

MARSHALL ISLANDS FILE TRACKING DOCUMENT

Record Number: 92

File Name (TITLE): Historical Installment No. 4,
Op. Castle

Document Number (ID): 79981

DATE: 4-5/1954

Previous Location (FROM): CIC

AUTHOR: ITF7

Additional Information: _____

OrMIbox: 5

CyMIbox: 3

SECRET

JOINT TASK FORCE 7
TASK GROUP 7.3
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.


FF3/7.3/OCL:jmt
A-12
RCS-JTF SEVEN H-1
Serial **001570**
12 JUL 1954

SUBJECT: Historical Installment Number 4, (Final Installment):
submission of

79981


TO: Commander
Joint Task Force SEVEN
Washington 25, D.C.

1. Reference is made to CJTF SEVEN letter SGS/314.7 of 9 Oct 1953, serial O-7467 and CJTF SEVEN Standing Operating Procedure Number 172-701.
2. Commander Task Group 7.3 Installment Number 4, (Final Installment), of Operation CASTLE is submitted:


H. C. BRUTON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander

1 Incl
Historical
Installment No. 4

Copies furnished:
CTG 7.1
CTG 7.2
CTG 7.4
CTG 7.5

DECLASSIFIED BY CHIEF, ISCM, DNA


SECRET

This document consists of 1 page(s)
No. 1 of 9 copies

201

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~



JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN COMMANDER TASK GROUP 7.3

COMMANDER TASK GROUP 7.3

HISTORY OF OPERATION CASTLE

INSTALLMENT NUMBER 4

(Final Installment)

RCS-JTF SEVEN H-1

Period 8 April through 15 May
1954

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1946~~

COPY No. 9 of 9

13/7.3/32124
1-12
100-217 50121 1-1
Serial 001570
12 JUL 1954

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~100-217 50121 1-1~~
~~Serial 001570~~

SUBJECT: Historical Installment Number 4, (Final Installment):
subdivision of

TO: Commander
Joint Task Force 50121
Washington 25, D.C.

1. Reference is made to GTF 50121 letter 50121.7 of 9 Oct 1953, serial 0-7457 and GTF 50121 Standing Operating Procedure Number 172-701.
2. Commander Task Group 7.3 Installment Number 4, (Final Installment), of Operation GATT is submitted:

R. C. BURTON
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander

1 Incl
Historical
Installment No. 4

Copies furnished:
CTG 7.1
CTG 7.2
CTG 7.6
CTG 7.9

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~100-217 50121 1-1~~
~~Serial 001570~~

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~100-217 50121 1-1~~
~~Serial 001570~~

This document consists of 1 page(s)
No. 9 of 9 copies

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1946~~

50101

CHANDLER TASK GROUP 7.3
LIST II OF OPERATING CATTLE
INSTALLMENT NUMBER 4
(Final Installment)

Period 2 April through 15 May 1951

Submitted

R. F. HADDER
Lieutenant Commander, USN

Approved:

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

H. C. BRUCE
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander, Task Group 7.3

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1946~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTLINE

- I. Deployment
- II. UNICE - YANKEE - ROOSTER
- III. Effect of delays
- IV. Security
- V. Operations
- VI. Logistics
- VII. Communications
- VIII. Roll-up
- IX. Re-deployment
- X. Statistics
- XI. Personnel Roster

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

I

DEPLOYMENT

1. The last ship of Task Group 7.3 to arrive in the forward area, USS LST 1157 (1157-42) (LSTC H. E. Smith, USN), reached Eilat on 8 April, the day following the FOX shot. She had arrived at Haifa on the morning of 7 April and was held there until after the Eilat Red Sea picture had cleared. At Eilat she joined USNA and LST 1157 in support of the Bureau of Ordnance's Project 3.6.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CHIEF - TANKS - R. CHIEF

1. Task Group ships made two sorties from Bikini Lagoon for UNITE, the fourth shot fired. The first took place on 15 April, 8 days after the EGM shot, in more or less routine fashion. Notice had been received early on radio one day that an attempt would be made to fire the shot, permitting ship movements to begin on schedule. By 1500 the lagoon was clear of shipping, except for several small craft and two manned Navy LCIs standing by at the shot barge to remove the firing party. At 1515 all ships reported their positions at a safe distance from the zero point, including TG 1545, stationed at Eniwetok Atoll with Air Force weather observers aboard. The firing party moved the device and boarded the LCI for Eniwetok Island where they were picked up by helicopter and flown to Enyu to connect the firing circuit. After disembarking the firing party, the LCI ran down the lagoon, moored to buoys off Enyu, the crew launched a DSW carried in one LCI and proceeded to Enyu for helicopter transportation to BIRNEN. During the arrival operation EGM, B IRON, BIRNEN (as plane guard) and BALE GROVE remained within ten miles of Enyu to shorten the helicopter flights and to be easily available in case an emergency developed. At 1615 the LCI crew arrived on board BIRNEN. At 1630 the firing party helicopter reached EGM, B IRON recovered her helicopters, and the four ships headed out to sea to join the rest of the formation.

2. At 1715 EGM departed her station at sea and headed

~~SECRET~~

II

completed her preliminary to launching a high altitude balloon. She completed her upwind run, reversed course and at 2157 launched the balloon and returned to her station. A little over an hour later word was received from the Joint Task Force command post in LIT that the shot had been delayed for twenty-four hours. All ships were notified of the delay and directed to remain at sea through the night. At 0300 HKT, BALWED and LEXEMER closed on LIT to transport the firing party in by helicopter to dismount the firing aircraft and disarm the device, but this action was delayed in the hope that a better weather situation might be developing. By 1500 it had become apparent that the weather would not permit firing next day, and the disarming process was begun. Word was received at 1710 that disarming was completed when the ships headed into the lagoon. By 2100 all were anchored.

3. A sortie for UNLIE was not again attempted until 25 April. Throughout the period between sorties the task group remained in an advanced state of readiness, prepared to move out again on short notice, with each day designated as minus-two or minus-three depending on the weather outlook. It became apparent that to fire the remainder of the GUMBLE series, the Joint Task Force had to be prepared to take advantage of favorable weather based on short range forecasts. To meet the situation the alert status of the Navy Task Group was further increased so that all ships were required to be ready to commence their minus-one day events at noon on any day. Plans were made for carrying out the sortie after dark, in case such

a movement should become necessary to take advantage of a sudden weather change. Plans were reserved of the cancellation from the schedule of the shot designated 2101. To clear up the remaining three shots it had been decided to fire one shot, KALIB, at KALIB, and two, WILK and WILK, at WILK. While the Joint Task Force waited for the weather to permit them to fire WILK at WILK, scientific personnel made preparations for KALIB at KALIB. When it began to appear that KALIB would be ready before WILK could be fired, an alternate firing plan was made, under which either shot would be fired whenever the weather permitted. To fire at KALIB the mine had to be from a quarter that would not deposit fall-out on KALIB to the west, or the islands to the east and southeast. KALIB could be fired at KALIB only when the mine would prevent any appreciable fall-out on the two heavily populated islands at the southern end of the atoll, Perry and KALIB, and on Ujaling Atoll, 125 miles to the southwest. Either shot would be fired when the weather first permitted it, with WILK receiving priority should the weather be favorable for both shots on the same day, to clear the way for KALIB, the remaining KALIB shot.

4. On 22 April, with WILK still unfired, KALIB was ready, and the task group was prepared to commence execution on the schedule of events for either shot with minimum warning. AFACIE and ALON were sent to their initial stations off KALIB to lay fallout collectors for Project 2.31. On the morning of 23 April AFACIE experienced a serious casualty to her electrical control boards for

II

main propulsion. She was returned to Eniwetok to effect project personnel and equipment and was then sent to Eniwetok to effect repairs.

5. On Sunday, 25 April, at about noon, word was received from GTF ENIWA at Eniwetok that, with a break in the weather front, the detonation of UNIM next morning would again be attempted. Ships prepared to sortie and awaited the arrival of the Eniwetok staffs. Boats in the lagoon with fishing and diving parties were recalled. A decision had been made that morning that the Eniwetok project would plant all its mines on UNIM rather than spread its participation over two shots; RICHMOND and SHAW were planting the two strings of mines that had been intended for a later shot. By 1700 they had laid all mines in the previously designated pattern and proceeded out of the lagoon. The firing party arrived from Eniwetok at 1800. GTF ENIWA and his staff landed on the Eniwetok airstrip and were flown to ENIWA by helicopter. At 1730 the firing party reached the shot barge, and GTF ENIWA got underway for the Eniwetok anchorage. As they received their passengers, ships hoisted anchor and left the lagoon. The sortie was accomplished by changing event times as necessary to meet the situations which resulted from late arrival of the Eniwetok groups. Despite the late start all preparations were completed by 2240 when ENIWA, with the firing party aboard, got underway and proceeded to sea, leaving the lagoon empty except for several boats and barges. BILL CORVE and BILL RO, with PHILIP

II

as plane guard, left their temporary stations close in to seaward of Lugu and, with INTIS, joined the formation at 2300. At 2300 KUTIMAS reported on station as aircraft control ship, and a half hour later, all ships were on station at a safe range from the shot barge, with embarked personnel keeping a wary but hopeful eye on the weather.

6. Events throughout the night continued without a hitch. CURTIS launched her weather balloon at 2250. Aircraft No. 1 of VP-27, on patrol, reported sighting a Japanese fishing boat and a freighter, but their location did not place them in any danger from fall-out. At 0200, following a weather briefing, the Task Force Commander directed that all ships except INTIS be moved south to a position 50 miles from the shot barge, with INTIS to open the range immediately after the shot. At 1500 at Rongerik was alerted to have all her passengers on board and be ready to get underway by noon. At 0300 ships began their southward movement. The last VP-27 patrol aircraft landed at Eniwetok, with no additional contacts reported. The sea area in the fall-out path was clear of itinerant shipping. At 0410 KUTIMAS reported that she was underway out of the expected fall-out area with the crew of YAG 40 aboard, leaving YAG 39 manned with a minimum crew in a well-shielded location, and in control of the YAG 40 drone. SIXTH was not at Bikini; during this period Project 2.5a had committed themselves to participate on KUTIMAS rather than on INTIS. By 0530 the ships had completed their move to the southward with CURTIS in an intermediate position to maintain UHF communications with INTIS and with the remainder of the task group. KUTIMAS reported well clear of the danger sector,

II

proceeding toward the formation at 15 knots. The two project aircraft reported on station. Ships took up their shot time headings as the final phase of the voice time broadcast was piped out over voice circuits. Personnel assembled topside to view the shot. There was still a feeling of doubt among them; a last minute delay would not have come as a surprise. But at 0617 on 26 April UNITE was detonated. Shot number four was finished, with only two to go.

7. The shock wave passed without harmful effect; the formation was well clear of the radioactive cloud. KATIE left her shot station and headed south. At 1200, with the cloud dispersed to the northwest, the ships moved in toward Bikini and BAKER prepared to launch helicopters for the initial radisafe survey. The survey was completed in the early afternoon. By 1530 the lagoon was declared safe for re-entry and the ships entered and anchored. The airstrip was debris-ridden to such an extent that flight operations could not be resumed, so at 1830 KATIE sailed for Eniwetok with CTF 7.3 and staff on board. The other task group units remained behind to resume work next morning to recover UNITE data and prepare for YAKINE.

8. With UNITE fired, KATIE was scheduled for detonation two days later, on 28 April. KATIE arrived at Eniwetok the morning of 27 April and discharged the Task Force Commander and headquarters staffs. The weather held, and when the 27th. was confirmed as KATIE minus-one day, CTF 7.3 with a small operational staff left Bikini by F4 and flew to Eniwetok, moved aboard KATIE, established

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

II

which and continued the MATAN schedule. For task group units were present. The plan for MATAN did not call for a pre-shot personnel evacuation; Eniwetok based personnel would view the shot from Perry and Eniwetok Islands, with the actual firing done from the control room on Perry. It was necessary only that MATAN be present to assist CTO 7.4 in aircraft positioning, that a S-1 be near Ujaling Atoll at shot time should evacuation there become necessary, and that sufficient vessels be in the vicinity to carry out an emergency personnel evacuation of Eniwetok Atoll should the need develop after the shot. Only SIXTH and YAG 39 were required in support of a scientific project, laying fall-out traps for Project 2.5a. One itinerant vessel, USS LEO (T-AM-67), was present at Eniwetok unloading cargo. To provide the necessary evacuation potential, it was planned to use ZWTS, LST, YAG 39, HNLBP (enroute from Bikini on a scheduled ferry trip) and the small craft present in the area. Since additional capacity was required, ALBATROSS was ordered to Eniwetok. She departed from Bikini at 1800 with orders to join the formation at sea.

9. All ships sortied from the lagoon before dark and took up stations southeast of the atoll. At midnight EPPHSON departed her patrol off Wide Entrance and set a course for Ujaling. The first VF-29 patrol aircraft reported negative search results and landed at Eniwetok. At 0200 HIGHWIND reported on station as aircraft control ship, 50 miles southeast of the shot atoll. By 0330 all five VF-29 aircraft had completed their searches of the area and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

II

reported no contacts. SI UI and YAG 37 finished laying buoys and reported on their shot stations. The task group was ready for the shot, but to no avail, for the weather was deteriorating. At 0942 word was received from the Task Force headquarters on Larry that KUSTAL had been cancelled for the day. Thus began a series of five sorties in all before KUSTAL was detected, three before ILLUMIN, and two afterward, with KUSTAL the final shot despite its early readiness.

14. ILLUMIN was recalled from Ujelang. ALEXANDER was ordered back to Elikini. After daylight the ships re-entered the lagoon and anchored. CGO 7.3 and his staff left ILLUMIN and, after conferences on Larry Island, boarded an aircraft for return to Elikini. Just prior to take-off word was received that the weather forecast had improved, and an attempt would be made again to fire KUSTAL next morning. The TG 7.3 operations center in ILLUMIN was reopened, ALEXANDER ordered to turn around and steam for Eniwetok again and the KUSTAL schedule repeated. SI UI and YAG 37 laid another string of fall-out buoys to windward of those laid the day before, still unrecovered. By 2000 all ships were again clear of the lagoon. PHILIP had sailed for Elikini on the ferry run and KUSTAL was now making the westbound trip from Elikini to Eniwetok. Again VP-29's aircraft searched the area. Shortly after midnight ILLUMIN had barely taken her departure for Ujelang, when the word came "KUSTAL delayed 48 hours". ALEXANDER was again turned around and sent back to Elikini, and ILLUMIN recalled. Patrol aircraft were or-

~~SECRET~~

II

desired to return to base where the last one landed at 0500. At daylight SI VI and LIT 507 commenced to search for fall-out buoys, to be joined later by T-10001 when she had returned the "hot" drone ship, T-340, to her mooring in the lagoon. At daylight other units re-entered and anchored. CGO 7.3 and his partial staff returned to the COMUSMACV at Ikinai, where preparations for LIT 507 were continuing. It was now 30 April and LIT 507 was scheduled to be ready on 5 May.

