed at 0732L. The remainder of the mission was uneventful.

At 1513L, 2 March, the Test Services Unit Operations Officer called to alert the SAR Element (Prov) for a possible radiological mission to Rongelap Atoll.[19] The SAR crew was briefed by the Deputy Commander, Task Group 7.4, Provisional, and successfully completed the mission at 2125L.

19. Mission Rept, SAR Element (Prov)-2-2 March 1954. (TAB 1).

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[redacted]

SAR ELEMENT HISTORY REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH-SAR CONTROLLER SECTION-Cont'd

The SAR Section was alerted at 1516L on 4 March for an intercept of a WB-29, AF 2195.[20] The alert crew was airborne in 15 minutes, and a successful mission was accomplished. The only difficulty encountered was a lack of result with the Q-17 homing equipment. Ground checks of this and the ARN-7 receivers aboard the WB-29 revealed that both were operating properly, so no explanation was apparent.

A SAR Element (Prov) SA-16 was used for orbit on 12 March for an F-84 on reconnaissance over Bikini. The SA-16 assumed a position 90 miles East of Eniwetok under the control of the Air Operations Center, and completed its flight without incident.

The following day, 13 March, a similiar mission was preformed, the SA-16 departed 15 minutes prior to the F-84, and again the flight was uneventful.

On 14 March at 1035L a Navy P2V reported a gas leak and requested a helicopter standby. The P2V was only 40 miles out, so an H-19 and crash boat was alerted. The P2V landed safely at 1100L.

The Test Aircraft Unit, Provisional requested an SA-16 for orbit on 15 March for two (2) F-84 aircraft on a flight to Bikini and return. The orbit position was again 90 miles East of Eniwetok. The flight was routine.

A request of the orbit missions was prefoormed on 21 March for one (1) F-84.

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20. Mission Rept, SAR Element (Prov)-3-4 March 1954 (TAB 2).

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SAR ELEMENT (PROV) HISTORY REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH-SAR CONTROLLER SECTION-Continued.

The SAR Element preformed three (3) intercept and escort missions on 23 March.[21] The first was a Navy P2V-6 with one engine out and approximately 60 miles out, the second was a WB-29 with one engine out and approximately 600 miles from Eniwetok, and the third was a WB-29 approximately 700 miles from base. All intercepts were successful and the distressed aircraft landed at Eniwetok without incident.

The second operation was preformed on 27 March, and was completely uneventful from the SAR viewpoint. All SA-16 aircraft made their departure times on the minute, and orbit missions were flown as scheduled.

At 0750L on 31 March the AOC Area Controller notified the SAR Controller that a WB-29, had feathered #2 propellor 100 miles out, due to turbo trouble. The SA-16 was advised to assume a runway alert status with engines running, and the H-19 and crash boat were alerted. The WB-29 landed safely at 0831L. Shortly after the mission the SAR Controller was informed that the new Element Commander's policy would be to dispatch either the SA-16 or the H-19 on all incidents.

At 1658L on 31 March the Area Controller alerted the SAR Section for a WB-29, with one propeller feathered.[22] The Alert SA-16 was airborne at 1714L and successfully intercepted and escorted the WB-29 to Eniwetok where it landed at 1936L.

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21. Mission Repts SAR Element (Prov)-4-23 Mar 54, 5-23 Mar 54, 6-23 Mar 54 (TABS 3, 4, and 5 respectively).
22. Mission Rept, SAR Element (Prov)-7-31 March 1954 (TAB 6).

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MAINTENANCE SECTION

As a result of the accelerated program during the Month of February to get the radar and electronics equipment in the aircraft in operational condition, this equipment operated satisfactorily during the month of March with only routine line maintenance and the replacement of such expendable items as tubes, etc.

On 3 March a helicopter taxied into such a position that the rotor struck the elevator on S/A-16 49-79. This aircraft was AOCP for a propeller and was parked on the ramp by the maintenace hangar. A replacement elevator that had been requisitioned from Kwajalein arrived and was installed on the aircraft on 8 March. The replacement propellor arrived on 9 March and was built-up and installed on 10 March, checked okay.

Generally during the month this section was confronted with routine line maintenance functions with few items of major maintenance, as noted.

The operations scheduled quite a few water transition flights during the month, which required fresh-water wash down after the flight. This was accomplished without undue hardship.

On 25 March an S/A-16 was scheduled for water Transition , during which, after the fourth water landing, the #2 propeller went into full feather during the un-reversing cycle and would not unfeather. The crew taxied the aircraft to the personnel pier on single engine and beached it there. The propeller was checked, no deffects were noted.

The feathering switch was tried several times to no avail. Then, the circuit breaker was pulled out and reset, and the feathering switch then actuated to unfeather at which time the propeller came out of feather and returned to normal.

