


"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy"

by Henry A. Kissinger

**Chapter 1 - The Challenge of the Nuclear Age**

The challenge of the nuclear age: in the uneasy armistice since the end of World War II, we have sought to devise ever more powerful weapons. However, the more powerful the weapons, the greater becomes the reluctance to use them. (Page 3)

In the nation-state system, international settlements are not brought about entirely by reasonableness and negotiating skill but, in the last resort, only by the willingness to employ force to vindicate an interpretation of justice or defend vital interest. (Page 4)

Unwillingness to employ force, if required, places the international order at the mercy of its most ruthless member. This is a particular problem in a revolutionary era like the present which gives priority to change over harmony. (Page 5)

Diplomacy is asked to overcome unparalleled schisms at a moment when traditional pressures -- the readiness to use force -- are less available. (Page 6)

The dilemma of the nuclear period is defined as follows: the enormity of modern weapons makes the thought of war repugnant, but the refusal to run any risks would amount to giving the Soviet rulers a blank check. (Page 7)

A nation's strategic doctrine must define what objectives are worth contending for and determine the degree of force appropriate for achieving them. The United States, in assessing what transformations to resist, has been inhibited by the fact that historically we have been able to wait until a threat has taken unambiguous shape before engaging in war. (Page 8)

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In present circumstances, our notion of aggression as an unambiguous act and our concept of war as inevitably an all-out struggle have made it difficult to come to grips with the real threats against us. (Page 10) Because our strategic doctrine recognizes few intermediate points between total war and total peace, we have found it difficult during periods of Soviet belligerency to bring the risks of resistance into relationship with the issues which have actually been at stake. (Page 11).

Because we consider war and peace, military and political goals, to be separate and opposite, we have been unable to adjust political aims to the risks of the nuclear period -- the consequences of military actions always appear to outbalance the gains to be achieved. In the one instance (Korea) where we resisted aggression by military power, we did not use the weapons around which our whole military planning had been built. The gap between military and national policy was complete. Our power was not commensurate with the objectives of our national policy. (Pages 12 and 13)

Where each side is equally deterred from engaging in all-out war, it makes a great difference which side can extricate itself from a problem facing it only by initiating such a struggle. It may gain a crucial advantage: every move on its part will pose to its adversary the dilemma of committing suicide to prevent encroachments which do not, each in itself, seem to threaten existence directly but which may be steps on the road to ultimate destruction. (Page 16)

An "all or nothing" military policy plays into the hands of the Soviet strategy of ambiguity through providing us with an incentive to defer a showdown to a more propitious moment or a clearer provocation. (Page 16)

In view of the power of modern weapons, it should be the task of our strategic doctrine to create alternatives less cataclysmic than a thermonuclear holocaust. (Page 19).

The basic challenge to U. S. strategy is to formulate a military policy which avoids the assumption that war, if it comes, will be inevitably all-out, and strives for a doctrine which gives our diplomacy the greatest freedom of action. (Page 20).

Chapter 2 - The Dilemma of American Security



We have assumed that a new war would inevitably start with a surprise attack on the United States, and this has led us to concentrate on an all-out strategy. We have thus given Soviet leadership an opportunity to strive to neutralize us psychologically in every dispute by so graduating their actions that the provocation would never seem "worth" an all-out war, the only form our doctrine took into account. (Page 30)

Our notion of power makes it impossible to conceive of an effective relationship between force and diplomacy, since, in war, our objectives would be total victory and our effort would be all-out. (Page 40)

Korea caught us unprepared in doctrine -- our strategic thinking had defined only two causes of war, surprise attack on the continental United States and military aggression against Western Europe. This doctrine was divorced from the reality we confronted, and frustration was the result. In the argument about Korea, both the advocates and the opponents of a greater effort in Korea agreed - incorrectly - that war was an all-out struggle that could be won only by crushing the enemy totally -- one group thought the effort should be made in Korea, the other that it should be conserved for a European battle. (Pages 43-44)

Our preoccupation with an all-out strategy, and our reliance on "purely military considerations," have caused us to consider the Korean war as an aberration and a strategic diversion. (Page 46) The Soviet thrust in Korea had been directed at the point where we were weakest psychologically, at the gap between the all-out strategy, our forces-in-being and our inhibitions. (Page 47)

Our strategic doctrine made it very difficult for us to think of the possibilities open to us in the limited war in Korea -- for example of whether, to the USSR, it was "worth" an all-out war to prevent a limited defeat of its ally. (Page 49)



Our alliances are based on the assumption that aggression is deterred by assembling the maximum force. We tended toward general collective security in which, unless all allies would resist aggression jointly, no resistance would be possible. Thus the greater the force the greater the reluctance to employ it. (pages 51-52)

Rather than reassessing our strategic doctrine, we have continued to regard limited war as a strategically unproductive holding operation, and have not admitted that our strategic doctrine has created a gap between our power and our policy. Instead we have reinforced our determination to reserve our all-out power for use in contingencies in which it could be utilized without restraint. (Page 54).


