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March 7, 1958

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 357th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, March 6, 1958

EYES ONLY

Present at the 357th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the U. S. Representative to the United Nations; Mr. Hatfield Chilson for the Secretary of the Interior (Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, National Science Foundation (Items 1 and 3); Capt. John H. Morse, Jr., USN, for the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; Dr. Paul Johnston, Aeronautical Research Institute (Item 3); Admiral Arleigh A. Burke for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy, for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; Dr. Edward Purcell and Dr. Herbert York, President's Science Advisory Committee (Item 3); Col. Vincent Ford, Staff of the President's Science Advisory Committee (Item 3); Bryce N. Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. U. S. POLICY ON ANTARCTICA

(NSC Action No. 1738; NSC 5715/1; SNIE 11-3-58; NSC 5804; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 5, 1958)

General Cutler briefed the Council in considerable detail on the contents of the proposed new policy on Antarctica (NSC 5804), pointing out at the outset, on a map, the different national claims to portions of Antarctica. He set forth the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were in opposition to the proposed new policy because

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)

Agency Case NSC 589-267NLE Case N/ABy DWH NLE Date 7/26/90

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March 6, 1958

they wished to exclude the USSR from any voice in the administration of Antarctica and because they wished the United States, as soon as possible, to claim both the unclaimed sector of Antarctica and areas in sectors claimed by other nations in which we had rights and interests. (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another copy is attached to this memorandum.)

Upon conclusion of General Cutler's briefing he called upon Secretary Dulles. The latter observed that the State Department supported the policy set forth in NSC 5804. Indeed, this policy had largely been worked out by a representative of the Department of State (Ambassador Daniels) in consultation with the other interested U. S. Government agencies and in discussions with representatives of certain of the claimant countries. Secretary Dulles predicted that we would encounter our greatest difficulty in getting agreement to our proposed joint organization to administer Antarctica, from Chile and Argentina, who were emotionally aroused because their claims to Antarctica conflicted with the claim of the United Kingdom. For this reason it might prove necessary to exclude the tip of the Palmer Peninsula, where the Chilean, Argentine and U. K. claims were in conflict, from the rest of Antarctica which was to be administered jointly by the eight or ten claimant and interested states.

With respect to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Dulles emphasized that he had a natural sympathy with their desire to exclude the USSR from the joint administrative organization and with their desire likewise to claim wide areas of the subcontinent forthwith for the United States. Indeed, this had been Secretary Dulles' own personal position at the beginning of this exercise of re-writing existing policy. Before the conclusion of the exercise, however, he had come to feel that it would be impracticable to try to exclude the USSR from the joint organization, and that an attempt to do so would fail of majority support of the other countries involved. Beyond this, as General Cutler had said, Secretary Dulles saw no way to push the Soviet Union out of Antarctica without resort to force. For all these reasons he had come to feel that the legitimate objectives of the United States in Antarctica would be satisfied if a regime there could be set up which would demilitarize the entire area, because possible use of this area for military bases was a matter of great concern. The Australians were genuinely and legitimately worried about it, and the United States should likewise be concerned; not at what might be done in the immediate future, but what might occur with respect to the military uses of the area over the next twenty years or more.

Secretary Dulles added his view that assertion by the United States of a wide claim in the area would at once precipitate conflicting claims and probably would not advance us very far toward

our objectives, although he originally had favored this proposal also. In effect, the procedure proposed in the policy now before the Council would constitute a UN trusteeship with the interested nations acting as trustees. This was different from a direct UN trusteeship and administration of the area, which Secretary Dulles said he did not favor because such a proposal would involve too many complications.

Secretary Dulles concluded by stating his view that if the Council accepted the general position set forth in the present proposal, there would follow a period of intensive negotiation with the other interested and claimant powers. Our negotiations with such powers so far have been very tentative and general because we ourselves lacked a fixed U. S. position. It would be difficult, Secretary Dulles predicted, to deal with the Chileans and the Argentines because of their nationalistic animosity against the United Kingdom.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles' comments, General Cutler asked him whether he thought it would be advisable to include language in the new policy which would provide flexibility so as to exclude certain portions of Antarctica from the proposed joint administration. Secretary Dulles answered in the affirmative, and repeated that we might have trouble in the Palmer Peninsula area.

Thereafter General Cutler called on the Acting Secretary of Defense, but Secretary Quarles said that it would be advisable, first, to hear from Admiral Burke, who was Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Burke, in explanation of the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the proposed new policy, cited in the first instance the unhappy experience of the United States in its negotiations with the Russians. He next pointed out that the views of other countries having an interest in Antarctica may not coincide with our own views, as had been indicated by the British leak. The Chiefs, moreover, do not want the USSR as a member of the joint group to administer Antarctica. As far as propaganda is concerned, the Chiefs greatly feared that the USSR would be able to twist our proposal to its own advantage and might, indeed, suggest the application of this scheme of administration to other areas of the world. Admiral Burke predicted that we would lose our propaganda battle with the Soviet Union, whose claims were, incidentally, in the Admiral's view, very weak indeed. Von Bellingshausen had merely circumnavigated the area in 1819-20. He had made no actual landings on the sub-continent.

