

407085

August 23, 1957

MEMORANDUM

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 335th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, August 22, 1957

R

Present at the 335th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; Christian A. Herter for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Attorney General (participating in Items 1, 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in Item 3); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Item 3); the Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (participating in Item 3); the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Acting Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (attending for Items 1 and 2); the Deputy Secretary of Defense; William Leonhart, Department of State; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Cutler and Dearborn; the White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (attending for Items 1 and 2); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES

(Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Clandestine Listening Devices", dated September 7, 1956; NSC Action No. 1640; NSC 5618; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 22 and August 20, 1957; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 8, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the highlights of the report of the NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 22). In the course of his briefing, he called on the NSC Representative on Internal Security for elaboration of the problem of clandestine listening devices. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note, and comments of Mr. Coyne, are filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS
E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.001
Agency Case NSC 68801501
88-340#3
2/17/94

TOP SECRET

REPOSITORY *Eisenhower Library*
Ann Whitman File
COLLECTION *NSC*
BOX No. *9*
FOLDER *335 214 Meeting of NSC*
August 22, 1957

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY

Upon conclusion of Mr. Cutler's briefing, the President indicated that he was satisfied with the action on this item recommended by the NSC Planning Board (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 8), but that he had a couple of questions he wished to address to Mr. Coyne.

General Cabell indicated that the measures which would be required to ensure complete safeguarding of our installations against such enemy devices would be both very cumbersome and extremely expensive.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the "Six Months Report" of the NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 22, 1957), the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 8, 1957), and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 20, 1957).
- b. Recommended that the Special Committee be continued under its present terms of reference as set forth in NSC 5618.
- c. Recommended that the Special Committee be directed to intensify its efforts to develop a coordinated research program to insure development of practicable detection devices adequate to meet the threat.

NOTE: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures.

2. RELATION OF PORT SECURITY PROGRAMS TO U. S. POLICY TOWARD POLAND
(NSC 5408; NSC 5616/2; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 30 and August 21, 1957; Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 8 and 14, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council, and concluded with a description of the action on this item which had been recommended by the NSC Planning Board. Thereafter he provided the Council with the alternative suggestions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as follows:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no compelling reason for the suspension of any provision of the Port Security Regulations with respect to Polish flag vessels. Instead, they consider that the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, should determine specific ports to be used by Polish vessels for the purpose of loading cargo being made available under PL-480; and that the Secretary of the Treasury, following such consultations, should be authorized to determine in advance that such vessels qualify under the exceptional circumstance provision of the regulations for entry into these ports. They concur in the recommendation that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security develop procedures for the screening of ships' crews."

Mr. Cutler then called on the Under Secretary of State for his comments.

Secretary Harter pointed out that the aforementioned views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been received in the Department of State until five o'clock last evening. Nevertheless, so far as he could determine, the State Department was frankly opposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's alternative, because it would prove to be extremely cumbersome. He also pointed out that U. S. trade with the Poles would not be limited to items made available under P. L. 480, as the JCS seemed to believe. As for the security aspects of the admission of Polish flag vessels, Secretary Harter believed that these were sufficiently covered by the procedures set forth in the appropriate subparagraphs of paragraph 21 of NSC 5408 and in the action recommended on this item by the NSC Planning Board.

Upon the conclusion of Secretary Harter's comments, Mr. Cutler called on Secretary Anderson for the views of the Treasury Department. Secretary Anderson said that it was a matter of no great concern to him whether the Council adopted the Planning Board recommendations or the JCS alternatives. He said, however, that he did wish to point out that if we limited access of Polish flag vessels to certain specified U. S. ports, we would thereby reveal the nature of our policy to the Communist countries. Moreover, specifying certain ports would

raise obvious public relations questions. Nevertheless, Secretary Anderson repeated that he had no strong objection to adopting the alternative proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


In reply to Secretary Anderson's argument that the specifying of U. S. ports of entry would reveal our policy to the Communist countries, the President pointed out that there need be no public announcement that we were directing Polish vessels to certain ports only. Secretary Anderson agreed that this was the case, but expressed the view that this knowledge would leak out whether or not there was a public announcement. The President then said that he was inclined to feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made a good point with respect to the specification of certain U. S. ports, although he believed that if no announcement were made as to the specifying of the ports, we might avoid the public relations problem.

The Acting Attorney General said that the Department of Justice tended to favor the alternative proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, though Justice had no strong feelings in favor of this version or the version recommended by the Planning Board.

General Twining said that the Chiefs merely wanted a somewhat tighter control of the Polish flag vessels, while Secretary Ferter expressed himself as still strongly preferring the recommendations proposed by the Planning Board. Accordingly, the President suggested that the State Department and the Joint Chiefs take a little time to talk over the problem together and see whether they could not come up subsequently with agreed recommendations.

Secretary Wilson said that he favored restricting the access of Polish vessels to a relatively few specified U. S. ports of entry. We should experiment on this basis, at least.

