



pointed out that a damage which has been brought to mind, including sudden and dramatic loss of nerve and nervous tension, including from fall-out of the same Nevada tests which has been mentioned for trial in Los Angeles in October, and it was noted also that the publisher of a book will be published giving the medical and scientific photographs of the Marshall Islands which were attached to the report from the Pacific Proving Grounds in 1952.

b. In the light of the foregoing, the majority of the working group felt that it would be more appropriate for the U.S. to refrain upon the type of campaign prepared by the USSR and others. These considerations were felt to outweigh those raised by the CIA representative who felt that the U.S. should continue to draw attention on the secrecy-safety issue, which is one of our weaknesses on which the Soviets have shown themselves vulnerable. He expressed concern that if we do not do this, the Soviets will shift their attention to the "stop-tests" question, which from the propaganda viewpoint, they are strong and we are weak. This would simply be an application of the time-tested strategy of leading propaganda to the most divergent attention from a question which we are not prepared to win in an effective answer.

3. Basis for U.S. Reporting Program

It was agreed that the recent announcement of three Soviet shots in eight days had been advantageous to the United States and that the best policy to be followed would be a conservative one given the ample reputation that "Soviet Test Nuclear Weapon" had agreed in the past to announce Soviet shots when such shots were of some significance. It was recognized that there is danger in continuously repeating announcements of Soviet shots lest the diversion of peoples of the world to testing is stimulated. It was agreed that the United States should periodically report each Soviet shot by the date and location, but not the details of the test.

4. The working group agreed that the U.S. should continue to maintain that its position with respect to the unprovoked effort to develop the Soviets on the weapons development should be based on the following lines:

a. Continued Soviet failure to halt the R&D program on the atom has given the U.S. a wide range of banking and other financial and economic policies to adopt a program of limitation on the U.S. nuclear test program in the face of a potential propaganda campaign which could be conducted in general.

b. The U.S. emphasis on secrecy and non-disclosure has been a major factor in the U.S. position. The majority of the working group questioned the wisdom of adoption of a policy of disclosure of the safety of the U.S. and the U.S. public might be misled, particularly in view of the possibility of unfair remarks being arising out of U.S. court actions, which damages to persons and property losses attributed to the U.S. nuclear tests.



5. Other Business

Pakistan newspaper reporter's request for disclosure of location of Soviet Testing Grounds - after discussion the working group decided that it would be useful for USA to provide the Pakistani newspaper reporter with materials on an unattributable basis which would indicate the location of the Soviet testing grounds. It was agreed that Japanese and U.S. newspaper comments be brought to the attention of the Pakistani reporter. It was further agreed that it would be helpful for the U.S. to expedite the sale of specified military equipment to neutral and friendly nations.

// Approved
(Signature)

Attachment

- Summary of Overseas Reaction to
- U.S. Announcements of New Arms

REPRODUCED BY THE DIRECTOR OF DOCUMENTATION



Overseas Reaction to White House-Strauss Reveal of Soviet Nuclear Test

Preliminary Report

USIA queried 20 overseas posts by telegram on press reaction; most of these posts are in the Middle East and Europe, areas nearest the Soviet test sites in Siberia and the Barents Sea. While not all replies are in (New Delhi and Tokyo are among the important posts which have not yet replied), it is clear that response has been much greater than to past AEC announcements of Soviet tests.

News play has been very prominent -- front page coverage almost everywhere; Editorial reaction has been mostly favorable, but not extensive as yet.

SAMPLE REACTIONS:

London - All papers carry prominently, most on front page under headlines such as "Ike Reveals Russian H-Test area" (Chronicle) and "Russia Sets Off New H-Bomb" (Gerald).

Paris - "Moderate" play. Several papers used Agence France Presse despatch interpreting Eisenhower announcement as "Start of new and important American counter-offensive against active Soviet propaganda in favor of cessation of nuclear tests."

Rome - Very wide coverage. Editorial interpretation similar to Paris -- that the U.S. move is an important counter-propaganda stroke; some papers also say that Ike's statement had domestic significance as a slap at Stevenson for recommending tests be stopped.

Karachi - Leading dailies carry on front page. Headlines feature proximity to Pakistan of Soviet Siberian test site. No editorials.

Tehran - Strauss statement extensively front-paged in leading papers; No editorials.

Rangoon - A strong editorial in the independent Rangoon Irishun contrasts US openness and Soviet secrecy on tests, charges India for supporting the USSR.



New Delhi - It is notable that when, in mid-September, in answer to a question in Parliament, Prime Minister Jawaharlaral Nehru stated that India had "suddenly and markedly" increased her nuclear tests, that this was "presumably" due to the Soviet tests in Siberia. This is the first time Soviet tests have attained such publicity in India. The item appearing in the New York Times, September 4, is being widely played by USIS media, especially to the Middle East.

Soviet Reaction - The two White House statements August 29 and August 31, obviously forced the Russians into the announcement they finally made on August 31: two tests had been made, and others were "pending". Their statement was defensive in tone. Soviet tests are so numerous because detonated at high altitudes because maximum fallout is undesirable.

The Russian statement gave no further details and no precautions. It did not mention the test site and did not say how long the current series would continue.

Aside from repeating old propaganda on Soviet support for bearing nuclear weapons etc., the current line in Soviet foreign broadcasts reflects one new note: Inspection to control nuclear tests is not necessary, because tests can be detectable by instruments. This has not yet become a major Soviet theme.



Reaction to Announcement of Nuclear Explosions in the Soviet Union

FBI's radio coverage of the current Soviet nuclear test centers on Moscow and Tokyo comment. Moscow has, in the last three days, excused the tests on the basis of military necessity generated by continued US and UK tests and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Soviet commentators emphasized that nuclear tests can be stopped without formal agreement because of the technical impossibility of hiding such tests. Moscow also made a point of calling attention to recent remarks by Adlai Stevenson alleging that Mr. Stevenson said "American business circles are opposed to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes because the market for atomic and hydrogen weapons is really a large profit."

The Tokyo commentary criticized the USSR for running unannounced tests and noted an increase in the radioactivity of rain "which might be caused by the Soviet tests". The USSR rejected the proposed visit to Moscow of the Japanese Atomic Energy Inspection Team composed of Socialist Party Diet members. Although it is willing to welcome the visit of the Socialist Party Chairman of the lower house committee on Scientific Research who is slated to go to Moscow about 20 September, it does not plan an atomic energy exchange program with the USSR.

CIA reports no reaction thus far from Communist Chinese propaganda to the Soviet atomic tests. The Communist Chinese population should be particularly vulnerable to propaganda that it is being unnecessarily exposed to atomic fallout from the Soviet tests, being more so than their origin than Japan where incidence of radiation has already been noted.