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407104

January 7, 1958

MEMORANDUM

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 350th Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, January 6, 1958

Present at the 350th NSC meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 3); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Item 3); the U. S. Representative to the United Nations; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration (for Item 3); the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Assistant Secretary of State Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague; the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; the Special Assistant to the President for Information Projects; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; the Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination; Mr. Robert E. Matteson, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament (for Item 2); Mr. Bryce N. Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

The Director of Central Intelligence stated that the Indonesian Government had apparently decided to turn to the Soviet bloc for the purpose of acquiring arms, although the Government would also shop for arms in Western Europe. Their first effort will be to try to get arms from Yugoslavia, and thereafter from Czechoslovakia or Poland. It also appeared likely that the Rwanda cabinet would try to induce the Indonesian Parliament to ratify the \$100 million barter agreement concluded many months ago with the Soviet Union.

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Agency Case NSC E.P. 260
NLE Case NSC 81-184 #6
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Sukarno left yesterday on his rather lengthy visit to various foreign states. He will be accompanied to certain of these capitals by his Foreign Secretary. A main objective of Sukarno will be to secure support from the governments of the countries he visits for the Indonesian claim to West Irian. Mr. Allen Dulles speculated that Sukarno might be making this extensive trip in order to permit certain changes to be made in the Government of Indonesia without loss of face for Sukarno himself. There were conflicting reports on this point.

Meanwhile, further measures against the Dutch were being planned by the Indonesians. It now appears that they are going to try to repudiate all their financial obligations to the Dutch. Such a repudiation would have the most serious repercussions. The deteriorating economic situation in Java has led to further defections from the Central Government on the island of Borneo, as had occurred earlier in Sumatra and the Celebes.

Mr. Allen Dulles reported that the revolt in Venezuela had apparently been put down and the country was quiet. It appeared, however, that the victorious dictator, Pérez Jiménez, had not yet fully secured his control of the press. There were, therefore, incipient possibilities of further uprisings. The revolt had had fairly deep roots and had centered in the Venezuelan Air Force. The Army had proved faithful to Pérez Jiménez and thus assured his success.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that Venezuela was very important to the United States because of our extensive trade and because of the heavy U. S. investment there, an investment second in size among U. S. foreign investments only to Canada.

The Vice President inquired about the character and prospects of Pérez Jiménez. Mr. Dulles replied that this gentleman was a dictator who was "running out of steam". He had been in power a long time for a Latin American dictator.

Secretary McElroy inquired about the character of the opposition to Pérez Jiménez. Mr. Dulles replied that the opposition was varied in character, although the role of the Communists in this opposition and in the revolt had been minimal. The Roman Catholic Church had also kept quiet throughout the revolt, though it was possible that the Church would eventually come out against the dictator. Secretary Dulles commented that the revolt seemed to him primarily a personal struggle for power.

Speaking of the Afro-Asian conference in Cairo, Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the assemblage had largely followed Soviet bloc leadership. There was, however, a certain amount of opposition to this leadership and to some of the pro-Soviet resolutions. Even

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some of the Arab states had manifested such opposition. Accordingly, Mr. Dulles felt that the effects of the conference over the years might turn out to be not as serious as now appeared to be the case. Nasser himself had been disturbed about the conduct of the conference, and had made some effort to moderate its extreme views.

Mr. Allen Dulles reminded the Council that the elections in Guatemala would be coming off in two weeks, and that the situation was still very confused. The extreme rightist candidate, Ydigoras, has refused to withdraw from the contest. On the other hand, Cruz Salazar, the middle-of-the-road candidate, has now reached an agreement with the Army. It was possible, therefore, that he might succeed in being elected, though Mr. Dulles still felt that no one of the three candidates would achieve a majority and that the outcome would have to be decided by the Guatemalan Parliament.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situations in Indonesia and Venezuela; the Afro-Asian conference in Cairo; and the forthcoming elections in Guatemala.

[The President, who was slightly delayed, arrived at the meeting as the Director of Central Intelligence was finishing his briefing, at about 9:15 a.m.]

