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James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have concluded it to be in the public interest to place before you, the American people -- and before the world -- a full and explicit review of your Government's policies and actions with respect to the development and testing of nuclear weapons, as these affect our national defense, our efforts toward world disarmament, and our quest of a secure and just peace for all nations.

In this cause of world peace, one truth must never be lost from sight. It is this: the critical issue is not a matter of testing nuclear weapons -- but of preventing their use in nuclear war. America has repeatedly stated its readiness, indeed its anxiety, to put all nuclear weapons permanently aside -- to stop all tests of such weapons -- to devote some of our huge expenditures for armament to the greater cause of mankind's welfare -- to do all these things whenever, and as soon as, one basic requirement is met. This requirement is that we, as a nation, and all peoples, know safety from attack.

In this spirit and in this awareness, we as a nation have two tasks. First: we must -- and do -- seek assiduously to evolve agreements with other nations that will promote trust and understanding among all peoples. Second: at the same time, and until that international trust is firmly secured, we must -- and do make sure that the quality and quantity of our military weapons command such respect as to dissuade any other nation from the temptation of aggression.

Thus do we develop weapons, not to wage war, but to prevent war.

Only in the clear light of this greater truth can we properly examine the lesser matter of the testing of our nuclear weapons.

On this specific matter, I last week directed the appropriate Departments and Agencies of your Government to submit to me summaries of all relevant facts in their respective areas of responsibility. This record covers the span of the past 11 years -- since the first atomic explosion which occurred in a test in New Mexico. It may be pertinent to note that my direct personal concern with these matters extends almost uninterruptedly over these some eleven years -- in my successive capacities as Chief of Staff of the Army, Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe, and, since 1953, as your President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

This record of your government's policies and actions -- insofar as it does not prejudice national security -- is herewith made public. It encompasses facts in the several areas of national defense, scientific development, and diplomatic conduct.

This record reflects, clearly and consistently, the persistent, peaceful purposes of our nation.

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I deem it proper, in this summary statement, to take note of the most salient points of fact in the accompanying record.

One: Your Government has been unremitting in its efforts to ease the burden of armaments for all the world, to establish effective international control of the testing and use of all nuclear weapons, and to promote international use of atomic energy for the needs and purposes of peace. The manifest evidences of this extend from the beginning of this Administration to the present: (a) my appeal to these specific purposes as early as my address of April 16, 1953; (b) the offer of "atoms for peace" in December of the same year; (c) the appointment of a Special Assistant for Disarmament, with Cabinet rank, to develop and coordinate our efforts toward disarmament; (d) my offer at the Meeting of the Heads of State at Geneva, in July of 1955, for immediate exchange of military blueprints between the United States and the Soviet Union, and mutual air inspection by the "open skies" formula; (e) acceptance of the Soviet proposal for ground-control teams if combined with air inspection; (f) the approval this week of the Statute to govern the International Atomic Energy Agency with 81 nations participating in its peaceful purpose; and (g) our continuing, constructive participation in the work of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

Facts such as these have given substance and validity to my statement before the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953:

"The United States pledges before you -- and therefore before the world -- its determination to solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

Two. The indispensable principle upon which we have insisted has been the securing of effective safeguards and controls in any program of disarmament. Our readiness to begin disarmament under such safeguards has been affirmed repeatedly during the past three and one-half years. At the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers last autumn, it was specifically reaffirmed by the Secretary of State, with particular reference to nuclear weapons and their testing.

There is only one reason why no safe agreement has been effected to date: the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept any dependable system of mutual safeguards. In the past two years alone, the Soviet Union has rejected no less than 14 American proposals on disarmament and control of nuclear weapons.

Three: In the light of these facts, your Government has kept enlarging its stockpile of nuclear weapons, and has continued its development and testing of the most advanced nuclear weapons. The power of these weapons to deter aggression and to guard world peace could be lost if we failed to hold our superiority in these weapons. And the importance of our strength in this particular weapons-field is sharply accented by the unavoidable fact of our numerical inferiority to Communist manpower.

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Four. The continuance of the present rate of H-bomb testing -- by the most sober and responsible scientific judgment -- does not imperil the health of humanity. On the amount of radio-active fall-out, including Strontium 90, resulting from tests, the most authoritative judgment is that of the independent National Academy of Sciences. It reported last June, following a study by 150 scientists of the first rank, that the radiation exposure from all weapons-tests to date -- and from continuing tests at the same rate -- is, and would be, only a small fraction of the exposure that individuals receive from natural sources and from medical X-rays during their lives.

