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The President & his Administration feel that the country is approaching a crisis with regard to the continuation of atomic tests or anything like the present course. With regard to the widely disseminated arguments against further tests which are in general unsound, there is widespread uncertainty in the country over the prospect of constantly increasing radioactive fallout, and many scientists share this feeling. The statements of the President regarding a possible change of policy after the completion of the present series of tests make it important in our view to explain that a statement should be issued before the end of that series, indicating that hereafter we are willing to restrict our tests so that fallout will be sharply reduced.

In no opinion the level of restriction which the Commission could offer with a prospect of winning over a substantial part of the sincere opposition would be to say that hereafter the great bulk of our tests would be carried out underground, with no fall-out production, and that tests in an above ground phase would be limited so that the maximum fission yield from the tests of the first or second January year would not exceed a megaton per year. The Russians would need to accept a similar limitation. If they did not, and we did then cooperate, we would reduce the addition



to potential fall-out to between 10 and 20% of the average annual addition resulting from the tests during the next 10 years. What is more important, in view of the state of radioactive decay, etc., we would actually not increase the total amount of potential radioactive fallout beyond that prevailing this summer.

Admittedly the policing of that agreement would not be easy, but an international inspection agency could be created which could determine compliance fairly accurately for each side. And, as a matter of fact, such a policy would penalize us so much that we might continue it for some time even if Russia did not reciprocate. Actually, the only tests of any size and importance which our people could not be carried out underground, would be in connection with the development of anti-missiles and some "Hoseback" tests.

While a majority of the Committee recommends that the first proposal be the one made, it would be desirable to go still further if necessary and eliminate all the proposals during a period of, say, two years. This would make it much harder for us to develop anti-missile missiles. It would also prevent testing some types of weapons as "ditch-digger" unless special exceptions were made for the type of tests under international inspection. Such an exception could not be too easily obtained, especially on small weapons, and would probably be avoided by the Russians unless there



were extensive policy debate. Meeting of 1950s practically eliminate any additional effort out during the period the agreement was effective.

The Committee is unanimously agreed that to go any farther than this in the restriction of rights would seriously endanger the security of the United States.

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