2. U. S. POLICY ON CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

(NSC Action No. 1419; NSC Action No. 1513 and Annex thereto; NSC Action No. 1553 and Annex thereto; NSC 5707/8; NSC Actions Nos. 1676 and 1722; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 26, 1957, and January 3, 1958)

Mr. Cutler introduced Governor Stassen, and gave a brief background statement on Governor Stassen's "Proposals for the Revision of U. S. Policy on Disarmament". (A copy of Mr. Cutler's comments is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

Governor Stassen then commented briefly on the substantive recommendation for a revision in the "Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament" which had been made by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada in London last August. Governor Stassen stated his belief that his three specific recommendations for revision of the August proposals would not only have the support of the other NATO governments, but of almost all other Free World countries.

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He also predicted that his proposed revisions would have the support of more than two-thirds of the members of the United States Senate, as well as the backing of most of the leading American scientists. Furthermore, he believed that his proposed revisions were largely in accord with the views of General Norstad, even though these proposed revisions had not been wholly agreed upon in the NATO Council.

In essence, Governor Stassen said that his three specific recommendations for revision of the August 1957 proposals were designed to move forward certain parts of the agreed U. S. position as of August 1957. He said he believed that these recommendations offered a very good chance of initiating an inspection system within the Soviet Union, and were in the interest of the United States as well as of the Free World generally. Governor Stassen also felt that the USSR itself would find in these recommendations an element which corresponded to their own interest in preventing global nuclear war. At any rate, these were the premises on which Governor Stassen had proceeded in drawing up his recommended revisions, and he warned that the United States would lose the support of world public opinion if we took a negative attitude with respect to any change in the August 1957 position.

Thereafter Governor Stassen dealt briefly with his first recommendation for a revision--namely, for the installation of some eight to twelve test monitoring inspection stations in the USSR and a like number in the United States. On a map he indicated the sites within the Soviet Union at which these test monitoring inspection stations would be located. He pointed out that the choice of sites for these stations in the Soviet Union had been selected on the basis of the opinion of experts in the Department of Defense. He went on to point out that following satisfactory agreement on the inspection stations and on prompt installation of the inspection system, his proposal recommended a 24-month suspension of nuclear testing. He added that he felt that in making this suggestion he was in line with a statement made by the President in June 1957, and he also admitted that there were possibilities of evasion of the test suspension by the USSR, although he thought that successful evasions were not likely.

Governor Stassen then turned to his second recommendation, which he pointed out could be put forward separately or in combination with his first recommendation. Again using a map, he indicated that his second recommendation called for the establishment of an initial inspection zone against surprise attack in the Western USSR and Central Europe. This zone would be from approximately 3° East longitude to 28° East longitude, and from 45 North latitude to the Arctic Circle zone. In describing this inspection zone, Governor Stassen pointed out that it covered a larger territory than General Norstad had described as the essential minimum. It also fitted in

with Chancellor Adenauer's statement at Hamburg. If the Soviet Union could be brought to accept such a zone, Governor Stassen felt that it would be an entering wedge to loosen the Soviet hold on the East European satellites.

Governor Stassen next turned to his third recommendation, calling for the establishment of an inspection zone in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, the Northwestern United States and Western Canada. This, again, was illustrated on a map. Governor Stassen felt that there was some genuine hope of Soviet acceptance of this proposal.

Governor Stassen reiterated the point that if any one of these three recommendations, or all three together, were accepted by the Soviet Union, such acceptance would be tantamount to beginning to open up the Soviet Union, which had long been an objective of the United States. Of course, he added, in putting forward these three specific recommendations we were leaving a number of very important subjects for follow-up negotiations. The reasons for leaving these subjects for subsequent negotiation was that, for example, our proposal for the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons would require a most long-drawn-out, detailed, and comprehensive inspection system. Furthermore, cessation of nuclear production in the absence of a thoroughgoing inspection system would not be in the interests of the United States. It took only a certain relatively small number of nuclear weapons to provide the means for a surprise attack. It took a much larger number of nuclear weapons to provide an adequate defense against nuclear attack. The field of ballistic missiles, likewise, was an area to be left for follow-up negotiations after the initial step had been taken. Ballistic missiles required an even more complete inspection system than other means of delivery of nuclear warheads. Accordingly, this was not a suitable proposal for an opening step.

