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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 29, 1954

STAFF STUDY

SUBJECT: Coordinating Information and Timing of Statements
in Nuclear Energy and Related Fields

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate recommendations with regard to overall coordination of public statements, information and timing of projects relative to the question of nuclear energy, particularly as to the extent of responsibility in these fields and as to which of any additional agencies the Board or other agencies might be charged with up to the date.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. OCB Responsibilities under Executive Order 10483 - The Board of Executive Order 10483 provides for two types of OCB actions:

a. Subparagraph (1) which deals with actions assigned to OCB by NSC, charges the Board with "advising, and coordinating concerned" respecting "the execution of each security action and that it will make its full contribution to the attainment of the United States security objectives and of the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world." In recognition of this function, the NSC recently assigned two actions to the OCB in the general nuclear energy field:

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- (1) NSC Action 1074 charges the OCB with advising the Council with respect to the timing of release of the Ivy Film.
 - (2) NSC Action 1061 charged OCB with coordinating the timing of the public announcement of the nation-wide Civil Defense Exercise, as well as the general lines to be taken by publicity about it.

b. A second responsibility of OCB stems from subparagraph (2) of Section 2 of Executive Order 10453 which provides that "this group shall initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunities and changes in the situation." In fulfillment of this function, the OCB, by action of December 1, 1955, authorized a program for the domestic and international information program in support of the President's Cold speech. This group includes representatives of the AEC and FCDA.

c. Subparagraph (2) of Section 2, cited above, provides that the OCB can make recommendations to the NSC staff regarding projects and related projects, which have not been officially referred to the Council, but which may affect national security. Projects have been assigned to OCB by the NSC staff.

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d. OCB's interest responsibility for clearing official statements authorized by the Atomic Energy Commission. On February 14, 1954, the OCB Staff Representative on Nuclear Weapons, charged officials of the Executive Branch with clearing nuclear weapons statements with the Chairman AEC, and charges the latter with clearing intelligence aspects with the Director of CIA, and foreign relation aspects with State. In two recent instances, the Chairman AEC has sought the advice of the OCB with respect to timing and content of official statements on nuclear weapons. By letter to the OCB Staff Representative of February 14, 1954, the Chairman AEC, a member requested OCB approval of the timing of the announcement of the United States Force Seven, and by letter to the OCB Staff Representative on March 1, 1954, requested public reporting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report on the OCB Staff Representative AEC stated:

"The ultimate decisions on whether to use nuclear materials, how to adopt them, and what timing to release in issuance, if it should be found desirable, must of course be made in the light of the judgments that may be assembled by the Operations Coordinating Board."

3. Additional Major Actions Recently Assigned for Completion

a. A number of major public statements with regard to the application of atomic energy, international exchange of technology, and exchange of weapons with NATO allies, and in connection with the forthcoming hearings on amendments of the Atomic Energy Act. These hearings are presently scheduled for April.

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b. The FCDA has developed a statement with major planning assumptions for the fiscal year 1955 which it wishes to release for use by state and local Civil Defense organizations. These assumptions include a considerable amount of significant data with respect to the effect of nuclear weapons, targets destruction, etc.

c. A number of additional actions and public statements will need to be developed with respect to OMA's annual report, 1954, exchange of Civil Defense information with friendly countries, and public information developed through the OMA will request for civil defense measures (industrial dispersion, dispersal of factories, etc.). These actions may have important aspects affecting the United States and its overseas, depending principally upon their content and timing in relation to other significant overseas developments.

4. Major Responsibilities for Actions Cited Above

a. The FCDA under authority of the Atomic Energy Act, 1946, is to disseminate appropriate Civil Defense information, and to coordinate such

b. The AEC under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is to make available to Congress and the public information and reports with respect to atomic energy.

c. The OMA, under authority of the National Security Council Reorganization Plan No. 2, has been authorized to coordinate and non-military defense measures. It is to provide public information and such measures.

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d. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission is to coordinate programs for the disclosure of atomic energy information to friendly countries. In carrying out this responsibility he operates through various agency channels depending upon the purpose involved.