AFWL/HC

The engine was started and the propeller checked out okay. Due to the tide having gone out during this time, it was necessary to await high-tide to refloat the aircraft. At high-tide the aircraft was refloated without undue difficulty and was flown to the airfield without incident.

Extracts of aircraft time for the month from the AF Form 110's are as follows:

Hours on Hand: 1949

Hours in Commission: 1733

Fuel Consumed: 15,508 gals.

Hours out of Commission: 216

Hours Flown: 105:40

Oil Consumed: 426 qts.

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SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

TAB 1. Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-2-2 March 1954.

TAB 2. Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-3-4 March 1954.

TAB 3. Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-4-23 March 1954.

TAB 4. Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-5-23 March 1954.

TAB 5. Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-6-23 March 1954.

TAB 6. Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-7-31 March 1954.

TAB 7. Maintenance Man of the Month.

TAB 8. Crew of the Month.

TAB 9. Commendations From Rear Admirals Olson and Clarke.

TAB 10. SAR Controllers Critique Comments.

TAB 11. S.O. # 58, Hq 78th Air Rescue Squadron, dated 29 March 1954.

TAB 12. S.O. # 4, Hq SAR Element (Prov), dated 30 March 1954.

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1954

HEADQUARTES
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

[redacted] 1

5 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report SAR Element (Prov)-2-2 March 1954

TO: Commander
Air Rescue Service
Washington 25, D.C.

1. In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2), the attached Mission Report is forwarded.

2. Comments:

a. The mission was a complete success and the findings were a basis for Task Group 7.4 operational planning.

3. Recommendations:

a. None.

4. Problems or Difficulties Encountered:

a. None.

5. Corrective Action:

a. None.

1 Incl:
Msn Rept SAR Element
(Prov)-2-2 March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/MO

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HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

6 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report SAR Element (Prov)-2-2 March 1954

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Forwarded herewith is a copy of a Mission Report SAR Element (Prov) 2-2 March 1954 for further submission to Task Group 7.4, (Prov), and Headquarters, Air Rescue Service respectively.

2 Incl:
1. n/c
2. n/c

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HO

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HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

RCS: ARS-F2

5 March 1954

MISSION NUMBER: SAR Element (Prov)-2-2 March 1954 (Uncl).

TYPE OF MISSION: Radiological Survey.

DATE OF CLOSING: 2 March 1954.

SOURCE AND TIME OF INITIAL ALERT: The Test Services Unit Operations Officer called at 1513 L, 2 March 1954, to request an SA-16 and crew be alerted for a possible mission to Rongelap Atoll, Marshall Islands.

DATE AND TIME OF DISPATCH OF ARS FACILITIES: SA-16 AF 1016 was airborne at 1636 L, 2 March 1954.

SYNOPSIS: The Test Services Unit Operations Officer specified that the standby aircraft and crew be readied for the transportation of a radiological survey team, and a landing in the Lagoon at Rongelap Atoll.

The rescue crew was briefed by the Deputy Commander, Task Group 7.4, (Prov), while awaiting the arrival of the survey team, and the aircraft departed at 1636 L, with two (2) radiological monitors aboard.

Due to the approaching darkness and water operation in an unprepared area, the SA-16 proceeded to the area at 160K, and arrived over Rongelap at 1813 L. While making radioactive checks at 200 ft the pilot made a study of the Lagoon, wind direction and surface conditions. A water landing was made at 1828 L, and the radiological survey team was put ashore in a life raft.

Radioactive checks were completed in approximitly 30 minutes, and the SA-16 made a take-off at 1915 L. The flight proceeded as briefed, to Wotho Atoll and made an aerial survey at 200 ft which was completed at 1942 L.

REMARKS: The water landing in the Lagoon was uneventful and no difficulties were encountered. The pilot evaluated conditions as:

a. Sea Condition: Two (2) to three (3) feet wind swells.

b. Wind: 60 degrees at 12 Knots.

c. Landing Heading: 60 degrees.

d. Take-off Heading: 40 degrees.

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical, Officer

/s/ Willard D. Welch
/t/ WILLARD D. WELCH
Captain, USAF
Mission Commander

AFWL/HO

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HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

[redacted] 2

6 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report SAR Element (Prov)-3-4 March 1954

TO: Commander
Air Rescue Service
Washington 25, D.C.

1. In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2) the attached Mission Report is forwarded.

2. Comments:

a. None.

3. Recommendations:

a. None.

4. Problems or Difficulties Encountered:

a. The attempted use of the O-17 equipment produced no results.