The strategic transformation caused by nuclear weapons derives from the fact that the notion of "relative damage" may have become meaningless when applied to all-out nuclear war, in which even the side with the stronger offensive may have to absorb a level of damage which drains its national substance. (Page 56)

A point may be reached at which additional increments of destructive power yield diminishing returns. What is the sense of developing a weapon that can destroy a city twice over? Thus for the first time in military history we are facing the prospect of a stalemate despite the superiority of one side in numbers of weapons and in their technology. (Page 60)

Chapter 3 - The Fires of Prometheus

The city is the distinguishing characteristic of modern civilization -- the expression of its power and its vulnerability. The power comes from organization and specialization, the vulnerability from the fact that a breakdown in one of the many links of a city's "nervous system" can produce paralysis. (Pages 64 and 66)

Confronted with a thermonuclear attack, the modern city may carry the seeds of its own destruction within itself. Under nuclear attack, what would happen to a society would be almost unpredictable. (Page 72) Such an attack may shake to the core the people's



confidence in the economy, the government and the national purpose. (Page 73) The essence of the catastrophe produced by an all-out thermonuclear war is the depth of the dislocation it produces and the consequent impossibility of reverting to familiar relationships. (page 79)

Faced with the knowledge of the consequences of thermonuclear war, policy-makers will be reluctant to engage in a strategy the penalty for which may well be social disintegration. (Page 84)

Chapter 4 - The Esoteric Strategy -- Principles of All-out War

The term "stalemate" now refers not to a balance on the battlefield but to a calculus of risks. With each side possessing the capability of inflicting catastrophic blows on the other, war is said to be no longer a rational course of action. (Page 86) But all-out war is far from being the "normal" form of conflict; it constitutes a special case. Military staffs in World War I developed plans for total victory because in such plans no political limitations interfere with the full development of power and all factors are under the control of the military. (Pages 87-88)

With the coming of total war, war ceased to be an effort to determine the actions of the opponent's government; its goal became that of overthrowing the enemy leadership. The destructiveness of modern weapons deprives victory in an all-out war of its historical meaning. (Page 90)

There exists no "cheap" way of fighting an all-out war, since the losing side, whatever its initial strategy, may resort to the kind of bombing which will maximize the damage inflicted on its opponent. (Page 95)

The smaller the political objective, the less should be the sanction. The power of modern weapons deters not only aggression, but also resistance to it. An all-out strategy may be effective in deterring all-out war. If it is the sole counter to enemy aggression, it may at the same time invite limited aggressions which by themselves do not seem "worth" a final showdown. (Page 96)

For a limited period of time, until the Soviet long-range air force grows substantially stronger than it is now, we could probably impose our will on the USSR through a surprise attack. (Page 110)



With the growth of the Soviet long-range air force and thermo-nuclear stockpile, the stalemate in all-out war will be between the ability of each side to inflict catastrophic blows on the other, but to do so only at the risk of national catastrophe. (Page 111)

As the increasing power and speed of delivery vehicles multiply the difficulties of active defense, ever greater importance should be attached to civil defense. (Page 112)

Whatever the calculation, whether it be based on the feasibility of a surprise attack with present weapons and delivery systems or on the impact of imminent technological trends, it is difficult to see how either side can count on achieving its objectives through all-out war. Henceforth the only outcome of an all-out war will be that both contenders must lose. (Page 125) All-out war is therefore likely to turn into a last resort: an act of desperation to be invoked only if national survival is unambiguously threatened. If the decision to engage in all-out war is going to be difficult for the United States, it will be next to impossible for most of our allies. (Page 126)

In every crisis from Korea to Suez, the non-nuclear powers have behaved as if nuclear technology did not exist. Our margin of superiority has never been less effective. (Page 127)

This is not to say that we can afford to be without a capability for fighting an all-out war, or that it will be easy to maintain the conditions which will make such a war seem unattractive to an opponent. We must retain a well protected capability for massive retaliation. (Page 128)



The more stark the consequences of an all-out war, the more reluctant the responsible political leaders will be to employ force. They may invoke our all-out capability as a deterrent, but they will shrink from it as a strategy for conducting a war. The more emphasis on an all-out strategy, the more the responsible policy-makers will hold that no cause except a direct attack on the United States justifies the use or threat of force, and that the Soviet leadership is equally strongly motivated to avoid all-out war. (Page 130)

