

February 28, 1958

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 356th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 27, 1958

EYES ONLY

Present at the 356th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (participating in Items 2-4); Mr. Maurice H. Stans for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Items 2-4); the Acting Secretary of Commerce (participating in Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Special Assistants to the President for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, and for Science and Technology; the White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 4); the Director of Guided Missiles (for Item 2); Brig. Gen. Austin W. Betts, USA, Office of the Director of Guided Missiles (for Item 2); Mr. A. G. Waggoner, Office of the Director of Guided Missiles (for Item 2); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense Mansfield D. Sprague; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

- 1. U. S. ECONOMIC DEFENSE POLICY (NSC 5704/3 and references listed therein; NSC Action No. 1857; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 25, 1957; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 17 and 26, 1958; Progress Report, dated March 8-December 31, 1957, by the Secretaries of State and Commerce on NSC 5704/1 and NSC 5704/3)

Upon entering the Cabinet Room ten minutes late, the President commented with a smile that national security affairs occasionally had to give way when domestic politics raised its ugly head.

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b) Agency Case NSC 589-266 NLE Case 80-43425 By [signature] NLE Date 7/21/89

UNCLASSIFIED SECRET

REPOSITORY Eisenhower Library COLLECTION NSC Series BOX No. 9 FOLDER 356th Meeting of NSC February 27, 1958

Thereafter, General Cutler briefed the Council in some detail on the CFEP position paper (CFEP 566) and the recommendations of the CFEP with respect to the U. S. position in the current COCOM negotiations, particularly as they concerned the U. K. proposal for a drastic reduction in the existing levels of multilateral controls on trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc. General Cutler concluded his briefing by pointing out that the basic issue confronting the United States in the current COCOM negotiations was whether: (1) to be more influenced by the objective of maintaining what the United States considers to be an effective multilateral control system, or (2) to be more influenced by the objective of achieving a unified allied position with respect to the level of multilateral controls (having in mind the possibility of an upcoming Summit Meeting). He also noted that the State and Commerce Departments, in the CFEP, wished general authority to negotiate downward from the agreed position of the Economic Defense Advisory Committee (EDAC). Defense, on the other hand, wished instead to hold substantially to the EDAC position for the present, and to develop alternatives to the EDAC position only after (a) there had been an attempt to reconcile international differences at a meeting of the policy-level Consultative Group, and then only after (b) a determination by the Secretary of State that further pursuit of U. S. objectives would endanger important U. S. mutual security relationships.

In the course of his briefing, General Cutler also noted the continuing views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the effect that any further erosion of international trade controls must be viewed as "imposing an increasing threat to our national and collective security by virtue of its direct contribution to Bloc military build-up." (A copy of General Cutler's briefing note, together with a statement entitled "Comparison of Present International Control Lists, Lists Proposed by U. K., and Lists Proposed by U. S.", are filed in the minutes of the meeting and attached to this memorandum.)

Upon concluding his briefing, General Cutler called first upon Secretary Dulles, who stated that he was dissatisfied with both the position taken by State-Commerce as well as the position taken by the Department of Defense in the discussion of this problem in the CFEP. He therefore wished to present an alternative position, which went further in the direction of liberalization than either of the other two. Secretary Dulles expressed great doubt as to whether the military potential of the Sino-Soviet bloc was appreciably affected by Western controls on trade with the bloc (assuming, of course, that we maintain controls on certain generally agreed items).

In explaining this doubt, Secretary Dulles went on to state that a nation as strong as the Soviet Union, and one as capable of giving priority to military needs, would encounter virtually no impairment of its military power through the imposition of trade controls by the Free World states. In illustration of this, Secretary Dulles reminded the Council of the widely-held and quite mistaken view at the outset of World War II, that Germany was incapable of fighting a long-drawn-out war.

Secretary Dulles pointed out further that all our U. S. military planning is based on the assumption that if general war breaks out it will be a nuclear war and that, accordingly, it would be of relatively short duration. He believed that our economic planning should be kept in line with the above assumption underlying our military plans.