DISCUSSION

5. NSC Actions 1045 and 1061, and the ABC Letters of 29 February and 1 March 1954, cited above, acknowledge the US's interests in the nuclear energy field. As precedents they suggest that the NSC should instruct the AEC to advise with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Director of the FCMA on the timing, and content of presentation of such programs as may significantly affect the US's role of nuclear power which the United States is seeking to maintain through such programs as outlined in those previously cited, logically would include:

- a. the timing of disclosure of information regarding nuclear energy in NSC/1, disclosure of classified information to allied countries;
 - b. manner and timing of release of papers relating to public officials, and information relating to disclosure nuclear weapons;
 - c. domestic nuclear power, ground publications;
 - d. military applications reports of US military agents, and non-military applications reports of US military agents.
- Defense unclassified reports.

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6. In addition, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, coordinated by the Office of Defense Intelligence, clearly defined OCB's responsibilities in the area of foreign climate of opinion, the OCB should make explicit the primary coordinating role of OCB, and the advisory role of OCB with respect to the timing of projects and any release of information of significance to foreign climate of opinion.

CONCLUSIONS

7. In the discharge of its functions of coordinating the timing and execution of the programs affecting the national security, the Operations Coordinating Board has the clear responsibility of:

- a. Formulating the general chronological schedule of projects which should be taken into account by agencies of the Department of Defense Branch in the execution of programs affecting the national security in this problem.
- b. Proposing particular operations designed to produce specific results of significance to foreign climate of opinion which supports the national security. Such proposals should serve as a guide to the administration of the operations done to achieve a desirable and desirable result. The OCB should and as definite projects, and as a guide to the administration of the operations by its member agencies, and as a guide to the administration of the operations by the Council for executive, administrative operations.

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8. Climate of opinion as such does not formulated by the NSC should guide all government actions in the sphere of nuclear energy and related projects which are capable of significant overseas impact. However, since there are many other significant factors which might militate against a program which seems desirable from a climate of opinion standpoint, the NSC must exercise judgments in balancing our domestic versus international political objectives.

9. Review of the NSC program assigned to OSI, NSC program assigned to the AEC, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the various obligations imposed upon departments and agencies by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) and Public Law 920 (FCMA) indicates that significant gaps in coordinated operational control exist in the area of information gathering and in timing of, nuclear energy projects and related matters. It is further evident that the OCE, as a principal operational control mechanism of the National Security Council, should, in the execution of its duties, in this position world-wide, take notice of those that may be detrimental to the detriment of national policy.

RECOMMENDATION

10. It is recommended that the operations coordinating committee

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a. Inform the NSC with respect to (CB responsibilities for the timing of projects and coordination of information in the field of nuclear energy and related projects, that:

"The OCB interest and concern is primarily to assure maximum foreign support of the U.S. international position with respect to national policies, programs and objectives. The OCB should therefore be in a position to express its views with respect to important statements and the timing of actions in the field of nuclear energy which may have significant bearing on overseas programs."

"Inasmuch as the OCB interest is primarily in the foreign field as indicated above, it should not be the final authority for balancing domestic considerations against overseas considerations with respect to actions and statements in the field of nuclear energy. The OCB will notify the NSC whenever such conflict of interests appear to exist."

"The OCB will develop a statement of guiding policy considerations involved in statements and actions with respect to nuclear energy and related problems. This statement would be designed to provide guidance with respect to sensitive problems in the foreign field of opinion field and related to nuclear energy programs."



b. Request the NSC to issue the following recommendations:


"In order to coordinate the manner and timing of
release of public information *and the timing of projects*
which may affect the international security interests of
the United States, the Operations Coordinating Board should
advise with the several agencies concerned with respect to
the advisability and timing of public releases of information,
official statements and approval of Department of Defense
information plans in the following categories:

- "A. Nuclear energy development of a type
category including announcement of facilities
Nevada Proving Ground tests and any release of
public information relative to same after 1961.
- "B. Guided missile development reflecting
air offensive or air defense capabilities including
nuclear charged missiles.
- "C. Announcement of military build-up of
defense or inner defense capabilities and
exercises.
- "D. Development of defense programs of political
interest to foreign and potential allies.