In these circumstances, the choice is between Armageddon and defeat without war. We return to the question: does the nuclear age permit the establishment of a relationship between force and diplomacy? Is it possible to imagine applications of power less catastrophic than all-out thermonuclear war? (Page 131)

Chapter 5 - What Price Deterrence? The Problems of Limited War

A strategy which achieves a better balance between power and will may gain a crucial advantage, because it permits initiative, and shifts to the other side the risks inherent in making counter-moves. The reliance on all-out war, by identifying deterrence with maximum power, tends to paralyze the will, and to inhibit by the incom-mensurability between the cost of the war and the objective in dispute. (Page 133)

A psychological gap is created by the conviction of our allies that they have nothing to gain from massive retaliation and by the belief of the Soviet leaders that they have nothing to fear from our threat of it. This gap may actually encourage the Soviet leaders to engage in aggression. (Page 134)

The dilemma: having to make a choice between all-out war and a gradual loss of positions. (Page 136)

There exists no way to define a limited war in purely military terms; the end result of relying on purely military consideration is certain to be an all-out war -- the attempt to render the enemy defenseless. A limited war is fought for specific political objectives



which, by their very existence, tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to affect the opponent's will, not to crush it, to make the conditions to be imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for complete annihilation. (Pages 139-140)

The argument in favor of the possibility of limited war is that both sides have a common and overwhelming interest in preventing it from spreading. Since the most difficult decision for a statesman is whether to risk the nation by unleashing all-out war, advantage will always be on the side which can shift to its opponent the necessity to decide whether to initiate all-out war. (Page 144) The purpose of limited war is to inflict losses or pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objectives under dispute. (Page 145)

There exist three reasons for developing a strategy of limited war. First, it represents the only means of preventing the Soviet bloc, at an acceptable cost, from overrunning the peripheral areas of Eurasia. Second, a wide range of military capabilities may be the difference between defeat and victory even in an all-out war. Third, intermediate applications of our power offer the best chance to bring about strategic changes favorable to us. (Page 147)

The growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile as transformed massive retaliation from the least costly into the most costly strategy. Where the B-36 once seemed a cheaper way of destroying distant objectives than the use of ground armies, its use now might unleash all-out war which would be the ultimate war of attrition. Limited war now enables us to draw greatest strategic advantage from our industrial potential -- to achieve a continuous drain of our opponent's resources, exhausting both sides. The prerequisite is a weapons system sufficiently complex to require a substantial production effort, but not so destructive as to deprive the victor of any effective margin of superiority. (Pages 154, 155)

Limited wars require units of high mobility and considerable fire-power which can be quickly moved to trouble spots and which can

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bring their power to bear with discrimination. This weapons system is basically different from a retaliatory force. (Page 157)

The restraint which keeps a war limited is a psychological one: the consequences of a limited victory or a limited defeat or a stalemate -- the three possible outcomes of a limited war -- must seem preferable to the consequences of an all-out war. Because the limitation of war is brought about by the fear of unleashing a thermo-nuclear holocaust, the psychological equation is constantly shifting against the side which seems to be winning. The greater the transformation it seeks, the more probable will become the threat by its opponent of launching an all-out war. (Page 168)

Creating a readiness for limited war should not be considered a problem of choice but of necessity. It results from the impossibility of combining maximum force with maximum willingness to act. The greater the power, the more likely that no objective will seem important enough to justify resort to all-out war. (Page 172)

Chapter 6 - The Problems of Limited Nuclear War

While the arguments against limited nuclear war (which some say is a contradiction in terms) have a certain persuasiveness, it appears that conventional war will soon become the most "unnatural" war (it would deny use of atomic anti-aircraft weapons, for example) and it does not seem necessary to react to any and every employment of nuclear weapons by an adversary by invoking all-out war. (Pages 176, 177)

The tactics for limited nuclear war should be based on small, highly mobile, self-contained units, relying largely on air transport even within the combat zone. (Page 180).

In nuclear war, industrial potential will play a smaller role than heretofore. Limited nuclear war need not be as destructive as would appear when we think of it in terms of traditional warfare -- cities and airfields would no longer be the most suitable targets. With new weapons, tremendous power may be concentrated in a small stockpile.



