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HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
ARLINGTON HALL STATION
ARLINGTON 12, VIRGINIA

From NMB-S

JTFCC

29 November 1958

SUBJECT: Conduct of Future Overseas Nuclear Tests (U)

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TO: Director, Division of Military Application
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Germantown, Maryland

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|-------------------|------------|
| 1ST REVIEWER DATE | 1/15/59 |
| AUTHORITY | |
| NAME | H. Schmidt |
| 2ND REVIEWER DATE | 6/16/54 |
| AUTHORITY | |
| NAME | |

DOD (DNR)

Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
Washington 25, D.C.

Reference: Final Report of Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, on Operation HARDTACK (Overseas Phase), dated 8 October 1958 (submitted to Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, as Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Declassified by DNA, Chief, ISTS
WITH IPLOSURE.
DATE: 10/18/94

1. In paragraph 9d of the above referenced report, it was noted that the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, would submit a report to the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and to the Director, Division of Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission, on the conduct of overseas nuclear tests.
2. It is the purpose of this memorandum to make certain recommendations in light of experience gained in overseas testing to date, and particularly in Operation HARDTACK, with a view to improving the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of future test operations of this nature.
3. To date, our nuclear testing in the Eniwetok Proving Ground has been conducted every other year in the late spring and early summer,

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Reg 12-1105



JTF-7 NR 5-80539

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but with exceptions including Operations IVY, WIGWAM and ARGUS. With respect to the Eniwetok Proving Ground, this "every other year" concept has some disadvantages. There have been proposals which it is believed have considerable validity that our testing concept should permit a test to be conducted whenever the need is indicated by the development program. Acceptance of such proposals would require that the Eniwetok Proving Ground be operated on a continuous basis. While recognizing the advantages inherent in a continuous testing concept, it appears that when a number of tests are involved, the factors of proving ground location, climatology, and effective use of personnel prove to be most difficult of accommodation. Even though tests were limited in number and scheduled throughout the year, it appears that these factors, and that of weather in particular, would tend to force these individual efforts, time-wise, into a group or series. Testing under a continuous concept would probably most logically be accomplished by an organization and command structure similar to that now in use at Patrick Air Force Base, yet other considerations are such that the safety, coordination, support, and control problems associated with a test series would require that all participating activities be under one head. The Task Force arrangement for conducting atomic tests is so constituted as to take advantage of the seasonal Eniwetok weather, to provide coordination of the many activities involved, to provide over-all support required, and to exercise some judgment and influence to keep over-all costs and commitment of forces to reasonable levels consistent with the magnitude of the test series. Based on these and other considerations, I have concluded that the Task Force concept, while not an ideal solution, is generally sound and should, for the present at least, be continued unless and until there are firm indications that the United States will observe a test moratorium for some indefinite extended period of time.

4. The remainder of this memorandum is devoted to changes in the Task Force concept and organization which it is believed will permit the conduct of nuclear tests in the Eniwetok Proving Ground with greater economy, efficiency, and harmony.

5. With each succeeding overseas test operation, the scale of the operation has increased and the number of agencies and personnel involved have also increased. The programs and projects for Operation HARDTACK were so numerous and varied, became a part of the test program through so many channels and authorities, were funded and manned from such a variety of sources as to be almost impossible of proper technical and administrative management in the proving ground. HARDTACK was further complicated by the sense of urgency resulting from the evident

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possibility of a test moratorium. The magnitude of the operation was increased by the necessity for repeat testing of modified devices which failed to operate as expected, and because of the necessity for transfer of two of the test detonations and associated programs from prepared sites at Bikini Atoll to Johnston Island where construction and other preparations had not been made. The Task Force was sufficiently flexible to absorb most of these changes to its original program and to accommodate the additional technical programs approved for implementation after the operational phase had begun. This capability to accommodate major changes during the operational phase can be a most important consideration and some flexibility in this regard is essential. However, it is susceptible of abuse unless a proper procedure is established and observed to assure that the efforts of the test organization are devoted strictly to the objectives of the operation. Even though the problems associated with the early appraisal of the test program, strict observance of established procedures for approval of technical programs and need for control in their implementation are recognized to be great and the need for flexibility essential, it is believed that positive action must be taken to: (a) Limit the number of detonations scheduled for the specific series and (b) Assume more positive control over the number of experiments, their readiness, sponsorship, and method of conduct. Although the greatest problems encountered by the test organization during HARDTACK resulted from changes in the operation after deployment and were either unavoidable or were clearly necessary in the national interest, there are certain changes in the current Task Force structure and procedures which could be made to increase the effectiveness and economy of the operation.