Five. On the other hand, the continuance of this testing is having two important beneficial results.

(A) The most recent tests enable us to harness and discipline our weapons more precisely and effectively -- drastica lly reducing their fall-out and making them more easy to concentrate, if ever used, upon military objectives. Further progress along this line is confidently expected.

(B) And these same recent tests have helped us to develop -- not primarily weapons for vaster destruction -- but weapons for defense of our people against any possible enemy attack, as well as knowledge vital to our whole program of civil defense.

Six. There is radio-active fall-out, including Strontium 90, from the testing of all nuclear weapons, of whatever size. But the character of the weapon, as well as its size, determines the fall-out. Such fall-out cannot be avoided -- as has been implied -- by limiting tests to the smaller nuclear weapons. Such fall-out of Strontium 90 as does take place results from the process of atomic fission. Fission is the basic phenomenon of the smaller weapons. Thus, the idea that we can "stop sending this dangerous material into the air" -- by concentrating upon small fission weapons -- is based upon apparent unawareness of the facts.

Seven. With reference to the Soviet Union: its sympathy with the idea of stopping H-bomb tests is indisputable. This idea merely reflects the Soviet Union's repeated insistence, ever since discussion of the Baruch Plan in 1946, that all plans for disarmament be based on simple voluntary agreements. Now, as always, this formula allows for no safeguards, no control, no inspection.

Eight. A simple agreement to stop H-bomb tests cannot be regarded as automatically self-enforcing on the unverified assumption that such tests can instantly and surely be detected. It is true that tests of very large weapons would probably be detected when they occur. We believe that we have detected practically all such tests to date. It is, however, impossible -- in view of the vast Soviet land-mass that can screen possible future tests -- to have positive assurance of such detection, except in the case of the largest weapons. No r is it possible to state, immediately following the long-range detection of a test, its size and character.

Nine. If your Government were to suspend research and preparation for tests -- as well as the tests themselves -- and resume such preparation only upon knowledge that another nation had actually exploded another H-bomb, we could find our present commanding lead in nuclear weapons erased or even reversed. For the preparation for such a test may require up to two years.

Ten. If your Government were to suspend only its tests, while continuing precautionary research and preparation -- if that were feasible -- we could still suffer a serious military disadvantage. It requires a year or more to organize and effect such tests as those conducted at our proving ground in the Pacific Ocean.

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These facts dictate two conclusions.

First. We must continue -- until properly safeguarded international agreements can be reached -- to develop our strength in the most advanced weapons -- for the sake of our own national safety, for the sake of all free nations, for the sake of peace itself.

Second. We must -- and we shall -- continue to strive ceaselessly to achieve, not the illusion, but the reality of world disarmament. Illusion, in this case, can assume either of two forms. It can mean a reliance upon agreements without safeguards. Or it can be the suggestion that simple suspension of our nuclear tests, without sure knowledge of the actions of others, signifies progress -- rather than peril.

There is nothing in post-war history to justify the belief that we should -- or that we could even dare -- accept anything less than sound safeguards and controls for any disarmament arrangements.

I remain profoundly hopeful that -- if we stay strong and steadfast -- the reality of significant world disarmament will come to pass.

There is every reason to believe that -- if there but be sincerely peaceful purpose on all sides -- the nations of the world can achieve and agree upon a system of dependable controls governing disarmament.

We shall never cease striving to this end.

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MEMORANDUM -- Weapons Tests and Peaceful Uses of the Atom

In response to a request by the President, the following statement has been prepared by the Executive Branch officials chiefly concerned. It covers:

I. The United States Program of Testing Atomic Weapons.

II. Fall-Out from Atomic Tests.

III. Long-Range Detection of the Detonation of Nuclear Weapons.

IV. International Atoms-for-Peace Program.

I. THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM OF TESTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Beginning with the first test in 1945, the United States has conducted 13 test series. With the exception of the first test, which was in time of war, each series was publicly announced before it was held.

2. Each of the series and every shot in each series was individually justified and evaluated as necessary for the advancement of our nuclear weapon technology or to gain important weapon effects information.

3. Of the shots in the several series, approximately 20% have been of high-yield thermonuclear designs and 80% of fission devices.

4. The first test -- TRINITY -- in July 1945 demonstrated the feasibility of an atomic weapon.

5. In July 1946, 2 devices were fired at Operation CROSSROADS at Bikini Atoll for information as to the effects of atomic bursts on ships.

