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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, U. S. C.

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March 19, 1954.

STAFF STUDY

SUBJECT: Coordinating Information and Timing of Projects
in Nuclear Energy and Related Fields

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate recommendations with regard to overall coordination of public statements, information and timing of projects related to the question of nuclear energy, particularly as to the extent of US responsibility in these fields and as to which if any additional responsibilities the Board or other agencies might be charged with by the Adm.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. OGB Responsibilities under Executive Order 10483 - Section 2 of Executive Order 10483 provides for two types of OGB actions

a. Subparagraph (1) which deals with actions specifically assigned to OGB by NSC, charges the Board with "advising with the agencies concerned" respecting "the execution of each security action or project so that it will make its full contribution to the attainment of national security objectives and of the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world." In recognition of this function, the NSC recently assigned two actions to the OGB in the general nuclear energy field:

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Authority NLE 87-485A
By DJF NLE Date 1/19/87

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- (1) NSC Action 104.5 charged the OCB with advising the Council with respect to the timing of release of the Ivy Film.
- (2) NSC Action 106.1 charged OCB with coordinating the timing of the public announcement of the nation-wide Civil Defense Exercise, as well as the general line to be taken by publicity about it.
- b. A second responsibility of OCB stems from subparagraph (a) of Section 2 of Executive Order 10433, which provides that "the Board shall... initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunities and changes in the situation." In fulfillment of this function, the OCB, by action of December 9, 1953, authorized a program for the domestic and international information program in support of the President's UNGA speech. This group includes representatives of the AEC and FCDA.
- c. Subparagraph (2) of Section 2, cited above, provides that the OCB can make recommendations to the NSC with respect to nuclear and related projects, which have not been specifically assigned to it by the Council, but which may affect other national security actions which have been assigned to OCB by the Council.

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d. OCB's interest responsibility in this aspect has been recognized by the Atomic Energy Commission. Although HSC Memo, October 1, 1953, "Official Statements on Nuclear Weapons" charges officials in the Executive Branch with clearing nuclear weapons statements with the Chairman AEC, and charges the latter with clearing intelligence aspects with the Director of CIA, and foreign relation aspects with State, in two recent instances, the Chairman AEC has sought the advice of the OCB with respect to timing and content of official statements on nuclear weapons. By letter to the OCB Staff Representative of February 19, 1954, the AEC Working Group member requested OCB approval of the timing of the announcements of Joint Task Force Seven, and by letter to C. L. Jackson on March 1, with reference to public reporting of the Joint Task Force Seven tests, the Chairman of the AEC stated:

"The ultimate decisions on whether to use these materials, how to adopt them, and what timing to follow in issuance, if it should be found desirable, should of course be made in the light of the judgments that can be assembled by the Operations Coordinating Board.

3. Additional Major Actions not Presently Assigned for Coordination

a. A number of major public statements with respect to one-time application of atomic energy, international exchange of power reactor technology, and exchange of weapons with NATO allies will be made in connection with the forthcoming hearings on amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. These hearings are presently scheduled for May.

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b. The FCDA has developed a statement with respect to basic planning assumptions for the fiscal year 1955 which it wishes to release for use by state and local Civil Defense organizations. These assumptions include a considerable amount of significant data with respect to the effect of nuclear weapons, targets, destruction, etc.

c. A number of additional actions and public statements will need to be developed with respect to FCDA's annual report, FCDA's exchange of Civil Defense information with friendly countries, and public information developed through the OIM with respect to non-military defense measures (industrial dispersion, dispersal of Federal agencies, etc.). These actions may have important aspects affecting the United States position overseas, depending principally upon their content and their timing in relation to other significant overseas developments.

4. Major Responsibilities for Actions Cited Above.

a. The FCDA under Public Law 920 has responsibility to "publicly disseminate appropriate Civil Defense information by all appropriate means."

b. The AEC under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is charged with making available to Congress and the public unclassified reports with respect to atomic energy.

c. The OIM, under authority of the National Security Act and Reorganization Plan No. 3, has responsibility for the broad development of non-military defense measures, including public information with respect to such measures.

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d. The Chairman of the ABC, under NSC 151/1, is responsible for coordinating programs for the disclosure of atomic energy information to friendly countries. In carrying out this responsibility he operates through various agency channels depending upon the purpose involved.

