

June 26, 1950

EYES ONLY

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 32nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 26, 1950

Present at the 32nd Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Under Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 1); the Director, U. S. Information Agency; Assistant Secretary of State; Gen. Harold S. Bull, CIA (for Item 1); the Acting Secretary of the Army, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Item 1); Gen. Nathan F. Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, the Chief, Naval Operations, and the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps (for Item 1); Lt. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson, Dr. Albert G. Hill, and Dr. Bernard Kopman, of the Department of Defense (for Item 1); William M. Holladay, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (for Item 1); the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President, Cutler and Dearborn; the White House Staff Secretary; the Military, Naval, and Air Force Aides to the President (for Item 1); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken.

1. RELATIVE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF IRBM-ICBM vs. MANNEK MISSILES AND NON-BALLISTIC MISSILES
(NSC Action No. 1690-g; NIE 11-3004)

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that the President, at the March 28 Council meeting, had requested the Defense Department to prepare a report, assuming reasonable success in carrying out plans for the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which would set forth the relative military advantages of these missiles in comparison with manneke missiles and with non-ballistic missiles assumed to be available at the same time. He then introduced General Samuel E. Anderson, Director of the Weapons System Evaluation Group of the Defense Department, to present the report.

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General Anderson made his report (a copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting). His general conclusion was to the effect that for at least the period 1960 to 1967, it would continue to be necessary to develop different weapons systems, including manned aircraft, ballistic and aerodynamic missiles. The report also recommended a review of the same problem by the Weapons System Evaluation Group at the end of a year's time.

When General Anderson had concluded his report, the President asked if there were any questions from Council members. Secretary Quarles said he would like to add one point to General Anderson's report. He indicated his view that the report given by General Anderson pointed up the need for a quantitative measure of the value of the several weapons systems which had been discussed. While such a measure needed to be more selective in our procurement of weapons, General Anderson had brought out the problems which made such a selection difficult.

The Director of the Budget said he had a question with respect to the continued development of new types of manned aircraft. Were we at the end of the period of spending money on the development of new types of manned aircraft? Secretary Quarles replied that the Department of Defense felt it necessary to continue to develop new types of manned aircraft.

The President said he had one comment to make. One significant matter had not been mentioned in General Anderson's report. This was understandable, because it had not been requested. This element was the total economic cost in relation to the performance of different weapons systems. Thus it was important that manned aircraft performed their initial missions and often returned to perform subsequent missions. On the other hand, missiles, once launched, never returned from their target. Accordingly, this element of cost should be established--at least in relative, if not absolute, terms--because ultimately there was a limit to what we can afford to pay for these weapons systems. The President again pointed out that the absence of reference to the cost element was not to be taken as a criticism. He had not asked that this element be included, but he emphasized that the report had been a very good one.

The Director of Central Intelligence reminded the Council that the intelligence community was following very carefully the problem of estimating Soviet capabilities in the missiles field. Indeed, a National Intelligence Estimate on this subject had been issued not long ago (NIE 11-5-57, copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). A particular effort was being made to try to determine on which of the various weapons systems the Soviets were placing greater emphasis.

The National Security Council

- a. Noted and discussed a report on the subject by the Department of Defense pursuant to NSC Action No. 1000.
- b. Noted the comment by the President that, although not requested or included in the above-mentioned report, the economic element of total cost of each of these weapons systems, in relation to their effectiveness, must always be taken into account, in view of the fact that the maintenance of a sound U. S. economy is vital to U. S. defense expenditures.
- c. Noted the President's approval of the recommendation that the above mentioned report be reviewed and reissued hence in the light of technological and other developments during the period.
- d. Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence invited attention to the National Intelligence Estimate on "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missiles Field" (NE 42-107, dated March 10, 1957).

NOTE: The actions in paragraphs above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY


The Director of Central Intelligence commented briefly on the report of the special UN committee on the Hungarian uprisings which had been released this morning. The report was unanimous and constituted the clearest and most dramatic denunciation of Soviet policy in Hungary that had ever been issued. Mr. Dulles thought it was particularly significant that the report came from five rather small countries, some of whom pursued a neutralist foreign policy. He followed up with a statement of the conclusions of the report.


Mr. Larson commented that one of the difficulties faced by the USIA in publicizing the UN committee report was its great length, of some 400 pages. Nevertheless, USIA was ready to "shorten the works" on all media with a shortened version of the report.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that at long last Mao Tse-tung's speech of February 1957 had been released by Peiping in the official version. It had likewise been published in Pravda today. While the official text had been doctored, it still contained many of the most significant points covered in the earlier texts of what Mao had said. After describing some of these points, Mr. Dulles proposed that the speech would constitute the ideological basis for the Government of Communist China for some time to come. Moreover, the speech certainly indicated differing trends in Communist China and in the USSR.

Mr. Dulles also noted a withdrawal of significant numbers of Chinese Communist troops from Tibet. He believed that these troops were being withdrawn in the face of Tibetan-inspired difficulties, on the one hand, and for reasons of economy, on the other. The Chinese Communists would presumably attempt to win the allegiance of Tibetans by different methods than the military methods of the past.

The President inquired whether the stationing of Chinese Communist troops in Tibet had not been considered a means of maintaining pressure on India. Mr. Dulles replied that this was certainly a consideration in the deployment of Chinese Communist troops in Tibet.





The National Security Council

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to a summary of the UN report on the Hungarian uprisings; the recent publications of the official text of Ma Tse-tung's speech of February 1957; the Chinese Communists troop withdrawals from Tibet; and the situation in Indonesia, Thailand and the Middle East.

- 3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD ETEIOFLA
(NSC 5615/1; Progress Report, dated May 29, 1957, by the Operations Coordinating Board; NSC 5615/1)

The National Security Council

Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

- 4. ANTARCTICA
(NSC 5424/1; Progress Report, dated May 29, 1957, by the Operations Coordinating Board; NSC 5424/1)

The National Security Council

Noted the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

- 5. FURTHER APPLICATION OF "NEW LOOK" TO U. S. DEFENSE EFFORTS OVERSEAS

The National Security Council

Noted the distribution by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of a draft memorandum for the President on the subject, dated June 19, 1957, and the request for comments thereon prior to next week's Council meeting.

A. S. ...

Special Assistant to the President

June 19, 1957

Washington, D. C.

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