

August 2, 1957

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 333rd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 1, 1957

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Present at the 333rd Council meeting were the President of the United States; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Attorney General (participating in Items 2, 3, 4 and 5); Mr. Frederick Mueller for the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (participating in Items 2, 3, 4 and 5); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (participating in Items 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5); the Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; Assistant Secretary of State Bowie; Assistant Secretary of Defense Sprague; Mr. William M. Holaday, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Ralph Spear, Federal Civil Defense Administration; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Special Assistants to the President Cutler and Dearborn; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Director, NSC Secretariat.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

- 1. DEFINITION OF THE TERM "MOBILIZATION BASE" (NSC Action No. 1522-h; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: "Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base", dated March 1, 1957; NSC 5707/8; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Definition of the Term 'Mobilization Base'", dated July 24 and 26, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this project (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting). He added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the Planning Board recommendation, and called on the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for comment.

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DECLASSIFIED WITH DELETIONS I.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b) Agency Case NSC FRG-411 No. E. Date 78-11/24/88 By [signature] NLE Date 11/7/91

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Mr. Gray said that the proposed Planning Board definition was satisfactory to ODM.

Mr. Brundage felt that the illustrations in the second paragraph of the definition were restrictive and subject to change from year to year. Since U. S. policy with respect to the mobilization base was already set forth in the Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5707/8), he felt it was unnecessary to add illustrative material to the definition.

Mr. Gray pointed out that the proposed definition contained a new element which had never before appeared in a definition of the mobilization base--namely, the services required for survival activities. He said this element appeared in the illustrative material in the second paragraph of the definition. Mr. Brundage said that some other new element might be thought of next year.

The President said perhaps we will think of something new next year. He felt the concept of survival must be an essential part of the definition of the mobilization base. He pointed out that global war could be divided into two stages: first, survival of the initial blows, and second, going on to win the war.


Mr. Cutler asked whether Budget would object if the illustrative material were placed in a footnote. The President said the illustrations in the second paragraph of the proposed definition were valuable. The elements affecting the state of readiness of essential military, civilian and survival activities must include everything. It seemed to the President that the Planning Board's proposed definition was satisfactory as it was.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the proposed definition of the term "mobilization base" prepared by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1522-h and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 24, 1957, and the proposed revision of that definition prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 26, 1957; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.
- b. Adopted the revision of the definition prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 26, 1957.

NOTE: The definition referred to in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all interested departments and agencies.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY




Mr. Dulles pointed out that the hostilities in Muscat and Oman had more importance than any very, very small war had had for some time.

The importance of this conflict lay in the fact that it might spread throughout the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms. The British feel their prestige is involved and are very much disturbed. If the conflict spreads, it would involve areas with vital oil resources. Mr. Dulles noted parenthetically that no oil had yet been discovered in Oman.

Secretary Herter said he was glad Mr. Dulles had explained the relation between Saudi Arabia and the conflict in Oman. The State Department had been informed that Saudi Arabian arms were not being used in this conflict.

Mr. Dulles then said that the elections in Central and East Java had resulted in a substantial increase in Communist strength. These elections were for municipal offices and did not directly affect the Central or Provincial Governments. Mr. Dulles displayed a chart showing the election returns in detail. He felt that the Communists had gained because Sukarno, father of the Nationalist Party, had withdrawn his support from that party, and that the Moslem parties had also lost strength.

Secretary Herter asked whether Sukarno had gone beyond the point of no return. Mr. Dulles replied in the affirmative, saying that Sukarno had been impressed by his trip to Moscow, had concluded that the party system did not work, and would henceforth play the Communist game.



**The National Security Council:**

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World (NIE 100-4-57); Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries (NIE 100-6-57); and the situations in Guatemala, Argentina, Muscat and Oman, Syria, and Indonesia.