6. The Task Force Commander and Task Force headquarters should participate to a very much greater extent in the planning of an operation. In the past, such participation has been entirely too limited and actual planning has been accomplished by individuals from various agencies involved during a time when these individuals had no responsibility to the Task Force for the ultimate success of the operation. The basic scientific planning function of the Department of Defense is normally accomplished by the many laboratories and contractors of the Services in coordination with Headquarters AFSWP. The resulting program, when approved by the Department of Defense is referred to Field Command, AFSWP, for implementation. During this interim or planning period, Task Force jurisdiction is limited to Task Group 7.2 and Task Group 7.3 (reduced to a planning staff). AEC planning is carried out by the scientific laboratories and the Albuquerque Operations Office under the general direction of DMA by individuals who are responsible directly to their respective organizations. While these individuals


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and agencies make a substantial effort to coordinate their plans and programs, their geographic location, diverse interests and objectives make full coordination most difficult, and is accomplished with minimum Task Force participation. As programs of all agencies are finalized, support requirements are channeled through Task Group 7.1. Task Group 7.1 at this time is a nonentity and the personnel acting as part of Task Group 7.1 are not a part of the Task Force or of any other single organization. All personnel during this period are performing their Task Group 7.1 function in addition to their regular duties. There is no desire to be critical of the personnel or efforts of this Task Group, yet it must be recognized that they are working at a great disadvantage and that their method of operation makes it essential that they take a great deal of unilateral action since they have no direct chain of responsibility until the beginning of the operational phase. It is believed that the functions normally carried out by Task Group 7.1 headquarters in preparation for a test operation should and could be accomplished by the Task Force headquarters after it had been properly augmented by appropriate technical personnel from both the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. After proper manning and proper participation in planning, the headquarters of the Task Force would then be in a position to perform the function normally performed by 7.1 during the operational phase. It is believed that a more harmonious and effective operation could be conducted if the scientific test elements (LASL, UCRL, FSWP) came directly under the operational control of the Task Force headquarters and if the Task Force headquarters performed for them the tasks which in the past have been accomplished by Task Group 7.1. (See organization chart attached.)

7. Task Group 7.2 (Army Task Group) is located in the Eniwetok Proving Ground and remains under the control of the Task Force headquarters at all times. Its functions are primarily garrison type, similar in many respects to the custodial services provided by the AEC contractor on Parry Island. Department of the Army has, for some years, considered that the role played by Task Group 7.2 in the overseas nuclear testing has not been appropriate. This, combined with their urgent need for personnel, has caused them to exert every proper pressure for the reduction of their function, particularly in the interim period, and for a support role similar to that of the Air Force and the Navy. In the performances of its functions during an operation, Task Group 7.2 totals about 1200 people. During the interim period, this total is reduced to about 650. Department of the Army has informed the Task Force of its intent to reduce this figure to something less than 300. It would appear economical and appropriate that some of the



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functions of 7.2 be transferred to the resident contractor and that support required from the Army during test operations be requested from them as operational requirements are determined. It appears impracticable to transfer all of the functions now being performed by Task Group 7.2 to the contractor.

8. A reduced garrison of Army personnel is therefore considered to be necessary. A small Task Group 7.2 headquarters should continue in being and should function much after the fashion of Task Group 7.3.

9. The present arrangement whereby the Navy element of the Task Force is reduced to a small planning staff during the interim period, remains under Task Force control and absorbs the Navy elements of support required during an operation appears entirely satisfactory.

10. Even though Task Group 7.4 is disestablished upon completion of an operation, continuity, know-how and planning functions are maintained by the 4950th Atomic Support Group, Air Forces Special Weapons Center at Kirtland Air Force Base. This arrangement has proved to be workable and is relatively satisfactory. It is believed, however, that a small planning staff or 7.4 cadre responsible to Commander, JTF-7 should remain in existence during the interim period and that those Air Force personnel who are stationed at Eniwetok should remain under operational control of this 7.4 cadre, and, through them, under operational control of the Task Force.

