

June 24, 1951

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at NSC Staff Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, June 21, 1951

EYES ONLY

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Present at the NSC Staff Meeting were: the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; Deputy Secretary Quarles for the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President (Mr. Boardman); the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating as Item 1); the Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Assistant Secretary of State (Mr. Acheson); Assistant Secretary of Defense (Mr. Boardman); Captain John H. Starnes, Jr., USN, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistants to the President (Mr. Boardman and Mr. Nichols); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Executive Secretary, NSD.

There followed a review of the discussion of the meeting, and the main points taken.


1. TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
(NSC Action No. 1777-1)

Mr. Cutler pointed out that at the luncheon on May 27, the President had requested Admiral Strauss to make a presentation of the types of nuclear weapons produced or being developed by size of yield, and the approximate percentage of each type in the stockpile. Admiral Strauss had made his presentation to the President and most of the members of the Council on Ocean Affairs at the Saratoga last week. At that time the Secretary of State had indicated that he would like to return to the subject for further discussion at a later time. In addition to the presentation to the President, Mr. Cutler said that Admiral Strauss had briefed the NSC Staff and other members of the Council on Ocean Affairs. The presentation had not been made to the NSC Executive Secretaries. The presentation had also been made to the NSC Planning Staff. Mr. Cutler said that Admiral Strauss would now make a brief presentation to the NSC Staff on nuclear weapons, and would answer questions from the NSC Staff.

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Admiral Strauss emphasized that the real danger of nuclear war of nuclear weapons had arisen in his mind as a result of particular questions directed to him earlier by the Secretary of State. Admiral Strauss went on to point out that public opinion in the world today mostly considers nuclear weapons to be indiscriminate in character and capacity for destruction, and that there is a real possibility of inducing general nuclear war. The Soviets under the leadership of Khrushchev encourage this illusion since, if nuclear weapons were to be totally banned, the Soviets would enjoy the great military advantage of their superiority in manpower. Thus, if the United States were to abstain from the use of nuclear weapons we might well be unable to respond to a Communist aggression. It was therefore essential that the public opinion come to understand that the United States does possess nuclear weapons, and that they can be used in military operations without causing indiscriminate destruction.



..... Nevertheless, writes Mr. Dulles, we cannot but worry about Nasser's possible reaction if these recent reverses. We believe that he is still plotting, and working with King Saud and King Hussein, and with some 30 guns in the region.

Meanwhile, President Karam of Syria has been visiting in Egypt. It is not clear what was transpired in the course of this visit. There are, however, indications of further rapprochement with Iraq. With regard to the recent resignation of the government of Nuri Said in Iraq, Mr. Dulles predicted that Iraq would probably be persuaded to accept the office of Prime Minister. There seemed no particular concern with this resignation, and it was regarded as a rest.

Secretary Dulles broke in to comment that in recent days Nasser had grown increasingly bitter, and that he was blaming the United States in general and Secretary Dulles in particular for everything that had gone wrong. This was illustrated by Nasser's article in Look Magazine. Nasser's attitude seemed to Secretary Dulles to be rather ironical in view of the direction of our policy when Egypt was invaded last November, although, admittedly, the prime motivation of our actions last autumn was not to bring about the revivification of the friendship of Nasser and the United States.

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Turning to Lebanon, Mr. Dulles reported that the first of the four successive Sunday elections had turned out well for the pro-Western candidates.

With regard to Israel, Mr. Dulles pointed out that on June 7 the first Israeli ship vessel had loaded at Haifa with little publicity and fanfare. Meanwhile, one or two other ships, vessels chartered to the Israelis have quietly been sailing the Suez Canal.

Mr. Dulles then turned from the Middle East to the situation in Algeria, which he described as very, very serious, with serious clashes highlighted by the massacre of 200 Algerian men and boys by the Algerian militia forces. This struggle has produced counter incidents in the north of Algeria. The situation there was on the upswing.

The situation in Tunisia, said Mr. Dulles, was likewise critical, with an increasing number of clashes between the French Army and the Tunisians. Reportedly, the Soviet Ambassador has stated that he would provide all that Prime Minister Bourguiba needed by way of replacement for the suspended French assistance to Tunisia. While this offer had been rejected, our own Ambassador in Tunisia believes that the only way of preventing the situation there from getting out of hand would be for the French to withdraw all their armed forces within the confines of the island base at Bizerte.

The Japanese Socialists, Mr. Dulles reported, together with the Communist front labor organization, are now planning a great anti-American demonstration in Tokyo on June 25, just before Prime Minister Kishi departs for Washington. The general idea was to hamstring Kishi in his negotiations here. Nothing might come of this plan of the Socialists, because the Japanese Government has been alerted to the situation.