6. Subsequent tests took place as follows:

Operation SANDSTONE during the spring of 1948.
Operation RANGER in the winter of 1950-51.
Operation GREENHOUSE in the spring of 1951.
Operation BUSTER-JANGLE in the fall of 1951.
Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER in the spring of 1952.
Operation IVY in the fall of 1952.
Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE in the spring of 1953.
Operation CASTLE in the spring of 1954.
Operations TEAPOT and WIGWAM in the spring of 1955.
Operation REDWING in the summer of 1956.

7. These tests were designed to fulfill, and have fulfilled, the following purposes:

(a) The development of successive designs using less material and therefore increasing the defensive strength of the United States in terms of the amount of material available.

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(b) The development of designs of smaller configuration and lighter weight with the objective of providing weapons which can be more readily and effectively used.

(c) The development of high-yield thermonuclear weapons. This development has been of vital importance to our striking force and to its capability to deter aggression.

(d) In the more recent tests the development of warheads for missiles designed to defend our populations and important installations against enemy attack. In the most recent tests, the development of weapons of high yield but low production of fission products. The successful attainment of this objective will make it possible for us to have weapons with greatly reduced radiological hazard (fall-out).

8. A major effort in our test series has been to secure information for the protection of our civil population in the event of attack with nuclear weapons. This information has been disseminated to our people through and by the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

9. The time required to prepare for a test series depends upon a number of variables such as:

(a) The state of readiness of devices for test.

(b) Whether the tests are to be conducted at our Eniwetok Proving Grounds or within the Continental limits of the United States (where only small devices can be accommodated).

(c) The number and complexity of the test devices and of the measurements and observations to be made.

The period required for preparation has varied from a minimum of months for the test of simpler, small devices at the Nevada Test Site of the Commission to from 1 to 2 years for tests of larger yield thermonuclear devices at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds.

II. FALLOUT FROM ATOMIC TESTS

10. This phenomenon associated with atomic explosions has been known since Operation TRINITY. It acquired a greatly increased importance with the advent of early thermonuclear weapons although the objectionable fallout of an atomic explosion, especially the component strontium 90, is the result of atomic fission, which is the specific reaction in existing small atomic weapons.

11. The Atomic Energy Commission has been continuously engaged in the study of the biological effect of radiation, both from the point of view of determining safety standards in its installations and for those individuals and institutions to whom radioactive isotopes are supplied, and in connection with the testing operations of the Commission.

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12. The Commission has made public all the pertinent information which it had collected on this subject, with due regard to national security. The National Academy of Sciences, the Nation's foremost independent scientific body, engaged in an independent study of the biological effects of atomic-radiation, conducted by approximately 150 of the most distinguished authorities in their several fields. The results were publicly reported in June, 1956.

13. The report states that, except for accidents, the biological damage from peacetime activities, which include the testing of atomic weapons, has been "essentially negligible." For a fuller statement of the radiation exposure from all weapons tests to date and from future tests continued at the past testing rate, the entire report of the National Academy of Sciences should be examined.

14. As regards fallout of strontium 90 from weapons testing, Dr. Willard F. Libby of the Atomic Energy Commission has stated that the present rate of testing, if continued indefinitely, would not produce a dangerous level of concentration of strontium 90 in the human body. Dr. Shields Warren, eminent radiologist, has stated that bone deposition of strontium 90 is well below the natural background level of radiation, and that to cause harmful effects the dose would have to be increased many times.

15. Mention might be made at this point of various speculations concerning the effect of atomic explosions upon the weather. The National Academy of Sciences also established a Committee on Meteorology which gave attention to this question and which concluded that there was no evidence to indicate that climate has been in any way altered by past atomic and thermonuclear explosions.

16. The Atomic Energy Commission has made extensive reports on the subject of "fallout", including the most authoritative scientific data, in testimony before various committees of the Congress.

17. On the initiative of the United States, an international study of the subject was undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations. This study is now in progress.

III. THE LONG-RANGE DETECTION OF THE DETONATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

18. A system for monitoring the occurrence of an explosion, attributable to an atomic source, was initiated by the Government in sufficient time to detect a Soviet nuclear explosion which occurred on the 29th of August, 1949, and which was announced by the President on September 23rd of that year.

19. Including that test and since that date, the organization concerned with this responsibility has detected 7 series of weapons tests within Soviet territory. These series have been announced by our Government as they occurred and were detected. Particular detonations which presented any unusual characteristics have been specifically identified at the time of detection.