11. On 3 May a third sortie for LIT 507 was carried out. This time LIT 507 was required at Ikinai for tests in connection with reconfiguring LIT 507, so CGO 7.3 set up a temporary command post ashore on Parry Island. Two of LIT 507's air controllers were transferred to the TC 7.4 AS on Eniwetok Island to assist in control of the TC 7.4 aircraft from that point rather than LIT 507. USS LEP was still in the area, and had been joined by two other itinerants, USS ALBATROSS (AF-11) and USS ALBATROSS (AF-176). These, coupled with LIT 507, were considered capable of carrying out the emergency evacuation of Eniwetok should it become necessary. No fall-out buoys were laid; Project 2.5a had exhausted its supply on the two previous LIT 507 attempts and efforts to recover the buoys had not been successful. The ships departed the lagoon by 2000 and proceeded to their alert time stations, except LIT 507 who took up her patrol of wide areas. Patrol aircraft searches were underway. At 2100 it was learned that

two LCGs, manned by naval personnel attached to TC 7.2 and under control of the Army Task Group, were missing. LCG 45 had

~~SECRET~~

II

failed to return from a sweep of the chain of islands begun earlier in the day, and was long overdue. She was still affording her command could be heard repeatedly broadcasting requests for a radio check, but his radio receiver apparently was not functioning, and he did not give his position. Because of a report that a vessel, possibly an LCI, had been observed in Wide Entrance, LCI 46 had been dispatched by the Army to search there for the 45. It in turn got into difficulties and radio contact with it was lost. An all hands effort to locate the two boats was begun. At 2300 ENTERPRISE, ordered in for her patrol to search the Wide Entrance, found LCI 46 and towed it to its mooring. At midnight an Air Force helicopter passed over LCI 46 and the boat command reported the fact on his radio and finally gave his approximate position. The helicopter was advised and orbited over the boat until another SG 7.2 LCI took it in tow. Two F3-3 aircraft, scrambled to aid in the search, returned to base, and ENTERPRISE left the lagoon and headed for Ujelang. A few minutes later ENTERPRISE was again postponed when the weather forecast became unfavorable. All units were directed to discontinue the schedule for the night. The ships remained at sea and returned to the lagoon after daylight. It was now 4 May, YANKEE minus-one day, and the weather, while not favorable for a shot at Eniwetok, appeared suitable for one at Bikini. Plans were made for an early trip to Bikini and the Task Group Commander and his KJTB staff left Eniwetok at 0800 to return to CUSTARD for YANKEE.

II

12. The YAGS sortie was conducted without incident, but on a delayed basis. By 1930 & 1940 all ships except YAGS were at sea and on their shot line stations. EAGS was anchored off Egea awaiting the arrival of the LAGS carrying the firing party from the shot barge. They were experiencing difficulties with the firing circuit to EAGS and delayed their departure to remedy the trouble. EAGS was in position to the northeast of the atoll with the two YAGS, preparing to debark the YAG 40 crew and leave YAG 39 manned and in control. YAG 39 aircraft were airborne and carrying out the pre-shot search plan. By 1930 the firing party was aboard EAGS, the LAGS moved to barge off Egea and their crew picked up. EAGS sailing was still delayed while work continued on the firing circuit; at 2100 she was underway, and left the LAGS. By midnight all patrol aircraft had landed at Eniwetok, reporting the search sector clear of shipping. At 0145 two C-47s, ordered to YAG 39 for a special fall-out raft laying project for the YAG, took off at Eniwetok. About an hour later C-47 5854 requested that ships move out to 50 miles from the debarkation point, with a change of bearing to the westward, except for EAGS, who was to remain in her original station and move after the shot. EAGS, acting as aircraft control ship 50 miles from Eniwetok and slightly north of east, was shifted south to a westerly bearing and moved out to a range of 50 miles. At 0230 the YAG debarkation was completed and EAGS headed south to join the task group. The formation steamed

II

on station, the weather remained favorable, and at 0610 5 May, YAKIMO was fired.

13. At about 0700, when the danger of immediate fall-out had passed, the ships were ordered to close their range to Bikini and stand by for re-entry. When B-IR-53 reached a point ten miles from Eniwetok she launched helicopters and the initial radiote survey began. When reports of the survey were in it appeared that the lagoon water was too "hot" to permit a general return of the ships that night and a conference was called in B-IR-53 to discuss the situation. The Task Group Commander and his Operations Officer transferred to B-IR-53 by helicopter for the conference. There it was decided that B-IR-53 would return to Eniwetok that night, first making an exchange of passengers with the other major ships, and that other units would spend the night at sea. At 1600 B-IR-53, CURTIS, L-750 and B-IR-50 entered the lagoon and anchored off Eniwetok. B-IR-50 put boats in the water and saw to the passenger transfer. At 1930 S-750 was underway and left the lagoon, followed by the other units. By 2040 the lagoon was again empty. The ships remained at sea until daylight, when they closed the circle and carried out the re-entry plan. By 0615 the last ship was in. The day was spent in conferring with commanding officers on their roll-up responsibilities, and that night CURTIS sailed for Eniwetok. Upon her arrival there next morning, the Task Group Commander and his staff moved ashore to Perry Island and reopened the headquarters there for the final phase of CURTIS.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

II

The rest of the team group was diligently clearing up its roll-up
tasks with a view to early departure.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

III

REASONS OF DELAYS

1. The last shot in the CATTLE schedule as it was contemplated at the commencement of the operational period was to be detonated on 22 April. ETC, the last shot actually fired, was detonated approximately three weeks after that date, on 11 May. In retrospect the extension of the operation for three weeks beyond its planned length was not a considerable delay. A delay approaching that length of time was not entirely unexpected. Perhaps the most significant effects that the element of delay had upon the Navy Task Group were attributable more to the lack of any firm knowledge as to when the operation would end, than to the delay that actually occurred. The added factor of the delays on individual shots contributed substantially to the Navy's problems during CATTLE.

2. As the operation continued on with its end not in sight, and shots were postponed again and again because of unsatisfactory weather, apprehensions were felt for a number of reasons. Navy task group ships were due for shipyard overhaul in late May or early June. Some were scheduled for other employment, notably the four DDGs of Escort Destroyer Division Twelve who were to deploy to the Far East in June. The material condition of all units was deteriorating. Lack of repair facilities and the impossibility of scheduling adequate periods of upkeep, due in part to the many shot postponements, began to be felt in April and had an increasing effect as time went on. Ships began to suffer mechanical failures: USS 762 was released from CATTLE

SECRET

III

and lived hard for repairs; the AFM and DUs began to report difficulties. Many had minor gear that was inoperative and not replaceable until spares could be obtained. Aircraft engine hours built up and approached allowable operating limits. Stores laid on for a 120 day operating period began running low. Logistics problems multiplied. Indictments and obligated active duty periods for a substantial number of essential task group personnel were close to running out. The lack of recreation for the large numbers of naval personnel whose ships seldom left Elkins except to go to sea had an adverse effect on morale which, though slight, threatened to become a major problem.

3. As it turned out most of the difficulties that the delay brought into sight were never actually realized. The weather permitted the shots to be fired before the problems reached a serious magnitude. Most ships were able to sail in time to meet their commitments; by utilization of the delay periods for partial roll-up the majority of them were able to leave for their home bases much sooner after the final shot than had been planned. All were in need of extended periods of continuous upkeep upon arrival at their bases. A few personnel were flown to the United States for discharge; the numbers due for release did not become significant until June and most ships had completed redeployment early that month. The lack of recreation ceased to be felt on 11 May with HATAG fired and the prospect in sight of a quick departure from the forward area.

III

4. The delays on individual shots, accompanied as they were by frequent earlier followed by postponement, multiplied the tasks of every task group unit. A considerable number of them had to cancel scheduled operations on minus two day or early on minus one to permit completion before shot time, notably the AT's supporting scientific projects, and the patrol squadrons at Enajlein. All ships had to prepare early on minus one day for sortie from the lagoon. Fourteen actual sorties were carried out in getting off the six CATTLE shots; preparations were carried out to a considerable extent on several other occasions. To meet the situation the task group was maintained in a state of constant readiness, and preparatory operations originally scheduled for minus two day were modified so that they could be commenced on minus one. The constantly changing situation required extreme flexibility of the task group. Logistics were complicated. Supply ships and tankers carrying fuel force cargoes had to put in at Enajlein to await a break in the schedule to permit them to proceed to Eniwetok without getting involved in shot operations. Unloading at Eniwetok had to be carried out hurriedly; complicated fueling ^{and} were necessary to keep ships supplied and spare stocks on hand. Proper upkeep became impossible. The task group successfully accomplished its CATTLE mission only by virtue of long hours of hard labor, and the determination, reflected throughout all units, that no CATTLE shot would be delayed on account of the Navy.

IV

SECURITY

BADGES

1. The security badge system for controlling the entry of personnel to sensitive areas at Eniwetok and Bikini went into effect on 23 January 1954. The areas of particular interest to Task Group 7.3 where badges were required for admission were Perry Island at Eniwetok Atoll and Eniwetok Island (and the smaller islands joined to it by a causeway and forming the airstrip) at Bikini Atoll.

2. Ideally, no one was to be permitted entry to either of these islands without a badge. Actually, since the Task Group 7.5 security office where the badges were made and issued was located on Perry Island, Task Group security officers were authorized to issue temporary permits to personnel without badges permitting them to land on the island and proceed under escort to the badge office. There a temporary badge, good for a maximum of five days, was issued to an eligible individual pending completion of his permanent CASER badge. To be eligible for a badge an individual had to hold a valid AEC "Queen" clearance, or have been granted an interim military clearance for access to Top Secret material, pending processing of his "Queen" clearance application. Military Police personnel of Task Group 7.2 enforced the badge system, controlling the movements of personnel to and from sensitive areas.

SECRET

IV

3. The number of Task Group 7.3 personnel who would require continuous or frequent access to Perry or Eniwetok Islands was estimated before the deployment of naval units. To the extent that time permitted arrangements were made for them to receive their badges prior to departure from the United States, or immediately after their arrival at Eniwetok. In many cases however, such advance arrangements were not possible, due largely to the late nomination of some ships and units for CASTLE, and to the delays inherent in the task of assembling and mailing clearance applications and clearances, badge requests, photographs and badges, at a time when many task force units were in the process of departing for the forward area. As a result a substantial number of naval personnel arrived in the forward area with "Queen" clearances not yet completed, and their badges not yet requested. In most cases the lack of a "Queen" clearance was remedied temporarily by granting an interim military Top Secret clearance. But the lack of badges placed a heavy workload on the Task Group 7.5 Badge Office, in issuing both temporary and permanent badges to the same individuals. As the operation progressed it became apparent that too many "Queen" clearances had been requested for task group personnel, and that there was much inconsistency in the number requested by ships of the same type. Recommendations to remedy this situation have been incorporated in the CGO 7.3 Final Report.

4. A number of incidents arose during the early operation of the badge system in which the necessary movement of naval personnel in the forward area was severely, and unnecessarily, hindered. One affected the operation of the Bikini fighter aircraft detachment, three aircraft and personnel of VC-3, attached to PALBEO. The three aircraft were flown off PALBEO as she was arriving at Bikini. They landed on the Bikini airstrip, where the pilots were met by security Military Police. VC-3 was one of the units nominated too late to complete all security requirements, and the pilots did not have badges. They were placed under restraint and, after interrogation, escorted from the island and returned by boat to PALBEO, which had by then entered and anchored in the lagoon. The pilots and squadron maintenance personnel were then denied access to their aircraft. This stringent enforcement of the security system was due to a local interpretation of Commander Joint Task Force SEVEN security regulations by military police personnel at Bikini. Since the personnel involved had been granted interim Top Secret clearances pending processing of their "Queen" clearances, the Task Group Security Officer, CDR R. A. Klare, USNR, obtained badges for them at Eniwetok, flew with them to Bikini and resolved the situation by issuing the badges.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

5. A similar situation developed with respect to transient naval personnel attempting to rejoin or report to their units at Bikini. They arrived in the area, usually by air, on Eniwetok Island. From

IV

there they travelled by ship, or on the C-47 air shuttle, to Fikini. If they travelled by ship, there was no problem, since they could reach their ships without any need to land on Tinian Island. However, many of them rode the C-47 shuttle to Fikini. Most were not badged, nor were they eligible for badges, since they held only secret military clearances. Again, when the first unbadged transient personnel began arriving at Fikini airstrip they were placed under restraint, interrogated, and finally escorted, under guard, to the boat landing. This situation was resolved by mutual agreement between the headquarters concerned that transient naval personnel travelling under orders, but without badges, would as a routine matter be escorted between Fikini airstrip and the boat landing without being viewed with suspicion.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

NAVAL

6. Several Task Group 7.3 units were nominated for CASTLE so late as to render futile any attempt to obtain "Queen" clearances for their essential personnel. These were the relief LSTs, 825 and 1146, ordered up as temporary replacements for the two regularly assigned LSTs when they were laid up for repairs, and the units connected with Project 3.4, the Bureau of Ordnance mining project, a late addition to the CASTLE program. These latter were USS SENA, USS RECLAIMER, LST 1157, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit One (EODU-1), and a detachment of Naval Beach Group One. All were ordered to participate in CASTLE well after deployment of the task group had begun. Since it was recognized that "Queen" clearance processing normally requires a

minimum of 90 days, and usually 120 days, CTS 7.3 decided, with concurrence by CTF SEVEN, to waive the "Queen" clearance requirements for personnel of these units. Secret clearances were issued, and for those who qualified and required badges, interim or de facto Top Secret clearances were granted. No attempt was made to process them for "Queen" clearances.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

7. After the operation was well under way, CTF SEVEN requested that Task Group Commanders cause still pending "Queen" clearance requests from their personnel be reviewed with a view to possible cancellation, on the possible promise that it might now have become evident that some of the individuals did not require "Queen" clearances. The Task Group was canvassed and some twenty-five such persons were located. However, before agreeing to cancellation of their requests, CTS 7.3 stipulated that the initial investigation, consisting of the agency record check, first be completed in each case, and the individual's command notified of the result. If this were not done the cancellation would leave the individual present in the area in violation of the Task Force requirement that all personnel be cleared at least through Secret. His Commanding Officer would not have a favorable National Agency Check on which to base the required Secret clearance.

SECURITY RISKS

8. As clearance requests which were still pending when their subjects arrived in the forward area were processed, a small number of personnel considered to be potential security risks were discovered and transferred from the Task Force. An unfortunate and important instance of this type occurred in the case of the Commanding Officer

IV

of one of the ships. After operations had commenced a report was received from the AOC indicating possible suspect activity on the part of a relative, together with indications that a "Queen" clearance would not be granted. Due to the highly sensitive nature of the ship's mission, CAG 7.3 had no alternative but to request the Chief of Naval Personnel to order the Commanding Officer's immediate transfer from his command and from the area. This was done, and the ship's Executive Officer assumed command until the arrival of the ship's new Commanding Officer. In a later case of a similar nature, involving an Assistant Communication Officer of another ship, the situation was resolved by his transfer to less sensitive duties in his ship, rather than from the area.

9. The discovery of a diary belonging to an enlisted man attached to one of the ships brought about his prompt removal from the area. While diaries were not specifically banned by CNEF SOWE directives, the entry in them of data of a classified nature was prohibited, at least implicitly. The diary in question was discovered in a crew's compartment and turned in to the Commanding Officer. While the diary as yet contained no prohibited statements beyond the projected date for the first thermonuclear shot, its owner had stated in it his intention to record whatever events of Operation CISTEN he would witness or otherwise learn about. Facing his action on this expressed intention, his Commanding Officer transferred him immediately upon arrival at Eniwetok, as a poor security risk, after

revoking his secret clearance and obtaining a signed termination statement. The man departed the area under orders to report to the nearest Naval Receiving Station in the continental United States. Since he had been certified as a good security risk earlier to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, CINCPACFLT was notified of his changed status and transfer. CINCPAC directed that the man be transferred to a station remote from the U.S. until the end of CREST, to guard against any possible security violation. The man reached Receiving Station, San Francisco before he could be intercepted, but was immediately moved again, this time to a Naval activity on Guam.

10. Because of alleged homosexual tendencies of five enlisted personnel, it became necessary to revoke their security clearances and transfer them to Naval Station, Papeete, pending completion of the operational phase and review of the investigations.

SECURITY VIOLATIONS

11. Early in February a member of CREST's ship's company, on temporary duty with CGC 7.5, reported that during the fueling of a DDG by CREST in Bikini Lagoon he had observed two individuals on the DDG photographing the operation. When a check revealed that no photographing had been authorized at this time, CGC 7.3 reported the alleged incident to ComCrestDesDiv 12 and requested an investigation. A board was convened on USS ALBATROSS. The findings of the board were that there was no basis in fact for the charge, no evidence could be found to substantiate the report of unauthorized photography. Inci-

dent to the investigation a surprise locker inspection was conducted on KUKUKUK and some film, exposed and unexposed, was found in an enlisted man's locker. The film was delivered to CWP-BUK developed and found to contain no classified information.

