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HEADQUARTERS
TASK GROUP 7.1
JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN

APO 187 (HOW), 4 POSTMASTER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

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13 February 1954

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JF-3803

MEMORANDUM TO: Col. Ma. S. Covart, Jr., JTF-7
FROM: Alvin C. Graves
SUBJ: SECURITY FORCE FOR FUTURE PACIFIC PROVING GROUND OPERATIONS
REF : Memo for Record of 28 January 1954, same subject, by Col. William Covart.

The reference memo states in paragraph 2 that "it would then appear that we have unnecessarily expended a large effort in patrolling the entire danger area". Although I agree with the conclusion of this paragraph that "security force should be based on the strength necessary to prevent interference with the Operation", I am not in agreement with the first quotation as a reason for a change in philosophy.

During Sandstone, Greenhouse and Ivy, it was highly important to deny information to enemy nations as to the yield of devices being tested. In particular, had the Mike shot been less successful, it might have been most important to deny that information to an enemy. I agree completely that estimates of yield have become less sensitive with time. The public shots at Nevada have made it reasonably obvious that the United States can design devices in the yield range from zero to 100 kilotons. In addition, the President has disclosed that we have a family of fission weapons of various sizes with yields up to 25 times that of one of the Japan drops and fusion weapons in the range of megatons. Once one admits fission weapons of the order of 500 kilotons and fusion weapons of the order of several megatons, concealment of approximate yields of new devices in this range becomes much less important. It would still be undesirable to release an exact yield of a stockpile weapon, but security forces are not capable of preventing the loss of such information, because such information can not be obtained by direct observation alone. Hence, although I am not willing to admit that we have wasted effort in the past, I believe we should reexamine the effort in view of the present situation.

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ALVIN C. GRAVES
Deputy, Scientific Matters

FEB 13 1954
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- CY 1A & 2A - Covart
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