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20. No Soviet weapons tests series has been publicly announced by the Soviet Government in advance of its occurrence. No description of the effects of tests useful to a program for the protection of civil populations has been made available by the Soviets.

21. The United States long-range monitoring program employs a variety of systems which in the interest of national defense have not been described and being intelligence operations, should remain classified.

22. While the system of long-range detection or monitoring is believed to be as effective as it can be made in the present state of scientific knowledge, it cannot insure the detection of every test irrespective of size, location, or type and composition of the weapon tested.

23. A determination as to size and nuclear character of detected weapons cannot be reached immediately upon detection, nor for several weeks and occasionally months thereafter. This is particularly true with respect to the larger, more complicated thermonuclear devices.

24. Our evaluation of nuclear weapons tests made by other countries has been dependent upon the calibration afforded by our own tests of weapons of known characteristics.

IV. THE PROGRAM FOR THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY (ATOMS-FOR-PEACE) AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

25. When the Administration of President Eisenhower took office, it inherited a disarmament stalemate and an atomic arms race, both of which stemmed largely from the repeated rejections by the USSR of the Baruch proposals of 1946-47 for putting all atomic energy under international control.

26. As a result of the President's consideration of this problem, the idea for the Atoms-for-Peace program was evolved and presented to the world in the speech on December 8, 1953, which the President made to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This speech pictured the holocaust of an atomic war, the blessings of an atomic peace, and proposed an international agency to which the powers possessing atomic materials would begin and continue to make contributions of such materials for peaceful uses.

27. Worldwide acclaim of President Eisenhower's proposal made it difficult for the Soviets to succeed in their efforts to sabotage it as they had the Baruch plan.

28. During the protracted negotiations following the speech, the United States took a number of affirmative steps without awaiting establishment of the Agency.

(a) Upon recommendation of President Eisenhower, the Atomic Energy Act was rewritten by the Congress in 1954 in order to permit international cooperation, as a result of which agreements have been entered into with 37 nations, providing for the exchange of information on the peaceful uses of atomic energy to build research reactors and power reactors. Scores of students from friendly countries have been trained in technical schools set up by the Atomic Energy Commission. In addition, we have presented Atomic Energy libraries to 45 friendly nations.

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(b) On June 11, 1955, President Eisenhower announced a proposal by our Government to share one-half the cost of research reactors to be built in friendly foreign nations. The purpose was to marshal world opinion in support of a demand that atomic science be used for the benefit of mankind.

(c) We initiated the largest scientific congress ever held (The International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, August, 1955) at which a very large amount of non-military atomic information was exchanged.

(d) The President allocated in 1954, 1955, and 1956 a total of 40,200 kilograms of fissionable material for research and power reactors in the United States and abroad.

(e) The United States announced to the Colombo Plan nations in a meeting in Singapore in October 1955 that it would support an Asian Nuclear Research Center for the training of scientists and engineers in the Far East; plans have been formulated for this Research Center to be located in Manila.

(f) The Atomic Energy Commission is assisting in the establishment of a research and training center at the University of Puerto Rico where instruction and training in the nuclear sciences will be given in the Spanish language, thereby expanding the Commission's training program for the special benefit of students from Latin American countries.

(g) In conjunction with the Organization of American States, the Atomic Energy Commission has initiated a program of assistance to the Inter-American Institute of Agriculture Sciences at Turrialba, Costa Rica.

(h) The United States has announced plans for an Inter-American Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to be held next May at the Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island.

29. President Eisenhower's United Nations speech in the meantime has borne fruit:

(a) On the initiative of the United States, representatives of 12 nations -- including the USSR -- met in Washington earlier this year and drafted the statute (charter) of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

(b) Delegates from 82 nations began a conference on September 20 in New York to consider the statute (charter); agreement was reached today, October 23d.

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MEMORANDUM - Disarmament Negotiations

In response to a request by the President, the following chronology of principal actions and events relating to international negotiations concerned with disarmament, control of atomic energy and atomic weapons, and limitation of atomic weapons tests has been provided by the Executive Branch officials chiefly concerned.

1. The foreign ministers of the US, UK and USSR on December 26, 1945 agreed at Moscow to sponsor, in the UN General Assembly, a resolution recommending the creation of a UN Commission on Atomic Energy (UNAEC).