12. Transient vessels entering the area to supply the Task Force were briefed on security requirements before arrival. Two minor security incidents arose aboard them early in the operation, both involving the sale of cameras in ships' stores. On one ship a camera was actually sold to a crew member of a task group ship. When the man turned in the camera to his Commanding Officer for custody until the end of CASUAL, the sale was reported to the Task Group Commander. Another transient ship entered the area with cameras on display in its ship's store. Arrangements were made to supplement the pre-arrival briefings by a briefing by the Boarding Officer upon each transient vessel's arrival at Eniwetok, and no further incidents of this kind occurred.

13. The security program within the task group was most successful. Only one letter was referred to in the press. It was written by a Corporal Don Whitaker of the Marine Corps. Whitaker viewed shot KUKUK from Kwajalein and the subsequent arrival there of natives evacuated from Rongelap, Utirik and Ailingnae. Since he was at no time a member of Task Group 7.3, his letter cannot be attributed to any failure in the security indoctrination program.

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~INFORMS OF ENEMY ACT~~ 1944
OPERATIONS

SECURITY MATTERS

1. A primary mission of Task Group 7.3 was to provide for the security of the Eniwetok/Eikini Danger Area. Forces assigned to accomplish this mission were the four DDGs of Escort Destroyer Division Twelve augmented by PC 1546, Patrol Squadron Twenty-Five, a six fighter aircraft detachment of Composite Squadron Three, and the Eniwetok Underwater Detection Unit.

2. CTG 7.3's ability to perform the security mission was limited by the strength of the forces provided for the purpose, and was still further reduced by the frequent diversion of security units to other duties as the Operation progressed. Within these limits, effective security measures were carried out on very nearly the level planned for the Operation, although often at the expense of adequate upkeep and training.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Surface Security Forces

3. KUPERCK, NICHOLAS, PHILIP, ZIESEMAN and PC 1546, under Commander Escort Destroyer Division Twelve, formed the Surface Security Unit. It was this unit's mission to prevent unfriendly forces from gaining intelligence of Operation CASTLE and to detect and counter hostile action against any unit of Joint Task Force SEVEN. Patrol and escort were the basic means by which the mission was accomplished. The surface craft were responsible for conducting

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ TA
~~INFORMS OF ENEMY ACT~~ 1944
~~OPERATIONS~~

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
patrols in the ocean area near the two atolls against any submarine or surface penetration. Continuous patrol coverage around both atolls was not possible with the number of ships available. As the most effective alternative the ships conducted intermittent patrols, varying the pattern of their movements so that hostile forces, if any were present, could not take advantage of an established but incomplete patrol pattern. The patrols were centered about the more sensitive areas at each atoll, i.e., near shot sites and off lagoon entrances. Whenever possible an in-port vessel was stationed as a sonar picket inside a lagoon entrance. The frequent absence of one or more ships on other missions made this practice irregular. In addition to their own patrols close inshore, the EDEs and PC were available to develop contacts farther out in the danger area when reported by patrolling aircraft of VF-29. Early in the Operation a EDE intercepted and diverted a Japanese fishing vessel approaching Eniwetok. Other than this, no unauthorized surface vessels were detected in the surface patrol area during the Operation. Several sonar contacts were made; all were classified, after investigation, as non-submarine.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

4. Surface escorts were provided in all inter-atoll movements of AUC devices, utilizing one or two screening ships, depending upon the number available. The escort destroyer division's initial task in CASUAL had been to screen CURTIS on her January voyage into the forward area, from a position off Hawaii to Eniwetok. No other ship movements were escorted.

~~SECRET~~
~~DECLASSIFIED DATA~~
~~RECEIVED~~

5. The surface security ships regularly performed a variety of minor functions concurrently with their patrol and escort tasks. They furnished the primary Search and Rescue surface potential at both atolls, although never called upon to effect any rescues. On each shot one DDG, usually KANSAS, was stationed approximately midway between the two atolls with Air Force Back Group personnel and a hoisting device aboard, to act as control ship for Task Group 7.3 aircraft, and as a communications relay. One DDG served as plane guard for KANSAS at sea during shot periods. Fighter aircraft at Eniwetok were controlled in flight from one of the DDGs stationed there.

6. The Surface Security Unit experienced a loss in effective strength throughout the Operation of about 25 percent due to the necessity of diverting its ships to duties unrelated to security. The first such incident took place when KANSAS was dispatched on 22 February, just prior to BEAVER, to assist in the search for a Canberra bomber lost between Kwajalein and Los Negros. She was returned to CGF 7.3 operational control on 3 March. For a considerable period after BEAVER some of the DDGs were temporarily relieved of their security duties and assigned a variety of tasks necessitated by the extensive post-BEAVER contamination in the area. PHILIP evacuated the natives from Rongelap and Ailinginas. KANSAS was sent to Utirik where she performed the same task, and then was returned to the contaminated atolls to conduct a radiological survey at locations where seaplane landings were impracticable. All DDGs, in their turn,

~~SECRET~~
~~DECLASSIFIED DATA~~
~~RECEIVED~~
191

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

were utilized as ferry craft, carrying passengers and light cargo between Eniwetok and Bikini during the several weeks the Bikini airstrip was closed or operating on a restricted basis after EAWO. PIC 145 was sent into the contaminated atoll area east of Bikini on a special survey mission. After the EAWO effects had lessened, surface security operations were returned to a nearly normal basis, except for the occasional employment of a PSE to assist in the search for Project 2.5a fallout collector buoys. As noted earlier, PG 1546 spent considerable time at Ailingmae and Rongerik on KONE, UJICE and TAMEE performing duties not connected with security. On all five F 354S sorties, LAFAYETTE was assigned the duty of standing by near Ujae Atoll to evacuate the natives there if severe radioactive fallout was received. The effects of over-employment of the PSEs during the period following EAWO was felt throughout the remainder of the Operation. The time lost from planned upkeep and maintenance schedules was never made up, and as operations continued over a longer period than had been planned originally the ships began to suffer engineering derangements of a serious nature. All were repaired, however, without outside assistance, and little operational time loss resulted.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Fighter Aircraft

7. Six F4U-78 day and night fighter aircraft were assigned to the task group for intercept duties. The aircraft with operating and support personnel were a part of Composite Squadron Three and ten-

~~UNCLASSIFIED DATA~~
~~10:13~~
~~ENERGY~~

permanently attached to ELMK for CASTLE. To provide intercept capabilities at both atolls three aircraft were assigned to each. The Eniwetok element was based on the airstrip there with a EEC at that atoll performing fighter control duties. Until BRAVO the Bikini element was based on the Bikini airstrip under control of ELMK's CIC. CIC officer personnel from both ELMK and CASTLE were assigned temporary duty throughout the Operation to the Task Group 7.4 Air Operations Center at Eniwetok, with the function of providing to ELMK and the Eniwetok fighter control EEC up-to-date information on flights transiting the area.

8. For BRAVO the Bikini element was moved back aboard ELMK, and prepared to conduct flight operations from the CVE during the period the ship was outside the lagoon for the shot. This element was never returned to Bikini. After BRAVO it was impossible for the aircraft to operate from the heavily contaminated airstrip. ELMK was needed inside the lagoon to conduct helicopter operations that were absolutely essential to continuation of the tests. It was concluded that the intercept capability at Bikini could not be maintained without seriously hindering the CASTLE program, and the three Bikini aircraft with their personnel were placed ashore at Eniwetok and joined with the three aircraft originally based there. The probable ineffectiveness of these propeller driven aircraft had modern enemy planes entered the area contributed to this decision. After BRAVO all six fighters continued to operate from Eniwetok.

~~UNCLASSIFIED DATA~~
~~10:13~~
~~ENERGY~~

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Tr- 1 [REDACTED]

9. Fighters were scrambled on four occasions, all in February, to identify air contacts that could not be readily identified as friendly. In each case the unidentified aircraft was on a prescribed flight path, but no flight plan information was available at the time of scramble. Two on the prescribed air route from Eniwetok to Eniwetok failed before intercept could be made. One was identified as friendly almost immediately after the scramble. One was intercepted and proved to be a VM-29 aircraft on patrol.

Patrol Aircraft

10. VM-29, with its 12 F4U-6 patrol aircraft, was deployed to Eniwetok for a dual mission, as the Pacific ready duty mining squadron, and as part of the CASTLE security forces. Under this arrangement CAG 7.3 was to have operational control of 6 of the aircraft at all times, and of all 12 during the 48 hours preceding CASTLE shots. The 6 aircraft thus freed from CASTLE periodically were to train at Eniwetok for their mining mission. This was done until JMWV when intensified CASTLE duties placed upon the squadron precluded continuation of the training at Eniwetok.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

11. VM-29's primary mission in CASTLE was to conduct search and anti-submarine patrols in the Eniwetok/Eikini Lagoon Area to detect and assist in denying entry to any unauthorized vessels or aircraft. Added to this mission, and supplanting it to some extent in relative importance after JMWV, was the one to conduct reconnaissance flights to detect shipping in expected or actual radioactive fallout areas during shot periods and warn it out of danger.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

12. To meet this combined requirement standard armed A-1J patrols were flown in the Danger Area throughout the Operation averaging one patrol every other night. In addition reconnaissance flights were flown preceding and following shots. The reconnaissance patrols covered two sectors; the Danger Area, and the sector along the bearing of the predicted path of the radioactive cloud, i.e. the significant sector. Initially the first reconnaissance flights took off from Eniwajalein early on shot day minus two. One aircraft searched the Danger Area continuously, relieving on station, until a few hours before shot time. One aircraft searched the significant sector on minus two day, returning to base upon completion of the search. This flight was repeated on minus one day. A third significant sector search was made by one aircraft on shot day, after the shot, if it was requested by COMF SEVEN. This was the general pattern of flights conducted for the first shot.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

13. As a result of the contamination of the Japanese fishing vessel Lucky Dragon which was caught in the widespread BRAVO fallout despite its position outside the predicted fallout area, the W-29 reconnaissance task was greatly increased on subsequent shots. The Eniwetok Danger Area, which before CASTLE had been enlarged to include Bikini Atoll, was further expanded, with a different area prescribed depending upon whether the shot was to occur at Bikini or Eniwetok. The number of aircraft to search the new areas was increased to three. The significant sector was now to be searched by two aircraft, bringing to a total of five the number of planes W-29 had to put in the

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~ 195
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
air for each shot time reconnaissance. The frequent delays and postponement of shots and the short notice on which they were so often fired made searches on nine or two day increments; the task force sometimes received its nine day status continuously for days while awaiting a break in the weather. Consequently the five plane intensified searches were made on nine one day only, and after a shot if required. Even then aircraft commenced many searches that were called off after late shot postponements. To reduce unnecessary flights to the greatest possible extent reconnaissance takeoffs were deferred until about 1330 on nine one day. No further continuation of itinerant vessels near the danger area occurred during CASUAL. As a precautionary measure CTO 7.3 was authorized to assume operational control of naval vessels passing through the fallout area to divert them if necessary before or after a shot.

14. Along with the increase in reconnaissance flights BRAVO effects brought additional employment to the patrol squadron in the form of three radiological survey flights over the atoll area to the eastward on BRAVO plus one day and a similar flight through the Gilbert Islands on BRAVO plus five days. These flights, combined with a shot day significant sector search employing two aircraft, a flight in support of Project 2.5a on shot day plus two and the task of furnishing aerial escort for a device movement from Eniwetok to Bikini on BRAVO plus two days required that CTO 7.3 retain control of more than the six aircraft originally intended for fulltime CASUAL employment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
196
196
BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] 15-16
Continued greater employment of the squadron after HAWK led to abandonment of the 6 plane concept, and all 12 aircraft were operated thereafter in support of CAMS.

15. As an additional phase of its security mission the patrol squadron provided continuous aerial escort of all A-1J device movements between Eniwetok and Bikini. W-29 aircraft escorted CAMS on the last leg of her January voyage to Eniwetok.

16. A special mission was assigned the squadron in support of the A-1J World Wide Fallout monitoring program. It required extended flights over the downwind atoll areas both before and after each shot for airborne monitoring purposes. In addition eight special flights were made in support of an A-1J Health and Safety Laboratory project instituted after the HAWK fallout experience.

Underwater Detection Unit

17. Harbor entrance protection in the form of an underwater hydrophone installation was provided only at Eniwetok Atoll. The high cost of this guarding the two Bikini entrances plus shortage of equipment and trained personnel led to a decision not to establish such a system at Bikini. The Eniwetok installation functioned efficiently throughout the Operation with no attempts at unauthorized entry into the lagoon detected. The frequent diversion of surface security vessels to other employment somewhat vitiated the UDU's effectiveness, since such a system can only detect and partially evaluate suspect contacts. At times no surface vessel with ASV capabilities was available to support the UDU.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

NAVY TASK GROUP 7.1

18. Seven scientific projects included in the Task Group 7.1 effects test program received individual support from units of the Navy Task Group in addition to the general support rendered by the Boat Pool, the helicopter squadron and all ships. Four projects required substantial support involving the almost exclusive use of specific task group units and often intermittent support from others; three were supported only by minor forces. All the projects requiring major support were Navy sponsored, included in the Department of Defense effects test program.

Project 1.4

19. Project 1.4 was an Office of Naval Research sponsored study of the behavior of a shock wave in water by means of ultrasonic pressure vs. time measurements. It participated in every shot except 8001. Navy Task Group assistance was required to lay barge, moor, service and recover instrument cans and record data teletermi to an aircraft at shot time. OT-57, a salvage lifting vessel constructed on an LST hull, a Navy manned F4U-2 aircraft equipped with teleterming devices, one of the five task group ATPs and a barge, YC 1001, were assigned to the task group to support this project. A Boat Pool LST was modified for the Project's use by addition of wooden decking, a guard rail and a small crane. By a special effort Ship'lt 1500-45 was completed to improve OT-57's lifting capability before the operation.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SECRET
RESTRICTED DATA
NOFORN
OT - 1045

Project personnel requested that a barge be made available for their use, after they had conducted preliminary mooring and recovery tests in Chesapeake Bay in October 1954. YC 1001 was assigned to the task group for this purpose. GODA was the AIF usually assigned to the Project, although GINA, APAGE and TAWANI assisted upon occasions. WILSON, whose primary function was support of Project 3.4, rendered some last minute assistance when it became necessary for the Project to make an all out effort on GINA.

21. Soon after her arrival in the forward area GINA reported that she was developing severe and extensive cracks in hull and bulkheads with the result that she had only one fresh water tank still capable of carrying potable water. She continued working with the Project while her difficulties were studied. A representative of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard flew to the forward area to inspect GINA. It was finally decided that she should be replaced, and another AIF, the HENDER, was ordered in to relieve her. HENDER arrived on 23 March and GINA departed the 26th. for shipyard repairs. Ironically, it was considered likely that the Shipalt installation was partially responsible for her difficulties.

22. In the rough lagoon waters supporting units experienced considerable difficulty in handling the moorings and five ton instrument cans and in working alongside the cans in small boats. HENDER's lack of the lift capability that the Shipalt provided to GINA was partially responsible, and the design of the mooring cans then difficult to handle.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PROJECT 2.3a

22. Project 2.3a, involving radioactive fallout studies conducted by the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, received heavy and excellent support from the task group. Two AFBs, AF ONE and AF TWO, were employed almost full time in the project. It was their task to lay free floating dan buoys equipped as fallout collectors downwind from the detonation point outside the lagoon, then relocate them after the shot and recover them. In case of a shot postponement it was necessary that the buoys be recovered, serviced and repaired, immediately if the postponement was a brief one. With the great number of postponements that occurred in GASTIN this task became a heavy one. Even though the buoys were equipped with special radio transmitters, and the AFBs with special radio direction finding equipment, the buoys were hard to locate. The radio signal emitted by the buoys weakened greatly after several hours in the water, and was not of very great assistance in the hunt. F4-49 aircraft and the security BUCs were often called upon to help in the search when they could be spared from other, more pressing duties. Once located, the buoys were hard to handle in the rough seas. The hand

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ling problem was made more difficult by the design of the antennas that projected from the tops of the buoys; shaped like short umbrella spokes the antennas enlarged the eyes of personnel handling the buoys and were themselves easily damaged. Fallout studies inside the lagoon were made by means of raft-borne collectors. A crane-equipped LCU handled the rafts. Despite the difficulties involved every effort

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~PROHIBITED FROM~~
was able to assist this project in the successful accomplishment of its mission. It was considered the most vital of those sponsored by the Department of Defense.