Secretary Dulles said that of course he recognized that elimination of controls on some of the items presently controlled would help the Soviet Union to accelerate slightly its current rate of industrial development--as, for example, in providing automation more rapidly. On the other hand, this may be a good thing or it may be a bad thing, in terms of keeping the peace. It was quite possible that the more rapid development of the Soviet industrial base would not turn Soviet policy to more peaceful ends, but rather would increase its capability to wage effective economic or political warfare against the Free World, although the Secretary was inclined to doubt it. Furthermore, we should remember that trade is a two-way proposition. When we trade with the Soviet bloc we do not give things away; there has to be an exchange of goods and advantages.

All this was one side of the picture. Beyond this side, however, we must remember that we are obliged to think of the impact of our policy on trade controls as it affected our alliances; not only the obvious impact on NATO, but the impact on other allied countries like those in Latin America, for example. In the face of an economic recession in the United States, with the resultant severe impact on industrial activity, it was going to be increasingly difficult to induce other countries to maintain restraints on their trade with the Soviet bloc when they feel they need to trade with bloc countries. As an illustration, we might take copper. The world price of copper is now approximately half what it has been. This works a very great hardship on countries like Chile and Peru, which depend on the sale of their copper. We would be in a difficult position if we find ourselves obliged to raise a protective tariff on imports of copper, while at the same time being obliged to insist that Chile and Peru refuse to sell their copper to Soviet bloc nations.

UNCLASSIFIED

As for NATO, the pressure to trade with the Soviet bloc would become irresistible if there is any considerable recession in the United States. If we take an isolated position on this issue, our cordial relations with our NATO allies and other allies will be seriously endangered. For all these reasons, Secretary Dulles said he would personally go further than the positions outlined in the CFEF paper which was now before the Council. He would favor more liberal trade policies than this paper envisaged. He did not think that the negotiating position in COCOM proposed for the United States in this paper was sound--a negotiating position which amounted to prolonged wrangling over each item, with appeal to the three Cabinet Members (the Secretaries of State, Defense and Commerce). In support of this latter view, Secretary Dulles reminded the Council of the bitterness which had been occasioned in COCOM by the battle over the elimination of the China differential, particularly on the part of the British. Before the China differential had been eliminated, the British had been in the habit of blaming us for the fact that trade between the United Kingdom and Communist China was of negligible size. Now that the differential has been removed and the trade is still not very notable in volume, the British must blame the Chinese Communists rather than ourselves.

When Secretary Dulles had concluded his observations, the President spoke up to state that in five long years this was the first time that a voice had been raised in support of his, the President's, position on the issue of controls on trade with the Soviet bloc, which for the most part he had considered damned silly practices (laughter).

General Cutler addressed himself to Secretary Dulles and said that he understood that in favoring liberalizing the controls on trade with the Soviet bloc, the Secretary would still maintain the controls on war-making items. Secretary Dulles replied in the affirmative, whereupon General Cutler summed up the Secretary's position as in general following closely the British position. Both the President and Secretary Dulles said that this was correct, generally speaking; the President adding that of course we would continue to control shipment of scarce items, of which we were the sole producers, to the Soviet bloc. Secretary Dulles agreed with this proposal, and added that we would also negotiate the controls on an item-by-item basis rather than on a category basis, as the British desired.

General Cutler then called on Mr. Walter Williams, the Acting Secretary of Commerce. Secretary Williams indicated that while he was somewhat intimidated by the force of the views of the President and the Secretary of State, he still felt that he must make his differing position clear. He believed that the issue was

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

essentially a matter of protecting ourselves by refusing to provide an enemy with items which are potentially useful and helpful, especially items involving advanced technology. He then added that he had four main points which he wished to make.