2. On January 24, 1946 the General Assembly approved a resolution setting up an Atomic Energy Commission.

3. The U S representative to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Bernard Baruch, presented on June 14, 1946 U S proposals for international control of atomic energy. He called for establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority which would own or manage all potentially dangerous activities in atomic energy. The US declared its willingness, under effective control, to give up its atomic weapons monopoly, destroy or dispose of its atomic stocks, and turn over atomic secrets to an international atomic agency in which no nation would wield a veto. The agency would own or manage all potentially dangerous activities in atomic energy and control and license all atomic activities in that field. The US proposal specifically provided that the Authority should be given the exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives, and should foster beneficial uses of atomic energy.

4. On July 19, 1946 the USSR proposed an alternative plan for a convention which would forbid "use of atomic weapons in any circumstances," prohibit production of atomic weapons, and provide for destruction of all atomic stocks within three months after ratification of the treaty. The USSR insisted on retention of Security Council veto power over any control system. This proposal, in essence, remained the Soviet position through the succeeding years.

5. On December 30, 1946 the UN Atomic Energy Commission approved by a vote of 10 to 0 (with the USSR abstaining) essential principles of the US plan for control of atomic energy.

6. On June 11, 1947 the Soviets made proposals in the Atomic Energy Commission again calling for a convention outlawing production and use of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction. They called for a separate convention which would provide for an "International Control Commission" with limited inspection rights, but subject to Security Council veto.

7. September 11, 1947 the UN Atomic Energy Commission reaffirmed its approval of the US plan by a vote of 10 to 1 (the USSR opposed).

8. On May 17, 1948 the UN Atomic Energy Commission voted 9 to 2 to adjourn indefinitely on grounds that the Soviet position provided no useful basis for further commission discussions.

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9. On November 4, 1948, the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 40-6 (the USSR opposing) a Canadian resolution approving the UN Atomic Energy Commission majority plan (the U. S. proposal) as a basis for "establishing an effective system of international control of atomic energy." The resolution created a committee of six to determine if there existed "any basis for agreement on international control of atomic energy."

10. On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced the first atomic explosion in the USSR.

11. On October 24, 1949, the committee of six reported on fundamental differences between the USSR and the Western powers with regard to control of atomic energy. The report concluded that the majority powers put world security above sovereignty, while the USSR put its sovereignty first and insisted on unimpeded exercise thereof.

12. The United States on October 24, 1950, proposed that the work of the UN Atomic Energy Commission and the UN Commission on Conventional Armaments be more closely brought together and that this work be carried forward by "a new and consolidated disarmament commission."

13. On November 7, 1951, the US, UK and France sponsored proposals in the UN, providing for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons. The proposals provided for a progressive disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic, and provided that the UN majority plan should continue to serve as a basis for control of atomic energy, unless a better or not less effective system could be devised.

14. On November 16, 1951, the USSR rejected the tripartite proposal and submitted a counter-proposal calling for a convention prohibiting atomic weapons.

15. On January 11, 1952, the General Assembly adopted a resolution creating the UN Disarmament Commission.

16. On January 12, 1952, the USSR delegation submitted proposals which provided that prohibition of atomic weapons and "strict international control" of atomic weapons should come into effect simultaneously, but that the control organ not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of any state.

17. On April 5, 1952, in the first meeting of the Disarmament Commission, the U. S. co-sponsored the first of a series of working papers, including a "proposal for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic."

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18. On August 29, 1952, the USSR categorically rejected the U. S. sponsored proposals and reaffirmed previous Soviet positions.

19. On November 1, 1952, the U. S. exploded the first hydrogen device at Bikini.

20. On April 8, 1953, the General Assembly noted the impasse in the Disarmament Commission deliberations and requested the Commission to continue its work and report back to the next General Assembly.

21. President Eisenhower in his speech of April 16, 1953 proposed "international control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only, and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons" under "adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations."

22. On August 21, 1953, the USSR exploded a hydrogen device.

23. In the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1953, the Soviet Union reiterated their proposal for an unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and continued to call for such a prohibition without specifying the nature of controls.

24. The General Assembly on November 28, 1953 adopted by a vote of 54-0, with the Soviets abstaining, a resolution co-sponsored by the U. S. which called for the establishment of a subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission "consisting of 'representatives of the powers principally involved' which should seek in private an acceptable solution."

25. President Eisenhower addressing the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953 emphasized U. S. readiness to meet privately with other powers principally involved to seek an acceptable solution to the atomic armaments race and proposed that the governments concerned begin at that time and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency, and that such agency find ways to assure that the contributed materials be devoted to peaceful purposes.