23. An interesting development involving this project was the discovery by busy hunting ships as the operation progressed that sharply defined patterns of low level radioactive contamination existed in the ocean area far downwind after a shot, in the water itself. On the GUTEX shot, with all their fallout buoys expended, personnel of this project assisted AEC Health and Safety Laboratory personnel in a study of the phenomenon, with the aid of SH-34, HUDDA and F-29 aircraft, monitoring and plotting the contaminated areas and obtaining water samples for analysis.

Project 346

24. The Navy Bureau of Ordnance had obtained approval late in the GUTEX planning period for inclusion of a program to test the neutralizing effect of high yield detonations on naval mines, - Project 346. The ships UNDA, a light minesweeper; KACAHUETZ a salvage vessel; and LST 1157, with two LCMs from Naval Beach Group One, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit One were assigned to the task group specifically to support the project. Arriving late in the operation, the project participated in only one shot, UGIR. The initial intention was to make a preliminary test by planting a few mines on one shot with the main effort on a later one. Uncertainty over the shot schedule led to the decision to dispense with the initial test, and on UGIR the

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~PROHIBITED FROM~~
BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~FROM THE LIBRARY ACT 1946~~

ships laid inside the lagoon seven strings of mines (123 in all),
plaster filled but with complete mechanisms. One hundred mines were
recovered after the shot, many of them contaminated. All obviously
damaged mines were jettisoned after careful examination and photo-
graphy; forty-eight in good condition were returned to Pearl Harbor
for study. All recovery work was completed before YANKEE.

25. Project 6.4, the Navy Bureau of Ships sponsored project for
proof testing atomic warfare countermeasures, has received extensive
coverage in OTO 7.3 Final Report, and also in the Radiological Safety
chapter of this installment, so a description of the project is omitted
here. The drone ships, Y-39 and YAG-47, especially reactivated from
the Maritime Administration "mothball" fleet, were necessarily devoted
mainly exclusively to this project. They were however used for another
purpose, at least in planning, when their evacuation potential was
dependant upon in some of the earlier ROST R sorties, thereby permit-
ting other units to continue essential work at Bikini. YAG 37 was
actually employed in an early ROST R sortie laying fallout buoys for
Project 2.5c. As tender to the YAGs, HMMA was employed almost ex-
clusively on Project 6.4, assisted at shot times by YANKEE. A FV3
essentially equipped to control the drones was used entirely on this
project. Two helicopters of HHC-362 were also fitted with drone con-
trol gear to back up the FV3 if necessary.

~~Major Support~~ **BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

26. Boat load boats assisted two of the three projects requiring
major support. Project 2.6, a study of water waves sponsored by the

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~FROM THE LIBRARY ACT 1946~~

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~1043~~

V

Scripts in titration of Oceanography, required an LCU especially equipped with diving, divers, a stern anchor and a fathometer to lay pressure-line gauges on submerged coral heads in Bikini Lagoon. Stanford Research Institute's Project 3.2 used an LCU modified by installation of a portable fall meter, a gyro-compass with three repeaters and a test wire spanning reel to make accurate fathometer surveys of the ENEB, UNIK and ENK craters. This LCU was also used in routine duties with the portable special equipment experimentally removed. A Project 6.6 station at Rongerik Atoll was operated during UNIK and ENK by Project personnel who lived on LC 1546 and serviced the station during brief periods ashore on contaminated Eniwetok Island. LC 1546 was stationed at Rongerik on these two shots with personnel of this Navy Signal Laboratory Project aboard, together with Air Force personnel who operated the Rongerik weather station in the same manner.

TRANSPORTATION OF DEVICES

27. ENEB ENK moved three barge loaded devices from Eniwetok to Bikini; those for ENK, UNIK and ENK. LC 762 moved the device for ENK, and LC 551 portions of the one for ENK, since they were not mounted on a barge and, as a ship, could be better transported by LC. GATCO, especially modified to transport and store material of this sort, carried portions of several devices between the two atolls.

17

28. A study of the shot barges' configuration as compared to ENEB ENK's hull dimensions conducted long before the operational

23

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~1043~~
BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED DATA

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1946

period began and led to the conclusion that movement of the barges in E 12 G 7 was practicable. Some adaptation was necessary, and since the design of the barges was already firm, the adaptations were made in E 12 G 7. Prior to her departure from San Diego the after section of her super-deck (over the well), was removed and left behind. Two more sections of this deck were taken off at Eniwetok and stored on Perry Island until the end of the operation. By retaining these two sections until her arrival in the forward area E 12 G 7 was able to carry a larger portion of the East Pool's stores and equipment. A special cribbing and shoring had to be installed in the well before each barge was loaded, and removed after the barge was discharged. The removal of the super-deck throughout most of the operation handicapped personnel based on E 12 G 7, since by its removal she lost her helicopter landing platform.

29. Before E 12 G 7 loaded a barge for actual detonation purposes she had benefitted by the experience gained in rehearsals described in an earlier installment. As a result of this experience a standard pattern was evolved for device movements in E 12 G 7. On a typical movement mission she transferred her East Pool personnel and boats to Eniwetok at Eniwetok, received cargo laden LSTs in her well and left for Eniwetok during the afternoon two days before the device was required at Eniwetok. Upon arrival at Eniwetok and morning she anchored off Perry Island on a berth close in and well sheltered, floated down and discharged her LSTs, pumped up and installed the

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED DATA

special cribbing, assisted by 33 7.5 personnel. Then the cribbing was complete she again floated down, took aboard up to two 100s loaded with cargo, and then was ready to receive the barge. Shortly after when the device barge was brought out, placed in position astern, and warped into place over the special cribbing. BNSL CRANE then pumped up, installing shores, chains and other hardware to secure the barge in the well. She was then ready for the movement to Bilboa.

30. On arrival at Bikini BULL CL-70 proceeded to the only satisfactory lee the atoll afforded, that of Bikini Island. Once inside the lagoon she commenced flooding down. When she was anchored and ready to discharge the barge, securing cables were cast loose and the barge was started out of the well by LCLs. It was then taken in tow by an ATF and delivered to the shot site where LCLs secured it in moorings prepared earlier.

31. On a typical LST device movement the assigned vessel beached on Larry Island two days before the device was required at Milini, and commenced loading cargo to be carried in addition to the device. With this loading completed next day about noon the device, loaded in its special trailer, was towed to the LST by tractor. The complete equipment, device, trailer and tractor, was taken aboard the LST, secured for the voyage with specially fabricated cables and chains and screened from observation by canvas awnings. The LST then retraced and sailed that afternoon for Milini. There the LST beached on Bulman Island and

[REDACTED] DATA
[REDACTED] 1040
[REDACTED] 1040
[REDACTED] 1040
an LST beached alongside. The entire device unit then was taken from the LST, loaded in the LCB, transported to the right island and there disembarked.

Security During Movement

32. All device movements between islands were escorted. In each case a Task Unit was formed, commanded by the senior officer in the vessels involved, composed of the ship transporting the devices, one or more escort vessels, and a VP-27 patrol aircraft. The LST or LCB received its surface escort prior to the commencement of loading, and retained it until the device had been discharged. In the case of LCB movements the escorting vessel remained until the barge had left the LCB, after which the normal security measures in effect at Bikini prevailed. For the LST the escort was terminated when the device was off-loaded at Eniwetok. Security guards for the device within the LCB or LST were provided from CV 2105's Marine detachment. It had originally been planned that this be a responsibility of the Task Group 7.2 Military Police detachment, but use of Marine Corps personnel, since they were available, was considered more appropriate. The Marine guard relinquished the watch to Military Police personnel when the device was discharged at Eniwetok Island by an LST, but continued guarding barge-loaded devices until the pre-shot evacuation on shut day minus-one. Enroute to Bikini the LCB or LST steamed at maximum speed under conditions of darkness ship and radio silence, without resort to weaving or zig-zagging. All ships in the Task Unit had full boiler

23
BEST AVAILABLE COPY

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] DATA
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
or engine power available for use in emergencies. Movement reports were made by Operational Immediate classified messages. The Tuck Unit Commander and Commanding Officer of the transporting ship had the usual instructions for jettisoning the device should circumstances require it. Scientific personnel accompanied the device to tend it and act in an advisory capacity. All device movements were completed in a satisfactory manner.

11.7.2.2.2

33. During the operational period the shortcomings of the LST beach at Eniwetok Island, Bikini continued to present a major problem. Every LST that beached there during the operation - four vessels in all - were used at various times - was damaged on this beach. Despite the hazard involved the LSTs beached and retracted at Eniwetok 17 times between 31 January and the detonation of RDS on 7 April, moving over 6500 measurement tons of cargo between the two atolls.

34. There was no remedy for the difficulties presented by the condition of this beach. The coral bottom with its unsuitable gradient, the short pier, the strong winds from the port quarter and the undesirable movement of sand and coral fragments on the lagoon bottom by wave action and currents were a combination that could only be endured out of operational necessity, not corrected. The change in the shot schedule that moved RDS ahead to 7 April in effect solved the problem, at least as far as Operation C-111 was concerned. The shot, fired on the western end of Eniwetok near the LST landing, obliterated the pier and eliminated any further need for beaching on the island.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED DATA

1045

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1954

35. Fortunately, no ship incurred damage on Indian coastline to put it out of commission. The only severe bottom damage incurred by an LST bearing was received by LST 321 at Kanyakumari early in the operation. LST 762 was placed in drydock status for 20 days to replace an imperative main generator and for other repairs, and cancelled the operation with a broken main shaft, but these casualties were not directly attributable to her repeated beachings at Madras. But all LSTs had their operating efficiency impaired by springing leaks, holed hulls, and lost masts. The most significant beaching incident of Indian coastline on LST 762 plus three days, when LST 325, beached and fully laden with cargo being evacuated from Madras, was unable to get off the beach. Efforts to assist her to retreat were unsuccessful until 36 hours later, at 10 0 on 3-2, when on a high tide, with all cargo unloaded, the concerted efforts of two ATFs, 15 LSTs and her engines backing full freed her from the beach. The action of the currents had built up a sand bar under her, just forward of the stern, while she was loading. This sand bar continued to add to the LSTs' troubles throughout the period.

RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY

36. During the latter half of the CAMEL test series, radiological safety in the task group became a relatively serious problem. The task group's experiences with radioactive contamination in 1954 made all subsequent contacts with this phenomenon appear minor, as they actually were in comparison. No ships received any significant

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA~~

contamination from fallout on either UNIK, YAGRE or HOUTA.

Occasional operations in slightly contaminated water were conducted but without ill effect on either ships or personnel. Some VF-29 aircraft received slight contamination in their post-shot flights, as did some of the HH-362 helicopters.

Small Craft

37. The Boat Pool LOGs, and the two barges, YV 9 and YV 1001, that were customarily moored or anchored in Bikini Lagoon during shots were again contaminated on UNIK and YAGRE. The intensities after UNIK averaged between 110 and 210 mr/hr, but the contamination was particularly tenacious and was not materially reduced by salt water flushing. Repeated scrub-downs with strong solutions of detergents and lye and wire brushing of "hot" spots brought the levels down sufficiently to permit operation of the craft on UNIK plus three days. The intensities after YAGRE were much higher, with average readings of about 3 R/hr and some as high as 7 R/hr. Initial decontamination measures reduced the levels to a 350 mr/hr average, but thereafter intensive efforts reduced them only very slowly. Complete decontamination at this time would have required extensive removal of the surface paint or rust with rotary powered wire brushes. This was not attempted. By the time they reached Pearl Harbor under tow it was expected that the combined action of radioactive decay and constant

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

209

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED DATA~~
~~1040~~
~~1040~~

while in a fallout area. Difficulty was experienced in maneuvering the two ships close enough together to obtain a true comparison. ICG 37's radiation gear was effective enough in holding down her contamination levels to permit her to be manned by a skeleton crew during the latter shots. This was done successfully on both ILLINOIS and YAG-40.

37. Decontamination of the ICG was a wholesale effort supported by large numbers of personnel from other task group ships. The operations were carried on with the ICGs at anchor in Makinok lagoon and were essentially a large scale application of the methods employed in decontaminating the fleet fuel tanks. After ILLINOIS an intensive decontamination was carried out to permit the ICG crews to live aboard on the return voyage to the United States. By 25 May average topside readings on ICG 37 were down to 7 mr/hr with average interior and below deck readings of 2 mr/hr. It was expected that these levels would be down to 4 mr/hr and 1 mr/hr respectively upon arrival in Pearl Harbor, and to 3 mr/hr and 0.5 mr/hr upon arrival in San Francisco. ICG 40's intensities were considerably higher: 40 mr/hr topside and 8 mr/hr inside and below decks on 25 May. Intensities in these locations were expected to be 25 mr/hr and 4 mr/hr respectively at Pearl Harbor, 15 mr/hr and 2 mr/hr at San Francisco. Many ICG personnel had already received dosages in excess of 3.9 R; CDR SCOTT granted permission for them to accumulate larger dosages in order that the voyage could be made. ICG 37 personnel were expected

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~UNCLASSIFIED DATA~~
~~1040~~
~~1040~~

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
V

to receive between 1.5 and 1 R on the trip to Pearl Harbor, Y C 40 personnel between 3 R and 5 R. Their total dosages after the trip, while high compared to the Task Force Limitation (approximately 3.9 R, would be well below 15 R and would represent no health hazard. Two men with high dosages were transferred from the LAGO to the K-12A before departure from Eniwetok. Additional transfers were to be made at Pearl Harbor where replacements could be obtained, if actual accumulated dosages warranted such action. Stringent radiological safety precautions were prescribed for the voyage. K-12A and the Y C 40 departed Eniwetok 26 May.

Radiological Clearances

4. All other task group units left the forward area with radiological contamination no substantial problem. They were all granted operational or final radiological clearances prior to or shortly after their departure. A few had "hot" spots requiring handling radiological equipment during the roll-up; these were to be decontaminated enroute. It was not expected that any would require shipyard decontamination. Personnel dosages, while they had continued to increase slightly after ENVO, generally remained well within the Task Force limit, except in the case of personnel who had approached or exceeded this limit early in the operation.

Task Force Operations

11. The Navy Beach Pool operated a total of 29 boats; 5 LCU; 17 LCB; 1 LCT; 2 LST; 1 AVB; 1 MCB. 1 LCB was assigned to the Underwater Detection Unit at Eniwetok, and 2 LCBs and the 1 LCT

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] RESTRICTED DATA
[REDACTED] 1040
[REDACTED] 1040

were stationed there also, supported by the Task Group 7.2 Navy detachment, and operated at various times by the Navy staff ashore on Navy Island, Inter-Island Harbor Control, and S.I. Island. The remaining boats formed the main body of the Boat Pool, based at Bikini. The Boat Pool was under an Officer-in-Charge, LT E. S. Nelson, USN, with three officer assistants, and approximately 205 enlisted personnel manning and maintaining the boats.

42. Primary support for the Boat Pool was furnished by EMLB 6076. To provide additional work and storage space a covered barge (IX) had been brought to Bikini, and was fitted out by Boat Pool personnel. During periods when EMLB 6076 had to be absent from Bikini, EMLB 6076 usually took over her boat pool support duties. Upon occasions EMLB 6076 and LST 702 performed this task.

43. The last Boat Pool boats and personnel arrived in the area in EMLB 6076, on 20 January 1954. Advance groups of boats and personnel had arrived in November and December 1953. The Boat Pool had overhauled its boats completely before departure from Coronado; all were expected to be one hundred percent operational two days after arrival in the forward area. A few minor mechanical difficulties occurred the first few days, but all boating requirements were met. Boat crews were briefed on Bikini atoll conditions, and sent out on jobs with the civilian contractor's boats, already operating at Bikini for some time, in order to acquaint them with the soundings of various islands, and the currents, time and distances and navigational

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~DATE 08-19-2010 BY [REDACTED]~~

1

[REDACTED]

BEST

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~
made but they landed on. Ships at anchor could not stow their boats to board without danger of lines parting or floats carrying away, and in any event their boats were too small to carry more than a few passengers safely except on unusually calm days. As a consequence ships depended on the boat pool for a great deal of their boating requirements.