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

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National Civil Control Administration (NCCA) shall
the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) shall
in the formulation of the Board's recommendations
such other activities of the Board as may be determined
with this program."


c. Contingent upon NSC approval of the above, circulate the statement
attached as TAB "A" with enclosure, to members of OCB, Chairman, Director
FCIA, and the Director OIM.

d. Establish working group to coordinate such other activities as may be
appropriate (1) to assist the Board in advising the Secretary of Defense
other agencies concerned with respect to NSC which is to be the result of
proposed actions or statements pertaining to nuclear energy; (2) to
initiate suggestions to the NSC or to other appropriate authorities for the
more effective exploitation of actions or statements in the field of nuclear
energy. This group should have appropriate security clearance and access
to ABC restricted data and the Chair ^{should} participate in the work of
the OCB at which nuclear energy matters are discussed.

Attachment:

TAB "A" - Draft Statement by OCB with
attached Check List, dated 8/22/54.

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Draft Statement by OCB to:
Members of Board
Chairman, AEC
Director, FCDA
Director, CDM

The area of United States development of nuclear energy is one of the most important problems of our time. It is a problem of nuclear energy development, both for defense and general peaceful uses. The urgency of bringing about such coordination has been heightened by the need to maintain and enhance the American leadership established by the President's message of December 8, 1953, to the UN General Assembly. Major action is being taken in the numerous public statements on nuclear energy and findings since that time. It will be examined with an eye to making the program the fullest possible support in support of this Nation's objective throughout the world.

The Board stands ready to assist in this type of coordination. It will give first priority of working with the various working groups to expediting it and to making written reports where appropriate. Our purpose is to bring quickly to the attention of timing and content of official action and statements. The range of judgments available in the various reports and the working groups to make sure that no pertinent information will be overlooked; and that the official position for the United States international position in nuclear energy matters will be maintained. The timing of actions taken and by official officials in this field.

To reduce the possibility of delay, the Board will

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consultation on matters of nuclear energy action or non-action. The Board's staff and working groups have compiled the attached check list of items which in the judgment of the various agency representatives hold potentialities for harm or help in the advancement of the United States' interests.

It is suggested that agency heads advise their principal assistants dealing with these matters to bring them to the attention of the CSE for advisory comment on content or timing or operational significance as concerns national policy. The longer in advance notice can be provided, the more adequate and useful will be our advisory action.

The check list, of course, does not include all points that might merit attention. It will be revised periodically. We will welcome your comments on additions--or deletions--which occur to you and your staff.

Attachment: Check List

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Check List of Actions of Interest to OGB Heerensville
in the Nuclear Energy and Related Fields

1. Actions in support of the President's proposals in the 1953 speech of December 8, 1953.
2. Major policy statements expressing or furthering U.S. interest in international control of armaments.
3. Executive Branch proposals with respect to amendments to the Atomic Energy Act.
4. General content of information plans for, and timing of public announcements on weapons test series at Pacific or Nevada Proving Grounds.
5. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements, and official reporting materials including evaluations of nation-wide civil defense exercises.
6. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements and official reporting materials on military exercises, such as the proposed Strategic Air Command-Air Defense Command (SAC-ADC) exercises planned for July 1954.
7. General content of information plans for and timing of public announcements and reporting materials on major non-military industrial defense activities in the United States and abroad by ODM.
8. Declassified information proposed for release to public, private and law enforcement agencies to aid them in detection of espionage.

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clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons by aircraft.

9. Timing of public announcements of overseas deployment of military combat elements capable of employing nuclear weapons.
10. Official comment on guided missile developments reflecting air offensive or air defensive capabilities involving nuclear characteristics.
11. Timing and content of public reporting materials on guided missile warfare, either offensive or defensive.