26. The USSR, on December 12, 1953 indicated a willingness to participate in discussions on the President's proposal but added the reservation that there should be a discussion of an unconditional obligation not to employ hydrogen, atomic or other weapons of mass destruction.

27. On April 2, 1954, Prime Minister Nehru proposed a "standstill agreement" on tests of nuclear weapons.

28. On May 25, 1954 the U. S. introduced into the U. N. Disarmament Subcommittee a proposal for the establishment of international control organs to enforce a disarmament program.

29. On May 28, 1954 the World Peace Council (Communist) launched a demand for a cessation of tests together with a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.

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30. The U. S. supported a French-UK proposal of June 11, 1954 in the Disarmament Sub-Committee which called for a phased approach to disarmament through successive stages and for nuclear disarmament phased with reduction of conventional arms and forces. The proposal included a proviso that states would regard themselves as prohibited from using nuclear weapons except in accordance with the UN Charter.

31. In late June 1954, after consideration of the matter with his top officials, President Eisenhower adopted an interdepartmental recommendation that the United States should not at that time agree to a test moratorium, but that disarmament policy review should be continued and expedited.

32. After initial rejection of the Anglo-French proposal, the USSR, on September 30, 1954, announced at the UN General Assembly that it would accept that proposal as a basis for a draft international convention on disarmament.

33. On November 4, 1954 the General Assembly unanimously called for "further efforts ... to reach agreement," by the Disarmament Committee.

34. On November 23, 1954, the Communist World Peace Council proposed that the great powers reach "immediate agreement on the banning of all experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs," and combined this with a demand that governments undertake "never to use nuclear weapons whatever may be the pretext."

35. On February 23, 1955, President Eisenhower at a news conference stated that the United States sees nothing to be gained by a separate ban on thermonuclear tests outside of a decent and proper disarmament.

36. In the resumed meetings of the UN Sub-Committee the U. S. during March 1955 called attention to the difficulties that had arisen in "accounting fully for all past production of nuclear materials" which "raises doubt that presently foreseeable plans can completely guarantee the elimination of all nuclear weapons."

37. On March 8, 1955, the U. S., U. K., France and Canada submitted a proposal to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee on the timing or phasing of a disarmament program; which was not accepted by the USSR.

38. On March 12, 1955 the US, UK, France and Canada submitted to the UN Disarmament Commission Subcommittee a joint draft resolution for the UN General Assembly on the principles to govern reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments; which was not accepted by the USSR.

39. To undertake a complete review of disarmament problems and to develop an approach taking account of the growing technological problems that had arisen, the President on March 19, 1955 appointed Harold E. Stassen as Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament and directed that special studies of basic U. S. policy on the matter be made, utilizing men both in and out of Government.

40. On April 21, 1955, the U. S., UK, France and Canada submitted to the UN Disarmament Commission Subcommittee a joint draft resolution for the UN General Assembly on the principles of disarmament controls; which was rejected by the USSR.

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41. At the UN Sub-Committee in London the Soviet Union, on May 10, 1955, recognized that "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading control and for organizing clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons." The Soviet Union further recognized the danger of mounting nuclear stockpiles and the necessity of guarding against surprise attack. The USSR made a disarmament proposal which included, without provision of safeguards, as one of the first measures of its execution: "the reduction of arms and the prohibition of atomic weapons, states possessing atomic and hydrogen bombs shall pledge themselves to discontinue tests of these weapons."

42. The first comprehensive report of the Special Assistant on Disarmament was presented to the President on May 26, 1955. This report stressed, among other things, the extreme importance of providing against the surprise attack, the absolute necessity of effective inspection in any agreement, the role of an aerial component and of scientific instruments and photography in such a system.

43. The President, in June, 1955, considered and approved the conclusions of an interagency group, following a second review of the matter, to the effect that a moratorium on H-bomb testing would not be in the interest of the U. S. and should not be agreed to except as a part of a comprehensive safeguard disarmament agreement.

44. On June 22, 1955 the US announced a proposal that the United Nations undertake to pool the world's knowledge about the effects of atomic radiation on human health, and later requested that this item be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly; subsequently a resolution to this effect was adopted.

45. On July 18, while the Summit Meeting at Geneva was proceeding the Soviet Union indicated that it was ready to participate in negotiations for the establishment of an international atomic energy agency.

