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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

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August 11, 1954

NOTE BY THE OCB STAFF REPRESENTATIVE



SUBJECT: Guidance on Soviet Nuclear Detonations

In response to the decision of the Working Group at the meeting on August 5, 1954, the enclosed guidance on nuclear detection is re-circulated for consideration at the next meeting, Thursday, August 12, 10 a.m., Room 7258 New State

Richard Hirsch
Richard Hirsch
OCB Staff Representative

See back for...

DISTRIBUTION

Enclosure:

Draft Guidance on Nuclear Detection, dtd May 11, 1954. (NOTE: This document was previously circulated under note of May 27, 1954.)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Headquarters United States Air Force
Washington 25, D.C.

10-10-54



SUBJECT: Guidance on Nuclear Detonation

1. The OCB Working Group has asked that a statement be prepared to guide releases by the United States Government on detected Soviet nuclear explosives.

2. Announcements concerning entirely new types of weapons or those involving radically different and improved techniques should be made, whether they be Soviet, U.S., British or the achievement of some other power. These announcements should be governed by the following conditions:

a. Timing: It is important that announcements not be made merely for the sake of informing the public, here and abroad. In the case of a new energy device, the release should be withheld until it can be neutralized insofar as possible by an accompanying statement about progress in the U.S. program, or release of necessary counter measures suitable to deal with the Soviet device. This should not be done at the price of fostering doubt about U.S. strengths and weaknesses, however.

b. Sources of Intelligence: Releases about the Soviet devices, or additional detonations, should be carefully treated if they involve new techniques of detection. It is important, at all times, to protect the source of our intelligence, particularly those involving new techniques.

c. Joint Announcements: Every consideration should be made to have the nations of the Free World, notably the British and other Commonwealth governments and possibly those of all the U.S. in the release of such information. The use of indigenous governments in announcing atomic developments would tend to alleviate Soviet attempts to depict the U.S. to our allies and the neutral nations as an imperialist power motivated by intent of nuclear destruction of the rest of the world.

d. Unilateral Announcements: If the U.S. is to make the announcement alone because of urgent domestic requirements...

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reasons, it should be made by the Director of Central Intelligence and not by the President, Vice President, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, or any Cabinet member.

3. With respect to further routine Soviet detonations, these should be made en bloc. It is suggested that a semi-annual statement, perhaps prepared jointly by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Director of Central Intelligence, summarizing what the U.S. (and the British, etc.) have detonated so many bombs for test purposes, and that the Soviets (and later certain of the Chinese) have done so, have conducted so many experiments, etc.

/s/ Stefan T. Posner

STEFAN T. POSNER

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