At this point, Governor Stassen passed around copies of a draft letter of reply by the President to Bulganin (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). In this he had suggested ways and means of resuming negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament. Simultaneously with this proposal to Bulganin, the United States could also take the initiative toward negotiations in the United Nations as well as through ordinary diplomatic channels. Also, if the National Security Council agreed with these three recommendations, Governor Stassen recommended that consultations be begun promptly with appropriate members of the United States Senate.

Upon the conclusion of Governor Stassen's statement, Mr. Cutler called on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the Council with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were in opposition to the recommendations made by Governor Stassen. General Twining read portions of the written views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had previously been circulated to the members

of the National Security Council. Secretary McElroy pointed out that the Department of Defense supported the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in opposition to Governor Stassen's proposals.

Thereafter Mr. Cutler called on Admiral Strauss, who said that he would limit his comments on the Stassen proposals to those aspects which concerned nuclear weapons; he would not speak on inspection zones or force levels, in which fields he was not an expert. Admiral Strauss then proceeded to indicate to the Council what the cessation of nuclear testing would mean to the United States and the USSR nuclear weapons programs. He noted in particular that the proposed 24-month suspension of nuclear testing would have rather severe repercussions on our present programs to achieve small "clean" nuclear weapons. While we would be in a position, even if nuclear testing were suspended for 24 months beginning in September 1958, to stockpile nuclear warheads for our ICBM and our IRBM missiles, such a cessation of testing would very adversely affect our program for developing peaceful uses of hydrogen explosions.

After a similar description of the estimated effects of the test cessation on the Soviet programs, Admiral Strauss went on to comment on the effect of a 24-month suspension on our laboratories. He said that the work in our laboratories would certainly lose momentum as a result of the cessation, but they would not suffer a serious setback if testing were renewed at the end of two years as the result either of a failure of the Soviets to follow the rules of the game or as the result of a more comprehensive disarmament agreement.

After reading a message from Ambassador Thompson on the subject of the attitude of the USSR toward disarmament, Admiral Strauss stated that in his opinion the principal weakness of Governor Stassen's proposal for a revision of our August 1957 disarmament proposal, lay in the fact that it constituted a retreat from what the United States had originally regarded as a sound position. Speaking personally, and not presenting the views of the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Strauss said he felt that such a retreat was unfortunate. Finally, said Admiral Strauss, both Dr. Teller and Dr. Lawrence felt that several score of inspection stations would be required to monitor testing in the Soviet Union, rather than the eight or twelve which Governor Stassen proposed as requisite to detect clandestine nuclear testing within the Soviet Union.

Mr. Cutler next called on Ambassador Lodge, who had come from New York in order to attend the Council meeting on this subject. Ambassador Lodge pointed out that he was speaking as one who was in daily touch with world trends in the disarmament field, but that he could not be a spokesman for the technical considerations governing this question. He had to assume that our massive

Page 7 was missing from the NSC copy and was not reviewed. It has since been resubmitted for review.

for test suspension unless and until there was an amendment to the U. S. atomic energy legislation which would permit the British to secure our technical information if they agreed to stop testing their own weapons. The French, predicted Secretary Dulles, would take very much the same position.

As far as the inspection zones proposed by Governor Stassen were concerned, Secretary Dulles expressed the conviction that these zones went far beyond anything which had been approved by the NATO Council, and he strongly doubted that the NATO Council would approve of them. Secretary Dulles also expressed great doubt that two-thirds of the members of the United States Senate would agree in approving the Stassen proposals. Most Americans don't like gerrymandering, and members of Congress from the West Coast would strongly oppose having their areas opened to Soviet inspection while the rest of the country was free of such inspection. Finally, said Secretary Dulles, on this subject of zones he agreed with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the effect that Governor Stassen's proposed zones were heavily weighted in favor of the Soviet Union in terms of both military and industrial significance.