46. President Eisenhower at the Geneva Meeting of heads of government on July 21, 1955 gave a comprehensive statement of the broad principles of U.S. policy and proposed that as a practical step the Soviet Union and United States, the two great countries which possess new and terrible weapons in quantities, agree immediately to an exchange of blueprints of their military establishments and to provide each other with facilities for aerial reconnaissance. The President stated that such a step would provide against the possibility of a great surprise attack and would be but a beginning toward a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament.

47. On the same day, Marshal Bulganin reiterated the Soviet proposal for establishment of control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and airdromes, in order to prevent surprise attack.

48. The U. S. on August 30, 1955 presented an outline plan for the implementation of the President's proposal to the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament at the beginning of a series of meetings at the UN Headquarters in New York; which was rejected by the USSR.

49. Marshal Bulganin, in a letter to President Eisenhower on September 19, 1955, raised objections to the "open skies" proposal.

50. On October 7, 1955, the U.S. proposed an extension of President Eisenhower's plan of aerial inspection to cover other countries, thus applying to U. S. bases overseas; which was not accepted by the USSR.

51. President Eisenhower on October 11, 1955 in a letter to Marshal Bulganin encouraged further study by the Soviet Union of the Geneva proposal and stated United States' willingness to accept the Soviet proposal for ground control teams, along with the President's open skies proposal. The USSR continued to reject the open skies proposal.

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52. At the Foreign Ministers' Confernece at Geneva on November 10, Mr. Molotov indicated willingness of the Soviet Union to consider the concept of aerial photography as one of the forms of control to be considered "at the concluding stage of the implementation of measures to reduce armaments and to prohibit atomic weapons."

53. On November 11, 1955, at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference, Secretary Dulles stated that "if agreement can be reached to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, the United States would be prepared to agree to corresponding restrictions on the testing of such weapons."

54. On November 29, 1955, Secretary Dulles stated at a press conference that the question of suspension of nuclear testing had been studied for a great many months, and that no formula had been found which would be both dependable and in the interest of the U. S. with regard to the protection of people and freedom in the world.

55. The United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1955, adopted by a vote of 56-7, against Soviet opposition, a resolution cosponsored by the United States which urged that the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission give priority to (a) such confidence building measures as the President's open skies plan and the Bulganin ground inspection plan, and (b) all such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible.

56. Marshal Bulganin, in a letter to President Eisenhower on February 1, 1956, again declined to enter into aerial inspection system.

57. On December 24, 1955, Pope Pius XII in a Christmas broadcast declared that the three steps of "renunciation of experimentation with atomic weapons, renunciation of the use of such, and general control of armaments" must be effected together.

58. On January 25, 1956, Governor Stassen testifying before the U. S. Senate Disarmament Subcommittee reiterated U. S. policy and pointed out that we do not have the technical facilities to detect all test explosions.

59. On February 14, 1956, Khrushchev before the 20th CPSU Congress in Moscow stated "we are willing to take certain partial steps -- for example to discontinue the thermonuclear weapon tests ..."

60. In a letter to Premier Bulganin of March 1, 1956, President Eisenhower answered questions regarding the "open skies" proposal, and added a proposal for efforts to bring under control the nuclear threat and reverse the trend toward a constant increasing of nuclear weapons hanging over the world. He stated the United States would be prepared to work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. The President suggested that this might be combined with his proposal of December 8, 1953 "to begin now and continue to make joint contributions" from existing stockpiles of normal uranium of fissionable materials to an international atomic agency. The President stated that the ultimate hope of this government is that all production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

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52. At the Foreign Ministers' Confernece at Geneva on November 10, Mr. Molotov indicated willingness of the Soviet Union to consider the concept of aerial photography as one of the forms of control to be considered "at the concluding stage of the implementation of measures to reduce armaments and to prohibit atomic weapons."

53. Cn November 11, 1955, at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference, Secretary Dulles stated that "if agreement can be reached to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, the United States would be prepared to agree to corresponding restrictions on the testing of such weapons."

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61. On March 21, 1956, the U. S. presented to the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission at London a proposal for a demonstration test area of open skies inspection in a strip of land 300 miles long and 100 miles wide in the USSR and in the U. S.; which was rejected by the USSR.

62. On March 21, 1956 the U. S. proposed to UN Disarmament Commission Subcommittee for immediate exchanges for a test period of technical missions for purposes of preliminary study of the methods of control and inspection; which was not accepted by the USSR.

63. On March 22, 1956, the U. S. proposed to the UN Subcommittee that, subject to certain accompanying conditions and safeguards, the first phase level of reduced armed forces and armaments should be on a basis of measurement of 2 1/2 million men each for the U. S. and USSR, 750,000 each for the UK and France.