Mr. Dulles predicted that the new French Government, under Prime Minister Bourges-Mauroy, might conceivably last through the summer. The new government was opposed by the Marxists, the Poujadists, and certain anti-Comm elements in other parties. Since it was proposed to retain Bourges in the new government, there appeared to be little likelihood of a significant change in French policy toward Algeria.

In conclusion, Mr. Dulles made a brief comment on the attack by the Chinese Communists on an American merchant ship. The President observed that he should think that the U.S. Navy's face would be very red. Admiral Radford stated that a recent message had explained that the incident was simply a poor judgment on the part of the flight leader.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situations in the Middle East, Algeria, Tunisia, and Japan; the new French Government; and the incident involving the attack on the American merchant ship by the Chinese Communists.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

(NSC 5514; NSC 5510; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea", dated October 12 and November 1, 1950; NSC Action Note 114, 1950 and 1695; NSC 5702; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Evaluation of Alternative Military Programs in Korea", dated January 30, 1951; NSC 5703; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Policy Toward Korea", dated February 10, 1951 and June 12, 1951 (NSC 5707-17))

Mr. Butler tried in the Council on NSC 5702 with particular reference to the revised paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, copies of which were handed out to the members of the Council. (Copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting.) Mr. Butler also distributed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these and other paragraphs in NSC 5702/1. After indicating that it had still been impossible for the Planning Board to present agreed recommendations on the modernization of U. S. forces in Korea, he stated that the Joint Chiefs had no comment.

Secretary Dulles said that the State Department had agreed that at the earliest possible date a statement should be made to the appropriate UN authority that, in the case of Communist withdrawal from the Korean Armistice Agreement, the United States proposed and felt to exercise greater flexibility in the armaments maintained in South Korea. In this point, at least, there was no dispute between State and Defense. Thereafter, however, we came to the second phase. What, precisely, do we do to implement the policy set forth in the public statement referred to above? We in the State Department, continued Secretary Dulles, were inclined to feel that it would be more preferable if we could confine our efforts in South Korea to such things as weapons (both conventional and nuclear) and munitions. It was felt that we should begin to put into foreign territory such weapons as we could. There was, however, some concern that there was bound to be a certain degree of difficulty. In particular, Secretary Dulles said, we had in mind these huge 280 mm. guns, for which it was necessary to use the roads and bridges so that the guns could be transported. It was hard to understand why in the world it was essential that we should have had these great monsters around us and have to advertise the widest use of such huge weapons as there would be heard to have been various negotiations for the United States throughout Asia. For such weapons to Korea would be resented throughout Asia because such weapons were identified with the West and with the policy of white supremacy, quite apart from the obvious effect of such weapons.

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Mr. Cutler pointed out that as a result of the proposed package deal, the United States would save \$127 million in costs to South Korea over a period of four years. Again citing the figures in the Financial Appendix to support his argument, Secretary Dulles reiterated his belief that the savings that we would realize from the introduction of the complete list of modern weapons (copies of which had been distributed to the Council members) could scarcely compensate for the political and propaganda liabilities which would be thrust upon us. Indeed, said Secretary Dulles, he would be even sure that there was a necessary interdependence between the introduction of these modern weapons and the reduction of the active forces.

In summary, Secretary Dulles stated his feeling that the proper way to proceed in this program was, first of all, to serve the notice of our intentions that he had spoken of in the past; and thereafter sit down and negotiate with the ROK authorities in order to determine what we could do to induce the desired reduction in ROK active forces. He expressed the hope that we could induce the desired reduction in ROK forces by providing developing weapons for modernizing U. S. forces in South Korea, but avoiding the high price of introducing our modern weapons as the cost of the Honest John rockets.

The President inquired whether the Honest John rocket was so clumsy and so unreliable a weapon. He added that he would have very little confidence in mobile weapons. Admiral C. W. Turner replied that he didn't think the Honest John was quite as clumsy as he had been depicted, but at any rate it was not a useful thing, and he didn't like it.

ever, we had five or six machine guns in Germany, and they were proving useful, even though they were not five or six years old and would gradually be replaced. Secretary Quarles added that from a technical sense both the 280 mm gun and the Honest John rocket could be described as dual-purpose weapons.

Governor Stassen passed a note to Secretary Dulles, who then pointed out the possible threat of some counter-attack by the Soviets or the Chinese Government if such weapons were introduced.

Secretary Quarles commented that the position of the Department of Defense could be summarized in the following terms: The Department felt that we must move into this situation very promptly if any changes were to be made in the existing levels of the ROK armed forces. Far from wishing to reduce them, our divisions, the ROKs wish to increase their active divisions. Accordingly, it would be wise for the United States to possess a free hand in modernizing its former ROKs Korea with adequate weapons, if we hope to bargain effectively with the ROK Government for their own forces.

