


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DATE March 2, 1955

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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

Washington, D.C.

OVERSEAS REACTION TO THE AEC REPORT ON
THE EFFECTS OF HIGH-YIELD NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

REFERENCE: NSC Action No. 320-b

DCB FILE NO. 55

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)
NSC Case NSC 58R-1480
NSC Case 58R 87-387 #4
NLE Date 4/10/92

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Handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page, including a signature that appears to be "John F. Kennedy".

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVES BOARD
Washington, D. C.

March 24, 1955



MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVES BOARD

SUBJECT: Overseas Reaction to the FBI Report on the Possibility of High-Yield Thermonuclear Bombs

The attached Director's coordinating memorandum, dated March 22, 1955, pursuant to NSC Action 10, 12, and 13, dated March 17, 1955, as noted by the National Security Council Memorandum, NSC 54104, No. 1344.

The recommendation of the Board was approved by the Council and approved by the President on March 24, 1955.

The Council noted the directive, subsequently approved by the President on March 24, 1955, in NSC 54104, No. 925, oral or written statements to be released by Government officials regarding nuclear weapons, which statements in addition to those previously made publicly, must be disclosed in advance with the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to coordinate the intelligence and foreign relations aspects with the operations of the intelligence staff.

The previous draft of the report team memorandum, dated March 1, 1955, is to be destroyed, in accordance with the security regulations of your agency.

John F. Dulles
Director, Operational Directives Board

Attachments:

Executive Officer, OCE File No. 50-100, on above subject, dated 3/23/55, with attachments as listed.

OCE File No. 50-

50-100-100

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OVERSEAS REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE HIBAR REPORT
YIELD TO ENEMY EXHIBITION

(Prepared Pursuant to the HIBAR Report, 1945)
Approved for Release by NSA on 05-08-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

A. SUMMARY.

1. In general, reaction to the HIBAR announcement was mild. Most Free World countries accepted it without comment. The only countries which placed emphasis on the report were always particularly sensitive to atomic matters.

2. The announcement also drew the attention of the press in Europe, as it might have done in the Near East. In the latter part of the rearming of West Germany, the propaganda lines have been that the defense system is being built in which Western Europe will be able to defend itself against

3. There also was little reaction in India. The only outstanding exceptions to the Free World was the Soviet Union, which was conducting tests which are admittedly dangerous. The Soviet Union is a race which could lead to a destructive war, and the threat of atomic and hydrogen energy as a part of a

4. The only Soviet reaction to the report was in Germany. The rest of the HIC countries, the United States, Communist China pointedly refused to mention the report, but continued to stress atomic matters in their reports, mostly in terms of the progress it represents in atomic energy, the Soviet Union for nuclear energy, and limiting conventional arms. The HIC countries are not atomic weapons.

5. The significant feature of the HIBAR report is the deliberate avoidance of the HIC countries, and its repeated inference that the HIC countries are a civilization which will be destroyed in an atomic war. Details of the present and future of the HIC countries.

B. REMARKS.

a. Firm conclusions as to the significance of the reaction thus far noted will not be made until the HIBAR report reflect a more long-range picture of public opinion in the HIC and officials utilizing the technical facts made available in the Report. In view of this, the HIBAR report will be given editorial attention since the report identified the HIC countries as the over-all phenomenon of the HIC world, and the HIC countries offensive or defensive war.

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7. Among the factors leading to the generally distorted picture thus far observed, except in the case of the following items, are:

(a) The statement that the atomic effect is due to radiation cause, hysteria, and to other causes that are not.

(b) The basic elements of the report are generally those indicated in official statements, speculation, and in the foreign commenters, and the statement that the atomic effect is due to radiation cause.

(c) The public opinion is generally based on the statements of the press and on the reports regarding the atomic effect, and the radiation fall-out is based on the reports of the press and on the reports of an anti-atomic.

(d) Other international developments are that the atomic effect is immediately after the atomic effect, the atomic effect is the atomic effect of the Russian atomic effect, the atomic effect is the atomic effect plan to build twelve atomic power reactors, the atomic effect is to construct the H-reactor, and the atomic effect is the atomic effect. In Japan, a Yamanashi atomic power reactor, and the atomic effect is to play in the new power.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS.

8. Based on foregoing information, the following recommendations are recommended:

(a) The continuing development of public opinion regarding nuclear weapons effects is a matter of the highest importance to the public and Congress should be advised, and it is recommended that specifically proposed.

(b) In light of the above information, it is recommended that opinion, the atomic effect is the atomic effect, and the atomic effect under (a) above should be given the highest priority in the light of overseas climate of the atomic effect. It is recommended that also cover public relations regarding the atomic effect.