46. The LCU's were the "workhorses" at Riddell. They made a total of over 1200 trips, carrying 4400 tons of cargo and over 47,000 passengers. While many of the trips were short ones, from ship to nearby ship or island landings, these figures represent noteworthy accomplishments by the boat pool.

47. The boat pool's LCUs, except for LCU 1225, performed a variety of services, of which about 75% involved carrying cargo between landings and other islands, and to ships. LCU's also laid and picked up buoys, carried recreation parties and launched and picked up DUKWs. LCU 1225 was employed almost exclusively in support of Project 3.2. On several occasions LCUs loaded with equipment were lifted in DUKWs on RV's and carried to Eniwetok and back. On 1 February 1954, LCU 1225, towed by an ATF, carried Air Force equipment to Eniwetok Atoll to complete the job of establishing a weather station there, begun in January by LCU 591. Many LCU's assisted in rolling up this station after R. OTCN was fired.

48. The two LCU's and motor whale boat were used to transport boat crews between ships and the boat moorings, and for a variety

~~SECRET~~

235

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED DATA

10/13

7

of odd jobs in the anchorage off Eniwetok. The AR was turned over to SALT II for SALT duties, and occasionally made special runs in the lagoon, although the waters were usually too rough for her to be considered as a comfortable means of transportation.

49. The SALT Pool was able to maintain its boats in full operational condition only because it had come to the forward area with a complete supply of spares, adequate maintenance personnel and the equipment necessary to effect extensive boat repairs. The boats' employment in rough seas with frequent landings on rough coral beaches resulted in recurring minor hull damage. To keep the boats available for day-to-day use the maintenance and repair work was normally done at night. Each boat received an inspection before securing for the night, and necessary repairs were accomplished before its first scheduled run next morning. Maintenance and repair personnel logged a total of over 17,000 hours work on the boats during the operation. At Bikini they performed considerable maintenance and repair on Holmes and Narver boats, a service Holmes and Narver reciprocated by repair of Navy boats at Eniwetok.

CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION

50. The 12 HH-34 helicopters, 20 pilots and 150 ground personnel assigned to C-117A from HHS El Toro, California, with temporary assistance from 3 AR Force helicopters prior to HMRV, effectively carried out the Navy Task Group's mission to operate a ship to shore and inter-island helicopter lift system at Bikini to support

216 BEST AVAILABLE COPY

RECEIVED DATA

10/13

~~SECRET~~ ~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

pre-shot operations and post-shot flights for damage survey and recovery of scientific data.

51. The helicopter operation was attached to B-10 for the operation. Prior to M. 1, 6 aircraft were based ashore on Eniwetok Island with pilots and assigned ground crews. Assisted by the Air Force planes they flew the continuous unbroken schedule during daylight hours, one clockwise, one counter-clockwise, around the atoll, with stops on islands where work camps were established. Passenger space for personnel of CG 7.1 and CG 7.5 was controlled by a civilian dispatcher employed by Task Group 7.5 who worked in close coordination with the B-10 only officer at the Eniwetok Island helicopter pad. The remaining aircraft were retained aboard B-10 and used for ship-to-shore flights and special flights coordinated through CG 7.1 operations representative on Eniwetok. The aircraft were rotated between ship and shore for maintenance which was all performed aboard B-10. In addition to the CG only one ship, B-10, had a helicopter platform in place. Since she was ashore at Eniwetok during this period the shipboard terminal of most ship-shore flights was B-10. YF-9, a barge provided for use as a helicopter landing platform, was anchored near B-10, landing the shot site, to provide helicopter service to personnel based aboard. On later barge shots the YF served the shot barge in a similar manner.

52. After B-10 the Air Force helicopters were returned to B-10, and all local air transportation at Eniwetok was provided by

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~1963~~
the Landing Helicopter, operating off H.M.H.B. Operations were directed by the CTG 7.1 operations section in close liaison with CTG 7.1 upon whom representatives now based aboard L.H.M.B. to coordinate TG 7.1 and TG 7.5 lift requirements.

53. The helicopter airlift was conducted without a serious personnel casualty. The major accident occurred on 23 January when an aircraft crashed on deck upon take off from the H.M.H.B., due to a mechanical failure. Passengers and crew escaped with minor bruises. The Landing Helicopter officer was slightly injured when he was struck by a fragment of the rotor blade. The aircraft made a forced landing on a runway at Bikini Island on a runway some one day while evacuation for the ship was in progress. No one was injured; the aircraft was repaired and returned to H.M.H.B. without any significant delay. With most flights conducted over water, and many over extremely radioactive areas, BuAero exercised close control during all flights, with helicopters making frequent position reports. Landing helicopters often accompanied aircraft on missions over "hot" areas.

NAVIGATIONAL AID

54. Prior to arrival of the task group in the forward area a navigational buoyage system had been installed at Bikini and channels and turning basins wiredragged and marked. A special limited edition of the 10 Chart for Bikini Atoll had been prepared and issued to task group ships. Work charts had been completed with CTG 7.5 for relocation of structures on islands of the atoll for use as navigational

218

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~REDACTED~~
~~REDACTED~~ **UNCLASSIFIED DATA**
~~REDACTED~~ **REDACTED** 1963
~~REDACTED~~
also. Even before the first shot of the series two buoys were missing, presumably due to the high winds and rough seas that prevailed at Bikini. Thereafter, wind, weather and the blast and water wave effect of the shots severely crippled the buoyage system and eliminated many of the shore structures that ships had been using for navigation. The blast and water wave following shots had no appreciable effect on unlighted buoys at all distant from the zero point, but damaged many of the lighted buoy mechanisms even at relatively great distances from the detonation. Lighted buoys close to the shots usually had their upper structures blown away, and often sank several days after the damage was received, presumably from slow leaks. The lack of lighted buoys made night movements in the lagoon and through the entrance particularly hazardous. For this reason night movements were held to an absolute minimum. The absence of good landmarks made offshore navigation difficult.

55. There was no arrangement for repair or replacement of buoys by the Coast Guard as the operation progressed, nor was there a supply of replacement buoys available. Limited repairs were undertaken by B-12345, C-12345 and the Boat Yard under the Bikini Harbor Buft, using buoys recovered after they sank or went adrift. When night movements were planned as they were in surface for some of the later shots at Bikini, compass marker lights were placed on essential but unresponsive lighted buoys.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DATA
[REDACTED] 10/10/50

56. JTO 7.2 has made a detailed report of the condition of the Elni buoyage system to the Navy Hydrographic Office for reference and is preparing the lesson for future operations.

LESSON 57

57. Consider the time and expense went into the provision of adequate mooring buoys at both atolls, particularly at Elni. There a full set of small craft moorings was planned before the operation began, along with three telephone equipped large ship mooring buoys. During the operational period the small craft moorings were put to good use, in fact one of them would not have been used. Up until the first shot the large buoys at Elni were used regularly by ROSE CRUISE and Elni, and by Elni when she was at Elni. After Elni little use was made of the telephone buoys. The telephone equipment was rendered inoperative by the shot, and the frequent surges and uncontrolled movements to which the large ships were subject made anchoring more practical than mooring. Elni radio telephone equipment and other voice radio circuits effectively substituted for the loss of the telephone system, except that they lacked the security of the telephone system. The large ship moorings at Elni were little used since after Elni the ships were seldom there long enough to warrant mooring. The in-port LST at Elni was the principal user of the telephone buoys there, regularly mooring to one off Elni Island.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VI

LOGISTICS

1. In preparation for CANTAS all ships and units had been directed to prepare for a 120 day operational period at a location remote from supply points. All units were to be self supporting to the greatest extent practicable, with the large ships assigned responsibility for the support of smaller ships whose capabilities for self support were limited.

2. CINCUSCANT exercised his responsibility for logistic support of Joint Task Force Seven through his principal logistic agent, CANTASUSC. Supply of aeronautical material for naval air units was the responsibility of CANTASUSC. CANTASUSC was assigned responsibility for coordinating the logistic support provided by West Coast activities.

REFRESHMENTS

3. All refrigerated provisions were ordered through CANTASUSC and shipped by Naval Supply Center, Oakland in regularly scheduled CANTASUSC refrigerator vessels as cargo consigned to the individual requisitioning ships. Reefers' schedules were adequate, the larger ships with adequate storage space seldom lacked fresh or frozen provisions in good condition. Smaller ships with insufficient storage space to maintain stocks between supply ship schedules had to depend upon the larger ships for assistance they were not always able to give, and as a consequence were not always as well supplied.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

VI

2. Requisitions for dry provisions, clothing, mail stores, ship store stocks, general supply materials and spare parts were submitted to Naval Supply Center, Orland and ships were assigned cargo in regularly scheduled cargo ships. Their schedules too, were adequate, but an abnormal length of time was required to obtain delivery, often from 30 to 60 days after submission of requisition. Unusually high usage rates on many items led to heavy requisitioning despite the 150 day supplies stocked for the operation. Unexpected developments such as the full-time presence of large numbers of excess personnel aboard ship at Bikini after E1 V5 contributed to this high usage. Loss of the recreation area placed a heavy drain on ship store stocks of recreational gear. Recombination operations consumed huge stocks of supplies. Unable to foresee a definite ending date to the operation, ships were forced to continue ordering to keep adequate supplies on hand.

3. A number of problems arose concerning delivery of supplies and refrigerated cargo. The frequent scheduling and postponements of slots complicated the entry of supply ships into the area and their movements between the two atolls and on to their next ports, requiring careful monitoring of their operating schedules. At Bikini the frequent movements of ships on short notice made it difficult to schedule supply ships into that atoll with sufficient time to unload. Since boat pool assistance was needed in the unloading process, care had to be taken that the unloading did not interfere with essential boat schedules in support of the test operation. Loading consisted

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

202

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

cargo without knowledge of consignees' operational commitments at the time of unloading inevitably resulted in the necessity of tunneling for stores, overhauling of cargo and unnecessary handling. Transshipment of cargo between atolls was a normal occurrence. There were no adequate and secure facilities ashore at Eniwetok for temporary storage of heavy stores offloaded for transshipment. Losses due to misplacement, pilferage and exposure to the elements resulted. Occasionally supply ships carried two scheduled assignments of provisions for a single ship, beyond the capacity of the consignee to receive. Adequate shore storage would have benefitted the task group greatly.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

6. Replenishment of fuel presented equal difficulty. The complications arising from short postponements and frequent ship movements at Eniwetok affected refueling even more than they did the other supply vessels, since it was usually necessary for the larger ships to get underway and remain at sea for several hours to receive fuel. Wind and the lagoon currents caused ships at anchor to yaw over a wide arc, and a frequent swell made lying alongside undesirable. Fueling schedules were developed to meet the situation prevailing upon the arrival of a tanker, and by judicious topping off of smaller ships by larger ones prior to the tanker's arrival the number of ships refueling directly from SHARPO tankers was held to a minimum. ALBATROSS, the LST transport, presented a particular problem, for she had never fueled at sea, and one refueling was essential before her

departure. Eventually an opportunity was found to send her to Latakia where she was fueled at anchor by T-127.

7. At Latakia the lack of shore storage for Navy special fuel oil presented a problem. Storage effort was provided by T-129 with a capacity of only 600 barrels. Between monthly SALTAS calls the DDEs at Latakia could soon exhaust the T-1's fuel supply. With US-100, US-101 and US-102 at Latakia after 28-30 the DDEs were left without a source of fuel short of a trip to Latakia to fuel from one of the larger ships. Considerable planning to take advantage of scheduled inter-ship movements and careful expenditure of the T-1's supply were necessary to keep the Latakia DDEs fueled.

UNFORESEEN SUPPLY

8. T-129 encountered an unforeseen supply problem that was solved with the assist use of Naval Station Eniwetok and Naval Air Station, Barber's Point supply activities. The T-129 was a new aircraft; the usage data from which allowance lists for the Operation were derived was based on estimates, and experience with similar type aircraft. As soon as operations commenced it became obvious that stocks of many items were inadequate. Within the first 60 days the squadron had to submit almost 1500 AFM requisitions. Seventy percent of the requisitioned items were furnished on a ^{copy} issue basis by the Eniwetok base supply department, backed up by Barber's Point. The remainder were furnished through regular supply channels. As the Operation progressed the squadron procured material through regular channels on a priority basis and built up its own supply stocks.

VI

MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR

9. Repairs to ships, boats and aircraft in the forward area were accomplished without the facilities of a repair ship or base ashore. The principle of self-sufficiency applied here as well. Ship maintenance and repairs in small ships were beyond the capacity of the ship's force, BATT GRP, BATT, BATT or COMBAT furnished assistance. The Task Force had its own repair section, supported by BATT GRP. They assisted Holmes and Kerver in effecting repairs to the contractor's boats at Bikini, and in return received some assistance from Holmes and Kerver in the repair of Task Force boats at Eniwetok. The aviation units had their own maintenance organizations. In most cases ships were able to effect repairs successfully without outside assistance. Holmes and Kerver aided LST 762 in installing a generator at Navy expense. LST 762, LST 551 and COMBAT were forced to return to Pearl Harbor for major repairs. JMWAVE obtained repair assistance at Naval Station, Eniwetok. The biggest problem in maintenance and repair was the impossibility of ships observing proper upkeep schedules. All suffered to some extent from this lack, with the many smaller ships, the LSTs, ATs and DDs suffering the most.

RECREATION

10. A highly successful and well organized recreational area for the task group was established early in the operation on Bikini Island. Task group personnel built the recreational facility under the direction of Commanding Officer, USS BULLDOG. Funds, equipment

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

VI

and athletic gear were borrowed from CHALWING. Bikini afforded a swimming area, baseball and softball diamonds, horseshoe pits and facilities for other games. Buildings left from Operation CHALWING were repaired and used as clubs, where beer, liquor and soft drinks were available. Ships held barbecues and picnics; on several of these the ship-billy band from CHALWING provided music.

11. Once HVO contaminated Bikini use of the area had to be discontinued. After radiation intensities had decayed enough to permit work on the island for short periods the equipment installed there was recovered, and later returned to CHALWING along with the funds borrowed to finance the venture. Profits from liquor, beer and soft drink sales were more than enough to repay the loan; the excess was distributed among task group units' recreation funds.

12. After the loss of the Bikini recreation area no shore-based recreational facilities on such a scale were again available at Bikini. A small island across the lagoon "cool" enough for occupancy was used briefly for beer and swimming parties. It was heavily contaminated on the third shot. Late in the operation contamination on the desolate tip of Rapa Island was found to be low enough to permit its use by recreation parties. Three tents, and a refrigerator recovered from Bikini Island were installed there. One drowning occurred in the lagoon off this island. Shipboard recreational activity substituted, not too effectively, for the lack of a suitable land area.

13. For the few ships at Eniwetok, CTG 7.2 recreation facilities were made available. Japen Island at Eniwetok, where the Navy re-

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

VI

reaction area was located during operation IVY, was used occasionally by ship's recreation parties. Although no attempt was made to install any facilities there it provided a good location for entertaining and shell hunting.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VII

COMMUNICATIONS

1. The communications facilities of the task group headquarters ashore were fully activated by 21 January 1954, when CWO 7.3 and the remainder of his staff arrived on Larry Island. In addition to the all-day CI and VHF voice circuits operated by flag personnel, the facilities of the CTF 165.1 teletype message center were made available to CWO 7.3, for use in handling inter-staff and out of the area traffic.

2. The major communications training aims during the period CWO 7.3 was ashore were to familiarize Navy communication personnel with both the task group and task force organization; to obtain efficient operation of Navy manned CI and voice circuits, and to accustom naval personnel to the joint communications procedures prescribed for inter task force communications.