**3. U. S. POLICY ON INDONESIA**  
(NSC 5518; NSC Action No. 1681-b)

Mr. Cutler read paragraph 12 of NSC 5518, as follows:

"Employ all feasible [.....] overt means, including, in accordance with constitutional processes, [.....] to prevent Indonesia or vital parts thereof from falling under Communist control by overt armed attack, subversion, economic domination, or other means; concerting action with other nations as appropriate."

and NSC Action No. 1681-b, as follows:

"b. Noted the President's statement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should arrange consultation with CINCPAC to ensure that there is a mutual understanding of the current situation in Indonesia, which does not at this time appear to require military action (other than continued planning) to implement paragraph 12 of NSC 5518."

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Mr. Cutler asked whether, in the light of the briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on Indonesia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be asked to study the military consequences of Java falling under Communist control. The President said he would like to have the views of the Department of State also.

Secretary Herter said he was disturbed by the developments in Indonesia. It appeared to him that a democratic government in that country was out the window,

He felt it would be useful to have a JCS estimate of the importance of maintaining Java in the Free World. He would also like to know the probable consequences of a division between Java and Sumatra. Such an estimate would be very helpful in enabling us to decide how much effort to devote to Indonesia in the future.

Admiral Radford said

If the Joint Chiefs were asked for their opinion now, they would probably say that the establishment of a Communist government would be militarily harmful, since Indonesia is astride the routes of communication in Southeast Asia and has a great many potential Communist submarine bases. He added that Sumatra was most important militarily, on account of its oil.


Mr. Cutler pointed out that Indonesia might fall to pieces, with Java becoming Communist and the rest of the islands remaining non-Communist. Admiral Radford thought the psychological effects of such a development would perhaps be worse than the military effects.

The President said that when the implications of the situation in Indonesia were under study, we should also consider what we can do about it. The best course would be to hold all Indonesia in the Free World. The next best course would be to hold Sumatra if Java goes Communist. We should also consider what to do if all Indonesia votes Communist.


Admiral Radford said he didn't believe the Indonesians were really Communists at heart.

Mr. Dulles, in reply to a question by the President, said Sukarno's recent desertion of the Nationalist Party was due to political ambition and political immaturity.

Admiral Radford said the Communists have worked through the Chinese community in Indonesia. They had exacted tribute from the Chinese and used it to build schools, and so forth.



The Vice President thought that Sukarno was probably right in believing that a democratic government was not the best kind for Indonesia. He said the Communists could probably not be beaten in election campaigns because they were so well organized, and were able to play upon the ignorance of the people. In his view, the United States should work through the Indonesian military organization to mobilize opposition to Communism. Admiral Radford agreed that there was a good chance of working successfully with the Indonesian military.



The President asked what military strength Sukarno controlled. Mr. Dulles said he controlled the Indonesian military strength in Java. Mr. Dulles added that the Indonesian officers were competent, mostly Moslem, and Dutch-trained. Admiral Radford said some Indonesian officers had been trained in the United States. He then suggested that the Departments of State and Defense make a prompt survey of the situation in Indonesia, in order to be prepared for fast action if necessary. Secretary Herter asked that a representative of ICA be included in this group.

The National Security Council:

Agreed that a group composed of representatives of the Departments of State (Chairman) and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency (and the International Cooperation Administration for economic aid matters), should prepare, not later than September 1, 1957, a report for Council consideration on:

- a. The implications for U. S. security of recent developments in Indonesia, especially Communist political gains in Java.
- b. Possible actions which the United States might take with respect to the situation in Indonesia pursuant

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to NSC 5518, including possible actions in the event of imminent or actual Communist control of Java.

NOTE: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, JCS, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director, ICA, for appropriate implementation.

4. HUMAN EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

(NSC Actions Nos. 1430-p, 1448, 1502 and 1665; NIE 100-4-57; NIE 100-6-57; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 29, June 19, and July 22, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this project, and added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in the draft NSC Action proposed by the Planning Board. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

Governor Hoegh said FCDA concurred in Governor Peterson's report and in the draft Action proposed by the Planning Board. Governor Hoegh felt that this was not the solution, but a solution, to be strengthened and supplemented in the future. He felt it was an admirable grass-roots approach.