Mr. Cutler, in response to the President's suggestion, said that the Planning Board would bring up recommendations at a later date on that part of the proposed action which dealt with the denial of Polish vessels to U. S. ports. He suggested, however, that the Council act at this meeting on the other sections of the Planning Board's recommendation, which dealt with the problem of shore leave for ships' personnel on Polish vessels. He said he believed that the Planning Board's recommendations on this point would be agreeable to the Council.



The National Security Council:

- a. Noted the letters from the Departments of State and Justice on the subject (transmitted by the reference memoranda of July 30 and August 8, 1957), the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board thereon (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 14, 1957), and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 21, 1957).
- b. (1) Requested the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) to develop adequate internal security procedures for the processing of ships' personnel seeking temporarily to enter the United States via Polish vessels.

(2) Agreed that, pending the adoption of such procedures, essential identifying information concerning such personnel be obtained by the Department of State at the earliest practicable date, and wherever possible prior to departure of the vessel for the United States, for the purpose of initiating checks with the appropriate intelligence agencies to permit a determination as to the admissibility of such ships' personnel in advance of arrival and that such personnel, if found admissible by the Department of Justice under applicable statutes, be permitted temporarily to enter the United States.
- c. Deferred action on the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board and the alternative recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the application to Polish vessels of the port denial provisions of paragraphs 21-c and -d of NSC 5408, pending further study by the responsible departments and agencies and further recommendations thereon by the NSC Planning Board.

NOTE: The action in b-(1) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, ICIS. The action in b-(2) above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.


3. A FEDERAL SHELTER PROGRAM FOR CIVIL DEFENSE
(NSC 5408; NSC 5606; NSC 5707/2; NSC Actions Nos. 1642, 1691 and 1760; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958", dated January 3, 1957; NSC 5709; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 2, 1957; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 14, 1957)

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted the receipt of the reports by the Council of Economic Advisers on "Economic Implications of Alternative Shelter Programs" and the Treasury Department on "Financing A Shelter Program", prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1691-b-(3) and -(4), respectively, and transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 14, 1957.
- b. Deferred consideration of the above reports until completion of the study called for by NSC Action No. 1691-b-(2).

4. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

The Acting Director of Central Intelligence outlined the background and depth of Syrian hatred of the West. He also traced the background of Soviet-Syrian rapprochement of the last two years,



Mr. Cutler then asked Secretary Herter if he wished to make any comment with respect to the State Department's attitude toward the crisis in Syria. Secretary Herter replied that he did not wish to go into the matter at the present time. He pointed out that the Secretary of State had kept the President informed of all developments, and, indeed, the reason that Secretary Dulles had not come to the Council meeting this morning was because he was working on this very problem.

The remainder of General Cabell's intelligence briefing was devoted to the situation in Indonesia and the Cabinet crisis in Thailand.

The National Security Council:

Noted an oral briefing by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situations in Syria and Indonesia, and the Cabinet crisis in Thailand.

5. U. S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA PRIOR TO CALENDAR YEAR 1960

(NIE 72-56; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Report to the President on the Vice President's Visit to Africa", dated April 22, 1957; NSC 5719; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 20, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council in very considerable detail on the highlights of NSC 5719. He noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the draft statement of policy, and that the report contained no split views. He then asked the Vice President, as the "father" of this new policy on Africa, to make any comments he wished.

The Vice President replied that he had not very much to add,

..... He went on to point out, however, that he sometimes detected a tendency on our part to get out of solving problems by means of ordering further studies. He was at a loss to know what developments were going to change the attitude of the Black Africans toward racism or colonialism in the period of the next thirty months.

Mr. Cutler asked General Cabell if he would undertake to answer the Vice President's question. General Cabell offered a cautious statement in favor of the proposed study as a contribution to the general fund of information available on Africa. This, he felt, was more significant than the study's contribution to any specific policy actions by the U. S. Government.

The Director of the International Cooperation Administration asked at this point if he might make an observation. Mr. Hollister pointed out that on the economic side, one of the biggest problems confronting the U. S. Government was how to provide effective aid to those areas which were not likely in the near future to emerge from their present colonial status. He expressed the view that it was wasteful for the United States to try, for example, to do much in the Belgian Congo, and recommended that we concentrate our assistance either on the independent countries of Africa or on areas which were emerging into independence.

The Vice President then said that he had no objection to the proposed study on "Africa in Transition" if it was understood that it was not being made to provide the basis for determining specific courses of U. S. political action in this area.

The Vice President then indicated that he had another point to make. He believed that he detected a tendency in the present report (NSC 5719) to underestimate the seriousness of the Communist threat in Africa. After all, we do not have to count only card-bearing Communists as a measure of the Communist threat. In Africa, the Vice President predicted, the Communists will clothe themselves in Islamic, racist, anti-racist, or nationalist clothing. The potential danger of Communist penetration he believed to be very great, because the Communists were always in a position to support and take advantage of extremist elements, where the United States could not do so. The Vice President indicated that he did not mean that his warning required a change in NSC 5719.

