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OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 19, 19..

STAFF STUDY

SUBJECT: Coordinating Information and Timing of Projects in Nuclear Energy and Related Fields

THE PROBLEM

1. To formulate recommendations with regard to overall coordination of public statements, information and timing of projects related to the question of nuclear energy, particularly as to the extent of OCB responsibility in these fields and as to which if any additional responsibilities the Board or other agencies might be charged with by the NSC.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. OCB Responsibilities under Executive Order 10483 - Section 2 of Executive Order 10483 provides for two types of OCB actions

a. Subparagraph (1) which deals with actions specifically assigned to OCB by NSC, charges the Board with "advising with the agencies concerned" respecting "the execution of each security action or project so that it will make its full contribution to the attainment of national security objectives and of the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world." In recognition of this function, the NSC recently assigned two actions to the OCB in the general nuclear energy field:

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(1) NSC Action 1045 charged the OCB with advising the Council with respect to the timing of release of the Ivy Film.

(2) NSC Action 1061 charged OCB with coordinating the timing of the public announcement of the nation-wide Civil Defense Exercise, as well as the general line to be taken by publicity about it.

b. A second responsibility of OCB stems from subparagraph (2) of Section 2 of Executive Order 10483, which provides that "the Board shall initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunities and changes in the situation." In fulfillment of this function, the OCB, by action of December 9, 1953, authorized a program for the domestic and international information program in support of the President's UNGA speech. This group includes representatives of the AEC and FCDA.

c. Subparagraph (2) of Section 2, cited above, provides that the OCB can make recommendations to the NSC with respect to nuclear and related projects, which have not been specifically assigned to the Council, but which may affect other national security actions which have been assigned to OCB by the Council.

d. OCB's interest responsibility in this aspect has been recognized by the Atomic Energy Commission. Although NSC Memo, October [illegible] "Official Statements on Nuclear Weapons" charges officials in the Executive Branch with clearing nuclear weapons statements with the Chairman AEC and charges the latter with clearing intelligence aspects with the Director of CIA, and foreign relation aspects with State, in two recent instances, the Chairman AEC has sought the advice of the OCB with respect to timing and content of official statements on nuclear weapons. By letter to the OCB Staff Representative of February 19, 1954, the AEC Working Group member requested OCB approval of the timing of the announcements of [illegible] Force Seven, and by letter to C. D. Jackson of March [illegible], with reference to public reporting of the Joint Task Force Seven tests, the Chairman of the AEC stated:

> "The ultimate decisions on whether to use these materials, how to adopt them, and what timing to follow in issuance, if it should be found desirable, should of course be made in the light of the judgments that will be assembled by the Operations Coordinating Board

3. Additional Major Actions not Presently Assigned for Coordination

a. A number of major public statements with respect to peace-time application of atomic energy, international exchange of power reactor technology, and exchange of weapons with NATO allies will be made in connection with the forthcoming hearings on amendments of the Atomic Energy Act. These hearings are presently scheduled for May

b. The FCDA has developed a statement with respect to basic planning assumptions for the fiscal year 1955 which it wishes to release for use by state and local Civil Defense organizations. These assumptions include a considerable amount of significant data with respect to the effect of nuclear weapons, targets, destruction, etc.

c. A number of additional actions and public statements will need to be developed with respect to FCDA's annual report, FCDA's exchange of Civil Defense information with friendly countries, and public information developed through the ODM with respect to non-military defense measures (industrial dispersion, dispersal of Federal agencies, etc.) These actions may have important aspects affecting the United States position overseas, depending principally upon their content and their timing in relation to other significant overseas developments.

4. Major Responsibilities for Actions Cited Above.

a. The FCDA under Public Law 920 has responsibility to "publicly disseminate appropriate Civil Defense information by all appropriate means."

b. The AEC under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 is charged with making available to Congress and the public unclassified reports with respect to atomic energy.

c. The ODM, under authority of the National Security Act and Reorganization Plan No. 3, has responsibility for the broad [illegible] of non-military defense measures, including public information [illegible] such measures.

d. The Chairman of the AEC, under NSC 151/1, is responsible for coordinating programs for the disclosure of atomic energy information to friendly countries. In carrying out this responsibility he operates through various agency channels depending upon the purpose involved.

DISCUSSION

5. NSC Actions 1045 and 1061, and the AEC letters of 19 February and 1 March 1954, cited above, acknowledge OCB's interests in the nuclear energy field. As precedents they suggest that the NSC should instruct the OCB to advise with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the FCDA on the timing, and manner of presentation of such programs as may significantly affect the climate of opinion factor which the United States is seeking to maintain abroad. Such programs, in addition to those previously cited, logically would include:

a. the timing of declassification of information covered in 151/1, "disclosure of classified information to allied countries";

b. manner and timing of release of proposed information to public officials, law enforcement agencies on clandestine nuclear weapons;

c. domestic nuclear proving ground publicity;

d. military applications aspects of AEC unclassified reports, and non-military applications aspects of Department of Defense unclassified reports.

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6. [illegible]

State, coordinat[illegible]

OCB's responsibilit[illegible]

should make explicit the pr[illegible]

role of OCB with respect t[illegible]

information of significance [illegible]

CONCLUSIONS

7. In the discharge [illegible]

execution of the program[illegible]

Coordinating [illegible]

a. [illegible]

b. Proposing [illegible]

opinio[illegible]

propo[illegible]

done [illegible]

8. Climate of opinion [illegible] all government actions in [illegible] which are capable of signi[illegible] are many other significant [illegible] which seems desirable [illegible] exercise judgment. In [illegible] objectives.