The President also thought this was a good approach. He said if we attempted to inform the public on the human effects of nuclear weapons by dramatic actions, we would create hysteria instead of spreading information. Working through the Foreign Policy Association and the American Assembly was a sound method. He favored the gradual approach. He wondered whether we had sounded out the Foreign Policy Association and the American Assembly. Mr. Cutler reported that FCDA had already been in touch with these organizations.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that there was a difference of opinion in the Planning Board as to the appropriate official to make the initial contacts with the Foreign Policy Association, the American Assembly, and other organizations. The President said this was a job for FCDA in the long run. Mr. Cutler said that many of the topics listed for group discussion fell in the State Department's field, and suggested that the Secretary of State might be asked to collaborate with the Federal Civil Defense Administration in making the necessary contacts. The President and Secretary Herter agreed with this suggestion.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the proposed program of group discussions of national security issues and related matters detailed in paragraph 7 of the report on the subject

prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administrator pursuant to NSC Action No. 1665-b and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 19, 1957, and the draft NSC Action thereon prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 22, 1957; in the light of the intelligence estimates prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1665-d (NIE 100-4-57 and NIE 100-6-57) and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.

b. Agreed that:

- (1) In lieu of earlier recommendations for joint governmental-private sponsorship of such group discussions (reference memorandum of January 29, 1957), efforts should be made to stimulate such group discussions under private auspices.
- (2) A gradual, developmental approach should be favored over a dramatic, nationwide approach.
- (3) The Foreign Policy Association, the American Assembly, and other appropriate organizations should be encouraged to take the lead in the matter.
- (4) The Federal Government should not be responsible for developing materials to facilitate the group discussions referred to in (1) above, but the cognizant agencies of the Federal Government should continue to make available, as part of normal information material, unclassified information designed to facilitate such group discussions.

c. Noted that the President designated the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, to make the initial contacts referred to in b-(3) above.

NOTE: The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Federal Civil Defense Administrator and the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation.

5. A FEDERAL SHELTER PROGRAM FOR CIVIL DEFENSE  
(NSC 5408; NSC 5606; NSC Actions Nos. 1642 and 1691; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958", dated January 3, 1957; NSC 5709; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense", dated July 2, 1957)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of this subject (briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).

The President asked whether FCDA, at a previous Council meeting, had not stated that it was making available to builders plans for shelters that could be built into homes. Mr. Cutler said this matter was being covered in the shelter studies.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted the receipt of the "Report to the National Security Council by the Special Committee on Shelter Programs", prepared by a committee representing the Federal Civil Defense Administration (Chairman), the Office of Defense Mobilization, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Department of Defense, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1691-b-(1), transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 2, 1957.
- b. Deferred consideration of the above Report until completion of the other studies called for by NSC Action No. 1691-b-(2), -(3) and -(4).

6. RELATION OF PORT SECURITY POLICY TO U. S. POLICY TOWARD POLAND  
(NSC 5408; NSC 5616/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 30, 1957)

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the Polish merchant ship "Stefan Okrzeja" was arriving in the Port of New Orleans today. He said that under present port security policy (paragraph 21-c-(1) of NSC 5408) such a vessel would be denied entrance to a U. S. port unless an exception were made by the Secretary of the Treasury after consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Cutler said that the necessary exception had been made in this case, and that the Coast Guard had been directed to board and search the "Stefan Okrzeja" and to admit it to the Port of New Orleans unless suspicious circumstances were disclosed. He added that the Planning Board is preparing a report, for Council consideration, on the State Department's recommendation as to granting a general exception for Polish ships.

The President said the FBI should watch everything connected with the Polish ship.