The concept of air supremacy -- which would involve knocking out air bases -- will be made obsolete by missiles and vertical take-off aircraft, and will be inconsistent with an effort of avoiding all-out attack. (Pages 183-184). It seems unlikely that very high-yield weapons would be used in limited nuclear war because the fluidity of such a war rules out a stabilized front. Detachments will be operating in each others territory. (Page 187)

It is not suggested that limited nuclear war should be our only strategy. We must maintain an adequate retaliatory force and not shrink from using it if our survival is threatened. (Page 189)

In a limited nuclear war everything will depend on leadership of a high order, personal initiative and mechanical aptitude, qualities more prevalent in our society than in regimented systems. Self-reliance, spontaneity and initiative cannot be acquired by training; they grow naturally out of social institutions or they do not come into being. The Soviet Union, in which everything is done according to plan and direction, will have extraordinary difficulty inculcating these qualities. (Page 196)

A strategy for a limited nuclear war requires an ability to harmonize political, psychological and military factors, and to do so rapidly enough so that the speed of war waged with modern weapons does not outstrip the ability of our diplomacy to intergrate them into a framework of limited objectives. (Page 199)

The American strategic problem can be summed up in these propositions:

1. Thermonuclear war must be avoided, except as a last resort.
2. A power possessing thermonuclear weapons is not likely to accept unconditional surrender without employing them, and no nation is likely to risk thermonuclear destruction except to the extent that it believes its survival to be directly threatend.
3. It is the task of our diplomacy to make clear that we do not aim for unconditional surrender, to create a framework within which the question of national survival is not involved in every



issue. But equally, we must leave no doubt about our determination to achieve intermediary objectives and to resist by force any Soviet military move.

4. Since diplomacy which is not related to a plausible employment of force is sterile, it must be the task of our military policy to develop a doctrine and a capability for the graduated employment of force.

5. Since a policy of limited war cannot be implemented except behind the shield of a capability for all-out war, we must retain a retaliatory force sufficiently powerful and well protected so that by no calculation can an aggressor discern any benefit in resorting to all-out war. (201)

Chapter 7 - Diplomacy, Disarmament and the Limitation of War

Negotiations can be successful only if all parties accept some common standard transcending their disputes. The smaller the interest in harmony, the greater has been the requirement of fear produced by force or the threat of force. Rarely has there been less common ground among the major powers but never has recourse to force been more inhibited. It is asking too much of diplomacy that it should resolve present day conflicts. Diplomacy can provide a forum for the settlement of disputes which have become unprofitable for both sides. It can keep open channels for information and enable each side to convey its intentions to the other. The primary bridge is a common fear. The Soviet bloc and the free world may not agree on any positive goals but they have in common the interest that, given the horror of thermonuclear weapons, neither one can be interested in an all-out war. The task of diplomacy is to give effect to the interest both sides have in common -- the avoidance of an all-out holocaust. (Pages 204, 5, 6)

In their quest for total remedies, both our diplomacy and our military policy have inhibited the consideration of more attainable goals: an understanding of some principles of war limitation which could keep any conflict that does break out from assuming the most catastrophic form. (Pages 206-7)

If nuclear stockpiles were reduced, a war that broke out would be likely to assume the most catastrophic form, since the emphasis would tend to be on "efficient" high yield weapons. (Page 211)



It does not appear that inspection schemes so far proposed would add a great deal to existing warning methods, or significantly reduce the element of surprise. The proposals for inspection as a bar to surprise attack reflect the thinking of a period when forces-in-being could not be decisive and when their power and speed were of a much lower order. (Pages 214 and 217)

A program to mitigate the horrors of war would have the advantage of focusing thinking on things to accomplish rather than on those which should not be done. It would relate disarmament to strategy. A unilateral declaration of what we understand by limited war would accomplish a great deal by providing a strong incentive to the other side to test its feasibility. It is not certain that the Soviet leadership has fully analyzed all the options of the nuclear period. (Page 223-224)

The notion that victory is an end in itself achieved by rendering the enemy defenseless approaches what Clausewitz considered the most abstract notion of war: one characterized by an uninterrupted series of blows of ever-increasing intensity, until the will of the enemy is broken. (Page 225)

It will be necessary to give up the notion that diplomatic contact ceases during military operations. It is never more necessary -- to inform about the consequences of expanding a war, and to present formulas for a political settlement. (Page 226)

Limitations as to targets and size of weapons can be visualized. We might exclude bases of opposing strategic air forces and towns above a certain size, or beyond a certain distance beyond the battle area. (Page 227)



The United States should shift the emphasis in disarmament negotiations from the almost impossible problem of preventing a surprise attack to an effort to mitigate the horror of war. This course would have the advantages of distinguishing between Soviet "ban the bomb" propaganda and disarmament, and of appealing to the rest of the world with a show of moderation. (Page 231)

We are seeking to relieve men's minds of fear of war; this provides only a plan for living with fear. A strategy of limited war cannot be used as a cheaper method of imposing unconditional surrender. The relationship of force to diplomacy cannot be established as a variation on all-out war. Limited war and the diplomacy appropriate to it provide a means to escape from the quest for absolute peace or for absolute victory. (Page 233)