64. On March 26, 1956, the U. S. proposed to the UN Disarmament Commission Subcommittee, as part of an air and ground inspection system, the advance notification of planned movements of armed units through international air or water or over foreign soil; which was not accepted by the USSR.

65. On March 27, 1956, the USSR proposed at the London meetings of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee the discontinuance of further tests of thermonuclear weapons as a measure independent of attainment of agreement on general disarmament.

66. At the London meetings of the disarmament subcommittee, the U. S. delegation on April 3, 1956 put forward a working paper suggesting a step-by-step plan for a first phase of a comprehensive disarmament program including limitation on conventional armaments, provision against surprise attack, including President Eisenhower's proposals for control of the nuclear threat, and limitations on the testing of nuclear weapons as part of a safeguarded disarmament program. The paper included a proviso that "the testing of nuclear weapons will be limited and monitored in an agreed manner, "by an armaments regulation council which the U. S. proposed should be established. This proposal was not accepted by the USSR.

67. On April 21, 1956, Mr. Stevenson urged that the U. S. "give prompt and earnest consideration to stopping further tests of the hydrogen bomb."

68. On April 23, 1956, Governor Stassen at the UN Disarmament Subcommittee in London stated that the U. S. is prepared to agree to restrictions on the testing of nuclear weapons provided there has been agreement on an effective limitation of nuclear weapons under proper safeguards as a part of the disarmament agreement, and provided this agreement limiting nuclear weapons has been satisfactorily carried out.

69. On April 24, 1956, Governor Stassen held a discussion with Bulganin and Krushchev in London in which the necessity, method, and sincerity of the "open skies" proposal and 2 1/2 million force level were presented at length and debated.

70. On April 25, 1956, President Eisenhower at his press conference stated that the United States has no more interest in developing bigger nuclear weapons, but is proceeding with testing to find ways and means to limit the weapon, to make it useful for air defense, to reduce fall-out, and to make it more a military weapon and less one of mass destruction.

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71. On May 4, 1956, the four Western Powers, in a joint declaration at end of Subcommittee meetings, reiterated the necessity for a "strong" control organization with inspection rights, including aerial reconnaissance, operating from the outset and developing in parallel with the disarmament measures.

72. On June 6, 1956, Marshal Bulganin in a letter to the President announced the intention to cut the armed forces of the Soviet Union by 1,200,000 men.

73. In the UN Disarmament Commission, the USSR supported a Yugoslav draft resolution of July 10, 1956, which called for "such initial disarmament measures as are now feasible and such forms and degrees of control as are required for these measures" and specified as one such measure "the cessation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons as well as other practicable measures in the field of nuclear armaments."

74. On July 12, 1956, Mr. Gromyko of the USSR, in the UN Disarmament Commission, made a statement accepting the figure of 2.5 million men for the armed forces of the U.S. and the Soviets, but only as a first step, and without accepting the accompanying conditions and safeguards.

75. On July 13, 1956, in the Disarmament Commission, Ambassador Wadsworth stated that "in the absence of agreement to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons under proper safeguards, continuation of testing is essential for our national defense and the security of the free world."

76. On July 16, 1956, the U.S., UK, France and Canada proposed to the Disarmament Commission the principles on which a sound disarmament program could be based; which was rejected by the USSR.

77. On July 16, 1956, the 12-Nation UN Disarmament Commission adopted a resolution recalling the terms of the General Assembly resolution endorsing the open skies, and requested the Subcommittee to continue its studies.

78. Also on July 16, 1956, USSR Foreign Affairs Minister Shepilov, before the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, stated the "question of discontinuing tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons can be ... settled independently" of disarmament agreement.

79. President Eisenhower in a letter of August 4 to Premier Bulganin affirmed the proposals of his March 1, 1956 letter and asked if progress could not be made on the matter.

80. On August 26, 1956, the White House announced that the Soviets had exploded a nuclear device two days earlier.

81. On August 31, 1956 the President announced that a second Soviet atomic explosion had occurred on the previous day.

82. On September 3, 1956, the AEC announced that a third explosion in the test series had taken place on the preceding day.

83. On September 5, 1956, Mr. Stevenson, at the American Legion convention, restated his proposal as "to halt further testing of large nuclear devices, conditioned upon adherence by the other powers to a similar policy."

84. On September 10, 1956 the Soviets announced that a nuclear weapon test had occurred that same day.

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