## The National Security Council:


- a. Noted that, pursuant to paragraph 21-c-(1) of NSC 5408 and in the light of NSC 5616/2, the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Acting Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, has directed the U. S. Coast Guard to board and search the Polish merchant ship "Stefan Okrzeja" and to admit the vessel to Baton Rouge through the Port of New Orleans unless suspicious circumstances are disclosed when the ship is boarded and searched.
- b. Noted that the NSC Planning Board is preparing a report for Council consideration, on the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of State circulated by the reference memorandum of July 30, 1957, as to granting an exception to paragraph 21-c-(1) of NSC 5408 for Polish vessels in the light of NSC 5616/2.


## 7. U. S. POLICY TOWARD GREECE

(NSC 103/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "Review of Current National Security Policies Adopted Prior to 1953", dated April 30, 1954; NSC Action No. 1193; NIE 32-56; NSC 5718; Supplement to NSC 5718; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U. S. Policy Toward Greece", dated July 31, 1957)


Mr. Cutler introduced NSC 5718, "U. S. Policy Toward Greece" (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting). After reading paragraph 27 of NSC 5718, Mr. Cutler read the JCS proposals for amendment of this paragraph, and called upon Admiral Radford for comment.

Admiral Radford said the Joint Chiefs merely wished to make the paragraph clearer. Secretary Herter said he had some difficulty in understanding the implications of the Joint Chiefs' amendments. Admiral Radford said the JCS proposals had no particular implications. They were merely designed to clarify the meaning of paragraph 27.





Secretary Herter asked what was meant by the term "atomic-capable weapons systems". Admiral Radford said it would make little difference whether the paragraph said "weapons" or "weapons systems". The President said he thought the term "weapons systems" was satisfactory. He pointed out that a weapons system for air defense might include not only the anti-aircraft projectile, but also the entire system of interception and fire control.



Secretary Herter said that, after these explanations, he had no further objections to the proposal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5718, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 31, 1957.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5718, subject to the following amendment:

Paragraph 27, page 10: Revise to read as follows:

"27. Continue during FY 1958 to support currently approved Greek force levels. Consider providing in the total military aid program for

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Greece for the period Fy 1958-60 appropriate conventional equipment and recurring maintenance costs; and atomic-capable weapons systems, predicated upon her desire and ability to absorb, train with and maintain such systems as are contained in Military Assistance Programs and, if applicable, upon the granting of atomic storage rights to the United States. The United States should review the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Greece and, in phase with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Greek armed forces, appropriately revise Greek force levels in the light of NATO requirements."

NOTE: NSC 5718, as amended, subsequently approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5718/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

(At this point, Secretary Herter left the meeting, and Assistant Secretary Bowie took his place at the table.)

8. U. S. POLICY TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE  
(Supplement to NSC 5718)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the background of the statement of policy toward settlement of the Cyprus dispute (Supplement to NSC 5718). (A copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, together with part of his note on Greece.)

Mr. Cutler noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the Supplement to NSC 5718.

The President asked whether this was not an unusual type of paper for the National Security Council to consider. It appeared to him that the courses of action in the Cyprus Supplement consisted mostly of things the Department of State should do. Mr. Cutler said the Cyprus Supplement had been prepared primarily for the information of the Council. The Planning Board had felt it was difficult to talk about Greece without any mention of Cyprus.

Mr. Cutler then pointed out that there was a difference of opinion in the Planning Board on paragraph 12 of the Supplement, relating to U. S. participation in arrangements guaranteeing the

interim or eventual status of Cyprus. Secretary Bowie said that it was conceivable that a guarantee arrangement might be concluded some time in the future, especially if the United States would participate. State was not asking that the NSC now approve U. S. participation in a guarantee, but had suggested paragraph 12 of the Supplement in order to alert the Council to the problem. He said State would be prepared to amend the wording of the paragraph so that the phrase "be prepared to give serious consideration to participating" would replace the phrase "be prepared to participate".