Secretary Dulles said that he must, however, agree that from the world standpoint the Council must consider the views expressed by Ambassador Lodge, together with other significant views on this subject. Secretary Dulles felt that the ordinary run of people in many countries were going along with the simplified Soviet views on disarmament. This, however, was not true of the governments of these countries, most of whom thought our own position was sound even though they had to make apparent concessions to their public opinion. This ill-informed public opinion was undoubtedly important, but so also was the fact that we had taken a firm position last August on the subject of disarmament, had insisted that this position was sound, and had likewise stressed in public statements the emphasis that we were now giving to the achievement of "clean" tactical weapons. If we retreat from this general position sketched above, Secretary Dulles predicted that we would momentarily appease hostile public opinion, but at the same time we would invite a new Soviet propaganda campaign, the essential keynotes of which would be either that the United States is now thoroughly frightened and willing to make any kind of disarmament agreement, or, alternatively, that the USSR had always been right in its own proposals for disarmament and now at long last the United States was coming to admit it. It seemed to Secretary Dulles that this was a very wrong time to make these concessions. This was a time when everybody was looking for signs of weakness in the United States. It was also a time which would provide the occasion for a fresh Soviet propaganda onslaught on the subject of disarmament.

Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that we should, of course, not be rigid in our views on disarmament and, indeed, we had not been rigid. But to change our position on disarmament at the present time, in ways that would threaten the strength of the alliance and which would be interpreted as a great Soviet victory, was an error. He did not think this was the time to take such an action and, furthermore, such an action would be incompatible with our basic policy. Indeed, Secretary Dulles said he did not think that he would be able to maintain a belief in the posture of U. S. strength and confidence if these proposals were adopted. Our allies are invariably fearful of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR.

Beyond all these considerations, Secretary Dulles also emphasized the fact that we are now coming face to face with the problems of outer space. We should now strive to do our level best to see that outer space was used for peaceful purposes only. Much of our energy should be directed to this kind of study.

To repeat, said Secretary Dulles, he did not believe it was desirable for the United States to take too rigid a position in the matter of disarmament agreements. He was perfectly willing to take some chances. We could never be one hundred percent sure. Indeed, he might be willing to support Governor Stassen's proposals if they were looked at only under technical and military aspects, but not if looked at on the political and foreign policy side. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles recommended that the United States for the time being stand firm on the August 1957 proposals. We must not panic. We must not give in to the Soviets under present conditions. After all, it took two years of negotiation with the Soviets to achieve the armistice in Korea, and an even longer time to achieve the treaty on Austria. In both instances, however, the Soviets had finally come round to our point of view, and in this connection our disarmament proposal was only four months old. Secretary Dulles repeated that he didn't claim that we shouldn't change our August 1957 proposals; but he did insist that we shouldn't do it now, and especially we shouldn't do it until the requisite changes in the atomic energy legislation had been assured.

Mr. Brundage expressed his view of the desirability of some kind of middle ground. He felt that some kind of U. S. initiative would be very helpful, and believed that we should not stand pat on the August 1957 position.

The President said he had some questions to put to the Council. First of all, we must remember that we do not know what the Congress will do on our recommendations for changes in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The President believed that we could contemplate the break-up of NATO if we ceased nuclear testing in agreement with the USSR before the terms of this Act had been changed.

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Now as to his second point, the President said he found himself in agreement with Governor Stassen and Ambassador Lodge with respect to the importance of world public opinion. Much of this public opinion is very uninformed in the area of disarmament. What the world wants is easy answers to the disarmament dilemma, and we must be clear that this opinion on the necessity for disarmament steps is steadily growing stronger and insisting on results. Even in confidential talks at the NATO meeting, the President said that he encountered very strong insistence that something must be done to advance disarmament.

