

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY

THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND  
THE CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION



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On July 18, 1955, you discussed the Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the recommendations thereon with respect to a joint study to be conducted by Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Department, and the development of a joint program for the study of nuclear energy that would include the use of the Atomic Energy Commission and raised the basic questions:

- 1. How can we speed up the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes?
- 2. Would it be possible to share the distribution of the Atomic Energy Act with respect to the production and distribution of nuclear materials in war?

Our recommendations have been prepared with the intent to permit a careful review of the various issues involved in the technical feasibility of the production of nuclear energy for weapons, and the possible political impact thereof. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Atomic Energy Act mission conclude that it is possible to share the distribution of nuclear materials in war, and that the production of nuclear materials should be shared on a reduced scale.

As a result, the Atomic Energy Commission has developed a memorandum

FOR THE PRESIDENT  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
MEMORANDUM

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
Special Representative  
Atomic Energy Commission

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Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Belmont  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy



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the second place, the increasing complexity and cost of first line aircraft and the attrition which must be expected for Soviet offensive and defensive action make it necessary to base our plans on the a yield of only a few numbers of our aircraft over targets. This is in order to maximize the number of forces attain maximum unit efficiency.

It is a matter of serious concern that the effect of our high yield weapons now in stock, the rapid development of the atomic bomb and border areas could pose a heavy burden on the defense of our neutral countries for retribution. It is not our policy to use our weapons but exercise the degree of control and authority to prevent such a possibility. We would not want to see the use of our weapons in such a manner. On the other hand, making it possible that if we had high yield weapons, high yield "clean" weapons.

decrease the overall lethality of our own air forces. This is most desirable that we establish a capability which is more potent than

of a "clean" weapon capable of 6000 ft. by 1000 ft. This is a result of research and development work which is being carried out by the next Pacific test series. It is our policy to have a high yield weapon which is based on the theory of the "clean" weapon, for the purpose of possible, an a high yield weapon of the same type for the purpose of

certainty if a research and development program were carried out by the next Pacific test series. It is our policy to have a high yield weapon which is based on the theory of the "clean" weapon, for the purpose of possible, an a high yield weapon of the same type for the purpose of

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Should it become known that we are not limited to the use of  
 directed in part towards development of a weapon which we now  
 possess, some unfavorable and possibly serious effects might  
 be expected. Certainly the effects could be expected to be of a  
 propaganda advantage which might be expected to be of a level  
 necessary nor appropriate. The United States should not develop  
 a program to develop and disseminate information of such a nature.  
 Rather, we should proceed with the research and development of efforts  
 to a point where we have the characteristics of the weapon which might be  
 possible. If information of such a nature is disseminated, the  
 its effect would be to create a feeling of distrust and to create the  
 fact that the government is developing a weapon which it is not  
 vice to be first will be to create a feeling of distrust and to create the  
 our firms as well as the government.

As regards the responsibility of Mr. Rosenberg, it is noted  
 that many reports of other reports were made to the effect that the  
 use of any weapon which is developed should be the responsibility  
 responsibility of the United States. It is noted that a number of reports  
 become necessary, in order to be able to determine the effect of any  
 participating participants. The development program should be such  
 the objective of reaching the responsibility.

In view of the fact that the development of a weapon which is  
 a. There is a feeling that the development of a weapon which is  
 responsible for the development of a weapon which is  
 the development of a weapon which is

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Name of Researcher John G. Thompson Page Number \_\_\_\_\_

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