DISCUSSION

5. NSC Actions 1045 and 1061, and the AEC letters of 19 February and 1 March 1954, cited above, acknowledge OCB's interests in the nuclear energy field. As precedents they suggest that the NSC should instruct the AIE to advise with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the FCDA on the timing, and manner of presentation of such programs as may significantly affect the climate of opinion factor which the United States is seeking to maintain abroad. Such programs, in addition to those previously cited, logically would include:

- a. the timing of declassification of information covered in 151/1, "disclosure of classified information to allied countries";
- b. manner and timing of release of proposed information to public officials, law enforcement agencies on clandestine nuclear weapons;
- c. domestic nuclear proving ground publicity;
- d. military applications aspects of AEC unclassified reports, and non-military applications aspects of Department of Defense unclassified reports.

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6. In the event of a conflict between the proposed OCB role and the State's coordinating role, the State should make clear the OCB's responsibility in the event of a conflict. The State should make explicit the proposed role of the OCB and the proposed role of OCB with respect to the disclosure of sensitive and/or classified information of significance to security and/or intelligence.

CONCLUSIONS

7. In the discharge of its responsibilities under the proposed execution of the program affecting the coordination of the State's Coordinating Plan and the OCB, the OCB may:

- a. Determine the proposed programmatic elements of the proposed execution of the program affecting the coordination of the State's Coordinating Plan and the OCB, and propose changes to the proposed execution of the programmatic elements of the proposed execution of the program affecting the coordination of the State's Coordinating Plan and the OCB.
- b. Propose joint statements to be issued by the OCB and the State specifying the proposed execution of the program affecting the coordination of the State's Coordinating Plan and the OCB, and propose changes to the proposed execution of the program affecting the coordination of the State's Coordinating Plan and the OCB.

Proposed joint statement to be issued by the OCB and the State:



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8. Criteria of Optimum Readiness for War: In addition to the above, all government actions in war must be conducted in accordance with criteria which are capable of being readily understood by the public. There are many other significant criteria which may apply, but the one which seems desirable is that each action taken in time of war should exercise judgment. In this way, there will be no confusion and differing objectives.

9. Review of the NSC Directive: It is recommended that the President, to the AGC, the Office of Defense Planning, and the Director of Defense, impose upon defense agencies the following policy of Readiness and Public Law (RPL) which is designed to add further precision to the operational control established in the NSC Directive, particularly in the timing of, nuclear weapons, and other pertinent parameters. It is also evident that the RPL is not to be construed as changing the existing National Security Council Directive on the conduct of the war, but that its position would be, to the greatest extent possible, to minimize the risk to the detriment of civilian morale.

RECOMMENDATION:

10. It is recommended that the Director of Defense, the Director of Defense Planning, and the Director of Defense, issue the following:

1. NSC Directive
2. RPL



a. Inform the US Mission of all OCB projects and their timing of projects and coordinate with other US agencies involved in energy and related projects, that:

"The OCB international program is primarily to provide maximum foreign support to the UN International Agency and with respect to nuclear proliferation, imports and exports. The OCB should inform the US position on proposed actions with respect to export controls and the taking of actions in the field of nuclear energy which may have significant US economic consequences.

"Inasmuch as the OCB international program is in the foreign field so far as it is concerned, it should be given final authority to determine executive action taken by the agent overseas classifications with respect to cables and statements of policy of interest to the US should notify the US Ambassador or his diplomatic representative to visit

"The OCB will be required to furnish information on its activities and the specific areas of interest to the US Ambassador or his diplomatic representative, particularly with respect to the following:
a. Nuclear power plants
b. Nuclear weapons
c. Nuclear research facilities
d. Nuclear waste disposal
e. Nuclear transportation
f. Nuclear weapons testing
g. Nuclear weapons production

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1. To advise on the feasibility of developing hydroelectric power

"by a foreign corporation which has no
residence or place of business in the United States,
which may be established for the purpose of developing
the United States' rivers, and applying the results of its
advice with other countries, and in connection with respect to
the advisability of allowing such corporation to develop the
official state water power resources of the United States
information relevant to the following subjects:

- (A) Dual purposes, i.e., hydroelectric power
and navigation, irrigation, recreation, etc.
- (B) Normal river flows, the amount of water required
to produce electric power, the amount of water available
for other purposes.
- (C) Possible methods of financing the development, including
the cost of construction, maintenance, operation, and
marketing of power.
- (D) Adequate and reliable hydroelectric power plant
systems for the proposed developments, including
storage, transmission, distribution, and marketing.
- (E) The cost of developing the proposed hydroelectric power
plants, including the cost of construction, maintenance,
operation, and marketing.
- (F) The cost of developing the proposed hydroelectric power
plants, including the cost of construction, maintenance,
operation, and marketing.

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1. **Initial** - Initial information about the project, including:

Primary data sources, relevant publications, methods used,

be coordinated by the project manager or designee.

"A. Project description and objectives.