The President next expressed his great concern about the difference of views of the experts in this field. There was the Teller article in Foreign Affairs referred to earlier by Mr. Cutler, which doubted the effectiveness of any inspection system. On the other hand, Dr. Rabi was at the same time urging a cessation of nuclear testing provided there was an adequate inspection system. Apparently Governor Stassen believes in the opinion of one group of scientists and Admiral Strauss follows the views of another group. It was clear to the President, however, that we should never make any inspection proposals which precisely delineate any areas we are going to accept as being open to Soviet inspection, because as soon as you agree on a certain area as subject to inspection, the Soviets will attempt to expand these areas. Accordingly, said the President, he found himself in agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the matter of Governor Stassen's proposals on zones of inspection.

The President then alluded to the date of September 1958 when, if the Stassen proposals were adopted, nuclear testing would cease for 24 months. This would include the period when the Atomic Energy Act could have been changed and Operation HARDTACK would be concluded. These two matters are at the moment prerequisite to making any new proposals.

The President said that he had yet another point. Secretary Dulles had spoken of the significance of outer space. Was he talking about outer space in connection only with ballistic missiles? Or was he speaking of other matters, such as satellites and the exploitation of outer space for peaceful purposes? Secretary Dulles replied that the proposals which we had put forward at London dealt with outer space above the atmosphere. The President said that such a proposal would include not only ballistic missiles but also vehicles sent into outer space for peaceful purposes. We should clarify this distinction.

Finally, said the President, on the supposition that we made the changes that Governor Stassen was suggesting in our August 1957 position on disarmament, through what channels would our proposals for change be put forward? Certainly we could not proceed

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bilaterally with the Soviets. We would have to coordinate our proposals with our allies. By and large, the President concluded that this was not the time to make any new proposals. We have not concerted either with our allies or even among ourselves. Secretary Dulles commented that the President's position did not preclude proposals for change in the August 1957 position at some future time.

Dr. Killian read from a report of the Science Advisory Committee's Panel on Disarmament, in which the Panel had concluded that the United States should not proceed with additional proposals for nuclear test suspension without up-to-date technical appraisals made in advance by the most highly-qualified U. S. scientific and technical personnel.

Governor Stassen reverted to the President's question as to the channels through which we would now or at some future time put forward proposals for changes in our position on disarmament. He explained his conviction that if we stood pat on our August 1957 position we would not hold the support of NATO but actually lose it. He also explained what must have appeared to the Soviets as the inequity of the European zone of inspection which we had proposed in August at London. The Soviets had rejected this proposed inspection zone. Nevertheless, our NATO allies clearly do not want us to stand pat on this zone and refuse to consider any modification.

Likewise, continued Governor Stassen, he could not agree with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the inspection zones he was proposing were undoubtedly disadvantageous to the United States or were weighted in favor of the USSR. He defended the proposed new zone, and expressed again the feeling that if the United States did not now take the initiative in proposing other zones of inspection, we could be sure that some other NATO country would do so. Governor Stassen also insisted that his proposals as a whole did not constitute a retreat by the United States, but rather a manifestation of U. S. leadership. It was not only the ill-informed public opinion of the world, but the well-informed people of the world, who are looking to the United States for new leadership. We cannot ignore this opinion, and our national security requires the support of other free nations.

With respect to the question posed by the President as to how we should proceed to advance any new proposals we should decide on, Governor Stassen suggested the following outline: First, we would confer with the appropriate Senate leaders. Then we would take up the matter with the British, the French, and the NATO Council. Governor Stassen said he believed that all of these would support his proposals, and ended with a plea for support in the National Security Council for these proposals.

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In reply, Secretary Dulles said he simply could not agree with the accuracy of Governor Stassen's presentation of what had occurred in the presentation of the U. S. position on disarmament at London last August. He did not care to argue this matter, but he was not sure that Governor Stassen qualified as an expert in the knowledge of what our NATO allies will or will not accept, though, he added, he did not question Governor Stassen's sincerity.