The President pointed out to Admiral Burke that he had made no mention of Secretary Dulles' point concerning the possibility that the Soviets would establish a base in the Antarctic. If they remained there, we would not be able to remove them from this base except by the use of force. Admiral Burke replied that he doubted the practicability of bases in the Antarctic area.

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Secretary Quarles commented that it seemed to him that in the matter, first, of preparing our claims, it would be advantageous to have them ready to proclaim even though we made no claim. Everybody seemed to agree on the wisdom of making this preparation. It also seemed to Secretary Quarles that everyone was in agreement that it would be fine if we could exclude the USSR from any voice in the administration of Antarctica, but we also agree that we can't do it. So we will have to assume that we will work with the Soviets. In terms of procedure, the plan set forth in this paper seemed excellent--that is, we begin negotiations with friendly claimant powers and, after reaching agreement with them, we approach the Soviets. If this procedure was practical enough, Secretary Quarles doubted very much whether the terms that we would offer to the Soviets were realistic and likely to be accepted by them. If this is the case, we would find ourselves pretty well insulated from the fear of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Soviets would gain a voice in the administration of Antarctica. Nevertheless, Secretary Quarles counseled earnestly the wisdom of not seeking any agreement with the Soviets that was not an enforceable agreement. We must plan to enforce any agreement we enter into. This will prove expensive, and the expense will fall largely on the United States.

With respect to Secretary Quarles' last point, Secretary Dulles observed that everyone agreed that there was no likelihood in the immediate future for the use of Antarctica for military purposes. But, as in the case of Alaska, which nobody thought of much advantage when we bought it, Antarctica may ultimately prove to have a considerable military usefulness. Accordingly, if we are to be involved in expenses in the area, such expenses will fall upon us perhaps 25 years from now, but certainly not in the near future.

General Cutler summarized for the Council the arguments which had arisen in the Planning Board with respect to the precise relation of the joint administrative body to the United Nations. He gave his own view that it would be highly advantageous, particularly from a propaganda angle, if the administration of Antarctica could be worked out in the UN and made subordinate to the UN. For this reason, the phraseology with respect to the relation between the joint administration and the UN has been made sufficiently flexible to apply to a number of possible situations.

Secretary Quarles commented that it seemed to him that the time to conclude the agreement was the time when we propose to enforce the agreement, not years before we propose to enforce the agreement.

The President observed that we would encounter a very tough inspection problem if and when the agreement was achieved and the joint administration set up.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy in NSC 5804, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 13, paragraph 14-e, 2nd line: Place an asterisk after the word "Antarctica", and insert the following footnote at the bottom of the page:

"* A certain portion or portions of Antarctica may, if deemed to be in the U. S. interest, be excluded from the area of Antarctica subject to 'joint administration' as contemplated in this policy."

(2) Page 14: Delete the asterisk following the heading "MAJOR POLICY GUIDANCE" and the footnote thereto; changing the subsequent double asterisk to a single asterisk.

NOTE: NSC 5804, as amended and adopted, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5804/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

The Director of Central Intelligence commented on renewed evidence of activity on the Soviet missile test range. [.....]

With respect to the situation in Indonesia, Mr. Dulles pointed out that Sukarno had postponed setting forth his policy statement with respect to the rebellion, from March 3 to March 8. The intelligence community believed that he had done this in order to have his armed forces in place for a possible invasion of rebel territory immediately after he made his pronouncement. Meanwhile, Sukarno has been having conversations with Hatta which do not seem to have come to anything, but it was possible that Sukarno would propose some kind of compromise with the dissident forces.

Meanwhile, likewise, the military build-up on both sides has continued, and this build-up was described in some detail by Mr. Dulles, as was the possible shape of an attack by the forces of the Central Government against central Sumatra.

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Secretary Dulles interrupted to inquire as to the loyalty of the troops of the Djakarta government. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that the Djakarta regime had chosen carefully the troops it would use for the invasion, and that among them would be some very good fighters. On the other hand, he was not sure that either side had much appetite for fighting the other.

The President observed that if the clash really occurred and the Sumatrans had a few good aircraft, they should be able to throw back the Djakarta invaders.

Mr. Allen Dulles continued

[Redacted section]

In the Near East, said Mr. Dulles, a dramatic development had occurred over the course of last night. Nasser was now fully engaged in an all-out battle with the remaining pro-Western Arab leaders.