3. Good communications between such widely separated but interdependent units of the task group as the security forces, which included VI-27 on Eniwetok (served by joint Navy-Air Force facilities), fighter elements on Eniwetok and Bikini (served respectively by Air Force and Army facilities), surface security elements afloat in ES-2B, and the 7.3 Underwater Detection Unit at Eniwetok (served by Army facilities), required a practical knowledge of traffic routing and local procedures on the part of supervisory and operating personnel. A growing familiarity with task force call signs, an increased understanding of alternate means of communications, and the establishment

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1
FBI

of standard procedures for the handling of routine task group operations, enabled the headquarters and effect communications centers to carry the rapidly increasing volume of traffic prior to D-Day.

4. Assigned to GTO 7.3 was continuous GI contact with all units afloat, including those with a limited number of communications personnel and equipment. Naval Fleet operations did not provide Navy operators with the experience they needed to operate and control successfully, high speed GI circuits like the Task Group GI Circuit, with from 25 to 27 stations on the net. Dispersal of task group units between docks, which precluded extensive use of visual and voice communications, and a reluctance to utilize fully joint ship-shore teletype facilities, resulted in an overload on GI circuits which threatened to break down effective communications between GTO 7.3 and units outside of visual and UHF range. Marked improvement in operator proficiency as a result of experience on the circuits, combined with strict circuit discipline exercised by net control, pooling of the best qualified operators on large ships, and indoctrination of communication officers upon arrival of ships in the area, greatly increased the efficiency of Navy GI circuits.

5. Task Group 7.3 personnel, accustomed to Navy teletype and radio telegraph procedures, encountered some difficulty in using the facilities of other task groups, and with the joint teletype procedures prescribed by GTF 50.3. Basic differences in service operating practices, such as the use of predetermined routing and transfer of traffic from GI to teletype circuits by the Navy, or the use of express

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

VII

handings and procedures adapted to strictly "point-to-point" communications employed by Navy activities, required both experience and coordination on a central level before maximum Navy use of the extensive teletype facilities of the Task Force was effective. Implementation by CTF 7.3 and CTF 7.3 of a standard routing for teletype traffic, reduction in the use of address headers by CTF 7.3 activities, and increased familiarity with joint procedures and the operating practices of the Enliston relay center, increased the efficiency of Navy use of the joint ship-shore teletype network.

6. The tape scrambling crypto devices (Siglet and Hanson systems) installed for joint use at Enliston, Enliston, Enliston, Enliston, and aboard USNS and USNS, proved to have limited use in CTF 7.3 communications. Used successfully by staffs subjected in USNS for "point to point" communication, they appreciably reduced the crypto load at the shipboard terminal. However, messages originated by shore-based commands, addressed to task group units afloat and encrypted by these devices, placed a retransmission responsibility on shipboard relay centers, and thereby increased the workload and overall delivery time. Siglet equipment was not used by CTF 7.3 after he moved to USNS on 6 March.

7. A heavy requirement was placed on the Navy crypto facilities ashore and afloat, by the differences in cryptographic allocations of units under CTF 7.3 operational control. In anticipation of a high percentage of encrypted traffic during COMINT, Navy Class III

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

VII

(machine crypto system) allotments had been obtained for all TG 7.3 ships except the USS H. L. H. ALBATROSS, and Y 5's 39 and 40. ALBATROSS did not arrive in the area until just prior to H. 73. Employment of the YAG's prior to H. 73 was such that mail or guard mail delivery of classified messages was an acceptable alternative to multiple encryptions. After H. 73 the Project 6.4 headquarters on Perry Island accepted communication responsibility for the YAGs when they were in port at Eniwetok, and LARMA acted as guardship for them when they were operating at sea during shore. After H. 73, a class III allotment was placed aboard the ALBATROSS. At no time was UIC 7.3 able to send urgent classified matter simultaneously to all ships in the task group by means of a single machine encrypted message. Unchecked retransmits and additions to the task group continued the necessity of multiple encryption of all messages addressed to "TG 7.3". Incorrect use of Class II cryptosystems by task group units resulted in nine reported incidents involving practices dangerous to security.

2. The passage of time, during which communications procedures for routine TG activities were standardized, the movement of TG 7.3 afloat, and the concentration of ships within visual and voice communicating range at Bikini, all served to increase the efficiency of Army communications. The proximity of KSTW, LARMA, and GUMTAC at Bikini after H. 73 permitted the establishment of AM/EM telephone and teletype nets to serve staffs afloat, which materially reduced requirements placed on the few ship-shore facilities. Use of EM voice nets, and

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

VII

authorization by CIG 7.3 for the transmission of confidential messages in the clear by visual means increased traffic on G. circuits. The centralization of the ship-shore relay function and not control of the task group G. circuit aboard the flagship further reduced relays, and increased ship-shore flexibility.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. A Task Force communications conference was held at CTF SEVEN on 9 February in preparation for the first full scale shot rehearsal. Included in the agenda was a discussion on the handling of high precedence "must" traffic to be originated during shot time, and destined for addressees outside of the JTF SEVEN operating area. It was concluded that all such traffic would be originated on board ships by staffs embarked, and processed through an officer watch established by CTF SEVEN. As a result of this conference, a list was made of all persons throughout the task force authorized to release traffic aboard task group ships. CIG 7.3 promulgated this list and established the policy that commanding officers were not responsible for messages released by passengers or staffs embarked, and sent over circuits officially operated or controlled by such passengers and staffs, or for the classification or contents of messages released by individuals whose names were listed. **BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

10. On 16 February a communications rehearsal involving NSTS, EIGHTH, SEVENTH and SEVEN was conducted by CTF SEVEN concurrently
1. CIG 7.3 instruction 1231.2

~~SECRET~~

VII

with the 70 7.4 air rehearsal in the Rikini area. Air control and ship-shore circuits were activated, in addition to all-normal under-
way circuits. The voice-time announcements originated by the firing party in the Lays Island but or were received and rebroadcast on the UFF administrative net from minus 3 hours to the simulated shot time. These announcements were rebroadcast over ships' public address systems to insure that all participants and observers were prepared for the detonation. BOMBING's and GUNFIRE's homing devices were tested. The Johnston-2-2-2-2-2 circuit was unsatisfactory due to inoperative transmitters at Eniwetok, and the Johnston-Lays ciphony circuit was activated late due to defective crystals. Aircraft communications proved satisfactory. GTO 7.1 desired to conduct further tests of the ciphony and time signals operations, and they were satisfactorily completed on 17-18 February.

11. On 20 February 1954, before the rehearsal of 22-23, GTO 7.3 had shifted his flag from Lays Island to P. I. I. The communications shift was accomplished smoothly, and the task group communications activities on Lays were reduced to one operator running the task group G-1 common, maintained primarily to facilitate contact with GTO 7.3 Liaison Officer at Lays Island.

12. Communications during the 22-23 rehearsal, conducted on 22-23 February, were generally satisfactory. All shipboard circuit terminals were runned continuously for 48 hours while tests were conducted. A heavy load was placed in the task group G-1 common due to

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

VII

the fact that UHF communications were impaired both by unfamiliarity of some units with two force calls and the location of certain ships beyond UHF range at the time. These ships were employed in continued preparations for the actual event, and simulated participation in the rehearsal by transmitting necessary reports. As a result of this rehearsal the shot-time positioning of ships was reconsidered with a view towards improving communications where possible. Ships that had to be outside of UHF range during actual shot operations were directed to maintain voice communications on the ship-shore HF voice frequency. Daily circuit drills on all voice circuits were conducted for several days.

SHOT-TIME COMMUNICATIONS

13. Shot time conditions involved the rapid delivery of high precedence traffic, the reduction of traffic to the absolute minimum required to execute the event, and the provision of maximum flexibility in case of equipment failure or unexpected deployment of task group units. In addition, operations required that the Task Group Commander maintain direct control of individual units and ships rather than exercise control through task unit commanders. Rapid and direct communications with logistics and itinerant ships within range of follow-up was also essential. To meet these requirements, supplementary communications instructions were issued before each shot. The E-10 instructions directed:

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- a. All ships to test all equipment at least 36 hours prior

~~SECRET~~

VII

to check time and notify CIG 7.2 of any inability to carry out that time requirement.

b. All ships to provide continuous guard on the primary tactical and IFF administrative nets, and all ships with two or more operators to guard the IG of course continuously, commencing at 0300 on that day minus two.

c. Activation of all aircraft control circuits by ships involved.

d. Activation of a direct ship-shore (X) circuit between IFF and Radio Room.

14. At 1200 on E1 Y minus three a final check of all circuits was made by all ships. All underway and that time circuits were manned continuously commencing on schedule at 0300 on E1 Y0 minus two. Final tests of voice time broadcasts were received on E1 Y0 minus two at 1215, and tests of radio, vision and signal light and time warnings were completed. At 0300 on E1 Y0 minus one traffic on each group circuits was restricted to that which was absolutely essential and related to the execution of IFF. These restrictions remained in effect until about 1600 on that day.

15. Communications during E1 Y0 were very successful, due primarily to the experience gained during the rehearsal, and the circuit circuits activated subsequently. Excellent preparation execution contributed to the success of IFF communications. Use of previously designated code words, and of an abbreviated plain language system for

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

VII

radius, position, and fellow reports reduced the length of those frequently recurring messages over voice circuit. On the flag ship, the primary tactical and administrative voice circuits terminated in Flag 112, under the control of the staff watch officer, and were immediately accessible to the Task Group Commander. Considerable use of visual communications was made during the hour when the ships remained in formation, on station outside the log on. However, traffic on the task group CTG Common became seriously bogged. No messages of routine precedence or below were passed for approximately 40 hours, and priority traffic was delayed for several hours.

16. Communications for subsequent shots in general followed the pattern established during III 70. There was no necessity for further pre-shot drills and rehearsals of time broadcast and other special signaling; the frequent practice provided sufficient drill. Activation of shot time circuits was deferred until 0700 on minus one day. This shortened the period from 70 to approximately 36 hours when most ships were forced to maintain a watch-in-two among communications. CTRMS, now the flagship, met all the communication requirements imposed by CTG 7.3, but the number of control lines between Main Com and Radio II (4 audio and 5 CT) was a limiting factor in activating any additional circuits. **BEST AVAILABLE COPY**

17. A considerable decrease in traffic during the later shots was evident. In part this was attributable to the teamwork within the task group prior to these shots, and to previous resolution of problems and promulgation of directives. Originators were directed

~~SECRET~~

VII

to reduce dependence on short time messages to an absolute "need to know" basis which reduced delays considerably. Use of a radio controlled firing mechanism allowed LATER necessitated a period of radio silence on all circuits except 275 mms from shot minus 20 minutes until detonation. The only exceptions to this requirement permitted were essential telegraphing signals, voice time broadcasts, traffic on aircraft control circuits and emergency traffic.

MOVEMENT REPORTS

10. Encrypted reports of movements of ships and units within the area constituted a large percentage of traffic during COMINT. To facilitate handling of movement reports, COMINT LATER proposed that they be made unclassified. COMINT did not know. On 30 March, COMINT 7.3 promulgated a series of classified code words for use in movement reports which satisfied the requirement for classified reports, but permitted movement report messages to be transmitted unencrypted. Designated code words, classified Confidential, were substituted for "Location" and "Status" in messages reporting movements between these units, in which no other classified information was included. Special movements continued to be reported in encrypted reports of higher classification. Incorrect usage of several of the code words, especially by linkage with identifying additional information, compromised the original series of code words. Temporarily, movement reports were again classified Confidential and encrypted until the promulgation of more detailed instructions and a new series of code words which was used successfully thereafter.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



1.1

subject to a limit for distribution to ships. After 12:40 and the temporary closing of the United shipping, B-200 continued to act as the receiving and distribution point for mail at Island, but mail was carried between 12:40 and 13:00 by ship. When the United shipping resumed, mail was carried by both air and surface lift. Delivery time of the mail from the United States varied from 7 to 11 days, with occasional delays up to a month from the postmark date.

22. On several occasions during April, it was necessary for CTR 7.3 to exercise control in the island or at Navy Island for a day or two. In each instance, CTR 7.3 administration remained in CTR 7.3. During these periods, all mail was directed to address all messages to both CTR 7.3 and CTR 7.3. Both CTR 7.3 and CTR 7.3 handled all traffic as addressed, thus insuring that all staff members and the Commander would have complete access at all times. This procedure resulted in some duplication of messages but was considered necessary in view of the rapidly changing situation prior to the detection of T-34.

23. The Navy Island communication facility was reactivated on a full time basis on 6 May concurrent with the shifting of the CTR 7.3 flag ashore from CTR 7.3. Although short-time communications were handled aboard CTR 7.3 when B-200 was fired, the shore station remained fully manned until 13:43Z May when the last official message was sent.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



~~SECRET~~

VIII

ROLL-UP

REMARKS

SECRET

1. It had been anticipated that the Task Force roll-up would require the presence of several task group ships for a considerable period after the final shot. However the delays in getting off the shot, the early abandonment and roll-up of shore based activities at Bikini, and the location of the last shot at Eniwetok, all combined to reduce and in effect practically eliminate this requirement. The base at Eniwetok Island, Bikini, was rolled-up before the third shot. Equipment on the other Bikini islands was removed as the operation progressed and it was no longer needed there, until there was very little roll-up left to accomplish after I-505. When the task group headquarters moved to Eniwetok for the last shot, B-100, B-101, B-102 and B-103 remained behind to support the final roll-up, assisted by other task group units. Before the weather permitted B-105 to be fired the Bikini roll-up was substantially complete, with the last load standing by to be loaded aboard B-105. Some non-hazardous material was left at Bikini for recovery in future months after radioactive contamination levels decayed sufficiently to permit extensive work on the "hot" islands.

REMARKS

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

2. The Task Force and other task groups required little Navy assistance in support of roll-up activities at Eniwetok, since the base there is a permanent one. In general ships returned to the

~~SECRET~~

VIII

United States with the same non-consumable material they brought to the area. GROUP 1 carried the A-1 test material and device spares for return to the A-1. 3 M 10 lifted short range Air Force aircraft and T-10 trainers. AIRLIFT carried a small number of personnel; but passenger capacity was only partially used since most personnel of other groups returned to the United States by air.

MOVING THE TRUCKS

3. The roll-up of the Air Force Test Group's supplies, weather stations was accomplished by L-1 551 and B-100 G. W. B-100 G. W. rolled-up the long-trail station. In establishing this station in January L-1 551 had received various damage in beaching, and the L-1's experience, plus a naval survey conducted after T-1000 led to the conclusion that beaching there by an L-1 was impractical. Roll-up part of the task by L-100s escorted by an L-1F was contemplated, but, as the shot schedule worked out, B-100 G. W. became available to do the job. Air Force material on the base island at Eniwetok included an eleven ton trailer, an imperative B-100, radio equipment and other instruments, a fresh water distillation unit, refrigerator, a forklift truck and a number of helium cylinders. There also was a Project 6.6 ionospheric recording station with another eleven ton trailer, a two and a half ton power unit and miscellaneous equipment. Much of the island surface was soft sand, making the moving job difficult. B-100 G. W. took about two Navy L-100s, one Holmes and Narver L-100, trucks and moving and lifting equipment, and with Air Force and Scientific personnel aboard to assist in the task, left for Eniwetok on 14 May.

VIII

There the equipment was moved to the beach, loaded in the LCCs which were in turn loaded in BRIS on the well, and returned to the beach for declassification and further shipment. Roll-up of the other three weather stations, at Makura, Nuanetsi and Lomphe, was accomplished by LST 551 enroute to Pearl Harbor. The LST beached at these abodes without difficulty.