Ambassador Lodge said that apropos of the matter of timing, he found himself opposed to any meeting of the Disarmament Commission in January, even though it was chaired by the United States and even if we were to have a new position on disarmament. He would much prefer to have a meeting in some three months' time, during which period the necessary preparations could have been made.

As to inspection, Ambassador Lodge said that he had never visualized spelling out in a UN resolution what the precise inspection system would be. He thought we would only agree in principle to inspection in the resolution. We would have to confer most carefully with our allies on the size and shape of any actual inspection zones.

Secretary Dulles said he felt that the situation was very fluid at the moment, and that we might want to change our position on disarmament later.

The President said he couldn't believe that Governor Stassen's inspection proposal could properly be called a retreat, and Secretary Dulles agreed with him. Again Governor Stassen insisted that his proposal was not a retreat, but merely a new initiative.

The Vice President said he had a question to put to Secretary Dulles. Supposing that an agreement for the cessation of testing occurs and tests thereafter would be frozen. The Vice President assumed that we would be ahead. If this is the case, what is the explanation of the fact that the Soviets are pressing other nations so hard for a cessation of nuclear tests?

Secretary Dulles replied that he supposed that the Soviets feel they have all they need in the way of nuclear weapons for an aggressive attack on the United States. On the other hand, we do not feel that we have enough nuclear weapons for the defense of the United States.

Admiral Strauss added, in explanation to the Vice President, that the Soviets probably believe that we would not conduct clandestine tests if we agreed to a cessation. On the other hand, there was no reason why they would not conduct clandestine tests and so ultimately they would overtake us.

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Governor Stassen added still another point. He felt that the Soviets were very concerned about the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons into other hands. They fear that if this occurs some other nation will trigger a war which would ultimately involve all-out nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR. Secretary Dulles expressed his agreement with this point, but added that the nuclear cut-off was the surest defense against that kind of situation.

The President expressed the hope that we could advance rapidly in our discovery of detection devices. Dr. Killian indicated that we could not surely detect all nuclear tests. Secretary McElroy pointed out that, as compared to certain other nations, the population of the United States was relatively small. Accordingly, we were compelled to rely on greater fire power. The continued development of small "clean" nuclear weapons, therefore, was of the very greatest importance to the United States. The President commented that certainly we were in the midst of an arms race, and the burdens of armament hung heavy everywhere. We must keep the hope of disarmament before the world.

At the conclusion of the discussion of this subject, Mr. Cutler gave his view as to the consensus, and suggested a possible Council action, which was subsequently modified in part by proposals from the President, Secretary Dulles, and Dr. Killian.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the enclosure to the reference memorandum of December 26, 1957, prepared by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 3, 1958.
- b. Noted the President's decision that the United States should continue to adhere to the Four-Power proposals of August 29, 1957 (Annex D to the reference memorandum of December 26, 1957) for the time being; having in mind the importance, in any further consideration of this subject, of such matters as determining the Congressional attitude to changes in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
- c. Noted the President's approval of the recommendation of the Science Advisory Committee Panel on Disarmament (as summarized by Dr. Killian at the meeting) that the following technical studies be made by representatives of the Science Advisory Committee, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency:

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- (1) In the area of nuclear testing, the following three studies:
 - (a) A study of the losses to the United States consequent on a total suspension of nuclear tests at specific future dates.
 - (b) A symmetrical study of the losses to the USSR that would accrue from cessation of nuclear testing, using the same hypothetical dates.
 - (c) A study of the technical feasibility of monitoring a test suspension, including the outlines of a surveillance and inspection system.
- (2) A study to cover the technical factors involved in monitoring a long-range rocket test agreement to assure that it is carried out for peaceful purposes (such as the launching of scientific reconnaissance vehicles).

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of the reference memoranda, and referred to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, AEC, and the Director of Central Intelligence, for appropriate implementation.