[Redacted section]

... together with other developments, constituted so serious a trend that unless the trend were reversed the pro-Western regimes in Iraq, Jordan, and elsewhere in the Near East may well collapse, and we may find that the USSR will take over control of this whole oil-rich area. The situation was extremely grave.

The National Security Council:

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
Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to recent Soviet ballistic missiles activity; and the situations in Indonesia and the Near East.

3. U. S. OBJECTIVES IN SPACE EXPLORATION AND SCIENCE
(NSC Action No. 1859)

General Cutler introduced Dr. Killian, who stated initially that the reports to be given by himself, Dr. Purcell and Dr. York were in the nature of informal reports and would not contain specific recommendations. Next, Dr. Killian undertook to explain the main motives behind the development of space technology and space exploration. These he listed as, first, natural human curiosity about the nature of the universe; secondly, military considerations; third, U. S. prestige vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and other countries; and fourth, scientific observation and experiment. Space travel, thought Dr. Killian, may or may not have material and practical values, but the space programs that would be discussed at this time must, all of them, be based on the above-mentioned four motivating factors.

Dr. Killian then indicated that various programs of differing size, shape and cost would be presented to the Council in order to provide the basis for a subsequent choice of a U. S. national outer space program. Dr. Killian, in this context, pointed out the need for a balanced outer space program--one which would take into due account the other great national security programs, inasmuch as any effective outer space program was bound to prove very costly.

Thereafter Dr. Killian called on Dr. Purcell, who discussed with the Council his views on space science and the objectives of space science. At the end of his discussion, these objectives were summarized on a chart which was divided into three time-periods: Early (first years), Later (two to five years), and Still Later (five to fifteen years).



At the conclusion of Dr. Purcell's remarks, the President inquired whether Dr. Purcell thought it would be a good idea if there could be more public education with respect to the matters in his report. The general view seemed to be in the affirmative.

The President then inquired of Dr. Purcell whether the distant planets of which he had spoken rotated on their own axis as did our earth. Dr. Purcell replied that most of them did, but that there were some we could hardly see and could not determine whether they rotated or not.

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Dr. Killian next introduced Dr. York, who, he indicated, would discuss various illustrative space science programs designed to achieve the objectives of space science which had just been outlined by Dr. Purcell.


Dr. York spoke first, using a chart, of the vehicles which would be used in the exploration of outer space. The first usable vehicles would be the IREMs--JUPITER and THOR--with added stages. Such vehicles would be available late in 1958 or early in 1959. They would eventually be able to carry a pay-load (instrumentation, etc.) weighing 500 pounds.

Later on in the process, Dr. York indicated that ICBM vehicles would become available for space exploration. Either TITAN or ATLAS could be used, perhaps in 1961, with a third stage added to them. The pay-load carried by these vehicles would be much larger than that which the IREMs could carry. The pay-load for an earth satellite could be as large as 6500 pounds if fluorine were used for fueling, or 3800 pounds if the ICBM were fueled with liquid oxygen (lox). For a moon-hit or a Mars-hit, a pay-load of 2150 pounds with fluorine and 1000 pounds with lox could be carried.

Dr. York cautioned that even an ICBM vehicle was not sufficiently powerful to get a man to the moon. To do this we would have to construct a very large new rocket with a weight of 1.5 million pounds gross. He estimated the cost of developing such a new rocket as lying somewhere between \$500 million and \$1 billion.

After describing the various sample or illustrative space science and exploration programs, Dr. York turned to the subject of the approximate costs of such programs. The cost of any effective space exploration program would begin at \$275 million a year, and would be likely to reach a cost of \$650 million a year by 1965. Such figures, moreover, said Dr. York, were minimal.

Dr. York pointed out that a probing of the planet Mars, which might be achieved by the United States in 1962, would probably be the first achievement we could count on doing before the Russians, because they were so far ahead of us in big boosters.



In bringing the report to a close, Dr. Killian, followed by Secretary Quarles, stressed the security aspects of the information which had been provided for the Council, most particularly with respect to the final portion of Dr. York's presentation. Dr. Killian

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also indicated that time would not permit him to go on with a discussion of the organizational aspects of a U. S. program for space science and exploration. This subject would be discussed by Dr. Killian at a subsequent Council meeting.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, assisted by Drs. Edward Purcell and Herbert York of the President's Science Advisory Committee, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1859-b, on U. S. objectives in space exploration and science, and examples of possible programs designed to achieve these objectives.
- b. Noted that the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology would make a subsequent report to the Council on the organizational aspects involved in pursuing U. S. objectives in space exploration and science.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

S. Everett Gleason

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