The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in the Supplement to NSC 5718, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported at the meeting.
- b. Noted the suggestion by the Department of State that the last sentence of paragraph 12 of the Supplement to NSC 5718 be amended by revising the phrase "be prepared to participate" to read "be prepared to give serious consideration to participating".
- c. Noted the President's statement that the statement of policy contained in the Supplement to NSC 5718, as amended above, should be referred to the Secretary of State for his use in the conduct of future U. S. foreign relations with respect to the Cyprus dispute.

NOTE: The Supplement to NSC 5718, as amended by b above, subsequently referred to the Secretary of State pursuant to the President's action in c above.

9. GERMANY, EAST GERMANY and BERLIN  
(NSC 160/1; Supplement to NSC 160/1; NSC 5404/1; Progress Reports, dated July 17, 1957, by OCB on NSC 160/1, Supplement to NSC 160/1, and NSC 5404/1)

Mr. Dearborn briefed the Council on the reference Progress Reports (copy of briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting).

Admiral Radford said the comments he was about to make were his own, not those of the JCS. He wished first to highlight the great reductions that had been made in plans for the German armed forces. The plan to have 518,000 men in these forces by the end of 1959 had been scaled down to planning for 340,000 men by that time. The United States had 250,000 military men in Germany and another 150,000 dependents and civilians. He did not feel Germany was doing what it could and should do to contribute to NATO strength, and was very much concerned by the situation.

Admiral Radford then turned to the problem of air traffic entering Berlin.

He said he had asked the Air Force to look into the situation and make recommendations for the action which the United States should take if necessary. He would make these recommendations available to the Department of State.

The National Security Council:

- a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Reports on the subjects by the Operations Coordinating Board, with particular reference to recent reductions by the West Germans in plans for their defense contribution, and recent indications of possible Soviet or East German interference with Western civil air travel to Berlin.
- b. Noted the statement by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the U. S. Air Force has been requested to prepare a report on possible U. S. actions in the event of Soviet or East German interference with Western civil air travel to Berlin; and that this report will be made available for consideration by the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency for NSC 5404/1.

NOTE: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation by the Department of the Air Force.

10. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM) AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (IRBM) PROGRAMS  
(NSC Actions Nos. 1433, 1484, 1690 and 1743)

Mr. Cutler noted that after the Defense presentation on the missile programs on July 8, the President had asked the Secretary of Defense to recommend, not later than August 15, any missile programs which could be eliminated before October 1, 1957 (in addition to the missile programs which, as stated in the presentation, were scheduled to be phased out). Mr. Cutler invited attention to NSC Action No. 1484-c and the President's directive issued in lieu of approval of NSC Action No. 1484-d (December 21, 1955). Mr. Cutler then called upon Secretary Wilson.

Secretary Wilson read a memorandum addressed to the President under date of July 31, 1957 (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting), as follows:

"The present dual approach to the IREM development program with its resultant excessive cost is no longer justified. I recommend that the THOR and JUPITER development programs be combined into a single missile program.

"I propose to establish a committee composed of three members, one each from the Department of Defense, the Air Force and the Army to consider both the JUPITER and THOR programs with the purpose of properly evaluating the engineering and scientific information provided by the work to date. This committee will be asked to recommend a final program which, when adopted, will be under the management of the Air Force. The advisability of a new name for the program will be considered at that time.

"I propose in the meantime to suspend or cancel the production of additional missiles and missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program. I further propose that overtime be eliminated except that necessary in conjunction with flight testing and for the small amount necessary to take care of emergencies. This applies to both contractors' operations as well as those under our supervision.

"I conceive the new program as costing substantially less than the present dual approach.

"These changes may cause some delay in the program. While this cannot be definitely evaluated at this time, I believe it will not be great enough to be important in the light of the time it will take to work out operational use and deployment of the perfected missile.

"In respect to the ICBM programs, I propose to continue the ATLAS at the highest priority. We are re-examining the facilities and schedules for experimental production, including a careful study of the overtime problem, to see if acceptable economies can be made.


"In respect to the TITAN program, I believe that by reducing the pressures on this program we can make substantial economies in this alternative development.