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3. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE SECURITY RESOURCES PANEL OF THE
ODM SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(NSC Action No. 1814; NSC 5724; NSC 5724/1)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at very great length on this agenda item (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting; another attached to this memorandum). In the course of his briefing, Mr. Cutler distributed to the Council a summary of the recommendations of the Gaither Panel and of the comments of the agencies assigned primary responsibility for commenting on these recommendations. (Copy of this summary is also filed in the minutes of the meeting.) Lastly, Mr. Cutler distributed a single page entitled "Comparison of Estimated US-USSR Missile Operational Capability" (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler's briefing, he first called upon Dr. Killian, the President's newly-appointed Special Assistant for Science and Technology. In commenting on the Panel report, Dr. Killian said that he would direct his remarks to outlining the principal policy questions which seemed to require decision. He noted that the Gaither Panel's first concern was with the vulnerability of SAC to a Soviet surprise bomber attack. To reduce this vulnerability of SAC, the Panel had recommended a five-sided time-phased program, the elements of which Dr. Killian outlined. This seemed to Dr. Killian to raise two questions basic to national security policy:

First, is the Panel's conclusion valid, based on its estimate of the threat in relation to planned defense programs, that the U. S. air-nuclear retaliatory force will be critically vulnerable to a surprise long-range missile attack in the 1959-1960 time period, when the United States may not possess a significant ICBM retaliatory force?

Second, if so, what additional precautions should we take to assure the survival of an adequate retaliatory capability in the face of a surprise missile and aircraft attack, including the provision of blast shelters?

The third major question was whether the prospective vulnerability of manned aircraft in the early 1960's was such as to justify the technical risks in making the early decisions on production schedules and bases necessary to have a significant missile retaliatory capability during that time period. With respect to the latter question, Dr. Killian pointed out that the Gaither Panel had recommended a force of 600 ICBMs by mid-1963; whereas present Defense Department plans called for only 130 as of that date. In general, added Dr. Killian, the time-phasing of the Defense programs was generally behind that recommended by the Gaither Panel.

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At the conclusion of Dr. Killian's statement, Mr. Cutler called on Secretary Quarles, who pointed out initially that the recommendations of the Department of Defense for stepping up our defenses went only part way to meet the recommendations of the Gaither Panel. If one were to measure the matter in dollars, perhaps the Defense expenditures would amount to one-half the amount called for by the Gaither Panel recommendations. On the other hand, the Defense Department believed that it had picked out for acceleration the most essential areas of defense described in the Gaither Panel recommendations.

Secretary Quarles then indicated that he would comment briefly on a few of the key recommendations of the Gaither Panel in terms of what Defense was doing about them. His first reference was to the third Panel recommendation, viz.: "Accelerate the initial operational capability of the Polaris submarine ICBM system, and increase the submarine force from six to 18." With respect to this recommendation, Secretary Quarles stated that the Department of the Navy was now working on a proposal which would involve the construction of nine submarines capable of carrying Polaris missiles, rather than the three hitherto contemplated in Defense Department plans. Furthermore, the Navy plan would accelerate the completion dates for these missile-bearing submarines. But, said Secretary Quarles, this Navy Department plan was not yet firm, and if the Navy Department plan were actually adopted, sums well beyond those currently available to the Department of Defense would be required. Secretary Quarles also predicted very strong Congressional support for the construction of perhaps as many as 100 of such submarines.

Secretary Quarles next turned to recommendation 11 of the Gaither Panel: "Improve and ensure tactical warning against aircraft, including radar modernization and lengthening of seaward extensions." Secretary Quarles pointed out that the tactical warning network constituted one of the most difficult areas of judgment facing the Department of Defense. To strive for perfection in a warning network would involve costs going far beyond anything that the Defense Department had hitherto thought wise to put into our continental defense. The currently-proposed program admittedly fell far short of the ideal warning system. Similarly, with respect to recommendation 13, to "develop early warning radar system; meanwhile using interim crash program", Secretary Quarles explained that tremendous expenses would be involved in carrying out this recommendation of the Gaither Panel.