5. Corrective Action:

a. A ground check of the O-17 after the mission revealed it was operating satisfactorily. No explanation presents itself since the WB-29 pilot also reported his ANR-7 was operating normally.

b. The O-17 will be checked in the air on the next flight of AF 1016.

1 Incl:
Msn Rept, SAR Element
(Prov)-3-4 March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HRO

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HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

6 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report SAR Element (Prov)-3-4 March 1954

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2) the attached Mission Report is submitted for your information.

1 Incl:
Mission Report, SAR
Element (Prov)-3-4
March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

Gerald E. Storts

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HO

756

~~254~~

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

6 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report SAR Element (Prov)-3-4 March 1954

TO: Directorate of Flying Safety
Norton Air Force Base
California

In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2) the attached Mission Report is forwarded for your information.

1 Incl:
Msn Rept, SAR
Element (Prov)
3-4 March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/MO

757
~~755~~

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

RCS: ARS-F2 6 March 1954

MISSION NUMBER: (Uncl) Mission Report SAR Element (Prov)-3-4 March 1954.

TYPE OF MISSION: Interception.

OBJECTIVE: AF2195/WB-29/Shanon/Eniwetok/10,000/Track Kilo/Eniwetok/180K/VHF/P. 7685mcs, S. 4415mcs/0700L/11 plus 45/15 plus 00/2-1/8.

DATE OF CLOSING: 4 March 1954.

SOURCE AND TIME OF INITIAL ALERT: Air Operations Center (AOC) Senior Air Controller at 1615L 4 March 1954.

DATE AND TIME OF INITIAL DISPATCH OF ARS FACILITIES: SA-16 AF1016 was airborne at 1630L.

SYNOPSIS: The Senior Air Controller reported AF2195 had feathered No. 2 propeller due to excessive oil consumption and had requested interception. Position at 1605L was 1529N-16731E on track of 231 degrees, ground speed 190K, and altitude 9,800 feet. Immediately after take-off the SA-16 contacted the AOC on 137.88mcs and was given the 1620L position of AF2195 which was 1456N-16653E, track 231 degrees, ground speed 186K, and altitude 10,000 feet. Additional information relayed was HF frequencies and winds of 310/10 at 10,000 feet.

Voice contact was established between the SA-16 and the WB-29 on 137.-88mcs at 1645L, and AN/ARA-8 bearings at 1605L, 1700L, and 1715L indicated the distressed aircraft at 12 o'clock to the SA-16. CW contact was made at 1651L. Attempted use of the G-17 begining at 1705L was unsuccessful.

At 0518L the APS-31 Interrogator-Responder indicated an emergency signal 50 miles straight ahead, and contact was maintained until interception was accomplished visually at 1726L at 1252N-16418E. Radar contact was not attempted until after the intercept due to the positive IFF contact.

The WB-29 was escorted visually and by radar to a safe GCA landing at Eniwetok at 1825L. The SA-16 landed from a GCA at 1835L.

LOCATION OF OBJECTIVE: Interception accomplished at 1252N-16418E at 1726L.

REMARKS:

a. The WB-29 was sure of its position and was not dangerously impaired at any time.

AFWL/HRO

SAR ELEMENT (PROV) Subj: (Uncl) Mission Report (RCS: ARS-F2)- Cont'd

b. No apprehension was apparent among the crew of AF2195.

c. There is no doubt that the WB-29 could have completed its flight safely without ARS assistance.

d. Interception was requested as a precautionary measure.

e. There were nine (9) people aboard AF2195.

/s/ Willard D. Welch
/t/ WILLARD D. WELCH
Captain, USAF
Mission Commander

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HO

759

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

26 March 1954

[redacted] 3

SUBJECT: (Unal) Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-4-23 March 1954

THRU: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TO: Commander
Air Rescue Service
Washington 25, D.C.

1. In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2) the attached Mission Report is forwarded.

2. Comments.

a. None.

3. Recommendations.

a. None.

4. Problems or Difficulties Encountered.

a. The mistake in reporting the correct information delayed interception. N6538 reported his bearing from Eniwetok, but stated it was his track.

5. Corrective Action.

a. None.

1 Incl:
Mission Report, SAR
Element (Prov)
4-23 March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:
GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HO

760
763

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

26 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-4-23 March 1954

THRU: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TO: Directorate of Flying Safety
Norton Air Force Base
California

In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2) the attached Mission Report is forwarded for your information.

1 Incl:
Mission Report, SAR
Element (Prov)
4-23 March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

Gerald E. Storts
GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HO

761

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
(RCS: ARS-F2)

26 March 1954

MISSION NUMBER: (Uncl) SAR Element (Prov)-4-23 March 1954.

TYPE OF MISSION: Interception.

DATE OF CLOSING: 23 March 1954.