11. Under present arrangements, the Eniwetok Proving Ground reverts to the control of the Albuquerque Operations Office and is exercised through the AEC Resident Manager. The division of responsibilities for activities in the Proving Ground during the interim period between the AEC agencies, the Task Force headquarters, Task Group 7.2 and elements of the Task Group present in the Proving Ground is such that it requires examination and re-evaluation. The responsibilities and problems involved are so numerous and great as not to be susceptible of proper examination in this short memorandum and would need to be further investigated by the agencies involved. My evaluation leads me to the conclusion that the operation, both during the interim period and operational period, could be more efficiently and effectively carried out if the Eniwetok Proving Ground remained under the operational control of the Task Force at all times. I will be prepared to discuss this problem further with either of you at your convenience.

12. While I am not prepared at this time to make definite recommendations as to how the function of Radiological Safety should be integrated into the Task Force operation, I am convinced that there is

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a better method than we are now using. Over-all control should be centralized, yet most of the day-to-day operations need to be decentralized to the various Task Groups. Some of the functions need to be consolidated, then established and administered as a direct command function.

13. The Task Force concept of operation is normally a method peculiar to wartime military effort. As its name implies, it is a collection of agencies brought together under a single commander to accomplish a single goal after which it is normally disbanded. In the case of Joint Task Force SEVEN, even though established as a permanent joint command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with continuing responsibility, most of the participants (units and personnel) have been lost after each operation, the Executive Agency has been changed, and a new commander has been designated. While the return of military units and of civilian and military personnel to their agencies after completion of the operational phase is appropriate, the change of Joint Task Force SEVEN's key staff and Commander fails to take advantage of experience gained and makes each new test series a new experience insofar as the Task Force command establishment is concerned. This condition, of course, is further complicated by the rotation of command between the three Services. It is believed essential that the commander of the Task Force and his key staff personnel be selected solely on the basis of military and technical qualifications and that they remain for more than one operation. The qualifications and experience of the Task Force Commander in particular should be evaluated. It is further believed that a qualified individual with appropriate scientific background and test experience should be assigned on a permanent basis to the Task Force as Deputy Commander and that additional deputies should be assigned only on the basis of need and not as Service representatives.

14. The foregoing discussion may be summarized into recommendations as follows:

a. Unless and until a period of test moratorium is more definite, plans and preparations for overseas nuclear testing should be continued.

b. The task force concept for conduct of overseas nuclear tests is generally sound, and, with certain adjustments, is suitable, feasible, and acceptable.

c. Every possible effort should be made to establish the scope and magnitude of an overseas operation as early as practicable and some kind of limitation should be recognized.

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d. The task force headquarters must actively participate in all program planning for an overseas nuclear test operation.

e. The concept and use of a scientific task group (7.1) should be discontinued and its present functions absorbed by task force headquarters and other task groups as appropriate.

f. Some of the functions performed by Task Group 7.2 should be transferred to Holmes & Narver, and personnel of Task Group 7.2 reduced accordingly. A small planning staff and headquarters cadre for Task Group 7.2 and Task Group 7.4 should be retained under the operational control of Joint Task Force SEVEN during the interim phase. Military units of the Army and the Air Force physically located in the proving ground during the interim period should be under the operational control of these planning headquarters.

g. The division of responsibilities among participating agencies in the Eniwetok Proving Ground during the interim period should be re-examined and reassigned. After this has been accomplished, responsibility for operation of the EPG during the interim period should rest with the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN, and he should exercise operational control of all units or agencies remaining therein.


h. The test organization RadSafe program should be re-examined and so established as to assure centralized management and direction with actual RadSafe tasks decentralized to units of the Task Force to the maximum practicable extent.

i. The Task Force Commander and key personnel of the Task Force headquarters should be selected for their military and technical qualifications and retained on a stabilized tour basis.

j. The rotation of the Services as Executive Agent for the Task Force should cease.

k. A Deputy for Scientific Matters or a Scientific Advisor should be assigned to the Task Force on a full-time basis, and other AEC personnel should be integrated on a full-time basis into the staff of Task Force headquarters. Other Deputy Commanders are not usually needed and should be assigned only as justified by the Task Force Commander.

15. The above recommendations, with possible slight modifications, are believed to be valid whether the Task Force remains as a unified





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command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or whether it is responsible to them through the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. The recommendations I have made here are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of other agencies or personnel who were a part of Joint Task Force SEVEN during the operational phase.

A. R. LUEDECKE
Major General, USAF
Commander

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Org Chart





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 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
 APPLICATION
 DEPT. OF DEFENSE
 1958

----- PLANNING (BECOMES OPERATIONAL DURING TEST SERIES)
 ----- OPERATIONAL CONTROL AT ALL TIMES

ref to S-SC-5-39