"I would like to make it clear that the actions we are proposing at this time might be considered to depart from the directions that we received as a result of National Security Council Action 1433 on 8 September 1955 under which we were

instructed to pursue these programs at highest priority and to explore promising alternative avenues of development. I should therefore like your approval for this proposed course of action."

Secretary Wilson asked that the President approve the recommendations in this letter.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the President had previously laid great stress on developing guided missiles rapidly for their psychological effect. The President asked whether Deputy Secretary Quarles and Mr. Holaday agreed with Secretary Wilson's recommendations, and Secretary Wilson replied in the affirmative.



Mr. Cutler wondered how long the committee referred to in Secretary Wilson's letter would require for its deliberations. Secretary Wilson said he didn't know.

The President asked why Secretary Wilson wished to put the single missile program, which would result from a combination of the THOR and JUPITER programs, under the management of the Air Force. Secretary Wilson said that the Air Force was responsible in accordance with its roles and missions, and that originally JUPITER had been put under the Army because of its REDSTONE experience. The President said that when he had agreed to the dual approach, he had also agreed that the force developing the missile need not be the one to utilize it. He still wondered why there should be an advance decision that the Air Force would manage the single missile program. Secretary Wilson said the Air Force would be responsible for installation and operational use, and that the Air Force had sufficient money in its 1958 budget, whereas the Army did not. The President said he wasn't objecting too strongly to Air Force management, but he wondered what would happen to morale if a group of technicians in a service worked for a long time on a missile and then had it taken away from them. He thought Secretary Wilson had adopted the correct approach in general, but still wondered about this advance decision on management by the Air Force.

The President added that the part of Secretary Wilson's letter dealing with cancelling the production of missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program, made him smile,

because he had suggested this some time ago. He had made the point that we should not approve components of production models unless we were sure the missiles would work. Secretary Wilson said that the United States had a "mess" of JUPITER and THOR missiles. The President said these missiles wouldn't be a mess if they worked. Secretary Wilson said we had a missile that went 1500 miles, but it had no guidance and the re-entry problem was not solved. He said we had two versions of an ICBM, one a year behind the other. We were replacing the first before we were sure it would work. Secretary Wilson thought that if ATLAS did not work, neither would TITAN. The President said he agreed with what Secretary Wilson was proposing.

With reference to overtime, the President thought the real bottleneck in missile programs was not overtime, but thinking out the problems. Mr. Dulles said that he had no evidence of anything new or dramatic in the Soviet missiles program. The President said he thought Secretary Wilson's plan was satisfactory.

Mr. Cutler said he understood that ATLAS was continued at the highest priority, and that the priority of TITAN was reduced. Secretary Wilson asked whether Admiral Strauss agreed with the recommendations in his letter, and Admiral Strauss replied in the affirmative.

The National Security Council:

Noted the President's approval of the following recommendations by the Secretary of Defense presented at the meeting:

- a. That the THOR and JUPITER development programs be combined into a single missile program.
- b. That a committee composed of one member each from the Departments of Defense, the Air Force and the Army, consider both the THOR and JUPITER programs and, after evaluating the engineering and scientific information available to date, recommend such final single missile program, to be under the management of the Air Force; with a report thereon by the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council not later than October 1, 1957.
- c. Meanwhile, as to the THOR and JUPITER programs:
  - (1) Suspend or cancel the production of additional missiles and missile components beyond those necessary for a continuing test program; and

(2) Eliminate overtime except that necessary in connection with flight testing and to take care of emergencies.

- d. Recognize that, while the actions in a, b and c above may cause some delay in the IREM development program, such delay is not expected to be significant in the light of the time required to accomplish operational use and deployment of a perfected missile.
- e. Continue the ATLAS program at the highest priority; re-examining the facilities and schedules for experimental production, including a careful study of the overtime problem, to see if acceptable economies can be made.
- f. Reduce the priorities on the TITAN program in an effort to make substantial economies in this alternative development.

NOTE: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.

MARION W. BOGGS  
Director  
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