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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Tolson, Mr. Boardman, Mr. Nichols, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Ladd, Mr. Clegg, Mr. Glavin, Mr. Harbo, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Tracy, Mr. Egan, Mr. Gurnea, Mr. Hendon, Mr. Pennington, Mr. Quinn Tamm, Mr. Nease, Mr. Gandy

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

The attached report... [Illegible]

The Boardman... [Illegible]

[Handwritten signature]

Attachment:

Report on... [Illegible]

VOL. 582-410
NO. 82-387-13

51 NOV 28 8 36 AM '54

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NOV 30 1954

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OVERSEAS REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOMBING OF
VIETNAM

(Prepare Summary and Report on the above subject)
approve in the above subject, reference to the above

A. SUMMARY.

1. In general, reaction to the announcement was mild. Most Free World countries accepted it soberly and with comment. The only country which had a special reaction was always particularly sensitive to the matter.

2. The announcement had a great editorial reaction in Western Europe, as it might have, and in the West European nations. The rearming of West Germany after the end of the war has been a propaganda line that has been a constant theme in the press in which Western Europe would be a battle ground.


3. There also was little reaction in India, although the outstanding exceptions the United States was said to be conducting tests which are admitted dangerous, for fear of a race which could lead to a total destructive war, and the threat of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

4. The only Soviet Bloc reaction of the report was in Germany. The rest of the Bloc, including the Soviet Union, Communist China pointedly refrained from commenting on the report but continued to stress their own attitude towards the armaments, mostly in terms of Soviet progress in peaceful use of atomic energy, the Soviet Union's banning of tests and limiting conventional armaments, and the West's possession of atomic weapons.

5. One significant feature of the Soviet Bloc reaction was a deliberate avoidance of admitting that the report was a deliberate attempt to influence the world opinion, and its repeated inference that the report was a deliberate attempt to influence the world opinion, and its repeated inference that the report was a deliberate attempt to influence the world opinion.

B. CONCLUSIONS.

6. Firm conclusions as to the significance of the overseas reaction thus far noted will not be available until additional reports reflect a more long-range picture of public opinion. The reactions and officials utilizing the technical facts made available in the Report. In view of this it would be wise to a more detailed editorial attention given the opportunities provided by the over-all phenomena of the report, and the reactions to it, as offensive or defensive.



7. Among the factors bearing on the generally held view that thus far observed, except in Japan, the following are noteworthy:

- (a) The statement made that in an effort to control the cause, hysteria, and to limit radiation effects.
- (b) The basic element of the report has been indicated in official statements or regulations. Foreign commentators, such as the Japanese, have noted.
- (c) The public interest in the specific factors ran so far ahead of most regarding the radiation fall-out that the Japanese government of an anti-climax.
- (d) Other international news media or officials immediately public attention to the subject. The Japanese of the Romanian Legation in Bucharest, the Japanese plan to build twelve nuclear reactors, to build and construct the H-bomb, and the Japanese government. In Japan, a Yokuha (Tokyo) newspaper has played in the newspapers.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS.

8. Based on foregoing information, the following actions are recommended:

- (a) The continued interest of public attention on nuclear weapons effects. The information should be made public and Congress is urged to specifically pose the question.
- (b) In light of the general nature of public opinion, the manner and content of the information under (a) above should be carefully considered of overseas climate of public opinion. It should also cover public relations and the general public.
- (c) In the event the American public becomes concerned the effects of the radiation was caused, information should be given to the recipient. Information from the information source should also be provided so that prior not first-hand information can be given.

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missions abroad and certain other government activities.

(d) In order to ensure the best administration of this perspective, high-level state officials will continue to emphasize U.S. policy on establishing a world of an enduring peace, including the abolition of unguarded disarmament, (2) strict determination of participation in international affairs, (3) the need for disarmament including nuclear weapons, (4) the need for disarmament by the aggressor, (5) point out that the nuclear weapons are not with those of our allies, (6) the need for disarmament of the free world, and (7) the need for disarmament for peaceful uses of atomic energy.

(e) While additional steps will be taken designed to counter un-American activities, at the same time, the problem should be considered under the Operations Occurrences, and the information furnished the National Security Council. Special attention should be given to the ever increasing neutralist trends which are a byproduct of the increasing awareness of the effects of the arms race.