SOURCE AND TIME OF INITIAL ALERT: Air Operations Center (AOC) Senior Controller at 1020L 23 March 1954.

DATE AND TIME OF INTTIAL DISPATCH OF ARS FACILITIES: SA-16, AF 1021, was airborne at 23/1026L.

SYNOPSIS: The Senior Controller advised that a Navy F4U had called on VHF "D" to report N6538 had feathered a propeller approximately sixty (60) miles from Eniwetok and was having difficulty holding his altitude. The F4U reported N6538 was making a track of 234 degrees, destination Eniwetok, and was requesting intercept. AF 1021 departed on a heading of 54 degrees, and established direct communications with N6538 on VHF "D" at 1032L. A check on track, position and ground speed by AF 1021 revealed that N6538 was on a bearing of 238 degrees from Eniwetok. The SA-16 reversed course. At 1035L the Area Controller in the AOC picked up N6538 on his APS-23, and vectored AF 1021 to the intercept. The AN/ARA-8 was used by the SA-16 at 1035L, and indicated the distressed aircraft at 12 o'clock. Visual interception was accomplished at 1041L and the P2V was escorted to Eniwetok where it landed at 1050L. The SA-16 landed at 1100L.

LOCATION OF OBJECTIVE: Interception was accomplished at 231041L at 1112N-16207E.

REMARKS:

a. The target aircraft was dangerously impaired in that his altitude was only 500 ft, and he had difficulty maintaing it.

b. No apprehension was evident in the crew of N6538.

c. The distressed aircraft could have made destination without ARS assistance.

d. Intercept was requested as a precautionary measure.

e. There were three (3) people aboard N6538.

A TRUE COPY:

Gerald E. Starts

GERALD E. STARTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HO

/s/ Willard D. Welch
/t/ WILLARD D. WELCH
Captain, USAF
Mission Commander

762

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

27 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-5-23 March 1954

THRU: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TO: Commander
Air Rescue Service
Washington 25, D.C.

1. In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2) the attached Mission Report is hereby submitted.

2. Comments.

a. None.

3. Recommendations.

a. None.

4. Problems or Difficulties Encountered.

a. APS-31 and APX-6 equipment aboard AF 1021 was not operational during this mission.

5. Corrective Action.

a. The APS-31 and APX-6 equipment were removed and replaced after Mission (SAR Element (Prov)-6-23 March 1954)and the sets operated normally.

1 Incl:
Mission Report, SAR
Element (Prov)
5-23 March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HO

763
~~767~~

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

27 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov), 5-23 March 1954

THRU: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TO: Directorate of Flying Safety
Norton Air Force Base
California

In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2) the attached Mission Report is forwarded for your information.

1 Incl:
Mission Report, SAR
Element (Prov)
5-23 March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HO

764

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
(RCS: ARS-F2)

27 March 1954

MISSION NUMBER: (Uncl) Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-5-23 March 1954.

TYPE OF MISSION: Interception.

OBJECTIVE: AF7343/WB-29/Hopson/Eniwetok/0115S-15743E/0143S-16600E/ Eniwetok/[illegible]/VHF, 7685kcs, 4425kcs/0730L/10 plus 30/ 15 plus 00/2-1[illegible]8.

DATE OF CLOSING: 23 March 1954.

SOURCE AND TIME OF INITIAL ALERT: Air Operations Center (AOC) Senior Controller at 1120L.

DATE AND TIME OF INITIAL DISPATCH OF ARS FACILITIES: SA-16, AF 1021, was airborne at 1126L, 23 March 1954.

SYNOPSIS: AF 7343 reported he had feathered number 3 propeller due to internal failure of the engine and requested intercept. Position of the WB-29 at 1052L was 0154N-15843E, altitude 10,000 ft, track 020 degrees and ground speed 205K. AF 1021 made CW contact with the AOC immediately after take-off on the frequency of the distressed aircraft, but attempted direct contact with the WB-29, which was unsuccessful. Information and instructions were relayed through the AOC until 1230L at which time VHF contact was established on 121.5mcs. An AN/ARA-8 bearing taken at 1232L indicated the distressed aircraft was directly ahead of the SA-16. At 1234L the SA-16 started transmissions on the O-17 which verified the AN/ARA-8 bearing. Continued use of the AN/ARA-8 and the O-17 resulted in visual interception at 1251L. Escort was furnished the WB-29 to a successful landing at Eniwetok at 1349L. AF 1021 landed at 1409L.

LOCATION OF OBJECTIVE: Interception was made at 0815N-16053E at 1251L.

REMARKS: a. The WB-29 was sure of its position and was not dangerously impaired at any time.

b. No apprehension was apparent among the crew of AF 7343.

c. The WB-29 could have completed its flight without ARS assistance.

d. Interception was requested as a precautionary measure.

e. There were ten (10) people aboard AF 7343.