Secretary Murphy said that what really interested him was what we thought we saw as the need in Korea. Would we propose to go on spending \$600 million a year in assistance to South Korea for the rest of our natural lives? Secretary Quarles replied that the outlook was certainly not very promising, but that there might be any better course of action available unless some other development should occur.

Mr. Cutler explained that the subject of the ROK active divisions, as set forth in the package deal in NSC 55021, was only the first step. It was hoped that further reductions could be achieved later and, in any event, a reduction by the ROK in the package deal would result in savings to the United States of \$1 billion over a period of four years. Both Secretary Dulles and Secretary Murphy commented that they believed this package deal had a very great significance.

Admiral Radford expressed surprise that Secretary Murphy would scorn a saving of 11 divisions. Admiral Radford went on to state that the Council might be somewhat disappointed precisely that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind in suggesting the package deal set forth in NSC 55021. The United States, he pointed out, has some 60,000 troops in Korea, four two divisions standing on a front line which stretched for 150 miles. Except for the 1st Airborne Brigade, there were practically no other UN troops in Korea. While, as the Secretary of State might have expected, the ROKs were

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..... would eventually stop any Communist invasion of South Korea, the Communist invasion to be stopped before they had overrun the 50,000 U. S. troops. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that defensive forces would actually be in place in South Korea to protect the security of our own U. S. troops and to prevent them from being overrun in the initial phases of a Communist offensive. Moreover, from the point of view of the ROKs themselves, their capital, Seoul, was only 25 miles distant from the front lines, and since this capital had already been overrun three times, the ROKs were only too well aware that it could be overrun once again. Accordingly, the ROKs also would be much safer if the invasion routes into South Korea were well guarded offensive

Secondly, said Admiral Radford, we do not normally know precisely what the ROK authorities will agree to in way of a reduction of their own forces. We think they will agree to reduce their 20 active divisions by four, and they might be willing to eliminate these four divisions which would reduce the total ROK forces to 16 active divisions and 10 reserve divisions. We might be able eventually to reduce even more. General Lemnitz, for example, thought that at some future time we might induce the ROKs to come to a level of 10 active and 10 reserve divisions. But one thing is, our Number One reason for wanting to introduce the 160 mm. howitzers and the 280 mm. guns for our forces in South Korea is to provide for the security of these ROK forces in South Korea.

Thirdly, continued Admiral Radford, he had also discussed these nuclear weapons in the course of his visits to the various countries of the Far East. Most of the military men in the friendly nations of Asia accepted such weapons. The only exception, where there was still a strong hostile feeling toward nuclear weapons, was Japan; and even in Japan many military men and diplomats admitted the vital necessity of an atomic defense.

Fourthly, Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that they could not continue to keep planning along the lines agreed to as basic policy to not depend to count on the use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, Admiral Radford said, there was the vexed problem of the command of UN Forces in Korea. If the United States reduced its forces in Korea much below their present strength it might find real difficulty in retaining a U. S. military command of the UN Command. The Koreans would wish to have one of their own nationals as the UN Commander. And if some incident occurred which resulted in a renewal of hostilities between North and South Korea, we might well not even be able to determine who would be responsible for renewing the war.

The President turned to Admiral Radford and inquired what conceivable reason there was that both our U. S. divisions in Korea should be located continuously on the front line. Admiral Radford replied that only one of them was in the front line and that both U. S. divisions were necessary to defend Seoul against an invasion and a sudden overwhelming of its territory. The Communistic Governor Stassen pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to get allies like the South Koreans voluntarily to contribute to the redeployment of U. S. forces because of the loss of the strategic exchange which accrued through the expenditure of U. S. military personnel. Secretary Humphrey stated that it was at least for him to see why this should be difficult. Admittedly we were in a political and diplomatic; but the United States hardly needed anyone's consent but its own to the redeployment of its own armed forces. Admiral Radford pointed out that the United States would find it very difficult to hold its alliances together if it acted in such matters as this.

The President turned to Admiral Radford at this point and said that he certainly agreed that the United States could introduce into Korea jet aircraft despite of carrying nuclear weapons; but if we had these nuclear capable jet aircraft together with all the other modern weapons in use here, this would certainly constitute a considerable and ready capability ready to use. However, if it was not necessary to inform anybody about this capability, it was not necessary to inform anybody about this capability. In fact, Korea, except, of course, the U. S. also put in the Honest John and the Thor range guns. The Communistic people means that you would have to explain their interest in the whole world, as Secretary Humphrey had pointed out.