Chapter 8 - The Impact of Strategy on Allies and the Uncommitted

The growing Soviet nuclear capability would seem to impose a measure of harmony between the interest of the United States in an overall strategy and the concern of our allies with local defense. Until now we have had a theoretical choice between a strategy of massive retaliation and a strategy of local defense. Now it is in our interest, as much as in that of our allies, to seek to defend Eurasia by means other than all out war. Because we have insisted for so long that an attack on Europe would be the signal for an all-out war, we might well find ourselves engaged in the most wasteful kind of struggle because other alternatives had never been considered. (Page 243)

If the Soviets can force us to shoulder the risk of initiating all-out war, there is great danger that soon no areas outside the Western Hemisphere will seem "worth" contending for. It would not be in our interest to resort immediately to all-out war, which is the most wasteful and cataclysmic strategy. Our alliances should be considered not from the aspect of an all-out strategy, but as a means to escape it. Our capability for all-out war can be used as a shield to organize local defense, and our assistance should be conceived as a means to make local defense possible. Thus, far from being inconsistent with a strategy of limited war, our policy of alliances should represent a special application of it. (Pages 244, 245)

This war would say -- "We are to be an armed camp - capable of doing all things, all the time, everywhere."

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A strategic doctrine which poses less absolute sanctions than all-out war would go far toward overcoming the tendency of our system of alliances to merge into a worldwide system of collective security. For all-out war is of direct concern not only to every ally, but also to every neutral. A worldwide system of collective security is extremely difficult to implement. The acid test of an alliance is its ability to achieve agreement on two related problems: whether a given challenge represents aggression, and if so, what form resistance should take. Differences in national interests -- that is in objectives and in risks nations are willing to take -- have the result that the wider the system of alliances, the more difficult it will be to apply it to concrete cases. To seek to give too generalized an application to a system of alliances may therefore paralyze the power or powers capable of resisting alone. In every crisis short of overriding attack, such a system of collective security gives a veto to the ally with least interest in the issue at dispute and often with the least power to make its views prevail. The corollary to a regional system of alliances is the willingness of the United States to exercise its leadership in defining the transformations the alliance is prepared to resist. (Pages 246, 8, 9, 251)

Our allies must understand that we have an obligation to maintain not only a regional equilibrium, but the world balance of power as well. (Page 254)

The remarkable aspect of colonialism from its beginning was the imposition of rule by a very small group of Europeans over vast populations -- due principally to the fact that the European powers displaced an existing ruling group in a society where the vast majority of the population neither enjoyed nor expected direct participation in government. The Europeans brought with them the doctrines of rational administration and popular participation in government. The colonies now are opposing their present or former masters in terms of values they have learned from them. (Page 255-256)

Many of the newly independent states are based neither on a common language nor on a common culture. Their only common experience is the former colonial rule. Their leaders require

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anti-colonialism to achieve a sense of national identity. (Page 259)

The independence movements, almost without exception, provide a poor preparation for an understanding of the element of power in international relations. Because of the bad conscience of the colonial powers and their preoccupation with European problems, the leaders of the newly independent powers achieved results out of proportion to their suffering. (Page 261)

Many of the leaders of the newly independent states have found the temptation to play a major role in international affairs almost overwhelming. Domestically their problems are intractable; each action has a price and sometimes a high one. Unless the newly independent powers learn that every action has a price not only domestically but also internationally they will increasingly seek to play a global role not commensurate with either their strength or the risks they are willing to assume. (Page 263)

Without a military policy which poses less fearful risks than all-out war, our alliances will be in jeopardy, and the uncommitted areas will vacillate between protestations of principle and a consciousness of their impotence. It is the task of our diplomacy to bring about common purpose. Nevertheless we must beware not to subordinate the requirements of the over-all strategic balance to our policy of alliances or to our effort to win over the uncommitted. (Page 267)

Chapter 9 - American Strategy and NATO -- A Test Case

The world balance of power depends on our ability to deny to an aggressor the resources and manpower of Western Europe -- the second largest concentration of industry and skills outside the United States. If Eurasia were dominated by a hostile power, we would confront an overpowering threat. And the key to Eurasia is Western Europe because its loss would bring with it the loss of the Middle East and the upheaval of Africa. (Page 269)

So long as U. S. strategic doctrine identifies the defense of Europe with all-out war, a substantial military contribution by our allies is unlikely. Under an all-out strategy, our NATO partners see no point in a military contribution of their own, or else they

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strive for a nuclear establishment under their own control to reduce their dependence on the United States. The more fearful the strategy resulting from their adoption of new weapons, the more it has emphasized the sense of impotence among our allies. NATO is therefore the key test for the possibility of an effective alliance policy in the nuclear age. (Pages 273-4)