In the first place, it seemed to Secretary Williams that it was not necessary, as the CFEP paper suggested, to make a choice between maintaining an effective multilateral control system or achieving a unified allied position with respect to control levels. We don't want merely either one or the other of these desiderata; we want both. Our negotiating approach should be to sift the list of items carefully, make up our minds which items should be controlled, and then do a job of selling our U. K. associates on our list.

Secondly, Secretary Williams wanted to ask whether our past efforts to maintain controls on trade with the Soviet bloc had been effective. Secretary Williams maintained that these efforts would seem to have been effective, because of the evidence of Soviet procurement through clandestine trade and activity. So eager had been the Soviet Union to obtain certain scarce items which had been controlled, that there was evidence that they had paid five times the original price of the items they desired. Secretary Williams cited certain instances--Soviet deficiencies in copper have been and remain very serious; so also was their deficiency in hydraulic industrial presses, where the United States was far ahead of them. Do we really want to make our technology and know-how in such areas available to the Sino-Soviet bloc?

At this point the President interrupted to ask what the argument was about. We were all agreed that items such as those mentioned by Secretary Williams should be embargoed to the bloc. The President emphasized that he had never argued that we would simply accept the British list of items to be decontrolled.

On the same subject, Secretary Dulles stated that of course he was not competent to judge the particular items that Secretary Williams had cited. It was, however, foolish to delude ourselves that the Soviets, on their part, do not have some very fine machines; the launching of the Sputniks had clearly proved this. Our previous idea of our innate industrial and technological superiority has been blasted, and properly so. If the United States and the Free World possess a real know-how and a superior technology, we should by all means restrict the export of this know-how or technology to the Soviet bloc. But we must check carefully to be sure that we do possess these advantages. Secretary Dulles also stated that he too did not propose simply adopting the British list of items to be decontrolled. He was, rather, proposing a different approach, and he did not think it very productive to battle to keep every item that we thought should be controlled on the control list.

Secretary Williams pointed out, in answer to this argument, that the United States had already made concessions to the British with respect to the decontrol of various items. Secretary Dulles replied that while we should constantly keep in mind how we could hurt the Soviet bloc most, we must not forget or overlook how we may in the process hurt ourselves and our alliances.

Secretary Williams reverted to his list of points, noting thirdly that the proposed reduction of items for control would surely increase the Soviet bloc's capability for economic penetration of the Free World.

Secretary Williams' fourth point was a plea that if the urgency of the situation doesn't actually compel an answer to the United Kingdom right now, could we not postpone a decision on further reduction of the levels of control until the approach of the Summit Meeting or at least of a pre-Summit meeting. If we decontrolled too many items now, we would have nothing to bargain with the Soviet Union at these meetings.

Secretary Dulles answered this latter point by indicating that the State Department had given consideration to a delay, but had concluded that the matter could not be handled in this fashion. If postponed much longer, the thing would blow up. The Soviet Union knows very well the attitude and position of most of our allies on the issue of trade controls. Moreover, continued Secretary Dulles, he did not believe in the wisdom of negotiating with the Russians on any basis that we do something injurious to ourselves in order possibly to gain some concessions from the Soviet Union--concessions which might well prove illusory.

General Cutler then called on Secretary McElroy, who stated that he thought that Secretary Dulles' exposition of the problem had been very persuasive. The most that he would like to add at this time was that the approach of the Department of Defense to these lists of items would be more conservative than the approach of the Department of State. However, when you added it all up, Secretary McElroy said he did not believe that it would be too difficult to reach a common point of view. Accordingly, the Defense Department did not want to take a violent position on the issue.

Secretary Dulles said that it was his guess that we would probably end up in a position somewhere about half-way between the control list desired by the British and the list desired by the United States. While the lists were not susceptible of a mathematical division, we would probably end up roughly mid-way.

