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 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
 SAN FRANCISCO OPERATIONS OFFICE

APR 1954

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28-122
 THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 2 PAGES
 NO. 1 OF 7 SERIES A

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

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Mr. W. B. Reynolds, Business Manager
 University of California
 Radiation Laboratory
 Berkeley, California

Subject: USE OF THE NEVADA PROVING GROUND

Dear Mr. Reynolds:

At its meeting June 30, 1954 the Commission approved the continued use of the Nevada Proving Ground for atomic test activities subject to conduct of test activities in accordance with the following criteria which are furnished herewith for guidance and planning purposes.

- a. The number of nuclear shots at the Nevada Proving Ground in one year should be determined by laboratory requirements as reviewed by the Division of Military Application in the light of other pertinent considerations and approved by the Commission.
- b. Each nuclear shot programmed whether AEC, military or civil defense should be justified individually and the number involved should be held to the minimum consistent with technical requirements.
- c. Each potentially hazardous shot should be separately identified and justification for such a shot should include plans for controlling or reducing fall-out from it.
- d. Shots should be scheduled with more elasticity, so that non-critical shots may be fired when conditions are not right for more critical or marginal shots. Such elasticity will benefit from addition of new firing areas.

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W. B. Reynolds

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- e. Marginal shots should be fired only under satisfactory weather conditions that have a high degree of predictable stability. The possibility of continuing postponements and of resulting extension of series duration should be accepted. Participating organizations and units should be advised that they must accept the possibility of postponements on such shots.
- f. Any air drop of more than 1 KT projected yield should be scheduled only after thorough evaluation of the reliability of its fuzing system.
- g. Shots should be limited as follows with regard to yield and burst altitude, with maximum yield to incorporate a reasonable allowance for error:

- Surface and subsurface, 1 KT
- 300 foot tower, 25 KT
- 500 foot tower, 50 KT
- Air drop, 80 KT (Fireball not to touch ground).

Prior to detonating a 50 KT weapon from a 500 foot tower the safety factor calculated for such a shot should be confirmed by detonating a shot of lesser magnitude from a 500 foot tower.

Sincerely yours,



H. A. Fidler, Manager
San Francisco Operations Office

cy 3A - H. York, UCRL, Livermore

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