A TRUE COPY:
GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

/s/ GERALD E. STORTS
/t/ GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Mission Commander

AFWLMO

765

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

27 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-6-23 March 1954.

THRU: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

[redacted] 51

TO: Commander
Air Rescue Service
Washington 25, D.C.

1. In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2) the attached Mission Report is hereby submitted.

2. Comments.

a. None.

3. Recommedations.

a. None

4. Problems or Difficulties Encountered.

a. The APS-31 and APX-6 was not operational during this mission.

5. Corrective Action.

a. As indicated in the letter of transmittal for SAR Element (Prov) 5-23 March 1954, the equipment was removed and replaced. Only twenty four (24) minutes elapsed between mission number five (5) and six 6).

1 Incl:
Mission Report, SAR
Element (Prov)
6-23 March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:
Gerald E. Starts
GERALD E. STARTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

766

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

27 March 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report SAR Element (Prov)-6-23 March 1954

THRU: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TO: Directorate of Flying Safety
Norton Air Force Base
California

In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2) the attached Mission Report is forwarded for your information.

1 Incl:
Mission Report, SAR
Element, Provisional
6-23 March 1954

/s/ Leo J. Hagerty
/t/ LEO J. HAGERTY
Major, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. [illegible]
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFRHL/HO

762

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
(RCS: ARS-F2)

27 March 1954

MISSION NUMBER: (Uncl) SAR Element (Prov)-6-23 March 1954.

TYPE OF MISSION: Interception.

OBJECTIVE: AF2220/WB-29/Sharar/Eniwetok/0442N-17354E/1249N-17557E/Eniwetok/200K/VHF, 7685kcs/0630L/10 plus 35/15 plus 00/2-1/8.

DATE OF CLOSING: 23 March 1954.

SOURCE AND TIME OF INITIAL ALERT: Air Operations Center (AOC) Senior Controller at 1433L, 23 March 1954.

DATE AND TIME OF INITIAL DISPATCH OF ARS FACILITIES: SA-16, AF 1021, was airborne at 1440L, 23 March 1954.

SYNOPSIS: AF 2220 reported his number 4 propeeler had gone out of control, and he had feathered. Feathering was not completely successful in that the propeeler continued to windmill slowly. Position of the WB-29 at 1428L was 1240N-17449E, altitude 9,600 ft. The SA-16 made direct CW contact with AF 2220 at 1512 L and instructed the WB-29 to turn his IFF to emergency and standby on 137.88mcs. VHF contact was established at 1610L and an AN/ARA-8 bearing was taken at 1625L. The distressed aircraft was indicated directly ahead. At 1640L the O-17 was utilized and also indicated the WB-29 at 12 o'clock. Visual interception was completed at 1654L at 1155N-16731E, and the WB-29 was escorted to Eniwetok. IFF facilities at Bikini and Eniwetok observed the WB-29 for the last 250 miles, keeping his exact position plotted at all times. AF 2220 landed safely at Eniwetok at 1853L, and the SA-16 landed at 1856L.

LOCATION OF OBJECTIVE: Interception was made at 1155N-16731E at 1654L.

A TRUE COPY:

Gerald E. Storts
GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

/s/ Gerald E. Storts
/t/ GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Mission Commander

AFWL/HO

768

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

3 April 195

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-7-31 March 1954.

THRU: Commander
Tost Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TO: Commander
Air Rescue Service
Washington 25, D.C.

[redacted]6

1. In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS-F2), the attached Mission Report is hereby submitted.

2. Comments.

a. None.

3. Recommendations.

a. None.

4. Problems or Difficulties Encountered.

a. None.

5. Corrective Action.

a. None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Willard D. Welch
/t/ WILLARD D. WELCH
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

A TRUE COPY:

Gerald E. Storts
GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

[redacted]

AFWCL/HO

769

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

3 April 1954

SUBJECT: (Uncl) Mission Report, SAR Element (Prov)-7-31 March 1954

THRU: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TO: Directorate of Flying Safety
Norton Air Force Base
California

In compliance with ARSR 55-16 (RCS: ARS -F2) the attached Mission Report is forwarded for your information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ Willard D. Welch
/t/ WILLARD D. WELCH
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

AFWL/HO

[redacted]

770

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

RCS: ARS-F2

3 April 1954

MISSION NUMBER: (Uncl) SAR Element (Prov)-7-31 March 1954.

TYPE OF MISSION: Interception.

OBJECTIVE: AF 1819/WB-29/Sharar/Eniwetok/ 2602N-15939E/ 23N-17206E/Eniwetok/ 225K/VHF, 7685kcs, 4415kcs/1003L/10 plus 00/15 plus 00/2-1/8.