Admiral Radford replied that in any case we would have to tell the South Koreans what we were doing. We were doing it for them. Otherwise we should not be able to explain them to the rest of the world during their own forces.

Secretary Humphrey responded in an attempt to allude to the United States maintained a strategic line and a line of defense made up of forces equipped with nuclear weapons. The Communistic side of such a course of action would be drastic. It was difficult to convince him so consistently. Admiral Radford pointed out that in his own view that if in 1950 the United States had maintained a strategic line of forces it had in 1950 it would have been able to handle the Korean war.

The President intervened at this point and said that we would continue to talk about this problem for some time on an end, but he believed that in view of the situation we should begin by making the proposed announcement on the introduction of new weapons for our forces on the ground. In political terms, it was a very difficult way to announce it to Korea, in fact, it was a very

Ambassador Dowling and General Lemnitzer. Therefore the second step was to direct them to go and talk to Rhee and see if they can make some kind of an arrangement for purchasing ROK forces, but an arrangement that will not include the purchase of the 280 mm. gun and the Henschel gun rocket. Admiral Radford pointed out that such negotiations with the ROK were bound to take a considerable time, and that General Lemnitzer was due to leave at the end of the month. The President replied that the main thing was to have Lemnitzer stay over a while. This job was very important for the time being that the Joint Vice Chief of Staff and the Army.

Admiral Radford turned to the President and said he was puzzled about one aspect of the problem of the pending deal. He had himself taken part in certain of the negotiations which had been directed by the President the last time the Council paper was discussed -- the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, etc.. So far as Admiral Radford knew, representatives of these allied countries had agreed with our proposal to modernize the forces in South Korea, and they had actually read the list of weapons which we proposed to send to South Korea. The only problem that had come up in the course of these negotiations was whether we envisaged giving the ROK forces modern weapons, which of course we had assured them we did not intend to do. These allied representatives have also recommended that if the United States determined the course of action to modernize our forces, we should do it by agreement. Otherwise we were bound to run into difficulties at the United Nations. It was believed that the Executive order would be issued later than June 15.

Secretary Dulles stated that he was ready to announce this matter at once, and to make the announcement of a joint plan to modernize our forces in Korea by next Monday.

Admiral Radford said that there were still two questions remaining in his mind. The first of these was that we did not wish to agree to report to the Military Armistice Commission the modern weapons which we send to South Korea. Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague pointed out that the proposed statement, as presently drafted did not specify precisely what weapons were to be sent to South Korea. Secretary Dulles agreed that such precise specification was not desirable, and that what we sought was flexibility. We should therefore confine our announcement to stating that we are sending in modern weapons. Hereafter we will go to President Rhee and begin our negotiations with him. Admittedly such negotiations are likely to be very difficult, but it is in the nature of these negotiations that we shall become involved with the question of the types of weapons involved in the modernization of the ROK forces. Secretary Dulles then repeated his view on the matter.

ROK active forces in return for the modernization of the ROK Air Force and the modernization of the US Air Force in Korea.

Secretary Dulles said he wished to point out that, in a certain sense, the Council was confronted by an entirely new situation in the interval since it had last considered the Korean problem. All the world now knows that the United States is up against serious budgetary problems. We can therefore go to Seoul and demand that we simply do not have the same to maintain his standard of life style to which they have been accustomed. We must certainly follow a sterner line with Rhee than we have in the past.

Mr. Casler inquired whether we could direct Ambassador Dowling and General Lamnitzer to begin their negotiations promptly and to report back to Washington not later than July 1. Secretary Dulles replied that there was no chance that such negotiations could be completed by July 1. He did, however, add that he hoped that General Lamnitzer could be back over in Korea for the necessary time, for we should look upon these negotiations as a truly drastic treaty.

Agreeing with Secretary Dulles, Secretary Rogers said that drastic as the proposal was, it was merely the beginning of an operation which we should be able to conduct all over the world. In other words, at long last we had found our way out of the tunnel with a vengeance.

However, Secretary Dulles concluded the meeting with a word of caution about the rapid redeployment of US troops from overseas, and expressed the thought that, with the development of new tactical nuclear weapons developed by the Soviet Union, the United States might be able to substitute the use of such weapons at minimal cost.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5412, and the proposal submitted by the Joint Planning Staff in the form of a memorandum of June 20, 1954; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted in their reference was rendered on June 22, 1954.
- b. Noted the Board of Chiefs of Staff's report (1) The United States should base its policy at the earliest possible date the annual budgeting prepared by the Department of Defense, in view of the fact that, in view of Communist activities in North Korea, the Korean problem of the United States was growing into a world-wide problem of the United States.