9. Review of the [illegible] to the AEC, the [illegible] imposed upon depa[illegible] and Public [illegible] operational control [illegible] timing of, nuclear [illegible] evident that the [illegible] National Security Council [illegible] position was [illegible] the detriment [illegible]

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is [illegible]

a. Inform the [illegible] timing of projects and coordin[illegible] energy and related projects, that:

"The OCB inte[illegible] is prim[illegible] maximum foreign su[illegible] Inter[illegible] with respect [illegible] The OCB shoul[illegible] views with resp[illegible] of actions in [illegible] have significan[illegible]

"Inasmuch a[illegible] foreign field [illegible] final authority [illegible] against overseas [illegible] and statement [illegible] notify [illegible] to [illegible]

"The [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] and the timing of projects

[illegible]

which may [illegible]

the United States [illegible]

advise wi[illegible]

the advisability [illegible]

official statements [illegible]

information [illegible]

[illegible]

public [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

military [illegible] following [illegible]

be coordinated by [illegible]

"A. [illegible]

"B. [illegible]

[illegible]

"C. [illegible]

"D. Construction [illegible]

"E. [illegible]

"OCB [illegible]

timing of release [illegible]

be furnished by [illegible]

Office of [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Subject [illegible]

is [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Federal Civil Defense Administration will sit with the Operations Coordinating Board and will participate in the formulation of the Board's recommendations and such other activities of the Board as may be concerned with this program."

c. Contingent upon NSC approval of a. above, circulate the memorandum, attached as TAB "A" with enclosure, to members of OCB, Chairman AEC, Director FCDA, and the Director ODM.

d. Establish working groups or make such other arrangements as may be appropriate (1) to assist the Board in advising the Chairman of AEC and other agencies concerned with respect to OCB views as to the timing of proposed actions or statements pertaining to nuclear energy; and (2) to initiate suggestions to the NSC or to other appropriate authorities for the more effective exploitation of actions or statements in the field of nuclear energy. This group should have appropriate security clearances for access to AEC restricted data and the Chairman of AEC should participate in meetings of the OCB at which nuclear energy matters are under consideration.

Attachment:

TAB "A" - Draft Statement by [illegible]
attached Check List [illegible]

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Draft Statement by OCB to:
Members of Board
Chairman, AEC
Director, FCDA
Director, ODM

The area of United States Government public reporting [illegible] the most important problems of coordination now arise is that of nuclear energy development, both for weapons and general beneficial uses. The urgency of bringing about such coordination has been heightened by the need to maintain and enhance the American leadership established by the President's speech of December [illegible] to the UN General Assembly. Major actions taken and the subsequent public statements on nuclear applications and findings should [illegible] be examined with an eye to making them [illegible] the fullest [illegible] in support of this Nation's objectives throughout the world.

The Board stands ready to assist [illegible] this type of coordination. It will give first priority of members, staff assistants [illegible] working groups to expediting it and to providing written guidance where appropriate. Our purpose is to [illegible] quickly to [illegible] of timing and content of official actions and statements the [illegible] range of judgments available in the agencies represented [illegible] and the working groups to make sure that no pertinent considerations will be overlooked; and that the maximum support for the United [illegible] international position in nuclear energy matters may be [illegible] timing of actions taken and by official public reporting [illegible] in this field.

To reduce the possibility of lapses, oversights, or [illegible]

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consultation on matters of nuclear energy action or announcements, the Board's staff and working groups have compiled the attached check list of items which in the judgment of the various agency representatives hold potentialities for harm or help in the advancement of the United States' interests.

It is suggested that agency heads advise their principal assistants dealing with these matters to bring them to the attention of the [illegible] for advisory comment on content or timing of operational significance as concerns national policy. The longer in advance notice can be provided, the more adequate and useful will be our advisory action.

The check list, of course, does not include all points that might merit attention. It will be revised periodically. We will welcome your comments on additions--or on deletions--which occur to you and your staff.

Attachment: Check List

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Check List of Actions of [illegible]

in the Nuclear Energy and [illegible]

1. Actions in support of the Pre[illegible] speech of December 8, 1953.
2. Major policy statements expre[illegible] on international control of [illegible]
3. Executive Branch proposals wi[illegible] Atomic Energy Act.
4. General content of informatio[illegible] announcements on weapons test [illegible] grounds.
5. General content of informatio[illegible] announcements, and official reporti[illegible] ons of nation-wide civil defense [illegible]
6. [illegible] content of informatio[illegible] announcements and official [illegible] [illegible], such as the proposed [illegible] Command ([illegible]) exercises [illegible]
7. General content of informatio[illegible] announcements and reporting [illegible] industrial defense activities [illegible] by ODM.
8. Declassified informatio[illegible] and law enforcement agencies [illegible] detection [illegible]

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clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons by enemies

9. Timing of public announcements of overseas deployment of military combat elements capable of employing nuclear weapons

10. Official comment on guided missile developments reflecting on air offensive or air defensive capabilities involving nuclear characteristics.

11. Timing and content of public reporting materials on bacteriological warfare, either offensive or defensive