Attachment:

- Annex "A", Foreign Relations
- Reaction of the ABC's
- Effects of Anti-Communism
- Explosions

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FOREIGN PRESS AND RADIO REACTION TO DISCOVERY OF ATOMIC BOMB
EFFECTS OF A-BOMB - (Continued)

WESTERN EUROPE

1. England. In England the report was given almost exclusive coverage without editorial comment on the side of the press. The British Government announcement that it would construct atomic power plants. When the British announce on the 17th that they would construct atomic bomb there was no mention of the 17th report. The press coverage reported from Britain the other day to the public that the report was following the Bikini test of the atomic bomb.

The London Daily Worker attacked the report as a part of the campaign of the report and asked the public to be careful of the report's campaign.

2. France. French press coverage was very extensive. The details of the report, but not the name of the report, were shadowed by the British press announcement that they would construct atomic power plants. The French press reported the report.

The French Atomic Energy Commission report that the report contained a great deal of useful information which is believed that the general public should have.

The French Communist press magazine used the report to attack the United States. The magazine is said to have reported the case of the Japanese fishermen captured in the Pacific. It says that one Japanese fisherman was a result of the atomic bomb and that dozens of others were injured. It states that the Humanite had not used the report in connection with the report's treatment of the alleged danger of atomic war.

3. West Germany. The report received very extensive coverage in the German Press, being largely overestimated. The report was given. Those non-Communist papers which commented discussed the report in the devastating effects of the atomic bomb on human life. It is said that the United States should experiment with atomic power. The international plan is drafted to end the threat of atomic war. The report said that the report was a sensational attack on the report and raised an alarm in western Europe.

The West German Communist press reported the report in a number of articles of content for January 1945.

4. Austria. The report was given very extensive coverage in the Austrian press, but received very little comment. The report was in Greek commented. The report was given very extensive coverage in the Austrian public and press.



The only Communist reaction was a brief article in the extent of contamination during H-bomb experiments in the Pacific Ocean and stating that had this area been contaminated, the H-bomb would have been destroyed.

5. Belgium. The report was widely distributed in the press but received no editorial comment.

6. Greece. The report was widely distributed in the press, but there was no editorial comment and little public reaction except expressions of approval at the time. The report was cleared up many obscure.

7. Other Western European countries. The report was widely distributed in these countries the report received little editorial comment.

LATIN AMERICA, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA

8. Latin America. The report was widely distributed in these countries the announcement was widely distributed.

9. Canada. The report was widely distributed in this country. Comment to the AEC statement. It was widely distributed in this country. (a) impossibility of carrying out the war with weapons; (b) the need for new and better weapons; (c) the need for civil defense.

10. Australia. The report was widely distributed in this country. Comment to the announcement. It was widely distributed in this country. points out that the H-bomb is a weapon of mass destruction and that it comments that every nation should have the right to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction. The primary purpose of the announcement was a propaganda effort to make the H-bomb a weapon who have been tested and are now available for use.

MIDDLE EAST

11. India. Summary of the report was widely distributed in the press but given little prominence in contrast to the H-bomb decision to produce the H-bomb in the Soviet Union in February. However, there were few outstanding reactions to the report and the tests which were held in Rajasthan. A member of the working committee of the Congress Party who had been an anti-Communist, rather than a pro-Communist, had been conducting dangerous nuclear tests in Rajasthan. He was using weapons as a means of mass production. In the H-bomb decision in the Hindustan Standard was a report on the H-bomb decision to conducting tests in the H-bomb decision in the H-bomb decision. This was followed by the H-bomb decision in the H-bomb decision. The Peterson statement that the H-bomb decision in the H-bomb decision world and the H-bomb decision in the H-bomb decision in the H-bomb decision arms race.



on 16 February the East German Home Service broadcast outlined the mass destructive effects of the bombs as described in the announcement, coupled this with commentary on the total destructive effect of cobalt bombs, and used the total as a prop for propaganda against West German ratification of the Paris Accords, pointing out that ratification would bring on a war in which Germany would be an atomic battleground.

18. Communist China. While there is considerable discussion of atomic matters over Communist Chinese radio there is no mention of the AEC report. However, there have been charges that the United States Government is whipping up an anti-Comm score in the United States to create acceptance of atomic warfare as an inevitability. In spite of this, the tenor of commentary is that China has little to fear from atomic or nuclear warfare, that only the highly industrialized countries would be devastated.

19. Other Also Mentioned. Mention is made of reports from other countries of the New York Times.



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