Secretary Quarles referred thereafter to recommendation 17: "Increase initial operational capability of ICBMs from 80 to 600." In point of fact, the Defense Department was planning to produce 130 ICBMs by the end of FY 1963. Secretary Quarles then explained the nature of the problem involved in meeting the Panel's recommendation for 600 ICBMs by the end of FY 1963. He indicated that we had the

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Changing the subject, the President turned to General Twining and said that in all the subject matter of the Gaither report he was most interested in the alert position and in the retaliatory power of the United States. He said he understood that General Twining now had 31 SAC bases. Suppose that we got down to placing one squadron of B-52 heavy bombers on each base. How much time would be required to get off 15 planes under ideal conditions, including ideal warning? General Twining replied that it would take about 20 minutes under ideal conditions.

The President addressed a second question to General Twining on the subject of alert. It had seemed to the President, he said, that the Air Force visualized a long period of time in the future in which our main reliance would still be placed on manned aircraft. Was this correct? If so, the President felt that money expended on improving the early warning system and the dispersal of SAC bases would be money well spent.

Thereafter the President indicated considerable anxiety about the necessity of proceeding to the production of certain ballistic missiles without full testing of these missiles, although he realized that Secretary McElroy believed that it was necessary to follow this course of action. In any case, the President counseled that after achieving the production of a certain number of such ballistic missiles--the number deemed absolutely necessary--we should flatten out the production curve until further testing had resulted in the perfecting of the missiles in question.

Reverting to the discussion of the release of the Gaither report to members of Congress, Mr. Gordon Gray said he hoped that the President had not completely excluded the possibility of releasing a summary of the Gaither report, because Mr. Gray felt that what was being publicly said about the contents of the Gaither report was much worse than what the Gaither report itself had stated. The President replied that he had not excluded this possibility.

Secretary Dulles said that in any case he would like to know what answer to make when this question was put to him on the Hill. As an alternative to issuing a summary or a sanitized version of the Gaither report, Secretary Anderson recommended that an oral briefing of the contents of the Gaither report be given to selected members of the appropriate Congressional committees. Secretary Anderson felt that something would have to be contrived by way of a departure from the usual privileged handling of such reports to the President.

The President, again changing the subject, expressed a certain degree of skepticism as to the wisdom of expending billions of dollars on a Shelter Program as opposed to spending the money on additional measures of active defense.

Mr. Cutler and the Vice President brought the subject back to the release of the Gaither Panel report. Mr. Cutler continued to express his violent opposition to the issuance of any written summary or sanitized version. On the other hand, the Vice President emphasized that what had been published about the contents of the Gaither report was fantastically worse than what the Gaither report actually said. Moreover, most of the recommendations of the Gaither report had appeared in Chalmers Roberts' story in The Washington Post. It seemed to the Vice President that making public the recommendations of the Gaither report would pose no particular problem. Our real concern is with the timetable aspect of the report. It would, he agreed, be dangerous to make the timetable public, because of its effect on our allies as well as on other nations.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the comments and recommendations by the respective departments and agencies on the Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee (NSC 5724), as contained in NSC 5724/1 and summarized at the meeting.
- b. Noted the President's directive that the Department of Defense report to the National Security Council on the feasibility and desirability of particular military measures, additional or supplemental to those covered by the Department of Defense comments mentioned in a above, further to improve U. S. capability to deal with the Soviet threat (especially the estimated Soviet ICBM capability); the scope and timing of such reports to be presented to the Council in accordance with a schedule developed by the Department of Defense in consultation with the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology.
- c. Noted that the President would discuss separately, with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, the recommendation on strategic warning and intelligence contained in paragraph IV-B of NSC 5724.
- d. Deferred, until the next Council meeting, discussion of the comments and recommendations by the respective

departments and agencies on a nation-wide fallout shelter program (paragraph III-B-3 of NSC 5724) and on "Costs and Economic Consequences" (paragraph V of NSC 5724).

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology for appropriate implementation.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

S. Everett Gleason

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