DATE OF CLOSING: 31 March 1954.

SOURCE AND TIME OF INITIAL ALERT: The Air Operations Center (AOC) Area Controller at 1658L 31 March 1954.

DATE AND TIME OF INITIAL DISPATCH OF ARS FACILITIES: SA-16 AF 9082 was airborne at 1714L 31 March 1954.

SYNOPSIS: The SA-16 made CW contact with AF 1819 at 1755L on 7685kcs and VHF contact at 1810L on 137.88mcs. An AN/ARA-8 bearing was taken at this time which indicated the distressed aircraft at 12 o'clock to the SA-16. At 1814L IFF contact was made with the WB-29 at a distance of 117 miles, and this contact was maintained until intercept was made. AN/ARA-8 bearings at 1815L and 1820L substaniated the IFF indication, and the intercept was accomplished at 1833L. Approximately thirty minutes prior to the arrival of the WB-29, the H-19 and crash boat were alerted, but the WB-29 made a safe landing at 1936L. Visual and radar contact was maintained by the SA-16 during the escort to Eniwetok. AF 9082 landed at 1942L.

LOCATION OF OBJECTIVE: 1402N-16344E.

REMARKS:

1. No difficulties were encountered with the communications and electronic equipment. The excellent IFF contact made it un-necessary for the SA-16 to attempt radar contact, so the Navigator used this equipment for navigational purposes.

2. Following is the ARS pilot's opinion of the Intercept:

a. The WB-29 was sure of its position and was not dangerously impaired at any time.

b. No apprehension was apparent among members of the WB-29 crew.

c. The distressed aircraft could have completed its flight safely without ARS assistance.

d. Interception was requested as a matter of policy.

e. There were nine (9) people aboard AF 1819.

A TRUE COPY:
Gerald E. Storts
GERALD E. STORTS, Capt, USAF Officer

Historical /s/ Willard D. Welch
/t/ WILLARD D. WELCH, Captain, USAF M/C

[redacted]

771

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

22 March 1954

SUBJECT: Maintenance Man of the Month

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco , California

1. Under the provisions of Task Group Regulation 62-13 dated 22 February 1954, I hereby recommend, Technical Sergeant William A. Brooks Jr, AF 18164012, for nomination as Maintenance Man of the Month, for the month of February.

2. Sergeant Brooks, non-commissioned officer in charge of maintenance for the SAR Element, has maintained an 86% in commission rate on assigned aircraft; except for an eight (8) day AOCP on one aircraft, this percentage would exceed 95%. This rate is considerably higher than the USAF or Air Rescue Service average, even discounting maintenance not accomplished here. He has less than two (2) men per aircraft in his section.

3. In his capacity as line chief, Sergeant Brooks has steadily improved the overall condition of the aircraft since their arrival here. No maintenance officers being assigned to the element, and Sergeant Brooks has assumed full responsibility for records, forms, and all other aspects of the maintenance section. He has an additional duty as acting First Sergeant for the element.

4. The fine example this non-commissioned officer has set for other members of his unit is remarkable, inasmuch as he has recently been involuntarily removed from flying status, after being promoted to his next higher grade is practically non-existent in this organization. While many of Sergeant Brook's attributes may also be found in other USAF airmen, his willingness to tackle adverse conditions, and knack for getting things done on his own qualify him for the Maintenance Man of the Month Award.

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

/s/ Mahlon B. Hammond
/t/ MAHLON B. HAMMOND
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

772

HEADQUARTERS
TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

22 March 1954

SUBJECT: Crew of the Month

TO: Commander
Task Group 7.4, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Under the provisions of Task Group Regulation 62-12, dated 22 February 1954, I hereby recommend the following crew for nomination as the Crew of the Month for February.

Captain Milton A. Diver	Pilot
2nd Lt Thomas J. Teprovich	Co-Pilot
Captain Thomas L. Wright	Navigator
S/Sgt William A. Trerice	Engineer
A/2C Richard Z. Miyashiro	Radio Operator

2. This crew has developed a high standard of crew discipline and preformance. While regulations allow 30 minutes for day time scrambles on emergencies, this crew's average is 9 minutes; at night where 45 minutes is permitted, they average 14 minutes from notification of alert to "wheels up". While scramble procedures are usually a compromise between expedicency in helping a distressed aircraft and flying safety, Captain Diver has developed a positive check system insuring that the crew and aircraft are ready to go before take-off.

3. Captain Diver's crew is meticulous in their attention to the aircraft's airworthingness. They have ably assisted in a weight reduction program, now in progress, to give the SA-16 some single engine preformance during the early stages of long range missions.