Its conception of its obligations as a world power has induced Great Britain to seek to duplicate the entire range of U. S. military establishments with a defense budget a little more than 1/10th of ours. Since Great Britain will still be dependent on U. S. assistance in an all-out war, it would seem to make more sense for Britain to concentrate on developing forces for limited war and for the local defense of Europe. The proponents of the predominant strategic school in Britain, like their counterparts in the United States, reject the concept of graduated deterrence for two contradictory reasons: that a distinction between the tactical and strategic uses of weapons is difficult to make and impossible to enforce; and that an intermediate course, by reducing the dangers faced by the Soviet Union, would increase its willingness to run risks. (Page 284)

The emphasis on a strategy which stakes the national substance on every dispute deprives the British defense effort of political effectiveness and causes NATO increasingly to lack a sense of direction. (Page 285)

Germany's geographic position is so precarious that even a strategy that sought to defend the Federal Republic was not sufficient to overcome German hesitations. The next concern was to define a tactical doctrine which would stop a Soviet attack at the zonal boundary along the Elbe. White "Carte Blanche" had been designed as a warning to the Soviet leaders and as a means to reassure Germany that NATO, by using tactical nuclear weapons, would be able to protect its territory, it became in fact a demonstration that the power of nuclear weapons inhibits their use unless there exists a doctrine which poses alternatives less stark than total devastation. (Page 293)

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The French argued -- remarkably -- that they could escape the dilemmas of the nuclear age by refusing to participate in its military applications. They sought to substitute prestige for lack of power. Thus France wished to play a principal role in allied councils, but without assuming the responsibility for effective defense. It desired to remain a great power, while following a policy of minimum risk. French military realists have pressed for production of nuclear weapons, but have proposed a strategy which inhibits going ahead with an arms program -- the Anglo-American theory of deterrence and all-out war. (Pages 298, 299, 300)

NATO's difficulties are due to its inability to resolve two issues in terms which are meaningful to all partners: the purpose of a military establishment on the continent, and the implications of nuclear weapons for allied strategy. So long as the United States and Britain assume that any war in Europe will be an all-out war with thermonuclear exchange, their interests in the alliance differ from those of the other NATO powers. Is NATO a device to warn the Soviet bloc that an attack on Western Europe will unleash all-out war? Is it designed to insure the integrity of Europe against attack? In the first case, there is little point in maintaining British, American and Canadian forces on the continent, and the European build-up will be hesitant and meaningless. In the latter case, a radical adjustment is required in our strategic doctrine and supporting policies. (Pages 306, 307)

With the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile, our allies have become the real victims of our policy of withholding atomic information. They are either forced into a wasteful duplication of effort and into research long since accomplished by the United States and the USSR, or they are obliged to rely on obsolete military establishments. (Page 311)

Should our allies prove reluctant to support even a militarily revitalized NATO, it would seem time to put an end to half measures. Lacking a military structure capable of local defense, the protection of Europe resides in the willingness of the United States and Great Britain to undertake all-out war in response to Soviet aggression. A reduction of United States and British strength in Europe would



make this clear.

Chapter 10 -- The Strategy of Ambiguity -- Sino-Soviet Strategic Thought

Throughout history, states have appeared time and again which jointly proclaim that their purpose is to destroy the existing structure and to recast it completely. And time and again, the powers that are the declared victims stand by indifferent or inactive while the balance of power is overturned. (Page 316) The status quo powers are at a disadvantage in that they have everything to gain from believing in the good faith of a revolutionary power for the tranquility they seek is unattainable without it. A revolutionary power confronts the legitimate order with a fearful challenge. A long period of peace leads to the temptation to trust appearances and interpret motives of other powers in the most favorable and familiar manner. (Page 319) If the revolutionary power displays psychological skill, it can present every move as the expression of limited aims or as caused by a legitimate grievance. The status quo powers on the other hand cannot be sure that the balance of power is in fact threatened or that their opinion is not sincere until he has demonstrated it, and by the time he has done so it is usually too late. (Page 320)

As a result of Soviet doctrine, relations between the Communist and the non-Communist world always have some of the attributes of war, whatever form the contest may take at any given moment. (Page 327) To the non-Soviet world, peace appears as an end in itself, and its manifestation is the absence of struggle. To the Soviet leaders, by contrast, peace is a form of struggle. (Page 328)

The nature of the Soviet challenge is inherently ambiguous. It uses the "legitimate" language of its opponents in a fashion which distorts its meaning and increases the hesitations of the other side. The Soviet leaders maintain a constant pressure just short of the challenge which they believe would produce a final showdown. (Page 334). A policy of precaution is the most difficult of all for status quo powers to implement. All their preconceptions tempt them to



wait until the Soviet threat has become unambiguous and the danger has grown overt, by which time it may well be too late. (Page 335)

