

Eisenhower: Papers, 1953-61
(Ann Whitman file)

407797

February 4, 1955

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 235th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, February 3, 1955

Present at this meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; Under Secretary Hoover for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 2); Mr. Brundage for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3); Mr. Washburn for the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Messrs. Cutler, Dodge and Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Harold A. Botkin, Office of Defense Mobilization (for Item 1); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. ELECTRO-MAGNETIC COMMUNICATIONS:EFFECTIVENESS OF U. S. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

(Progress Report, dated January 10, 1955, by the Office of Defense Mobilization, on paragraph 8 of NSC 159; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 2, 1955)

Mr. Cutler made a brief statement as to the nature of the Progress Report, noted the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and called on Dr. Fleming.

Dr. Fleming indicated the extent to which the OCB committee and his own ad hoc committee on the evaluation of the program effectiveness of U. S. international broadcasting had benefited from the so-called Schramm study. Because of the misgivings which had arisen in the minds of the ad hoc committee with respect to the effectiveness of U. S. international broadcasting in a good many free world areas (specified in detail in paragraph I-A-3-(c), -(d) and -(e) of the report of the ad hoc committee), Dr. Fleming stated his belief that the OCB should reappraise the effectiveness of programs in these areas at an earlier date than December 31, 1955, as was now proposed.

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- b. Noted the President's directive that other governmental departments and agencies should defer any public announcements following upon the release of the Atomic Energy Commission announcement, pending Council consideration of a report by the Operations Coordinating Board on the psychological reactions to the AEC announcement within approximately two weeks following its release.

NOTE: The action in a above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, AEC. The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to interested Government departments and agencies and to the Operations Coordinating Board to prepare the report referred to therein.

5. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

The Director of Central Intelligence indicated that the government of Premier Mendes-France was in very great danger as a result of the statement by Rene Mayer, in an eloquent speech to the Assembly, that he would vote against the government's North African policy. The fall of the Mendes-France government would not necessarily prejudice the passage of the WEU agreements in the French Senate, but passage might be delayed. Moreover, General Ely had expressed the fear that the fall of Mendes-France might force a review of the U. S.-French agreement regarding the training of the armed forces of Free Vietnam.

In Egypt, Colonel Nassr was also in great difficulty over (1) the Sudan situation, (2) the Arab League situation, and (3) the execution of two of the convicted Israeli spies. Our observers in Egypt believed that the spies had received a fair trial, but the execution of two of them had created a sensation in Israel and would make rapprochement between Israel and Egypt even more unlikely. Mr. Dulles predicted that Colonel Nassr would probably survive these difficulties, but that he faced a hard course.

With respect to the Formosa situation, Mr. Dulles said that the pattern of Chinese Communist conduct was now clarifying a little, though he warned that revolutionary regimes like China's were "boisterous" and hard to predict. They need foreign devils, and at this point the United States is playing the part of foreign devil. The emerging tendencies were these: (1) Freeing Formosa has become the main propaganda theme; the offshore islands are cast in a role secondary to this. (2) Formosa is wholly an internal Chinese matter, and one not susceptible of legitimate international interference. (3) U. S. policy is deliberately leading to war and accordingly there can be absolutely no accommodation to it.