The President said he was deeply impressed with the variety of considerations which entered into the development of lists for multilateral trade controls. On the other hand, if the Soviets

want copper, he couldn't think of anything that would be better for the United States now than to sell it to them. He had been under very heavy pressure by U. S. copper producers. In general, the President added, he did not believe in these restrictive trade practices except on items whose technology was known to the United States but not known to the Soviet bloc. He would like to see these lists taken up in the negotiations item by item for a careful scrutiny. The President predicted that the Free World would be stronger if we in the United States were more sensible about trade practices. The President cited Japan. The Japanese desired to manufacture stainless steel. Our manufacturers of stainless steel wanted the President to put on a protective tariff. If he did so, what would the Japanese do?

In summing up the discussion of this item, General Cutler said that he would try to write out in general terms the desired policy guidance for the U. S. negotiators. He would submit this proposed policy guidance to the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce before showing the guidance to the President. General Cutler then outlined what he believed to be the consensus of the meeting as to the desirable U. S. position in the COCOM negotiations.

Thereafter General Cutler suggested to the President that it would be desirable for the President to ask the CFEP to review our current U. S. Economic Defense Policy (NSC 5704/3) in the light of the changes which were now contemplated in our COCOM position with respect to the level of multilateral trade controls against the Sino-Soviet bloc.

The President reiterated that he wanted a scrutiny of the lists item by item. General Cutler said that this would be done, and that the three Secretaries (State, Defense and Commerce) would agree on which items were to be decontrolled. Such a process, however, would be better accomplished in the CFEP than in the National Security Council.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that the Central Intelligence Agency ought to be brought into this scrutiny of the items on the lists,

After consulting with Under Secretary Dillon, who sat behind him at the meeting, Secretary Dulles pointed out that there was very little time to reach agreement on the U. S. position, and he added that he thought the technique of having all three of the Secretaries agree on the items to be decontrolled, before they were presented in the COCOM negotiations, would not be effective. He believed, therefore, that the decision as to the actual items which we would agree to decontrol should be determined by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, together with the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence.

UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the actions by the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, taken pursuant to NSC Action No. 1857 and transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 17, 1958, with particular reference to the U. S. position in current negotiations on multilateral security trade controls; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 26, 1958, and the reference Progress Report on NSC 5704/1 and NSC 5704/3.
- b. Agreed that the best interests of the United States would be served by liberalizing the multilateral security controls on trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc; thereby facilitating accord with our allies and agreement on the maintenance of an effective multilateral security trade control system. Such system should continue controls on munitions and atomic energy items and on other items having a clear military application or involving advanced technology of strategic significance not available to the Sino-Soviet bloc.
- c. Requested the Council on Foreign Economic Policy to review current U. S. Economic Defense Policy (NSC 5704/3) in the light of b above and of developments in such current multilateral security trade control negotiations.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and with the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence, in relation to the current multilateral security trade control negotiations.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, CFEP.

REPRODUCED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE DIRECTOR OF LICENSING

2. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE SECURITY RESOURCES PANEL OF THE ODM SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1841 and 1842)

General Cutler, in his briefing on this item, pointed out that the Department of Defense was to present a report on certain military recommendations included in the so-called "Gaither Report" for which there had not been sufficient time for discussion before the Council at its January 6 meeting.


The first item to be reported on was whether to produce additional first-generation ICBMs beyond the 130 currently programmed to be operational prior to the end of 1963; whether to build additional launching sites required for an operational capability of such additional ICBMs; and whether to harden such additional launching sites.

The second item, continued General Cutler, was whether to order now production of more than three POLARIS submarine missiles systems, and whether possibly further to accelerate POLARIS production.

The third matter was whether to utilize modified existing anti-aircraft missiles (TALOS) as interim defense against ICBM attack at SAC bases, pending the development of an initial operational capability of the more effective NIKE-ZEUS anti-missile missiles.

The fourth matter was whether to harden SAC bases by providing blast shelters for a large part of SAC planes, weapons, personnel, and supplies.

The report on the first three of the aforementioned matters was presented by Mr. William Holaday, Director of Guided Missiles, Department of Defense. (A copy of Mr. Holaday's report on these three items is included in the minutes of the meeting.) In the course of his report, Mr. Holaday made use of charts which indicated force objectives and estimated fund requirements.