The legalistic approach is peculiarly unsuited for dealing with a revolutionary power. Law is a legitimization of the status quo and the change it permits presupposes the assent of two parties. A revolutionary power, on the contrary, rejects the status quo and accepts a "legal" framework only as a device for subverting the existing order. (Pages 334-336)

Lenin thought that "War is part of the whole. The whole is politics." (Page 340) Lenin underlined the following passage of Clausewitz: "War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means... Policy makes out of the all-overpowering element of war a mere instrument, it changes the tremendous battle sword which should be lifted with both hands and the whole power of the body to strike once for all, into a light handy weapon which is even sometimes nothing more than a rapier to exchange thrusts and feints and parries." (Pages 342, 343)

The correct military line Mao summed up in his three propositions which he considered the prerequisite for victory: 1) to fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is certain; 2) to avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is uncertain; and 3) to avoid absolutely a strategic decisive engagement which stakes the destiny of the nation." The basic military strategy of Chinese Communism was defined as "protracted limited war." (Page 346)

Mao never tired of counselling a strategy of maximum ambiguity, in which the enemy's impatience for victory is used to frustrate him. He expressed this principle in sixteen words: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue." (Page 347) Mao inweighed against "desperadoism" and "adventuriam" -- the tendency to cling to territory at all costs, or the quest for a quick victory. (Page 348)

Mao's strategy of the protracted war can be effective only against an opponent unprepared either physically or psychologically for limited war; an opponent to whom a war without total victory seems somehow beyond reason. No conditions should be sought for which one is not willing to fight indefinitely, and no advance made except to a point at which one is willing to wait indefinitely. The side which is willing to outwait its opponent -- which is less eager for a settlement -- can tip the balance. (Page 349)



What is permanent in Soviet theory is the insistence on the continuing struggle, not the form (for example, war or peace) that it takes at any given moment. (Page 350)

The emerging middle class in Russia may, of course, in time ameliorate the rigors of Soviet doctrine. It has happened before in history that a revolutionary movement has lost its Messianic clan. But it has usually occurred only when a Messianic movement came to be opposed with equal fervor or when it reached the limit of its military strength. In any event, it might well be that a middle class deprived of Marxist theory would be even more inflexible to the present Soviet leadership. Hitler was not a Marxist. (Page 357)

We have been inhibited by refusing to take at face value the often repeated Soviet assertions that they mean to smash the existing framework, and have sought to interpret every Soviet maneuver in terms of categories which we have come to consider as "legitimate," and also by conducting our relationships with the Soviet bloc as if it were possible to conceive of a terminal date to the conflict. Effective action against the Soviet threat presupposes a realization that the contest is likely to be protracted. To the extent that we succeed in seeing policy as a unity in which political, psychological, economic and military pressures merge, we may be able to use Soviet theory to our advantage. Soviet and Chinese communist theory leaves little doubt that these are not regimes which would risk everything to prevent changes adverse to them, so long as their national survival is not directly affected. They are even less likely to take everything to achieve a positive gain. (Pages 359, 360)

Chapter 11 -- The Soviet Union and the Atom

Faced by U. S. possession of atomic weapons after World War II, the Kremlin advanced three themes with a cold-blooded effrontery, as if no other version of reality than its own were even conceivable, through all the media and organizations at its disposal, through diplomacy and propaganda: one was that the decisiveness of nuclear weapons was overrated; this was designed to demonstrate that the USSR remained predominant in the essential categories of power. Second, although not decisive, nuclear weapons were inherently in a special category of horror and should be banned; and by propaganda,

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resolutions, diplomatic notes and peace congresses, this campaign sought to paralyze the psychological basis for use of our most potent weapon. A third theme was that the only legitimate use of the atom was its peaceful application, in which the USSR was prepared to take the lead. This position gave impetus to peace offensives and strengthened the appeal to the uncommitted powers. (Pages 363-364)

These arguments, finely attuned to prevailing fears, almost imperceptibly shifted the primary concern away from Soviet aggression -- the real security problem -- to the immorality of the use of nuclear weapons which happened to represent the most effective means for resisting it. (Page 376)

The Soviets could not surrender the principle that the relations between different social systems are inherently warlike and that war is always possible. In 1949, therefore, a refinement was added to the doctrine of inevitable protracted conflict between opposing systems. The next war, Moscow claimed, would produce not the destruction of civilization, but the destruction of capitalism. (Pages 377-378)

However the Soviet regime might minimize the importance of nuclear weapons for purposes of home consumption, all energies of the Soviet state were thrown behind a "crash program" to develop nuclear weapons and a strategic air force. (Page 379) Once the Soviets had the atomic weapon, a subtle shift of emphasis in Soviet doctrine occurred. The horror of atomic warfare was maintained because it remained a useful instrument to paralyze resistance, but no more was said to the effect that nuclear weapons could not be decisive. They became a vital part of the equipment of a fully armed nation. (Page 381)