Task Group 7.3

4. The Task Group 7.3 roll-up was largely a self-contained operation. The only material left in the forward area was the under-water detection installation at Amvetok. The underwater system and hydrophones were left in place; equipment above water was dismantled and left in caretaker status. Underwater Detection Unit supplies and spare parts were loaded in BR 15 GARD with the Boat Pool equipment. Special equipment that had been installed in ships in the forward area, including such voice radio equipment that had been loaned to the Navy by other task groups or installed in ships for use by scientific or base facility's personnel, was removed and returned to its owners before ships left the area. Special equipment installations that had been made in naval shipyards prior to GUTAL, including the extensive communication installation in LST-10, were scheduled for removal when ships reached their home yards. The only ship to retain her special equipment was GUT-10, since she was already slated for employment in Operation HIG 11. Ships were instructed to remove their LST-10 designed workload gear, reconnaissance kit, survey unusable articles

~~SECRET~~

VN2

and ship it to Naval Medical Research Laboratory in San Francisco
for return to USNHC custody

5. The return of ships and aircraft to their bases accomplished
almost all of the task group personnel redeployment, since most of the
over 600 naval personnel who participated in GUNLINE were members of
ships' crews. B-1113 returned with her assigned Marine helicopter
squadron and fighter detachment aboard. B-1114 (CV) transported
back home personnel. Fleet enlisted personnel who remained aboard
ship throughout the operation returned to the West Coast in GUNLINE.
Staff personnel who were transferred ashore to Perry Island when
the headquarters was reestablished there after GUNLINE were redeployed
by air, along with USN personnel. W-29 flight crews returned to the
United States with their aircraft; ground personnel and equipment
gear were returned by fleet logistics flights and USN scheduled
surface lift.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

213

~~SECRET~~

II

REMOVAL OF THE

1. The redeployment of task group units was accomplished very expeditiously. The last shot in the C-70 series, HST 7, was fired at Eniwetok on 14 May. On 16 May, HST 7, plus four days, the last ships sailed for home, with the exception of the Atomic Warhead Contamination Unit, YAGs 37 and 41, and HST 11. They remained at Eniwetok an additional week, working to reduce the contamination on YAG 41 to levels low enough to permit her to sail for Pearl Harbor with a crew aboard.

REMOVAL OF THE

2. Three units had left the task group early in the operation. On 23 February, prior to the first shot, HST 825 completed approximately two weeks duty in C-70 as a temporary replacement for HST 451 and sailed for the far east. On 16 March, HST 7, relieved by HST 11202 because of her urgent need for hull repairs, sailed for Pearl Harbor. HST 11245, temporary relief for HST 762 while the 762 effected repairs at Eniwetok, departed for Pearl Harbor on 4 April.

3. The next ship to be released was HST 762. She reported in the forward area early in the C-70 buildup period on 13 July 1953 and under the operational control of HST 7.2, supported the establishment of the Bikini site. On 12 April shortly after completion of the period of support provided by the temporary assignment of HST 11245 she suffered a major casualty, fracture of a main propulsion shaft.

II

Repairs could not be effected in the forward area. The resultant loss of speed and maneuverability virtually eliminated her further usefulness to the task group. For a few days prior to ~~ENTER~~ she towed the ~~ENTER~~ site at ~~ENTER~~, assisting the scientific personnel engaged there in preparing for the ~~ENTER~~ test. By the time ~~ENTER~~ was fired work on ~~ENTER~~ had progressed to the point where an ~~ENTER~~ could take over the shot site support duties. ~~ENTER~~ 5.5 provided and ~~ENTER~~ for the purpose, and arrangements were completed to release ~~ENTER~~ 762 from the task group and assist her to Pearl Harbor. On one engine she could make a maximum speed of only 4.6 knots; at that speed was had difficulty holding her bow into a head sea. Since she would have to hold into the sea during the entire voyage, another ~~ENTER~~, enroute from the western Pacific, was ordered by ~~ENTER~~ to rendezvous with 762 between Eniwetok and Pearl Harbor and serve as escort. The rendezvous was effected, ~~ENTER~~ 975 joined 762, took her in tow to assist in holding her bow into the sea, and the rice voyage to Hawaii continued. On 6 May, approximately 75 miles east of Eikini, both ~~ENTER~~s were slightly contaminated by radioactive fallout from ~~ENTER~~, averaging about 2. m/m. Both ships effected decontamination before their arrival at Pearl Harbor.

4. Next to leave were the ~~ENTER~~ and ~~ENTER~~. They had been ordered to the task group for the specific purpose of supporting the Bureau of Ordnance's mining project, ~~ENTER~~. Since they had placed all their experimental mines in position on ~~ENTER~~, their mission was completed when they had completed recovery of the mine after the

blast. All survivors except the first one, nearest the zero point, were recovered by 3 May, and the two ships were released from the task group. ²YAMAGUCHI's early departure was desirable because she was due in the Far East to relieve a ship scheduled for rotation. She sailed from FUKUOKA 4 May for OSONO. At COMNAVSTA's request she was diverted from a stop at OSONO, but for three days followed the original routing and arrived at the request of COM 7.3 to keep clear of radioactive fallout from BIKINI. She departed FUKUOKA the afternoon of 3 May with her first scheduled stop at Eniwetok for fuel. While there she was assigned briefly to a SAM mission, joining the successful search for another missing British aircraft on 5 May, and then proceeded on to her base at Pearl Harbor. LST 1157, the third ship in this task element, remained behind to assist in the recovery.

5. PC 1515 completed her participation in Operation CASTLE at Eniwetok Atoll on 5 May, with YAMAGUCHI the last ship in which she took part. Commanding with the third shot, KIKU, the PC had been stationed in the atoll area to the east of BIKINI at that time, on varying missions. On both BIKINI and YAMAGUCHI she was at Eniwetok with Air Force weather station and scientific project personnel aboard. This atoll, evacuated because of radioactive contamination after BIKINI-10⁹ was still too "hot" for personnel to live ashore. Since weather data from Eniwetok was vital, the station was operated by personnel who lived aboard the PC and went ashore periodically to take readings. On YAMAGUCHI, personnel of Project 6.6, operating an ionospheric recording

BEST AVAILABLE COPY²
215




station (shore), were also about. After 1 AMM was fired on 5 May, IC 1516 proceeded to Eniwetok where CDR 7.3 relinquished her operational control. The distribution of her Air Force and Project 6.6 passengers there. After participating with CDR in the search for the missing British aircraft she departed for her base at Pearl Harbor.

OPERATION 6

6. With 1 AMM fired, test operations at Bikini Atoll were ended, and ships not required for rollout or for 1 AMM were released. On 9 May 21 AMM, her mission completed, and the new experimental helicopter landing barge, YAG 9, in tow and departed Bikini for Pearl Harbor, where she was overhauled for shipment overseas commencing 15 May. She was followed four days later on 12 May, by AMM 12. On 13 May AMM 12 left Bikini for Pearl Harbor with IC 1516 in tow.

OPERATION 7

7. There were no further departures prior to the detection of 1 AMM at Eniwetok 24 May. Starting on that date, ships left Eniwetok until by 19 May the only ships remaining in the forward area were the YAGs and LSTs. Six ships sailed from Eniwetok the day the last shot was fired. AMM 12 and CDR 12 departed for San Francisco in company. It had been decided by CDR 12 that the security measures taken on CDR 12's outward voyage in company, anti-submarine escort, partial air cover and assignment of radio silence and dark code ship, were not required for her return. With her partial code of 120



SECRET

1.

and while it was required only that she be ready, sailed to San Francisco by another surface vessel. LSTW was assigned. The two ships were formed into a task unit with Commanding Officer, LSTW the officer in tactical command, and completed the voyage without incident. LSTWIS discharged her cargo at the Naval Magazine, Port San Diego and at Naval Supply Center, San Diego, while LSTW continued on to San Diego to prepare for deployment to the Far East. LSTW arrived at Eniwetok from Hawaii on 13 May, and shed 9 cabin and 197 troop class passengers and departed on the 14th for San Francisco. She was routed via Pearl Harbor where she reported to Naval LSTO employment for the remainder of the voyage. Three LSTs of Naval Reserve Division TWENTY, LSTW, LSTWIS, LSTWIS and LSTWIS with the division commander in command, sailed from Eniwetok the 14th. They made round port stopping off Eniwetok with the fourth ship of the division, LSTWIS, and called for Pearl Harbor to prepare for deployment to the Far East.

2. On 15 May LSTWIS completed her tasks at Eniwetok and Eniwetok and sailed for Majalein. Prior to her departure she loaded two boat pool LSTs for return to San Diego, the equipment from the navy recreation island at Eniwetok for return to GUMPERT, and building material provided by GUMPERT SEVEN for the construction of living quarters for the natives who had been evacuated from Eniwetok. The natives were to be re-settled temporarily on another atoll since Eniwetok

215

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

was expected to arrive at San Diego for several months. Upon her arrival at San Diego on 17 May 1957 reported to Commander, Naval Station San Diego to return the ship's crew to their homes and families, and the ship's crew to their new duty.

2. On 16 May 1957, completed loading her V-5 defense unit, the Air Force fighter planes, helicopters and L-19s, and with 7 cabin and 46 troop class passengers, considerable Air Force cargo and 70 T-1 trailers aboard, sailed for San Diego. On 17 May 1957 551 departed for Pearl Harbor via Honolulu, Papeete and Majuro, where she rolled up the JRF-100 weather stations. From Pearl Harbor she was ordered to collect. It collected the official weather at these personnel and gear, then sailed for San Diego, the Panama Canal, Norfolk and her return to the Atlantic Fleet.

3. On 20 May 1957 551 took her departure. After 551 551 also had remained at San Diego with the fleet pool until operations there were very nearly rolled up. On 22 May she turned the fleet pool over to 157 1157 temporarily, loaded 2 L-19s, and cargo for Holmes and Harver and proceeded to Eniwetok. Arriving there on the 15th, she offloaded her cargo, took aboard an additional L-19 plus a caterpillar tractor, crane and truck and left for Majuro to rollup the weather station and ionospheric observation equipment there. She returned to Eniwetok on the 6th of May, offloaded the ionospheric equipment, took aboard the fleet pool boats, gear and personnel at both Eniwetok and Eniwetok, the ionospheric observation unit equipment and left in place or in caretaker

SECRET

15

— 414 —

2

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

25

[REDACTED]

10/10/1965

10/10/1965

General Situation Status
Following Operations
Flight - Aircraft Operations
Initial Operations (Emergency Operations)
Final Operations
Radio and Communication of ships
Radio and Communication of aircraft
Radio and
Inter-ship surface lift
Communication Traffic Analysis
Radio
Status of Aircraft

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

[REDACTED]

[illegible]

* All personnel hold Internal Security Clearance or Access to Secret
Security Ranks of National Agency Grade

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

1

FLIGHT OPERATIONS

10/1/54

10/1/54

	10/1/54	10/2/54	10/3/54	10/4/54
Aircraft assigned	12	11	11	11.3
Average in commission	11.7	10.3	9.4	10.1
Percent aircraft available	97.5	93.6	94.9	95.3
Flights	2123	730	215	2170
Passengers	915	733.6	211.6	2127.2
Passengers carried	612	4767	612	17673
Cargo (pounds)	74555	21555	41555	117555
Accidents	1	0	0	1
Controlled	1	0	0	1

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

22

~~SECRET~~

X

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

	Jan/Feb	March	April/May	Total/Average
Aircraft assigned	6	6	6	6
Aircraft available	4.62	5	4.17	4.5
Percent aircraft available	77 %	83 %	69.5 %	75 %
Flights	250	81	74	305
Hours	157.9	119	110.7	377.6
Accidents	0	1*	0	1
Incidents	4	0	0	4

* On 11-21-57, a one wheel landing under ATOL conditions as the result of the fractured hydraulic lines. Cause of damage repaired with no injuries to the pilot.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

100-100000

ITEM	QUANTITY	UNIT PRICE	TOTAL PRICE	TOTAL PRICE
ONE & HALF	22	52.6	4.2	46.4
ONE	53	577.3	275.4	222.9
ONE	27	117.5	1.9	175.6
ONE	23	277.2	154.9	122.2
ONE	72	712.5	274.0	450.5
ONE	4	31.6	1.7	34.9
ONE	2	12.7	0.0	24.7
ONE	6	66.3	2.8	62.5
ONE	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	235	1712.6	725.9	2172.7

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

33	11.15	107	51.70	191	617	160.60	2810	209	205.0	703
34	640	220	71.00	233	510	115.50	2771	92	60.0	279
35	921	122	100.5	165	632	67.00	1779	177	63.5	123
36	1210	134	11.0	230	945	127.60	2049	170	117.5	191
37	471	296	2.0	203	171	1.00	207	4		14
38	1009	209	50.5	202	603	124.25	2005	101	201.0	245
39	724	113	21.00	262	469	26.50	2621	151	75.5	410
40	550	103	1.50	207	357	61.00	2209	95	112.0	93
41	937	175	60.50	421	649	60.50	2221	121	175.0	211
42	1359	221	75.50	700	670	170.25	2250	245	270.5	203
43	675	145	43.00	441	521	121.0	2215	206	212.5	477
44	1031	7		6	907	117.00	2573	104	144.5	101
45	752	62	33.25	109	614	12.00	1047	76	100.0	111
46	700	306	22.00	938	200	35.00	1207	114	227.5	237
47	063	116	9.70	261	442	48.30	2072	375	270.5	1093
48	601	62	14.00	112	422	42.50	2001	202	152.2	231
49	1164	2136	629.45	5915	2121	1012.60	2770	207	259.00	4700

~~SECRET~~

1

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

Continuation of ships at short time of release from Operation CANT

SHIP	TIME AT SEA	TIME IN PORT	DATE	TIME
	15/12	15/12		
1000	1.5	1.0	14 May	11 May
1001	1.0		14 May	11 May
1002	1.5		14 May	11 May
1003	6		14 May	11 May
1004	.0	.2	14 May	11 May
1005	3	Less than 1	14 May	11 May
1006	1.1	.4	14 May	11 May
1007	0	0	14 May	11 May
1008	.4	.6	14 May	11 May
1009	.3		7 May	9 May
1010	1.5	1.0	14 May	11 May
1011	20	Less than 1	14 May	11 May
1012	15	1	14 May	11 May
1013	30	.2	14 May	11 May
1014	.1		14 May	11 May
1015	17	1	14 May	11 May
1016	1.2	.2	14 May	8 May
1017		Less than 1	14 May	7 May
1018	0	0	14 May	16 May
1019			Continued after	
1020			being released from	
1021			to 7.3 on 14 May	8 May
1022			14 May	17 May
1023		Less than 1	14 May	17 May
1024	20	6	14 May	11 May
1025	110	35	14 May	11 May
1026	130	35	14 May	11 May
1027	110	30	14 May	11 May
1028	35	12	14 May	11 May
1029	0	0	14 May	16 May
1030		30	14 May	16 May
1031	90		14 May	11 May
1032	0	6	14 May	11 May
1033	0	0	14 May	11 May
1034	0	0	14 May	11 May

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

1



SECRET

<u>PLANT</u>	<u>HEIGHT</u>	<u>WIDTH</u>	<u>DEPTH</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>
121544	1.4	4.2	.8	1.5
121546	1.5	3	.7	1.4
121547	.4	1.5	.2	.6
121549	0	1	0	.6
121541	1.5	1.9	.2	.7
121543	.6	2.3	.4	.6
121542	4.7	4.9	2.5	1.3
121545	.3	1	.15	.4
121538	.9	2	.4	.7
121540	.2	1.2	.15	.5
121542	.2	1.5	.15	.4
121542	.35	3	.15	1.5