Thereafter, General Cutler called on Dr. Killian for any comments that he desired to make on Mr. Holaday's report.


Dr. Killian stated that with respect to the first and second items (ICEM and POLARIS), he would say that we are reaching a point where it is necessary to undertake an over-all review of our U. S. ballistic missiles programs, particularly in view of the possibility of achieving a solid propellant ICEM (the so-called "Minute Man").

As to the TITAN program, Dr. Killian commented that it looked promising and appeared to be subject to greater improvement in the future than did the ATLAS, the prospects for improving which were not so considerable. Accordingly, it might be better to put our money on TITAN rather than on ATLAS. This question should be part of the general review which he was recommending. On the other hand, Dr. Killian warned that we should not jump to the conclusion that a solid propellant ICEM was near at hand and stake too much on that assumption.

With respect to the POLARIS missile, Dr. Killian pointed out the extreme complexities we were encountering in developing navigation and guidance systems. He also pointed out the very high cost per missile of the nuclear submarine program. (A copy of Dr. Killian's comments is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

When Dr. Killian had completed his comments on Mr. Holaday's report, the President inquired whether what they had been listening to did not emphasize the need for a centralized research on fuels because these fuels were used all across the board. The President said he would put such centralized research under the Secretary of Defense. In response, Dr. Killian pointed out that research on solid propellant fuels differs in important respects from research on liquid propellant fuels.

Secretary Dulles indicated that he had some observations to make.



REPRODUCED AT THE DANGER D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


The President said he had one comment to make on all this discussion--namely, that we were not going to carry out all these plans and still maintain a free economy in the United States.

At this point General Cutler asked Secretary McElroy when he estimated that the over-all review of the U. S. missiles program would be completed. Would it be by April 1? Secretary McElroy replied that the President would have made a decision on a number of moot points by April 1, but not on all.

General Cutler then called on Secretary Quarles for the fourth in the series of Defense Department reports--namely, on whether to harden SAC bases. Secretary Quarles made his report, and noted that the review of this matter in the Defense Department had confirmed the earlier position of the Defense Department that it did not concur in the recommendation of the Gaither Panel relative to providing blast shelter at SAC bases. (A copy of Secretary Quarles' report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

Asked by General Cutler to comment, Dr. Killian expressed the opinion that Secretary Quarles' reasoning against hardening SAC bases appeared persuasive, though Dr. Killian hoped that this opinion would not be interpreted to exclude the possibility of a limited and selected hardening of SAC bases as opposed to a total hardening program for SAC bases. Secretary Quarles replied that the possibility of a special and limited hardening of selected SAC bases could very well be kept in the picture.

Dr. Killian then added that he had a question to put to Secretary Quarles.



The Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization stated his agreement with the views of the Department of Defense that it was not wise to adopt now a program of hardening all SAC bases; but

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE DIRECTOR, FBI

Mr. Gray expressed the hope that we could follow out Dr. Killian's suggestion for a limited hardening program for certain selected SAC bases.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Department of Defense:
- (1) On the status of its studies pursuant to NSC Action No. 1842-g-(1), -(2) and -(3).
 - (2) Confirming, after further review, its comment in NSC 5724/1 that it does not concur in and would not propose to carry out Recommendation III-A-2-d of the Security Resources Panel Report (NSC 5724), relative to providing blast shelters at SAC bases.
- b. Noted the comment by the Secretary of State that the development of U. S. ballistic missiles programs should take account of foreign political conditions which could involve a risk to U. S. security through undue dependence upon deployment of such missiles in areas not under secure U. S. control.
- c. Noted that the Secretary of Defense would:
- (1) Report to the Council, prior to April 15, as to his recommendations regarding the measures referred to in NSC Action No. 1842-g-(1), -(2) and -(3).
 - (2) Keep under review the feasibility and desirability of providing blast shelters for a limited number of selected SAC bases.