4. I believe that this crew's aggressive determination to accomplish any mission assigned, plus their concern with the flying safety aspects of their operations, qualifies them for the February Crew of the Month Award.

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

/s/ Mahlon B. Hammond
/t/ MAHLON B. HAMMOND
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

773

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

TGO 201.2

2 March 1954

SUBJECT: SAR Incident

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

The inclosed TWX is forwarded for your information and retention.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:
TWX

/s/ Earl W. Kesling
/t/ EARL W. KESLING
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional, APO 187, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Your attention is invited to basic letter.

2. I wish to add my thanks and appreciation for the fine manner in which you preformed this mission.

1 Incl:
n/c

/s/ Mahlon B. Hammond
/t/ MAHLON B. HAMMOND
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

774

HA 65
RR ~~UHPJB~~
HUA61
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HB 71
RR/ MM UHP ZVA UUU

XTO
RR/MM UHP ZVA UUU

DE BHPV 41
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FM NAVSTA KWAJALEIN
TO CTG 7 PNT 4
INFO CTG 7
NAVY GRNC

GREATLY APPRECIATE USE YOUR AIRCRAFT FOR SAR INCIDENT X WELL DONE TO

THE CREWS X UNFORTUNATELY RESULTS TO DATE NEGATIVE X RADM CLARDE SENDS

CFN 27Ø516Z
27/Ø511Z FEB BHPV

A TRUE COPY:

Gerald E. Storts

GERALD E. STORTS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

Incl #1

AFWL/HO

775
~~773~~

HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.4, PROVISIONAL
APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

TGP 201.2 --

12 March 1954

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO: Commander
Test Services Unit, Provisional
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

The following message from Rear Admiral C.E. Olsen, Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, is quoted for your information:

" I DESIRE TO COMMEND YOU AND YOUR COMMAND AND PERSONNEL OF SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE RECENT SAR MISSION FOR THE OUTSTANDING COORDINATED EFFORTED MADE TO FIND POSSIBLE SURVIVORS X THE PREFORMANCE BY YOUR STATION WAS ESPECIALLY OUTSTANDING IN VEIW OF OTHER CONCURRENT HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES X WELL DONE X REAR ADMIRAL C E OLSEN"

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

/s/ A. J. Anderson
/t/ A. J. ANDERSON
Captain, USAF
Adjutant

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, TEST SERVICES UNIT, PROVISIONAL, APO 187, c/o POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

TO: Commander, Search and Rescue Element, Provisional (MAR 15 1954)
Commander, Weather Reconnaissance Element, Provisional
Commander, Documentary Photograpic Element, Provisional (Air)

Your attention is invited to basic letter.

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

A TRUE COPY:

GERALD E. STOATS
Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

/s/ James W. Montgomery
/t/ JAMES W. MONTGOMERY
Major, USAF
Executive

776

SAR CONTROLLER
CRITIQUE COMMENTS
1 MARCH '54 OPERATION

1. With reference to the incident of HARDTIME 1 returning to Eniwetok with # 1 engine feathered, the following recommendations are submitted:

a. That the Area Controller assure that the SAR Controller be furnished complete and accurate information to include the position, time altitude, track and ground speed of any aircraft requesting SAR assistance.

b. That all pilots be again reminded to furnish the the information specified in paragraph 1a., above upon initial call for SAR assistance.

c. That as soon as an aircraft that is returning to Eniwetok requesting SAR assistance the most applicable SAR Alert Aircraft at Eniwetok be assigned intercept and escort responsibility from the time the aircraft enters DIRTY FACE Control.

d. That it be left to the discretion of the SAR Controller to make a decision as to whether he will scramble the strip aircraft with one engine out, or alert the strip alert crew to maintain a position adjacent the active runway with engines running.

e. That the strip alert be assumed by a specific crew and aircraft to be designated STABLE 3, starting at 0001 of shot or rehersal days with the primary mission of providing SAR assistance to mission aircraft returning to Eniwetok, and a secondary mission of back-up for STABLE 1 and STABLE 2 aircraft missions.

f. That the aircraft and crews of STABLE 1 and STABLE 2 have the sole responsibility of assuming take-off and orbit positions to provide SAR coverage as briefed for the specific mission, and as directed by applicable control.

2. The foregoing recommendations are considered paramount for the effective conduct of the SAR aspect of the mission, and paragraphs 1a.,1b., and 1c., were prompted due to the demonstrated unreliability of the IFF Radar equipment, and some confusion that existed between AOC CIC coordination.

NOTE:

The above coordinated with and approved by Major Hagerty, Commander, SAR Element, Provisional, and Captain Koeppel, Senior Controller.