(c) In the event that the atomic effect is the atomic effect concerning the effects of the atomic nuclear weapons, the atomic effect should be given the highest priority in the light of overseas climate of the atomic effect. It is recommended that also cover public relations regarding the atomic effect.



missions abroad and certain foreign governments with respect to:

(d) In order to place state's policy of nuclear weapons in perspective, high-level state officials and public officials should continue to emphasize U.S. policy to establish a world order of an enduring peace, including the adoption of general principles of guarded disarmament, (1) state should consider limiting its participation in international arms race, to keep its arms strictly for defense, including nuclear weapons, (2) state should not be the aggressor, (3) point out that nuclear weapons should be used only with those of our allies, (4) state should not be a member of the world of the free world, and (5) emphasize the need for a world of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

(e) While state's policy is primarily state's policy, it is designed to counter unfavorable propaganda and rumors. At the same time, the problem should be explained in terms of the Operations Coordinating Board's report, particularly the part which furnished the National Security Council of the state's policy. Special attention should be given to the propaganda of neutralist trends which are likely to be particularly harmful because of the effects of their propaganda.

Attachment:

- Annex "A", Foreign Press Reaction to the Reaction to the AEC Report on the Effects of High-Altitude Nuclear Explosions.

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FOREIGN PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN WESTERN EUROPE CONCERNING THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF NAGASAKI

WESTERN EUROPE

1. England. In England the report was given almost full coverage without editorial comment, by virtue of the fact that the British Government announcement that it would construct a plutonium bomb. When the British announced in the 1940s that they would build a plutonium bomb there was no mention of the A-bomb report. The A-bomb report was reported from Britain that it was a bomb that had been developed following the Bikini test.

The London Daily Worker said that the London Daily Worker's reports of the report and its effect on the public opinion in England was a campaign.

2. France. French papers gave the report considerable coverage in details of the report, but with a view to showing the danger of the bomb shadowed by the British A-bomb report. The French papers also constructed atomic power stations and plants to be built.

The French Atomic Energy Commission regarded the report as a warning of a great deal of useful work in the development of atomic energy which the public should have.

The French Communist Party magazine used the report as a basis to attack the United States for its policy of atomic energy. It said that in the case of the Japanese fishermen, the report showed that one Japanese fisherman had died as a result of the bomb and that dozens of others were injured. It stated that the United States Humanite had not used the report in connection with the development of the alleged danger of atomic war.

3. West Germany. The A-bomb report received a great deal of coverage in the German Press, being especially covered by the Communist papers. Those non-Communist papers were concerned with the report and the devastating effects of the bomb. It was stated that the United States national plan is drafted to put the threat of atomic war. The paper said that the report showed that the United States could raise an army in West Germany.

The West German Communist Party used the report as a basis of contempt for human life.

4. Austria. The report was given considerable coverage in the Austrian press, but received little attention in the Austrian press. In Graz commented on the report and the danger of atomic war to the Austrian public and press.

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The only Communist reaction was a brief statement of contempt during the week-end press conference, stating that had this area been destroyed it would have been destroyed.

5. Belgium. The report was placed in the daily press but received no editorial comment.

6. Greece. The report was covered extensively by the press, but there was no editorial comment. The report contained expressions of approval of the action and the press cleared up many other reports.

7. Other Western European Countries. The report was covered in many countries but no editorial comment was received.

LATIN AMERICA, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA

8. Latin America. The report was covered in many countries but no editorial comment was received.

9. Canada. In Canada the report was widely covered and referred to the AEC statement. It was pointed out that the report was (a) impossible of carrying out, (b) not in the interest of the world, (c) the need for a new world order, (d) the need for a new world order, and (e) the need for a new world order.

10. Australia. The report was widely covered in Australia and the press pointed out that the report was (a) impossible of carrying out, (b) not in the interest of the world, (c) the need for a new world order, (d) the need for a new world order, and (e) the need for a new world order.

MIDDLE EAST

11. India. The report was widely covered in India and the press pointed out that the report was (a) impossible of carrying out, (b) not in the interest of the world, (c) the need for a new world order, (d) the need for a new world order, and (e) the need for a new world order.

REF ID: A66666



on 16 February the East German broadcast service announced the mass destructive effects of the atomic bomb and the devastation it would couple this with commentary on the total destruction of cities and bombs, and used the total destruction of cities and bombs as a means of ratification of the Paris accords, pointing out that the accords would bring on a war in which Germany will be an atomic battlefield.

13. Communist China. While there is considerable discussion of atomic matters over Communist Chinese radio there has been little of the AEC report. However, there has been comment that the Chinese Government is whipping up a great measure of fear in the Chinese people to create acceptance of atomic warfare as inevitable. With this in mind, the tenor of commentary is that the Chinese will be the first to initiate nuclear warfare, that only the United States and Britain will be devastated.


14. Inner Line Countries. The radio broadcast of the report to other countries of the AEC report is as follows:

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7 thru 17 (11 cys)	NIA, ...	7 thru 17 (11 cys)	NIA, ...
18 thru 21 (4 cys)	USIA, Mr. F. ...	18 thru 21 (4 cys)	USIA, Mr. F. ...
22 thru 26 (5 cys)	STATE, Mr. ...	22 thru 26 (5 cys)	STATE, Mr. ...
27 thru 30 (4 cys)	Top Secret Cont. ... OSD Mail Room ...	27 thru 30 (4 cys)	Top Secret Cont. ... OSD Mail Room ...
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37	Secretariat Staff	37	Secretariat Staff
38	Lilly, Br	38	Lilly, Br
39	originating office	39	originating office
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~~Dr Stefan Possony - 11/11/41~~
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