One of the chief concerns of Soviet propaganda has been to prevent the United States from increasing its freedom of action by developing a doctrine of limited nuclear war. Soviet propaganda has repeated endlessly that there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war, that any employment of nuclear weapons must inevitably lead to all-out war. (Page 392)

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
It is argued that if limited nuclear war is to our advantage it must be to Soviet disadvantage and their strategy would be either conventional or all-out war. But the Soviet leaders could not force us into a strategy of conventional war against our wishes. As regards all-out war, it cannot be repeated too often that the fact that the Soviets cannot profit from limited war does not mean that they can profit from all-out war. (Page 401)

Chapter 12 -- The Need for Doctrine

At a time when technology has put in our grasp a command over nature never before imagined, the value of power depends above all on the purpose for which it will be used. Only a doctrine which defines the purpose of weapons and the kind of war in which they are to be employed permits a rational choice of weapons. (Page 403)

A society acquires momentum by coupling cooperative effort with specialization of functions. Its sense of direction comes to expression in its strategic doctrine, which defines the challenges which it will meet in its relations with other societies, and the manner of dealing with them. The test of a strategic doctrine is whether it can establish a pattern of response for the most likely challenges. (Page 404) American security requires a doctrine which will enable us to act purposefully in the face of the challenges which will confront us. It must be able to assess the forces which move contemporary events and find the means for shaping them in the desired direction. (Page 405)

With modern weapons, a definition of primary missions for the services on the basis of mode of locomotion amounts to giving each service a claim to develop a capability for total war. The test of an organization is how naturally and spontaneously it enables its leadership to address itself to its most severe challenges. There is little in the organization of our national defense establishment that impels the service chiefs in a spontaneous fashion to consider over-all strategic doctrine. (Pages 407 and 409)



In presenting the budget to Congress, no attempt is made to show the relationship of strategy to events abroad beyond the general implication that the proposed program will ensure the security of the United States. Without a concept of war, comparative numbers mean little. The quest for numbers is a symptom of the abdication of doctrine. (Pages 414 and 415)

A vicious circle is set up: the more frightening we paint Soviet power, the more we confirm our predilection for an all-out strategy. But the more fearful the consequences of our strategy, the more reluctant will the political leadership be to invoke it. In every crisis, we are obliged to gear our measures to the availability of forces instead of having in advance geared our forces to the most likely danger. And our hesitations are multiplied because the services do not agree among themselves about strategy for either limited or for total war. (Page 416)

An administrative mechanism charged with developing strategic doctrine will be ineffective if nothing in the daily experience of the individuals comprising it leads them naturally to reflection about the problems of strategy. A mechanism will encourage profound strategic thought if it leads officials to reflect spontaneously about problems of doctrine, not only by fiat when they have achieved eminence but throughout their careers. This is impossible so long as there exists a mechanistic division of functions among our services which is growing increasingly unrealistic. (Page 417)

We should begin reorganization by creating two basic commands, each representing a clearly distinguishable strategic mission. The Army, Navy and Air Force could continue as administrative and training units, much as the training commands within the services today. But for all other purposes two basic forces would be created: the Strategic Force -- the units required for all-out war -- and the Tactical Force -- the units required for limited war. (Page 419)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would consist of a Chairman, the Chief of the Tactical Force, the Chief of the Strategic Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations, to represent operations such as anti-submarine warfare which do not fit into either of the above categories. Such a group would in its very nature be more oriented toward doctrine than the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs of each force would represent an integrated strategic mission and not a means of locomotion. (Page 421)

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Since the difficult problems of national policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as "purely" military advice. The Secretary of Defense would gain from instituting some form of Strategic Advisory Council, either composed of the service secretaries or by strengthening the functions now exercised by the Assistant Secretary, ISA. The Strategic Advisory Council, or the Assistant Secretary, should be related more closely to the deliberations of the JCS, for example through meeting jointly on all issues save purely technical matters of procurement or weapons development. Civilian officials and the Joint Chiefs would profit from an amalgamation of their functions. (Page 422)

There is no single authority, except an over-burdened President, able to take an over-all view or to apply decisions over a period of time. This results in the gap between the definition of general objectives so vague as to be truistic and the concern with immediate problems. (Page 424)

Despite all the information now available, it is still hard to realize that in the nuclear age the penalty for miscalculation may be national catastrophe. The irrevocable error is not yet part of the American experience. (Page 427)

A power can survive only if it is willing to fight for its interpretations of justice and its conception of vital interest. Its test comes in its awareness of where to draw the line and for what issues to contend. The refusal to act will ensure that the next contest will be fought on even more difficult ground. (Page 429)