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PRIVACY ACT MATERIAL REMOVED

78th Air Rescue Squadron
AIR RESCUE SERVICE (MATS)
Box 26, FPO 824

29 March 1954

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 58)

1. Hq 32nd Air Rsq Sq, APO 74 (Atchd 78th Air Rsq Sq) will pro o/a 29 March 54 to APO 187 on TDY for aprx 60 days for the purpose of participating in clas projects (DUPO); UCWR proper duty sta. TEMAA. Bag w/b ltd to 65 lbs while tvl by air. Add 100 lbs bag auth IAW AFR 76-3. Possession of photo equip, equip adaptable either in visual or elec comm, all optical equip (binoculars, telescopes,etc) wpns, explosives, drugs and intoxicating beverages is not auth at APO 187. All exposed films and items of contraband found in possession of unauth persons w/b confiscated. Indiv is considered a good scty risk. Scty CLNC: TOP SECRET CINPAC Serial 020 complied with. TDN. Per diem payable for pd at o/s loc is chargeable to 2142020 421-4010 P1727-02 S88-020. Cys of pd vou to be furnished Comdr T.G. 7.4. AUTH: Par 10e, Ltr 370.5, Hq MATS, 1 Dec 53, Subj:Clas.

* * *

* *

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER:

JO E. UNGER
CWO, USAF
Adjutant

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Jo E. Unger
/t/ JO E. UNGER
CWO, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
A, plus
5-ea indiv
2- Test Sv Unit, APO 187
2- Joint Task Group, APO 187

A CERTIFIED TRUE EXTRACT COPY:

FELL IE ROBINSON
Major, USAF

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HEADQUARTERS
SAR ELEMENT (PROV)
APO 187, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 4)

30 March 1954

1. Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, as amended, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the Search and Rescue Element, Provisional, effective this date.

Harold F. Cline

HAROLD F. CLINE
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

DISTRIBUTION:
Hq MATS, DCS/PL (2)
Hq TG 7.4, Kirtland AFB (5)
1401st AB Wg (5)
Hq APCS (5)
Hq AACS
Hq ARS (5)
Hq AWS (5)
Hq TSU, Prov. (5)
Hq PACD (5)
78th ARS (5)
COMM Element, Prov. (5)
WREP (2)
WCEP (2)
WRECEP (2)
201 File (1)
Ind Concerned (2)
File (1)

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G L O S S A R Y

AACS	Airways and Air Communications Service
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ADC	Air Defense Command
AFOAT	Air Force Office of Atomic Energy
AFOOP	Air Force Office of Operations
AFSWC	Air Force Special Weapons Center
AF 769SO	Air Force Supply Officer, Kwajalein
AF 2272 SO	Air Force Supply Officer, Eniwetok
AN/ARC-3	VHF Airborne Radio Set
AN/ARC-27	UHF Airborne Radio Set
AN/ART-13	HF Airborne Transmitter
APS-23	Airborne Radar Set
APQ-13	" " "
APQ-24	" " "
ARDC	Air Research and Development Command
ARS	Air Rescue Service
BPC	USAF Communications and Electronics Budget Program
C&E	Communications and Electronics
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
COMPACDIVMATS	Commander, Pacific Division, MATS
CI-32	A type of antenna tuner for low frequency
DCS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DOD	Department of Defense
Double-Squeegee	A device for cloud sampling which compresses gasses taken from the cloud into bottles by the use of pumps and compressors.
FY	Fiscal Year
HF	High Frequency
I&M	Installation and Maintenance
JCEC	Joint Communications - Electronics Committee
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTF	Joint Task Force
LABB-6	(Los Alamos Bomb Bay for B-36.) A device for cloud sampling by which particles of the cloud are taken through a filter so that they adhere to a type of paper and let the gasses escape.

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LASL	Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
LSM	Landing Ship - Materiel
LST	Landing Ship - Troops
MAMA	Middletown (Pa.) Air Materiel Area
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MK-10-IFF	A type of radar used for aircraft identification
MOAMA	Mobile (Ala.) Air Materiel Area
OOAMA	Ogden (Utah) Air Materiel Area
OPC	USAF Communications - Electronics Operating Program
SAAMA	San Antonio (Texas) Air Materiel Area
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAMSON	A device for the automatic scrambling of messages on tape
SAR	Sea-Air Rescue
SFOO	Samta Fe Operations Office
SIGTOT	A method of sending messages on tape
SMAMA	Sacramonto Air Materiel Area
SMSIL	TG 7.4's Liaison Officer at SMAMA
T/D	Table of Distribution
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TWX	Teletypewriter Exchange
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
UPX-7 IFF	A type of radar used on aircraft identification
VHF	Very High Frequency
WADC	Wright Air Development Center
ZI	Zone of Interior

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