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

100-1000

TABLE OF CORRELATION BETWEEN 1950-51 AND 1951-52										
UNIT	0.0 to 0.999	1.0 to 1.999	2.0 to 2.999	3.0 to 3.999	4.0 to 4.999	5.0 to 5.999	6.0 to 6.999	7.0 to 7.999	8.0 to 8.999	9.0 to 9.999
TO 7.3 START	10	67	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
100-1000	412(-44)	208(-19)	67(-22)	50(-21)	67(-21)	5	1	1	1	1
100-1000	73(-7)	10(-1)	10(-1)	15(-4)	11(-5)	2(-1)				
100-1000	62(-6)									
100-1000	324(-25)									
100-1000	114(-22)									
100-1000	4(-1)									
100-1000	36	376	157(-13)	17(-14)	11(-15)	7				
100-1000	76	272(-2)	21	20	13	6	1	1	1	4
100-1000	103(-42)	77	50	31						
100-1000	124 (-49)	26	103	67	32	2	1			
100-1000	191 (-55)	80(-73)	7(-7)							
100-1000	267 (-1)	30	1	1						
100-1000	221 (-1)	36	6							
100-1000	289 (-27)	13(-11)	1							
100-1000	33 (-2)	32	29	1						
100-1000	63 (-2)	9								
100-1000	93									
100-1000	21 (-56)	35(-33)	14(-14)	1(-1)	3(-3)	3(-3)		1(-1)		
100-1000	65	12								
100-1000	62 (-2)	5								
100-1000	76 (-1)	1								
100-1000	13 (-24)	12(-17)	15(-13)	8(-1)						
100-1000	157 (-37)	22(-10)								
100-1000	12 (-26)	5(-4)	6	5(-3)	4(-14)	1(-1)	5(-5)	5(-5)	8(-5)	
100-1000	7 (-5)	4 (-11)	9(-10)	7(-5)	14(-12)	6(-5)	1(-1)	2(-1)	1(-1)	
100-1000	22									
100-1000	0									
100-1000	8									
100-1000	14 (-24)	1096 (-23)	1475	244	150	257	0.50	0.15	0.15	0.22
100-1000	354	1096	1475	244	150	257	0.50	0.15	0.15	0.22
100-1000	59.34	24.77	5.50	4.00	2.57	0.50	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.22
100-1000	59.34	24.77	5.50	4.00	2.57	0.50	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.22

SECRET

1

1942-1943

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	<u>1/7 6 10 11 12 3</u>
1 1 7 52	1 Jan	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	512
1 1 7 52	3 Jan	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	448
1 1 7 52	7 Jan	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	474
1 1 7 52	10 Jan	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	505
1 1 7 52	13 Jan	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	453
1 1 7 52	16 Jan	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	524
1 1 7 52	22 Jan	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	471
1 1 7 52	25 Jan	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	475
1 1 7 52	4 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	450
1 1 7 52	7 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	160
1 1 7 52	9 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	562
1 1 7 52	12 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	63
1 1 7 52	20 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	125
1 1 7 52	20 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	172
1 1 7 52	21 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	748
1 1 7 52	21 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	675
1 1 7 52	23 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	54
1 1 7 52	23 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	740
1 1 7 52	25 Feb	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	574
1 1 7 52	2 Mar	Enlistok	Enlistok	-	104
1 1 7 52	3 Mar	Enlistok	Enlistok	31	37
1 1 7 52	4 Mar	Enlistok	Enlistok	107	5

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

SECRET


X

Summary of Personnel (continued)

NAME	DATE	STATUS	TYPE	REMARKS	1/2 CONTINUED
LTJ 702	5 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	- 9	112
LTJ 100	5 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	20	-
LTJ 101	5 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	19	20
LTJ 102	6 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	17	-
LTJ 103	7 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	13	-
LTJ 104	8 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	45	-
LTJ 105	8 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	22	-
LTJ 106	8 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	32	-
LTJ 107	9 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	16	-
LTJ 108	10 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	27	-
LTJ 109	10 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	20	-
LTJ 351	11 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	22	10
LTJ 702	11 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	33	3
LTJ 100	11 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	27	-
LTJ 101	11 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	22	-
LTJ 702	13 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	6	745
LTJ 551	13 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	3	73
LTJ 100	13 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	43	3
LTJ 551	14 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	-	63
LTJ 11/5	14 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	-	127
LTJ 702	15 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	6	-
LTJ 702	16 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	-	115
LTJ 551	17 Mar	Enlisted	Enlisted	9	103

SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



2

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (continued)

NAME	DATE	TIME	52	INTERVIEW	INTERVIEW
1ST 1145	16 Mar	Interview	Interview	1	-
1ST 1145	17 Mar	Interview	Interview	2	5
1ST 551	19 Mar	Interview	Interview	2	121
1ST 1145	20 Mar	Interview	Interview	-	120
1ST 1145	23 Mar	Interview	Interview	-	2
1ST 551	23 Mar	Interview	Interview	5	190
1ST 1145	25 Mar	Interview	Interview	-	25
1ST 1145	27 Mar	Interview	Interview	21	-
1ST 1145	28 Mar	Interview	Interview	-	207
1ST 1145	29 Mar	Interview	Interview	-	110
1ST 1145	29 Mar	Interview	Interview	12	50
1ST 551	30 Mar	Interview	Interview	3	1
1ST 1145	31 Mar	Interview	Interview	17	-
1ST 1145	31 Mar	Interview	Interview	10	-
1ST 1145	31 Mar	Interview	Interview	10	60
1ST 551	2 Apr	Interview	Interview	-	155
1ST 1145	2 Apr	Interview	Interview	7	153
1ST 1145	3 Apr	Interview	Interview	4	-
1ST 762	7 Apr	Interview	Interview	32	72
1ST 1145	8 Apr	Interview	Interview	7	375
1ST 1145	8 Apr	Interview	Interview	90	-
1ST 1145	9 Apr	Interview	Interview	4	1
1ST 1145	9 Apr	Interview	Interview	20	31



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

X

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE LIST (cont.)

NAME	DATE	TIME	IN	P. S. NUMBER	P. S. COMMENTS
ALLEN, JOHN	21 Apr	Initial	Interview	102	2
ALLEN, JOHN	22 Apr	Interview	Initial	-	7
ALLEN, JOHN	23 Apr	Interview	Interview	1	57
ALLEN, JOHN	24 Apr	Interview	Interview	19	-
ALLEN, JOHN	25 Apr	Interview	Interview	5	-
ALLEN, JOHN	26 Apr	Interview	Interview	-	1
ALLEN, JOHN	27 Apr	Interview	Interview	5	-
ALLEN, JOHN	28 Apr	Interview	Interview	4	-
ALLEN, JOHN	29 Apr	Interview	Interview	18	9
ALLEN, JOHN	30 Apr	Interview	Interview	-	75
ALLEN, JOHN	31 Apr	Interview	Interview	-	1
ALLEN, JOHN	2 May	Interview	Interview	21	22
ALLEN, JOHN	3 May	Interview	Interview	43	2
ALLEN, JOHN	4 May	Interview	Interview	24	-
ALLEN, JOHN	5 May	Interview	Interview	14	103
ALLEN, JOHN	6 May	Interview	Interview	-	5
ALLEN, JOHN	7 May	Interview	Interview	-	87
ALLEN, JOHN	8 May	Interview	Interview	3	81
ALLEN, JOHN	9 May	Interview	Interview	2	4
ALLEN, JOHN	10 May	Interview	Interview	9	-
TOTAL				1,359	12,500

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

I

ANNUAL REPORT 1955

Page 1

Page 1


Income	200
Expenses	200
Total	200

Daily Average Income	62
Daily Average Expenses	46

Capitalized Income	11 8
------------------------------	------

Net Income	80 7
Operational Income	15.1 2
Profitability	4.3 5
Debtors and Equity	4.3 5

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



I

CONTS

2.2 - 15 JUL 1954

Travel and Per Diem	623,715.00
Telephone and Utilities	none
Military Pay	1,223,771.00
Office Supplies	5,627.00
Alterations of Ships	28,000.00
Biological Defense	400.00
Land Improvement	none
Buy Project (Coast Guard)	none
Documentary Photography	none
Transportation of Supplies	315.00
General Stores for Ships	25,111.00
Fuel and Oils	150,127.00
Provisions (Food), General Stores	32,229.00
Habilitation of Y-29 living quarters	17,000.00
	<u>2,501,625.00</u>

2.2 - 15 JUL 1954

Travel and Per Diem	55,000.00
Telephone and Utilities	3,500.00
Military Pay	4,700,000.00
Office Supplies	8,000.00
Alterations of Ships	115,000.00
Biological Defense	12,000.00
Land Improvement	4,500.00
Buy Project (Coast Guard)	12,000.00
Documentary Photography	2,700.00
Transportation of Supplies	700.00
General Stores for Ships	45,111.00
Fuel and Oils for Ships	623,555.00
Provisions (General Stores)	60,171.00
Habilitation of Y-29 living quarters	<u>17,000.00</u>

GRAND TOTAL 7,227,770.00

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



I

STATE OF NEW YORK - DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

1974-1975

STATE OF NEW YORK - DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>1974-1975</u>	<u>1975-1976</u>	<u>1976-1977</u>	<u>1977-1978</u>
Travel	61,000	59,277.67	21,429.63	1,720.23
Transportation of Things	1,000	700.		30.00
Communications	2,000			2,000.
Task Group Overhead	400	300.		100.
Modification of Ships	115,200	65,200.	65,200.	30,000.
Land Improvement	4,000	4,500		
Documentary Photography	3,000	2,700	125.25	300.
Historical Reference	13,300	13,000	11,600.	300.
Emergency Project (Coast Guard)	15.00	20.00	10.00.	
TOTAL	232,400	177,607.67	125,024.88	34,780.23

Note 1: \$4,710.23 of the unobligated balance returned to GTF SEWER on 31 May 1974 as excess to Task Group 7.3 requirements.

STATE OF NEW YORK - DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
1974-1975 (1974-1975) 1975-1976 (1975-1976)

Received	4,000.
Obligated	200.
Expended	4,200.
Unobligated Balance	400.

STATE OF NEW YORK - DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
1976-1977 (1976-1977) 1977-1978 (1977-1978)

Received	165,000.00
Obligated	1,525.00
Expended	162,419.55
Unobligated Balance	755.45

Note 2: This allotment will be reported to GTF SEWER by Bunkips and is not reflected in GTF 7.3 Cost Report

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

XI

PERSONNEL ROSTER

Commander and Staff of Task Group 7.3

REAR ADMIRAL F. C. Triton, USN
CAPT E. D. Butterford, USN
LCDR E. F. Tilden, USN

Commander
Chief of Staff
Flag Lieutenant & Aide

T-1

LCDR A. C. Truere, USN
R. C. E. Tilden, USN

Flag Secretary
Personal Officer

T-2

CDR P. A. Klare, USN

Intelligence-Security

T-3

CDR W. S. Schmidtling, USN
CDR W. A. Clark, USN
LCDR E. A. Richter, USN
LCDR L. I. Teten, USN
LCDR C. P. Carlson, USN
Mr. Seymour Gordon

Plans & Operations
Asst. P & O (Air)
Asst. P & O (Atomic Defense)
Asst. P & O (Asst Atomic Defense)
Medical Officer
Civilian Consultant on
Radiological Defense

T-4

CDR E. Montecchi, USN
CDR F. I. Blair, Jr., USN

Logistics Officer
Supply Officer

T-5

LCDR J. E. Johnson, Jr., USN
LCDR E. C. Yelverton, Jr., USN
LTJG A. E. Sears, USN
LTJG J. D. Engels, USN

Communications Officer
Asst Comm Officer
Asst Comm Officer
Asst Comm Officer

Flag Allowance, Task Group 7.3

T-1

GARDNER, James E., Y12
FILLARD, George E., SF
HILL, Jack A., Y12
HAYES, Joseph E., Y12

HAYES, Alan C., Y12
JONES, Thurman D., SF
TUMMISON, James E., Y12
WILLIAMS, Charles E., Y1

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

X1

X-2

THOMPSON, Clyde, YN2

X-3

BRADY III, John P., Jr., E1
WRIGHT, Linda M., YN2
KOOT, James P., E13

TROBENSTON, Edward J., YN2
FRASER, Noah P., Jr., E1
VALLEY, Martin L., C13

X-4

SMITH, Carroll A., YN1

SMITH, Robert L., E10

X-5

SMITH, Paul P., E1

CHANDLER, Sanford A., E10

Admiral's Barge Crew

JOHN, Francis E., E1
SMITH, (son P.), E13

THOMAS, Samuel (n), E1
VAN ECKHART, Bruce P., E1

Staff C13 Crew

SMITH, Stanley P., E13
SMITH, Myron P., E12

WRIGHT, David L., E1

Stewards

BROOK, James P., E1
SMITH, Eric P., E12
CROMBIE, Jose C., E13
FLORES, Johnny C., E10

PERRY, Canoto P., E1
FACCHINI, Raphaelo P., E12
PARRIN, Robert (n), E1
VIRSOZA, Aureliano (n), E13

Communications Personnel

BALDWIN, Joseph (n), E13
BARRINGTON, George E., E12
CHAPMAN, George P., E10
DALRYMPLE, Keith V., E10
FOLWELL, John E., Jr., E12
SMITH, Edward J., E12
HARRISON, Ashmore P., E12
FISCHER, Freddy J., E13

RAUSTON, Billy J., E13
HUGHES, Jack P., E13
SMITH, Kenneth P., E10
TAN BORN, James P., E13
TAN SMITH, Charles C., E10
VORCE, Donald C., E12
VORCE, George C., Jr., E12
WINTER, Robert P., E12

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

II

Quartermasters

KINGMAN, Walter J., CM1
MC LEAN, Lawrence E., CM3

PAULSON, Roger L., CM1

Task Group 7.3 Boat Pool Officers

LT E. P. Watkins, USN
LMSG C. A. Filucio, USNR
CHESON F. J. Cook, Jr., USN
GRAND E. P. Ross, USN

Officer in Charge
Asst Officer in Charge
Asst Officer in Charge
Asst Officer in Charge

Task Group 7.3 Underwater Detection Unit

LT E. Pursetto, USNR

Officer in Charge

Task Group 7.3 Project 1.4 Aviation Unit

LCMR W. R. Hahn, USN
LMSG C. F. Cook, USN
LMSG E. L. Carlson, USN

Patrol Plane Commander
Co-Pilot
Navigator

Task Group 7.3 Project 6.4 Aviation Unit

LT Roy Borgstrom, Jr., USNR
LMSG J. A. Rora, USN
LMSG John F. Scholfield, USNR

Patrol Plane Commander
Navigator
Co-Pilot

Ships and Units

CAPE J. F. Waterhouse, USN
CAPT E. C. Fairbro, USN
CAPT E. L. C. Jones, USN
CAPT C. G. Holmby, USN
CAPT J. T. Smith, USN
Captain C. W. Hutcherson,
U.S. Merchant Marine
CDR E. E. Davis, Jr., USN
CDR G. W. Albin, Jr., USN
CDR L. E. Alford, USN
CDR C. C. Lowe, USN
CDR J. W. Reed, USN
CDR W. Arnold, USN
LCMR E. K. Smith, USN
LCMR E. L. Ansell, Jr., USN
LCMR J. F. Mangerton, USN
LCMR L. Jones, USN
LCMR E. S. Scott, Jr., USNR

CG, USS ESTER (AGC-12)
CG, USS BARKER (CVN-115)
CG, USS CURE (AV-4)
Commander Task Unit 7.3.6
ComfortMeat 12
Master, USS YARD C. AINSWORTH
(5-11-101)
CG, USS KENTON (FFC-719)
CG, USS PAULIN (DDC-495)
CG, USS KIRKMAN (DDC-499)
CG, USS BULLY GROVE (LSD-2)
CG, USS SPZA (DD-30)
CG, Patrol Squadron 20
CG, USS BUCKLEUP (ATF-42)
Cint, YAG-39
Cint, YAG-40
CG, USS KIRKMAN (ATF-2)
CG, USS LST 1157

~~SECRET~~

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

LT V. C. Wilson, USN
 LT E. F. Bond, USN
 LT K. M. Laughran, USN
 LT E. J. Casey, USN
 LT V. E. Irocks, USN
 LT T. P. Lurtz, USN
 LT E. C. Wilson, USN
 LT J. C. Scholtz, USN
 LT E. A. Fowler, USN
 LT E. O. Karsenbach, USN
 LT E. F. Corloughouse, USN

CO, USS COTTONA (ATF-101)
 CO, USS DELILA (ATF-106)
 CO, USS LST 525
 CO, USS APACHE (ATF-67)
 CINC, JTFM-ONE
 CO, USS EIGHT (ATF-75)
 CO, USS GYREX (AFM-1)
 CO, USS LST 762
 CO, USS TAWAGHI (ATF-114)
 CO, USS LST 551
 CO, USS PC 1546

BEST AVAILABLE COPY