Secretary Herter said that he was very glad that the Vice President had brought up this point about the Communist danger, because it was a point which he himself wished to speak of along the same lines. Secretary Herter continued by saying that he believed that the statement in paragraph 17 on page 12 of NSC 5719 was too optimistic, and he therefore suggested the addition of language which would indicate that the potential Communist threat to Africa was greater than the actual threat at the present time.

In support of Secretary Herter's views, the Vice President cited various instances in different parts of Africa where the Communists had been effective in securing the support of various elements of the population. He went on to speak of the matter of Egyptian influence in Africa South of the Sahara. The Vice President believed that the Egyptians had already acquired tremendous influence in the Sudan, and would from that point carry their influence further south. Much the same was true of the widespread Indian influence in Black Africa. Neither the Egyptian nor the Indian influence should be overlooked, because both might be used effectively by the Communists.

The President said he should have thought that the influence of Islam in general would be anti-Communist rather than pro-Communist. General Cabell replied that the President was correct, but that the influence of Islam could be manipulated in favor of Communism, as, for example, in Egypt today.

General Twining indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were inclined to the view that the statement of the military and strategic value of Africa South of the Sahara, as set forth in paragraphs 19 and 20 on page 13, played down somewhat the strategic importance of the area, although the Joint Chiefs were not recommending any

precise change in the language of these paragraphs. Mr. Cutler replied by pointing out that the estimate in paragraphs 19 and 20 was a short-range estimate which could be changed in the future. He indicated that the Record of Action might well take note of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these paragraphs.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5719, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 20, 1957, and the comments by the Vice President at the meeting.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5719, subject to the following amendment:

Page 12, paragraph 17, 1st sentence: Add, at the end of the sentence, the words ", but its potential influence is a matter of growing concern."

- c. Noted the statement by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, relative to paragraphs 19 and 20 on page 13, affirming the desirability of periodically surveying the strategic importance of Africa South of the Sahara.

NOTE: NSC 5719, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5719/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

6. LONG-RANGE U. S. POLICY INTERESTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
(NSC 5713; Annex to NSC 5713; NSC Action No. 1725; NSC 5713/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 20, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at length on the contents of NSC 5713/1, and explained the only split in the paper, which occurred in the final paragraph, as follows:

"Be prepared to consider any further proposals by Australia and New Zealand not involving U. S. grant aid or 'soft' loans/* for the progressive standardization of their military equipment on U. S. models.

/* Treasury and Budget proposal."

REPRODUCED AT THE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY

Mr. Cutler then called on Secretary Anderson and Mr. Brundage to explain why they felt that it was desirable to include the bracketed language in paragraph 22-c.

Secretary Anderson said that he simply felt that there was a definite limit to what the United States could afford to do by way of assistance world-wide, and that therefore we ought not to contribute grant aid or make soft loans to Australia or New Zealand. He did not mind, however, lending these countries soft currencies as opposed to granting them soft loans.

Mr. Brundage said that his reason for desiring the bracketed language stemmed from his fear that if this language were now left out, people at some future time might cite this paragraph as justification for U. S. grant aid to Australia or to New Zealand.

Secretary Herter feared that if this bracketed language remained in the paper, our hands would be tied over the indefinite future, though for the foreseeable future he agreed that we had no intention of offering grant aid to these countries, or soft loans. Mr. Brundage replied that we could, of course, always change our policy if events some day indicated that we should provide grant aid or soft loans to Australia and New Zealand.

Secretary Wilson said that he agreed with the views of Secretary Herter, and added that the time might well come when we need Australia and New Zealand more than we need them now.

Mr. Cutler inquired of Secretary Anderson and Mr. Brundage whether, in view of what was stated on page 14 in the "Financial Appendix Note" as to our not anticipating any significant expenditures in Australia or New Zealand, there was real need for including the bracketed language in paragraph 22-c. Secretary Anderson replied that he didn't care very much one way or another, although he still was a little worried as to what the words of this paragraph might mean to officials of this Government who were not aware of the views of the members of the Council on this issue. Secretary Anderson then agreed to leave out the bracketed phrase provided the Record of Action indicated the Treasury's concern. He rarely wanted to be sure that no official of this Government informed the Australians that they could get a soft loan from the United States.

Mr. Gray suggested, as an alternative to Secretary Anderson's proposal, that the "Note" on page 14 be added to the text following paragraph 22-c. This proposal met with general agreement.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5713/1, in the light of the views of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 20, 1957.

- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5713/1, subject to the following amendments:
- (1) Page 13, paragraph 22-c: Delete the bracketed phrase and the footnote relating thereto.
 - (2) Page 13: Insert the "Note" on page 14 immediately following paragraph 22-c.

NOTE: NSC 5713/1, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5713/2 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

S. Everett Gleason
S. Everett Gleason