NOTE: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

In dealing with the situation in North Africa, Mr. Allen Dulles said he would not deal with the situation in Tunisia, which was rather well known to the Council, but would concentrate instead on Morocco and the rapid deterioration of the French and the U. S. situation in that country. The Moroccans are now much excited against the French, and are getting into a state of mind comparable to that of the Tunisians. Algeria was also heating up again. We can hardly avoid asking the question as to how far Paris actually controls the actions of French military forces in North Africa.

Secretary Dulles commented that we are now facing in North Africa a situation comparable to that we faced a few years ago in Indochina, but more serious, inasmuch as the French are more deeply engaged and enemy forces against the French also more formidable. Secretary Dulles thought the situation likely to evolve in much the same way as had the situation in Indochina. Eventually we may see a leftist government in Paris which will liquidate the Algerian affair. But unfortunately such a leftist government was likely to liquidate NATO as well. Accordingly, we may have soon to make a choice as to whether to continue to support France and Spain in Europe at the expense of losing all of Africa. The State Department needed the help of the Defense Department on this issue.

Turning to the recent Argentine election, Mr. Allen Dulles stated that Frondizi had actually won more decisively than had been contemplated prior to the returns. He had very nearly secured a clear majority of the votes. He got the Peronista vote and most of the Communist vote. Frondizi made a deal with Peron during the campaign--allegedly in writing. In general he had promised that the Peronista Party would be legal, and that he would grant a general amnesty to the Peronistas. Of course, we do not know whether he will keep his word, but unless the United States is able to exert some real influence on Frondizi, he is likely to take Argentina along a neutralist path. Of course, it was possible that he may change views when he assumes the responsibilities of his office.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to a further Soviet atomic test on this date; the critical situations in Indonesia and North Africa; and the results of the recent Argentine elections.
- b. Noted and discussed a statement by the Secretary of State as to the serious policy implications for U. S.


security which would be posed by a possible Communist take-over of Indonesia which might follow a defeat of the dissident forces; and by a further deterioration of the relations between France and Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.

4. SHIPMENTS ENTERING THE UNITED STATES UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
(NSC 5802/1; NSC Action No. 1862)

General Cutler reminded the Council that at its last meeting, and in connection with the discussion of the continental defense policy, the Council had discussed internal security measures to protect the United States against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, including their introduction through diplomatic pouches, baggage or shipments. As a result of the discussion, the State Department had undertaken to study and report on whether, if there were substantial evidence that any shipment entering the United States under diplomatic immunity contained radioactive material, the State Department would be prepared to advise the diplomatic representatives of the country concerned that the shipment would be opened by U. S. officials in the presence of representatives of such country, to determine the nature of the radioactive material. General Cutler then called on the Secretary of State to report on the results of this study.

Secretary Dulles said that his people had studied the matter in the light of international law, and he proceeded to read the procedure on which the State Department had agreed; noting, however, that this proposed procedure had not been staffed through the Department of Justice.

After Secretary Dulles had read the proposed procedure,



Secretary Dulles replied that in this kind of situation we would be obliged to accept the practice of reciprocity.

The National Security Council:

Concurred in the following procedure recommended by the Secretary of State, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1862-e, relative to the use of devices to protect against the clandestine introduction of nuclear materials as provided in paragraph 14 of NSC 5802/1:

If a detection device indicates substantial radioactivity in a diplomatic shipment, the shipment will be detained and the Department of State will request

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PROHIBITED

the appropriate foreign diplomatic mission in Washington to have one of its officers appear at the port of entry to remove the objectional object for examination.

If the request is refused, the shipment will be removed from the United States forthwith. If examined, the material will either be permitted to enter if it is not dangerous or removed as soon as possible if it is dangerous.

Foreign diplomatic missions will not be advised of this policy. The Department of State will develop procedures for giving appropriate instructions to all U. S. personnel concerned with the entry of diplomatic shipments.

NOTE: The above recommendation, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation in coordination with the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

S. Everett Gleason

S. EVERETT GLEASON