"B. Current literature and available data.

"C. Data sources.

"D. Computer programs used.

The above is to be completed by January 15, 1970.

PPCP will be responsible for all data collected, including:

Timing of release of data, sources of data, quality of data,

be furnished by the project manager or designee, based on the

types of information requested.

The above is to be completed by January 15, 1970.

1992. **Supplemental** - General data required for the 1992 Report.

1. **Characterization** - General information:

"A. Description of the system, including major components.

"B. Description of the system, including major components.

"C. Description of the system, including major components.

"D. Description of the system, including major components.

"E. Description of the system, including major components.

GENERAL INFORMATION

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Federal Civil Defense Administration will sit with
the Operations Coordinating Board and will participate
in the formulation of the Board's recommendations and
such other activities of the Board as may be concerned
with this program."

e. Contingent upon NSC approval of a. above, circulate the memorandum,
attached as TAB "A" with enclosure, to members of OCB, Chairman ABC, Director
FCDA, and the Director ODM.

d. Establish working groups or make such other arrangements as may be
appropriate (1) to assist the Board in advising the Chairman of ABC on
other agencies concerned with respect to OCB views as to the timing of
proposed actions or statements pertaining to nuclear energy; and (2) to
initiate suggestions to the NSC or to other appropriate authorities for the
more effective exploitation of actions or statements in the field of nuclear
energy. This group should have appropriate security clearances for access
to ABC restricted data and the Chairman of ABC ^{should} participate in development of
the OCB at which nuclear energy materials will be used.

Attachment:

TAB "A" - Draft Statement by OCB on the
attached Block Link and Nuclear Energy.

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DRAFT STATEMENT
TO MEMBERS OF BOARD
Chairman, AEC
Director, FCDA
Director, ODM



The area of United States Government public reporting in which the most important problems of coordination now arise is the of nuclear energy development, both for weapons and general beneficial uses. The urgency of bringing about such coordination has been heightened by the need to maintain and enhance the American leadership established by the President's speech of December 7, 1953, to the UN General Assembly. Major actions taken and the subsequent public statements on nuclear applications and findings should obviously be examined with an eye to making them by the fullest consideration in support of this Nation's objectives throughout the world.

The Board stands ready to assist in this type of coordination. It will give first priority of members, staff assistants and the working groups to expediting it and to revising written guidance where appropriate. Our purpose is to bring rapidly to bear a range of timing and content of official actions and statements the widest range of judgments available in the agencies represented in the Board and the working groups to make sure that no pertinent considerations will be overlooked; and that the maximum support for the United States international position in nuclear energy matters may be obtained by the timing of actions taken and by official public reporting concerning this field.

To reduce the possibility of lapse, oversights, or delay in

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consultation on matters of nuclear energy action or announcements,
the Board's staff and working groups have compiled the attached check
list of items which in the judgment of the various agency representa-
tives hold potentialities for harm or help in the advancement of the
United States' interests.

It is suggested that agency heads advise their principal assistants
dealing with these matters to bring them to the attention of the Board
for advisory comment on content or timing or operational significance
as concerns national policy. The longer in advance notice can be
provided, the more adequate and useful will be our advisory action.

The check list, of course, does not include all points that
might merit attention. It will be revised periodically. We will
welcome your comments on additions--or on deletions--which occur to
you and your staff.

Attachment: Check List

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Check List of Actions of Executive Branch since 1953
in the Nuclear Energy and Defense Fields

1. **Actions in support of the President's policy statement in his speech of December 8, 1953.**
2. **Major policy statements expressing a justifications for, and a plan for, international control of nuclear weapons.**
3. **Executive Branch proposals with respect to amendment of the Atomic Energy Act.**
4. **General content of information plan for early firing of guided missiles on weapons test ranges, including plans for early disclosure.**
5. **General content of information plan for early disclosure of military commitments, and official reporting requirements concerning joint exercises of nation-wide civil defense organizations.**
6. **General content of information plan for early disclosure of military commitments and official reporting requirements concerning military exercises, such as the proposed U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint military exercise (SAC-ANT) exercises planned during 1954.**
7. **General content of information plan for early firing of guided missiles and reporting requirements for non-nuclear industrial defence activities in the United States or elsewhere by COM.**
8. **Declassified information proposed to be released to public by law enforcement agencies to assist the detection of illegal acts.**

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clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons by enemies

9. Timing of public announcements of overseas deployment of military combat elements capable of employing nuclear weapons
10. Official comment on guided missile developments reflecting on air offensive or air defensive capabilities involving nuclear characteristics.
11. Timing and content of public reporting materials on radiological warfare, either offensive or defensive

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